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HomeMy WebLinkAbout02-3845 - CivilMICHELLE RENEE LYNN VARNER, Plaintiff V. BRANDON GLENN HOLLEY, Defendant IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 02-3845 CIVIL TERM INDIRECT CRIMINAL CONTEMPT IN RE: 1925 OPINION HOFFER, P.J.: The defendant appeals from our Order of December 6, 2002, finding him to be in indirect criminal contempt of a Protection from Abuse Order. Sentence was probation for six months and costs of prosecution. The defendant voluntarily signed a protection from abuse order ("PFA') in favor of the plaintiff on August 16, 2002. The defendant was a minor [age of seventeen, with date of birth November 9, 1984] on that date and was unrepresented by counsel when he signed the PFA. His signature was witnessed by his juvenile probation officer, Michael Rose. The order prohibited the defendant from, among other things, having "ANY CONTACT with the Plaintiff...at any location, including but not limited to any contact at Plaintiff's school, business, or place of employment." The order specifically prohibited the defendant from going to the plaintiff's residence in Newville and from going near Saylor's Market in Newville ("Saylor's"), which was the plaintiff's place of employment. On November 29, 2002, the plaintiff, Michelle Varner, had been employed at Saylor's for approximately one year. The plaintiff did not have a regular schedule at Saylor's but worked a variety of shifts in that year. On November 29, the plaintiff was working at one of the checkout counters at Saylor's. At approximately 6:45 PM the defendant entered Saylor's, picked up items in the store, and went through the line to purchase them. The defendant did not approach the plaintiff or go through the checkout counter where the plaintiff was working. While he was inside Saylor's the defendant made eye contact with the plaintiff and gave her "dirty looks" as he passed her to walk out of Saylor's. The plaintiff left work that night and called Officer Finkey of the Newville Police Department to report the incident. The plaintiff made a written statement at the police station on December 2nd recounting the November 29th incident at Saylor's. That evening, December 2nd, Officer Finkey exited the Newville station and found the defendant walking around outside. Officer Finkey asked the defendant to step into the station, which he did. Officer Finkey read the PFA order to the defendant and the defendant acknowledged being aware of the order. The defendant admitted to Officer Finkey that he was at Saylor's on November 29th, 2002, and told officer Finkey that someone~ had previously advised him that the plaintiff was no longer employed there. ~ Officer Finkey testifed at the hearing on December 6, 2002 that the defendant was not specific as to who told him that the plaintiff no longer worked at Saylor's Market. DISCUSSION The overriding purpose of the Protection from Abuse Act ("PFAA"), 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 6101 et seq., and of a Protection From Abuse Order is to allow courts to act swiftly to protect victims of continuing domestic abuse. Commonwealth v. Snell, 1999 PA Super. 185, 189, 737 A.2d 1232, 1235 (Pa. Super. 1999). The purpose of imposing contempt sanctions for a violation of a PFA order forbidding one from threatening another is to prevent the ultimate harm such threats foretell. Pa. Super. LEXIS 4648, Commonwealth v. Baker, 722 A.2d 718, 724, 1998 17 (Pa. Super, 1998) (Orie, J., dissenting). The defendant did not merely enter Saylor's, purchase groceries, and leave. While in Saylor's on November 29th, plaintiff that frightened her. the defendant cast intimidating glances at the This is not a de minimis infraction but rather a knowing and willful violation of the express terms of the PFA order. To categorize the defendant's blatant disregard for the PFA order as a de minimis infraction is to emasculate the issuance of the PFA. Because the PFA seeks to prohibit future abuse and threats of abuse, a knowing and voluntary breach of this nature cannot be tolerated.2 The defendant argues that the underlying purpose of the PFA order in this case was not violated because no physical contact or harm resulted. The court : The defendant argues that his actions constitue a de m inimis violation of the law and therefore the prosecution should be dismissed in accordance with 18 Pa.C.S. § 312(a)(3) which states: (a) General Rule.-The court shall dismiss a prosecution if, having regard to the nature of the conduct charged to constitute an offense and the nature of the attendant circumstances it finds that the conduct of the defendant: has broad discretion to prevent the ultimate physical harm that results from abuse and threats of abuse. If the overriding purpose of the Protection from Abuse Act is to protect victims of domestic abuse3, then the overriding goal of the protective order was undermined in this case. The PFA failed to protect Ms. Varner on November 29th, and, in fact, she testified that she was scared of the defendant when she saw him at Saylor's Market. enough to have caused her physical harm even opportunity to do so. The defendant breached the The defendant was close if he did not act on the PFA first by entering the market, secondly by not immediately exiting the store after seeing the plaintiff working there, and lastly by casting menacing glances at her. The Commonwealth has proven beyond a reasonable doubt, as required by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Baker that (1) the order was definite, clear, specific and left no doubt or uncertainty in the mind of the person to whom it was addressed of the conduct prohibited; (2) the contemnor had notice of the specific order or decree, (3) the act constituting the violation was volitional; and (4) the contemnor acted with wrongful intent. Commonwealth v. Baker, 564 Pa. 192, 198,766 A.2d 328 (2001). The defendant argues that the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient evidence that he acted with the requisite "wrongful intent." He argues that because he offered to Officer Finkey the lame excuse that "someone" told him (2) did not actually cause or threaten the harm or evil sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense or did so only to an extent too trivial to warrant the condemnation of conviction. 3 Commonwealth v. Snell, 1999 PA Super. 185, 189, 737 A.2d 1232, 1235 (Pa. Super. 1999). that the plaintiff was no longer employed at Saylor's when he visited the store on November 29th, he could not have acted with wrongful intent. But even if the defendant actually believed that the plaintiff was no longer employed there, he nonetheless intentionally and wrongfully violated a court order to stay away from Saylor's for the duration of the order, which will not expire until February 15, 2004. That prohibition is not conditioned on the plaintiff's continued employment at Saylor's. In addition, the defendant acted with wrongful intent when he glared at the plaintiff and gave her "dirty looks" at her place of employment. The PFA prohibits the defendant from abusing, stalking, any place where she might be found. harassing and threatening the plaintiff in The dirty looks complained of were both harassing and threatening to the plaintiff. The underlying PFA order in this case is a valid one. It was voluntarily signed by the defendant. The defendant argues that it is invalid as he was an unrepresented minor when he signed the PFA on August 16, 2002. But the PFA states on the first page that "[d]efendant, Brandon Glenn Holley, a minor, is unrepresented, but has been advised of his right to counsel in this matter." Because the defendant was made aware of his right to counsel but waived it in this matter, and because he signed the PFA order knowingly and willingly, the PFA order is valid. While minors in this state are generally afforded many protections to ensure that their legal rights are not violated, this Court will not invalidate an otherwise valid agreement merely because a minor has chosen to appear pro se.