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HomeMy WebLinkAbout02-982 CivilPRESBYTERIAN HOMES, INC., t/d/b/a FOREST PARK HEALTH CENTER, Plaintiff RIGGS & CO., TRUSTEE OF THE MARGARET R. SMITH ACCOUNT, and MR. & MRS. CAMBARERI, Defendants IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO. 2002-0982 CIVIL TERM CIVIL ACTION - LAW IN RE: DEFENDANT'S RIGGS & CO. PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS RAISING QUESTION OF JURISDICTION BEFORE BAYLEY, GUIDO, JJ. OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT Plaintiff instituted this lawsuit to obtain payment for services rendered in connection with the treatment and care of a Ms. Margaret Peffer. The action was commenced by complaint filed on February 28, 2002.~ Defendant Riggs and Co. (hereinafter "Riggs") filed preliminary objections raising the question of jurisdiction. The parties engaged in discovery to create a factual record on this issue.2 The parties have briefed and argued their respective positions. disposition. This matter is now ready for FACTUAL BACKGROUND Plaintiff is a corporation with its principal place of business located in Cumberland County, Pennsylvania. It operates a nursing home in the Borough of The complaint contains one count in declaratory judgment and a second count requesting the imposition of a constructive trust. Relevant portions of that discovery were filed of record as an "Exhibit Compendium". NO. 2002-0982 CIVIL TERM Carlisle. For more than a year prior to her death, Margaret Peffer was a resident in that nursing home. Ms. Peffer was the sole income beneficiary under a trust agreement between Margaret Rebecca Smith as Grantor and the defendant Riggs as Trustee. The Trust Agreement also provided as follows: SECOND: Not withstanding any provision of this Agreement to the contrary, and upon the death of the Grantor, the Trustee herein may apply to or for the use and benefit of MARGARET L. PEFFER, so much of the income, and principal or corpus of the trust fund as the Trustee, in its sole and absolute discretion, may deem to be necessary or desirable for the proper support, maintenance, comfort, health or general welfare of said MARGARET L. PEFFER, and the proper receipt or receipts for funds hereunder expended by the Trustee shall constitute a discharge of the Trustee herein with respect thereto.3 Defendant Riggs is a national banking corporation with its principal place of business located in Washington, D.C.4 It does not have any branch offices in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. However, it acts as trustee for 10 trusts with a Pennsylvania situs.5 Additionally, 56 of its trust beneficiaries reside in this state.6 Furthermore, it has a total of nearly 500 checking, money market, IRA and certificate of deposit accounts which are owned by Pennsylvania residents.7 Riggs employees corresponded regularly with Ms. Peffer at her Cumberland County address since at least the latter part of 1990. On occasion they sought to obtain additional business for defendant Riggs by soliciting a local financial institution with 3 "Exhibit Compendium", p. 78a. The "Grantor" has long since passed away. 4 The Trust Agreement involved in the instant case was executed, and has a trust situs, in the District of Columbia. s This represents just under .42% of the total trust accounts under management. Riggs charges annual fees for its management services. 6 This represents 1.72% of all the trust beneficiaries it services. 7 This represents .22% of its total accounts. NO. 2002-0982 CIVIL TERM which Ms. Peffer dealt. In March of 2001, Ms. Peffer, was no longer able to properly care for herself. The Cumberland County Office of Aging took over her affairs and arranged for her admittance into plaintiff' s nursing home. At the time she entered the home, the trust account was being managed by Riggs employee Edward Wucher. Mr. Wucher corresponded frequently with the Office of Aging regarding the level of care Ms. Peffer needed and the expenses to be incurred in connection therewith. Further, as Ms. Peffer's overdue bill at the nursing home grew, Mr. Wucher negotiated with plaintiff to make sure that she would not be discharged. As he stated in his deposition, "I wanted to let them know that we're doing everything we can, you know, to pay them.''8 DISCUSSION Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1028(a)(1) allows a party to question jurisdiction by means of a preliminary objection. Our appellate courts have often articulated the standard to be applied in such cases. As the Superior Court noted: At the outset, we note that "when preliminary objections, if sustained, would result in the dismissal of an action, such objections should be sustained only in the clearest of cases." King v. Detroit Tool Co.,, 452 Pa. Super. 334, 337, 682 A.2d 313, 314 (1996) (citation omitted). Moreover, because the burden rests upon the party challenging the court's exercise of jurisdiction, the court must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id. See also Filipovich v. d.T. Imports, Inc., 431 Pa. Super. 552, 555-57, 637 A.2d 314, 316 (1994). Once the movant has supported its jurisdictional objection, however, the burden shifts to the party asserting jurisdiction to prove that there is statutory and constitutional support for the court's exercise of in personam jurisdiction. See, e.g., McCall v. Formu-3 International, Inc., 437 Pa. Super. 575, 577-79, 650 A.2d 903,904 (1994); Derman v. Vfilair Services, Inc., 404 Pa. Super. 136, 139-41,590 A.2d 317, 319 (1991). Pursuant to the Judiciary Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5301 et seq., our courts may exercise two types of in personam jurisdiction over a non- 8 "Exhibit Compendium", p. 54a. NO. 2002-0982 CIVIL TERM resident defendant. General jurisdiction is founded upon a defendant's general activities within the forum which evidence continuous and systematic contacts with the state. See Derman, 404 Pa. Super. at 139-43,590 A.2d at 319-20. Specific jurisdiction has a more narrow scope and is focused upon the particular acts of the defendant which gave rise to the underlying cause of action. Id. Regardless of whether general or specific personal jurisdiction is asserted, the propriety of such an exercise must be tested against both the Pennsylvania long arm statute, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5322, and the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. In order to meet constitutional muster, a defendant's contacts with the forum state must be such that the defendant could reasonably anticipate being called to defend itself in the forum. See, e.g., Kubik v. Letteri, 532 Pa. 10, 19-20, 614 A.2d 1110, 1115 (1992) (expressly adopting the minimum contacts test advocated by the United States Supreme Court in Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed. 2d 528 (1985)). Random, fortuitous and attenuated contacts cannot reasonably notify a party that it may be called to defend itself in a foreign forum and, thus, cannot support the exercise of personal jurisdiction. Id. That is, the defendant must have purposefully directed its activities to the forum and conducted itself in a manner indicating that it has availed itself of the forum's privileges and benefits such that it should also be subject to the forum state's laws and regulations. Id. Ha//-14/oolford Tank Co., Inc. v. R.F. Kilns, Inc. 698 A.2d 80, 82-83 (Pa. Super., 1997) (emphasis added). Applying the above standard to the case at bar, we are satisfied that Riggs' contacts with this Commonwealth are sufficient to establish both general and specific personal jurisdiction. Those contacts cannot be described as "random, fortuitous, and attenuated." It has hundreds of customers (in the form of account holders), manages several trusts and services dozens of trust beneficiaries within Pennsylvania. These facts alone are sufficient to establish that it has "availed itself of the forum's privileges". Id. Therefore, it should be subject to this Commonwealth's laws. However, even if those contacts were not sufficient to establish general personal jurisdiction, the defendant's actions on behalf of its beneficiary, Ms. Peffer, are sufficient NO. 2002-0982 CIVIL TERM to establish specific personal jurisdiction under Section 5322 of the Judiciary Act (42 Pa.C.S.A. {} 5322). The relevant portions of that section provide as follows: General rule.-A tribunal of this Commonwealth may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person.., who acts directly or by an agent, as to a cause of action or other matter arising from such person: (1) Transacting any business in this Commonwealth. Without excluding other acts which may constitute transacting business in this Commonwealth, any of the following shall constitute transacting business for the purpose of this paragraph: (i) The doing by any person in this Commonwealth of a series of similar acts for the purpose of thereby realizing pecuniary benefit or otherwise accomplishing an object. In the instant case, Mr. Wucher had numerous contacts with Ms. Peffer's personal representative, as well as employees of the nursing home, to insure that the medical and financial needs of the trust beneficiary were met. In fact, viewing the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, it appears that Mr. Wucher negotiated to keep Ms. Peffer in the nursing home with the promise of payment by the trust, if it could be done. Under these circumstances, we are satisfied that this court has specific personal jurisdiction over Riggs. Therefore, we will deny its preliminary objection. ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this 6TM day of SEPTEMBER, 2002, the preliminary objection raising the question of jurisdiction filed by defendant Riggs and Co. is DENIED. By the Court, Paula J. McDermott, Esquire H. Amos Goodall, Jr., Esquire /s/Edward E. Guido Edward E. Guido, J.