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HomeMy WebLinkAbout02-1540 CriminalCOMMONWEALTH V. ANTHONY L. NELL, JR. IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO. 2002-1540 CRIMINAL IN RE: MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE BEFORE GUIDO, J. OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT Before us is the defendant's Omnibus Pretrial Motion in the form of a Motion to Suppress Evidence. We conducted an evidentiary hearing and have reviewed the briefs filed by each party. For the reasons hereinafter set forth, the motion will be denied. F1NDINGS OF FACT On April 8, 2002, at approximately 1:00 a.m., Troopers Pays and Nardone of the Pennsylvania State Police were dispatched to a call in a rural area of Cumberland County. The call came from a homeowner who complained of loud voices and noises in the woods behind his home. While on route to the call, the troopers noticed a disabled vehicle that had apparently been involved in an accident. It was stuck in a ditch alongside the roadway, facing oncoming traffic. While it was not occupied, its headlights were still on and it obviously could not be driven from the scene. Upon interviewing the homeowner, it was determined that the noise he had heard was coming from the vicinity of the accident.~ When the troopers described the location of the disabled vehicle, the homeowner indicated that the noise was most likely associated with some people trying to get the car out of the ditch. His home was in close proximity to the accident scene, separated only by a wooded area. NO. 2002-1540 CRIMINAL TERM While they were talking with the homeowner, another vehicle drove past their location. The homeowner excitedly identified that vehicle as one he believed to be associated with the noises he had heard. He advised the troopers that he had spotted it driving very slowly in the area several times since he began hearing the noises.2 The troopers effectuated a stop of the second vehicle in order to investigate the accident. There were two occupants in the vehicle, the driver and the passenger, who is the defendant in this case. Both occupants initially denied any involvement with, or knowledge of, the accident. Based upon their training, and the inconsistent nature of the responses to their questions, the troopers did not believe those denials. After some additional questioning, the defendant admitted that he had been the driver of the disabled car. He was then directed to come out of the car for further questioning. As he got out, the troopers noticed an odor of alcohol on his breath, his gate was unsteady, he staggered, and he was unsure on his feet. Based upon those observations, he was placed under arrest for driving under the influence. Immediately after being placed under arrest, he was advised of his Miranda rights, which he voluntarily waived. Thereafter, the defendant answered some, but not all, of the troopers' questions. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW (1 .) The initial stop of the vehicle occupied by the defendant was proper in that the troopers had reasonable and articulable grounds to suspect a violation of the Vehicle Code. (2.) The arrest of the defendant for driving under the influence was supported by probable cause. 2 The rural neighborhood is sparsely populated and has little or no vehicular traffic at that time of night. NO. 2002-1540 CRIMINAL TERM (3.) The defendant was properly advised of his Miranda rights, which he voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently waived. (4.) Defendant's motion to suppress evidence should be denied. DISCUSSION Initial Stop. "When police stop a vehicle in this Commonwealth for investigatory purposes, the vehicle, and its occupants, are considered 'seized' and the seizure is subject to constitutional constraints." Commonwealth v. Knotts, 444 Pa. Super. 60, 663 A.2d 216, (1995). "(P)olice officers may stop a vehicle whenever they have articulable and reasonable grounds to suspect that a violation of the Vehicle Code had occurred." Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 543 Pa. 612, 673 A.2d 915, 918 (1996). In the instant case, the troopers were called to investigate a noise complaint. During the course of that investigation, they determined that the noise was most likely associated with events following a motor vehicle accident. They were also aware that the vehicle involved in the accident could not be driven and had been abandoned. Based upon those facts, they could reasonably conclude that the driver of the vehicle had breached his duty to report the accident as required by Section 3746 of the Vehicle Code, which provides in relevant part as follows: Immediate notice of accident to police department (a) General rule. - The driver of a vehicle involved in an accident shall immediately by the quickest means of communication give notice to the nearest office a duly authorized police department if the accident involves: NO. 2002-1540 CRIMINAL TERM (2) damage to any vehicle involved to the extent that it cannot be driven under its own power in its customary manner without further damage or hazard to the vehicle, other traffic elements, or the roadway, and therefore requires towing. 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 3746 (a)(2).3 The troopers also had reason to believe that the driver of the disabled vehicle was an occupant of the vehicle which they subjected to an investigatory stop. They were in a sparsely populated rural area in the wee hours of the morning. There is very little traffic in that area at that hour. In fact, the troopers had not seen any traffic, aside from the disabled vehicle and the one that was stopped. The complainant identified the suspect vehicle as having appeared in the neighborhood at the time the noise began. Under those circumstances, the troopers could reasonably conclude that the driver of the disabled vehicle was one of the occupants of the vehicle that they stopped. Therefore, the stop was appropriate.4 Arrest of the defendant. Pursuant to the proper investigatory stop, the troopers became aware of sufficient facts to justify the arrest of defendant for driving under the influence.5 They determined that he was the driver of the vehicle involved in the accident. His breath smelled of alcohol, his gate was unsteady, and he staggered. See Commonwealth v. Monaghan, 295 It is interesting to note that the troopers also had a duty to investigate the accident. 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3746 (c). See also 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 6308 (b) which provides in relevant part: Whenever a police officer.., has articulable and reasonable grounds to suspect a violation of this title, he may stop a vehicle, upon request or signal .... to secure such other information as the officer may reasonably believe to be necessary to enforce the provisions of this title. s 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 3731. NO. 2002-1540 CRIMINAL TERM Pa. Super. 450, 441 A.2d 1318 (1982). Statements after Arrest. The defendant was handcuffed at the scene of the original stop and transported to the scene of the accident. While no Miranda warnings were required during the investigative detention, 6as soon as he was placed under arrest, handcuffed and put into the patrol vehicle, he was in custody for purposes of Miranda. See Commonwealth v Turner, 772 A.2d 970 (Pa. Super. 2001). Therefore, he could not be subjected to additional interrogation without a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights. Id. Based upon the testimony of Trooper Nardone, which we found believable, we are satisfied that the defendant was advised of his Miranda rights immediately after he was placed into custody. We are further satisfied that he knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived those rights in connection with the questions he chose to answer. Therefore, his request to suppress his post arrest statements must be denied. 6 See Berkheimer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, (1984), and Pennsylvania v. Bruder, 488 U.S. 9, (1988). NO. 2002-1540 CRIMINAL TERM ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this 5TM day of NOVEMBER, 2002, for the reasons set forth in the attached opinion the defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence is DENIED. By the Court, Daniel Sodus, Esquire For the Commonwealth H. Anthony Adams, Esquire For the Defendant :sld /s/Edward E. Guido Edward E. Guido, J.