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HomeMy WebLinkAbout00-3488 CivilWALTER ARMSTRONG, Plaintiff V. BENJAMIN OCKER, Defendant V. EVAN SPENCER and ROBERT SPENCER, Additional Defendants IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO. 2000-3488 CIVIL TERM IN RE: MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF PLAINTIFF AND CROSS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF DEFENDANT BENJAMIN OCKER BEFORE HOFFER, P.J., OLER, GUIDO, JJ. OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT The above plaintiff sustained serious injuries in a motor vehicle accident involving a car driven by additional defendant Evan Spencer. Currently before us are the motion for summary judgment filed by plaintiff and the cross motion for summary judgment filed by defendant Benjamin Ocker. STANDARD OF REVIEW Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1035.2 provides, in relevant part, as follows: Rule 1035.2 Motion After the relevant pleadings are closed, but within such time as not to unreasonably delay trial, any party may move for summary judgment in whole or in part as a matter of law NO. 2000-3488 CIVIL TERM (1) (2) whenever there is no genuine issue of any material fact as to a necessary element of the cause of action or defense which could be established by additional discovery or expert report, or if, after the completion of discovery relevant to the motion, including the production of expert reports, an adverse party who will bear the burden of proof at trial has failed to produce evidence of facts essential to the cause of action or defense which in a jury trial would require the issues to be submitted to a jury. Pa. R.C.P. 1035.2. In determining whether to grant a motion for summary judgment we must view the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Ertel v. Patriot News Co., 544 Pa. 93,674 A.2d 1038 (1966). Summary judgment may only be granted in cases that are clear and free from doubt. J.H. Ex Re/. Hoffman v. Pellak, 764 A.2d 64 (Pa. Super. 2000). FACTUAL BACKGROUND The incident giving rise to this cause of action was an automobile accident that occurred on the evening of July 10, 1999. Additional defendant Evan Spencer (hereinafter "Evan") lost control of the car he was driving and collided with the vehicle occupied by the plaintiff. Shortly before the accident, Evan had consumed alcohol at a party hosted by defendant Ocker (hereinafter "Benjamin"). Both Evan and Benjamin, as well as several other party guests, were under the age of twenty-one (21).~ The party featured a keg of beer provided by the mother of one of the minor guests. Gordon and Donna Ocker (hereinafter the "Ockers") are the parents of Benjamin.2 Even though Benjamin was twenty (20) years old, he was still living with them. Benjamin was twenty (20) years old at the time. Although not a party to these proceedings, Benjamin's parents were sued by plaintiff in a separate action. Evan Spencer was also joined as an additional defendant in that case. 2 NO. 2000-3488 CIVIL TERM However, he was free to come and go as he pleased and they treated him as an adult. He was fully emancipated. The Ockers were on vacation in South Carolina at the time of the party. They were not aware that a keg party was planned in their absence. In point of fact, they specifically prohibited any parties and forbade the consumption of alcohol in their home while they were gone. DISCUSSION Plaintiff' s case against Benjamin is based upon the social host theory of liability.3 Since it is undisputed that Benjamin provided alcohol to additional defendant Evan, a minor, plaintiff contends that he is entitled to summary judgment. Benjamin argues that he is immune from liability under the social host doctrine because he was under twenty- one (21) at the time he furnished the alcohol. Therefore, he contends that he is entitled to summary judgment. InKle#t v. Rays#tger, 504 Pa. 141,470 A.2d 507 (1983) the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania recognized that "in the case of an ordinary able bodied man it is the consumption of alcohol, rather than the furnishing of the alcohol, which is the proximate cause of any subsequent occurrence." 470 A.2d 510. Consequently, it held that "there can be no liability on the part of a social host who serves alcoholic beverages to his or her adult guests." Id. at 511 (emphasis added). However, in a case decided the same day, the Supreme Court held that social host liability could be imposed upon an adult who ~ "The social host doctrine is a general phrase used to designate a claim in negligence against a person (the host) who provides alcoholic beverages to another (the guest), without remuneration, where the guest then sustains injuries, or causes injury to a third person as a result of his intoxicated condition. The theory is that the host should be liable for the injuries as he is the person who furnished the intoxicating beverages." Karpes v. Heller, 536 Pa. 551, 640 A.2d 888, FN1 (1994). 3 NO. 2000-3488 CIVIL TERM provides alcohol to a person under twenty-one (21). Congini by Congini v. Portersville Valve Company, 504 Pa. 157, 70 A.2d 515 (1983). Plaintiff contends that Benjamin's status as an emancipated adult should be sufficient to impose liability under the Congini rationale. He points to the case of Maxwell v. Keas, 433 Pa. Super. 70, 639 A.2d 1215 (1994)to support his position that, as an adult, Benjamin should be held responsible for the consequences of his actions.4 Plaintiff misinterprets the law of this Commonwealth with regard to the imposition of social host liability. The focus of the inquiry is not the status of the actors as minor and adult. Rather, the inquiry is limited to the age of the actors. Plaintiff' s confusion is understandable given the frequent use of the terms "minor" and "adult" by the various courts which have addressed the issue. However, after a careful review of Congini, and the cases that follow, we are satisfied that the application of the social host doctrine is based solely upon the ages of the parties. Kapres v. Heller, 536 Pa. 551,640 A.2d 888 (1994) would appear to be controlling. In that case the Supreme Court refused to apply the social host doctrine to a minor who furnished alcohol to another minor. Plaintiff argues that Kapres is not applicable because the age of the defendant is not of record in that case. We disagree. While the Supreme Court opinion in Kapres does not reveal the age of the defendant, the Superior Court opinion does. The lower appellate clearly articulated the issue to be decided as to whether "the holding in Congini v. Portersville Valve Co .... which imposed social host liability on adults who furnish alcohol to persons under the 4 The Maxwell case formed the basis of a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Benjamin's parents in a companion case. Armstrong v. Ocker et al., 2029 Civil 2000. We granted the motion, holding that the parents had no duty to control the activities of their son, an emancipated adult. 4 NO. 2000-3488 CIVIL TERM age of 21, should be extended to impose liability on persons between 18 and 21 years of age who provide liquor to persons between 18 and 21 years of age." Kapres v. Heller, 612 A.2d 987, 989 (Pa. Super. 1992). Furthermore, in a later case, the Superior Court specifically held that "for the purposes of imposing social host liability a person remains a minor until he reaches age 21." Goldberg v. Delta Tau Delta, 613 A.2d 1250, 1252, (Pa. Super. 1992), appeal denied 534 Pa. 639, 626 A.2d 1158 (1993). As the Goldberg Court went on to state: Although we find appellant's arguments persuasive, this Court is not prepared to extend social host liability to persons under the age of 21. The Congini case, which is the seminal case in Pennsylvania establishing a cause of action by a minor against an adult social host, specifically limited social host liability to one who is lawfully entitled to possess and consume alcohol and furnishes it to one who is not so entitled. Id. at 1253. Also instructive is the case of Sperando v. Commonwealth Dept of Transportation, 630 A.2d 532 (Pa. Commonwealth 1993). In that case the Commonwealth Court framed the issue as follows: Whether the trial court erred in holding that a person under the age of twenty-one is immune from social host liability when he has served alcoholic beverages to a minor, thereby enabling the minor to become intoxicated and injure a third person. Id. at 533. The Sperando Court refused to follow the Superior Court decisions in Kapres and Goldberg, supra. Rather, it held that "persons under the age of 21 may be held liable as social hosts for the consequences of furnishing other persons under the age of twenty- one with alcohol". Id. The Supreme Court reversed Sperando in a brief per curiam opinion which cited its decision in Kapres, supra. See Sperando v. Commonwealth Dept. of Transportation, 537 Pa. 352, 643 A.2d 1079 (1994). NO. 2000-3488 CIVIL TERM Plaintiff' s argument that an "adult" between the ages of 18 and 21 should be held responsible for his actions is very persuasive. However, we cannot ignore the unambiguous holdings in the above decisions; i.e. a person under the age of twenty-one is immune from liability under the social host doctrine. Therefore, we are constrained to deny plaintiff' s motion for summary judgment and to grant that of defendant Ocker. ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this 9TM day of NOVEMBER, 2001, for the reasons set forth in the attached opinion, plaintiff' s Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED. The Motion for Summary Judgment of defendant Ocker is GRANTED and the action is dismissed as to him. By the Court, Richard A. Sadlock, Esquire Charles E. Haddick, Jr., Esquire Karl E. Rominger, Esquire William A. Addams, Esquire Marlin Rudy :sld /s/Edward E. Guido Edward E. Guido, J. 6