HomeMy WebLinkAboutCP-21-CR-0082-2008
COMMONWEALTH : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
: CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
:
: CP-21-CR-0082-2008
vs. :
:
:
RONALD EDWARD BOLL :
IN RE: OPINION PUSUANT TO RULE 1925
BEFORE HESS, J.
Following jury trial, the defendant, Ronald Boll, was convicted of a count of receiving
stolen property. After the jury returned its verdict, we found the defendant guilty of a summary
charge of driving under suspension which had also been filed in this case. On September 2,
2008, the defendant was sentenced on the count of receiving stolen property to a period of not
less than ten nor more than twenty months in the Cumberland County Prison. On the count of
driving under suspension, he was sentenced to pay the costs and a fine of $200.00. He has
appealed. In his statement of matters complained of on appeal, the defendant raises a single
issue, namely: There was insufficient evidence to convict the defendant of driving under
suspension and, specifically, there was no evidence presented that the area where the trooper saw
the defendant drive was a roadway or trafficway.
The events complained of occurred at the Farmers Flea Market in Monroe Township,
Cumberland County. The victims were selling items at the Flea Market and a generator was
needed to operate their stand. The generator was left unattended and when the victims returned,
the generator was not there. The grounds of the Flea Market were searched and eventually the
generator was found, partially covered with a tarp, on a trailer attached to the defendant’s
CP-21-CR-0082-2008
vehicle. A state trooper was summoned to the scene and gathered information in connection
with the case. The generator was returned, the investigation concluded, and the defendant was
permitted to drive his vehicle from the scene. It was only later that the trooper realized that the
defendant’s driver’s license was under suspension.
We found the defendant guilty of driving under suspension because we were more than
satisfied that the driveway and other roadways within the Flea Market were “trafficways” within
the meaning of the Motor Vehicle Code. The term “trafficway” is defined in 75 Pa.C.S.A. 102
“as including every way or place of which any part is open to the public for purposes of
vehicular travel as a matter of right or custom.” We had no difficulty in concluding that the Flea
Market was open to the public who regularly operated vehicles into the Flea Market area. In
addition, however, we were satisfied that the circumstantial evidence was overwhelming that,
upon leaving the Flea Market premises, the defendant would have entered the adjacent highway.
At the trial of the case, the defendant testified that he did not enter the highway but, instead, was
met by a nephew at the entrance of the Flea Market who then drove the vehicle for him. No one
testified at the trial to verify this account.
We are satisfied that the defendant’s version, like the rest of his testimony, was nothing
short of preposterous. The trial court, of course, in its sound discretion is free to accept or reject
any testimony in whole or in part. See Com. v. Costa-Hernandez, 802 A.2d 671 (Pa.Super.
2002). In the case of Mr. Boll, we were unable to accept any of his testimony.
October 31, 2008 ______________________________
Kevin A. Hess, J.
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CP-21-CR-0082-2008
Christin Mehrtens-Carlin, Esquire
Sr. Assistant District Attorney
Michael Halkias, Esquire
Assistant Public Defender
:rlm
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