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HomeMy WebLinkAbout00-1537 CriminalCOMMONWEALTH V. DONTAE CHAhdBERS IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO. 2000-1537 CRIMINAL TERM IN RE: OPINION PURSUANT TO Pa. R.A.P. 1925 Guido, J., September ,2002 After a trial by jury, the defendant was convicted of second degree murder and various other charges in connection with the killing of Shippensburg University student Sydney Bull. On February 19, 2002, he was sentenced to a mandatory term of life imprisonment on the murder charge. ~ He filed post sentence motions which were denied. This timely appeal followed. In his statement of matters complained of on appeal, defendant raises the following issues: (1.) We erred in failing to suppress the statements he made to the police. (2.) We erred in our charge to the jury. (3.) The verdict was based upon insufficient evidence or, in the alternative, was against the weight of the evidence. We will address each issue in the opinions that follows. Suppression of Statements. The defendant filed an omnibus pretrial motion in which he sought, inter alia, to suppress numerous statements he had made to the police. Evidentiary hearings on the ~ He received concurrent sentences of varying length on the related charges. NO. 2000-1537 CRIMINAL TERM motion were held before us on October 8 and October 9, 2001. On appeal he alleges that we erred in failing to suppress those statements "because defendant's confession was the product of oppressive police interrogation and as a result, the waiver of his Miranda warnings was not made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.''2 The following facts were established at the evidentiary hearings. The Pennsylvania State Police were investigating the gruesome murder of a Shippensburg University student. A throng of troopers had been assigned to the investigation. Approximately six weeks after the murder, two of those troopers, Leydig and Covington, were dispatched to interview the defendant and his brother regarding information they might have about the local drug trade.3 They showed a group of photos to the defendant's brother. After interviewing him, they requested to speak with the defendant. The defendant spoke with the police outside his home.4 Neither trooper was in uniform. The defendant was not in custody and his participation in the interview was completely voluntary. The defendant identified some of the pictures, including those of Matthew Norris and Emmit Lockhart.5 He provided some background information to the police, but denied knowing anything about who killed Sydney Bull. Before leaving, the troopers talked to the defendant's parents. His mother felt that he was afraid of something. His father said that he might know more about the murder then he had shared with the police. The troopers suggested that their son talk with other : "Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal", paragraph 1. ~ During the course of the investigation, the police had begun to suspect that the murder may have been drug related. 4 The defendant had turned 18 about a month prior to the interview. s These two were eventually charged as co-defendants in connection with the murder. 2 NO. 2000-1537 CRIMINAL TERM investigators at the police station. Several hours later, at about 4:00 p.m., on June 8, 2000, the defendant and his mother came to the State Police Barracks at Carlisle. They were met by one of the lead investigators, Corporal Steve Junkin. Corporal Junkin expressly advised the defendant, in the presence of his mother, that his cooperation was voluntary and that he was free to leave at any time. He was then asked if he would submit to a polygraph examination to confirm that his statements denying knowledge of the murder were true. Despite being advised that he did not have to take the polygraph exam, the defendant voluntarily agreed to do so. Corporal Junkin introduced defendant to the polygraph examiner, Trooper McElhaney. The defendant began the pretest interview at approximately 4:40 p.m. At this time only he and McElhaney were in the room. He was again advised that the process was completely voluntary and that he could leave at any time. He was also given his Miranda warnings, which he waived.6 At approximately 6:19 p.m. the post-examination interview began. Trooper Covington entered the room at that time to assist Trooper McElhaney. The defendant was told that deception was indicated on some of the exam questions. Sometime later, Corporal Junkin and the defendant's mother came into the room. Because he was making so many inconsistent statements, the post test interview process lasted for several hours.7 While he did not implicate himself in the murder, he did indicate that he witnessed the events leading up to it. 6 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 7 During the course of the evening, the defendant was offered food and drink. He was also given several breaks. Furthermore, he was well aware that he was free to leave any time he wished. 3 NO. 2000-1537 CRIMINAL TERM At 11:19 p.m. the defendant agreed to give a taped statement detailing the events he had witnessed. The crux of his statement was that he had been picked up by Emmit Lockhart and Matthew Norris earlier on the evening of the murder. He got drunk and high in the back seat of their car. At some point the victim joined them. They went to a remote mountain location where everybody but the defendant left the car and went into the woods. The co-defendants returned to the car without Sydney Bull. 8 At the conclusion of his taped statement, the defendant and his mother left the station. It was about 11:30 p.m. on June 8, 2000. Corporal Junkin thanked them for their cooperation and asked if the defendant would be willing to talk to the police again. The defendant agreed that he would. After reviewing the taped statement, and doing field work to corroborate some of the details, Corporal Junkin found several inconsistencies. Early the next afternoon he called the defendant's home to ask if he could talk with him again. The defendant, accompanied by his mother, voluntarily returned to the police station between 4:00 p.m. and 5:00 p.m. on June 9, 2000. They were greeted at the lobby by Corporal Junkin and taken into the station commander's office. Once in the office, the corporal told the defendant that he was not in custody and was free to leave at any time. No Miranda warnings were given. While in the station commander's office, the defendant admitted that he and his co-defendants had planned to rob Sydney Bull.9 They lured him into their car and took 8 Lockhart and Norris were both convicted of first degree murder in an earlier trial at which the defendant testified for the prosecution. He implicated himself and the co-defendants in Bull's murder. However, on cross examination he recanted his entire testimony and denied any knowledge of the murder. 9 They planned on taking drugs and money from him. 4 NO. 2000-1537 CRIMINAL TERM him to a remote wooded location. Something went terribly wrong during the robbery and one of the co-defendants shot Bull in the face with a shotgun,l° Immediately after he gave that statement, Corporal Junkin advised the defendant of his Miranda rights. ~ He voluntarily waived those rights and agreed to give a taped statement. During the course of the taped statement, the defendant gave several conflicting versions of what had occurred. After the defendant completed the taped statement, he was asked if he would agree to submit to another polygraph examination. He did. The examination was conducted by Corporal Fegley and began at 7:49 p.m. She advised the defendant that his participation in the examination was completely voluntary and that he was free to leave at any time. 12 He was also advised of his Miranda rights, which he again waived. At the conclusion of the polygraph examination. Corporal Fegley engaged the defendant in a post test interview which took several hours. Numerous breaks were taken over that period of time. The defendant was offered food and drink. While he became emotional at times, he was allowed to take breaks to compose himself. The interviews were completed and the defendant was placed under arrest at 1:00 a.m. on June 1, 2000. Prior to his arrest, the defendant had no reason to believe that he was not free to leave the station at any time he wished. As Corporal Fegley indicated, if he had wanted lo No details regarding the murder weapon, the location of the wound, or the cause of death had been made public. ~ Corporal Junkin gave the Miranda warnings at this point because he felt that the defendant was no longer free to leave. Significantly, however, neither the defendant nor anybody else was made aware of the change in his custodial status until he was placed under arrest at 1:00 a.m. on June 10, 2000. ~2 Corporal Junkin had not advised Corporal Fegley, or anyone else, that defendant was not free to leave. In fact, Corporal Fegley allowed the defendant to go to the bathroom unescorted several times throughout the evening. NO. 2000-1537 CRIMINAL TERM to leave the building at any point during her interviews, there was nothing stopping him from doing so. The defendant contended that all of his statements should have been suppressed because the "oppressive police interrogation" rendered his Miranda waivers invalid. We start with the proposition that no Miranda warnings were necessary during any of the interviews on June 8, 2000. As our appellate courts have oft held: Miranda warnings are required where a suspect is subject to custodial interrogation. Interrogation occurs where the police should know that their words or actions are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. A person is in custody for the purposes of Miranda where he "is physically denied his freedom of action in any significant way or is placed in a situation in which he reasonably believes that his freedom of action or movement is restricted by the interrogation." Commonwealth v. Thompson, 778 A.2d 1215, 1221 (Pa. Super. 2001), quoting from Commonwealth v. Pitts', 740 A.2d 726, 731 (Pa. Super. 1999). While the statements made on that date were clearly in response to police interrogation, it is equally clear that the defendant was not in custody. He was repeatedly told that he was free to leave at any time. In fact, he did leave for home with his mother later that evening. Under these circumstances, he could not have reasonably believed that he was not free to leave. Therefore, we did not suppress any statements made on June 8, 2000. Likewise, the statement made in the commander's office early on the evening of June 9, 2000, was not the product of custodial interrogation. He appeared at the station voluntarily. He was specifically told that he was free to leave at any time. Therefore, no Miranda warnings were required. Thereafter, the defendant was advised of his Miranda rights on two separate occasions by two separate officers. After a careful review of the evidence, we concluded 6 NO. 2000-1537 CRIMINAL TERM that he voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently waived those rights on both occasions. Miranda holds that "[t]he defendant may waive effectuation" of the rights conveyed in the warnings "provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently." The inquiry has two distinct dimensions. First the relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion or deception. Second, the waiver must have been made with a full awareness both of the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it. Only if the "totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation" reveal both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of comprehension may a court properly conclude that Miranda rights have been waived. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, ----, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 1141, 89 L.Ed. 2d 410, 421 (1986) (citations omitted). Commonwealth v. Cephas, 361 Pa. Super. 160, 522 A.2d 63, 65 (1987). We were satisfied that the waivers were voluntary in that they were the product of a free and deliberate choice. The police tactics were neither oppressive nor unduly coercive. During his entire time at the police station, on both evenings, the defendant was treated fairly and professionally. He was allowed access to family members, given food, drink and liberal breaks. He was continually advised that he could stop talking and leave at anytime. ~3 Furthermore, he was advised and readvised of his Miranda rights on both evenings. Under the totality of the circumstances, we were convinced that the waivers and his subsequent statements were voluntary. ~4 We were also satisfied that the waivers were knowingly and intelligently made. While the defendant has a learning disability and takes Ritalin for ADHD, those ~3 As we indicated above, even though Corporal Junkin felt that the defendant was in custody after his initial statement on June 9, neither the defendant nor any other officers were made aware of Junkin's feelings. ~4 Despite his protestations to the contrary, we found as a fact that nobody promised him anything in return for his cooperation. 7 NO. 2000-1537 CRIMINAL TERM conditions did not in any way affect his ability to understand the nature and extent of his constitutional rights, the effect of waiving them, or the severity of the proceedings. ~5 Jury Instructions. The defendant alleges that our jury instructions were fatally defective in two respects. IN the first instance, he questions our refusal to give one of his proposed points for charge. The particular point requested that we instruct the jury on the voluntariness of defendant's statements and that we review the evidence regarding his psychological problems. We advised counsel that he could certainly argue those matters to the jury and we agreed to cover that issue generally. While we did not agree to the charge as proposed,~6 we did instruct the jury on the issue of voluntariness, using substantially the same language contained in the Pennsylvania Suggested Standard Criminal Jury INstructions 3.04(A)(B)(C)(D) and 3.05. ~? We are given broad discretion in phrasing our instructions and may choose our own wording "so long as the law is clearly, adequately and accurately presented". Com. v. Hawkins, 567 Pa. 310, 787 A.2d 292, 301 (2001). We were satisfied that the jury was properly charged on the issue in question. The defendant next argues that we erred in suggesting that first degree murder is more serious than second degree murder. He contends that because both carry a mandatory life sentence, there is no distinction. While we did indicate to the jury that ~s Defendant's numerous conflicting statements, denying knowledge, minimizing involvement, admitting involvement, recanting, and re-admitting involvement, clearly show that he understood the nature and severity of the proceedings against him. 16 "Transcript of Proceedings, Jury Charge", pp. 40-41. ~7 "Transcript of Proceedings, Jury Charge", pp. 18-23. NO. 2000-1537 CRIMINAL TERM "first degree murder is the most serious of the murders",~8 we were referring to the elements, i.e. "a murder in which the killer has the specific intent to kill". ~9 We were not referring to possible penalties. IN fact, we specifically advised the jury: IN arriving at your verdict, ladies and gentlemen, you should not concern yourself with any possible future consequences of your verdict, including what the penalty might be if you should find the defendant guilty. The question of guilt and the question of penalty are decided separately. IN this phase of the proceedings, you are to determine only if the defendant is guilty or not guilty. You should not in any way concern yourself with the penalty the defendant might receive should you find him guilty.2° Nevertheless, defendant's counsel requested that we explain to the jury that there is no difference in penalty for first and second degree murder.2~ Since we felt that our charge, when viewed in its entirety, was fair, we denied his request. See Com. v. Hawkins, supra., 787 A.2d at 301. Sufficiency of the Evidence. The defendant filed a post sentence motion for judgment of acquittal in which he contended that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the verdict. The standard of review on a sufficiency of the evidence claim is whether all of the evidence together with the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, when viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, is sufficient to enable the fact finder to conclude that all of the elements of the offense were established beyond a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. Cox, 556 Pa. 368, 728 A.2d 923, (1999). IN the instant case, we were satisfied that the standard had been met. ~8 "Transcript of Proceedings, Jury Charge", p. 28. 19 "Transcript of Proceedings, Jury Charge", p. 28. :0 "Transcript of Proceedings, Jury Charge", pp. 37-38. :~ "Transcript of Proceedings, Jury Charge", p. 47. 9 NO. 2000-1537 CRIMINAL TERM The defendant's own statements described how he agreed to be an active participant in the robbery of Sydney Bull. He went on to describe how the victim was lured into a car and taken at gun point to a remote location. There, by the defendant's own admission, he watched in horror as his codefendants struggled with and shot the victim before removing drugs and money from his body. There was certainly sufficient evidence in the record to sustain each of the defendant's convictions. Verdict Against the Weight of Evidence. The defendant also filed a post sentence motion for a new trial in which he contended that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. As the Superior Court recently noted: A new trial is warranted on a challenge to the weight of the evidence only if the verdict is so contrary to the evidence as to shock one's sense of justice. Furthermore, issues of credibility are left to the trier of fact; the jury is free to accept all, part, or none of the witnesses' testimony. (citations omitted). Commonwealth v. Zugay, 745 A.2d 639, 645 (Pa. Super. 2000). The crux of defendant's argument is that his statements to the police were so "patently unreliable and self contradictory" that any verdict based upon them cannot stand.22 This argument contains more than a hint of irony. Defendant is, in effect, saying that he is such an accomplished and chronic liar that it would be unjust to allow his conviction to be based upon his confessions. While it was obvious that many of defendant' s statements were self contradictory, it does not necessarily follow that they were all patently unreliable. It was for the jury to determine which portions, if any, of his statements were truthful. It obviously chose to believe those portions which implicated See "Defendant's Post-Sentence Motions", paragraph 6. 10 NO. 2000-1537 CRIMINAL TERM him in the robbery, kidnapping and murder of Sydney Bull. Furthermore, there was ample other evidence to support that decision, including his description of details that were unknown to the public, as well as physical evidence at the scene which corroborated those incriminating statements. In any event, we were not prepared to substitute our judgment for that of the jury. Stated another way, the verdict was not such that it shocked our sense of justice. Therefore, we refused the defendant's request for a new trial. DATE Edward E. Guido, J. Jaime Keating, Esquire For the Commonwealth Gregory Abeln, Esquire For the Defendant :sld 11