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HomeMy WebLinkAbout02-3 CriminalCOMMONWEALTH VS. JOHN MEARS IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 02-003 CRIMINAL IN RE: OPINION PURSUANT TO RULE 1925 In this case, the defendant was found guilty on charges of corruption of minors and unlawful possession of a controlled substance. He has since filed an appeal from his sentence. In a concise statement of matters complained of on appeal, he raises only one ground for relief; namely, that the undersigned erred in entering its order of April 29, 2002, denying the defendant's motion to suppress evidence. This opinion is filed in support of that order. The facts surrounding the omnibus pretrial motion are as follows. The defendant was on special probation. As part of this probation there was a requirement that he be seen twice a month by a Pennsylvania State Probation Agent. On November 23, 2001, around 8:00 p.m., Agent David Bennett was performing one of those routine checks on the defendant. Upon arriving at the defendant's residence located at 50 Potato Road, Second Floor Apartment, Upper Frankford Township, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania, Agent Bennett knocked on the defendant's door and identified himself. He told the defendant to open the door. There was no response. Agent Bennett could hear movement and what seemed to be another voice, a softer voice, inside the apartment. The softer voice sounded to Agent Bennett like that of a female child. Agent Bennett was aware of the defendant's criminal past involving child pornography and endangering the welfare of children. One of the defendant's parole conditions was that he was not to have any contact with minors. Agent Bennett knocked on the door again and told the defendant to open the door or he would kick the door down. 02-003 CRIMINAL The defendant did not open the door. Agent Bennett kicked the door in and found the defendant standing near his bed and a female sitting in a chair in the far left corner of the room. The defendant was then directed to the floor and he was handcuffed. Agent Bennett then ascertained that the female was fourteen years old. At the request of Agent Bennett, Pennsylvania State Trooper Philip M. Payes arrived. Agent Bennett explained to the trooper that the defendant was a special probation case and was in violation of his probation. IN looking around the room, Trooper Payes saw some small white rocks in plain view by a television set. These white rocks subsequently tested positive for cocaine. Generally, a search must be undertaken only pursuant to a warrant based upon probable cause. However, the United States Supreme Court has permitted exceptions when "special needs" beyond the normal need for law enforcement make the warrant and probable cause requirements impracticable. See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483, U.S. 868, 107 S.Ct. 3164, 97 L.Ed.2d 709 (1987). IN Griffin, probation officers searched a probationer's house without a warrant, on information from a police tip. See Id. at 871, 107 S.Ct. at 3167. The search was conducted under state regulations which permitted any probation officer to search a probationer's home without a warrant as long as his supervisor approved, and there were "reasonable grounds" to believe that contraband was present, including any item that the probationer cannot possess under the probation conditions. Id. at 870-71, 107 S.Ct. at 3167. As a result of the search, the officers found a handgun. Id. at 871, 107 S.Ct. at 3167. The probationer moved to suppress the evidence seized during the search. Id~. The trial court denied the motion and was affirmed by the Wisconsin Court of Appeals and the Wisconsin Supreme Court. Id. 2 02-003 CRIMINAL The United States Supreme Court, on certiorari, affirmed the judgment but on different grounds. The United States Supreme Court did not decide the issue of whether any search of a probationer's home by a probation officer is lawful when there are reasonable grounds to believe contraband is present. The Court affirmed the lower court because it found that a state's operation of a probation system, like its operation of a school, government office or prison, or its supervision of a regulated industry, likewise presents "special needs" beyond normal law enforcement that may justify departures from the usual warrant and probable-cause requirements. Id. at 873-74, 107 S.Ct. at 3168-69. The Court found that the search was "reasonable" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment because it was conducted pursuant to a valid regulation governing probationers. Id. at 880, 107 S.Ct. at 3172. In United States v. Knights, 122 S.Ct. 587, 2001 WL 1560882, the United States Supreme Court held that the warrantless search of probationer's apartment, supported by reasonable suspicion and authorized by a condition of his probation, was reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. ~ In Knights, a California court sentenced Mark James Knights to probation for a drug offense. Id~. at 588. The probation order included the condition that Knights "submit his.., person, property, place of residence, vehicle, personal effects, to search at anytime, with or without a search warrant, warrant of arrest, or reasonable cause by any probation officer or law enforcement officer." Id. Inherent in the very nature of probation is that probationers "do not enjoy the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled." Id~. (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,480, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d. 484 (1972)). It must be remembered that "the very assumption of the ~ Our Supreme Court has gone on to hold that the standard for parole searches under Article I, Section VIII of the Pennsylvania Constitution is the same as under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. See Com. v. Williams, 547 Pa. 577, 692 A.2d 1031 (1997). 3 02-003 CRIMINAL institution of probation" is that the probationer "is more likely than the ordinary citizen to violate the law." Id. at 592 (citing Griffin, supra). The State's interest in apprehending violators of the criminal law, thereby protecting potential victims of criminal enterprise, may therefore justifiably focus on probationers in a way that it does not on the ordinary citizen. Id. The Court held that a balance of these considerations requires no more than reasonable suspicion to conduct a search of this probationer's house. Id. The degree of individualized suspicion required of a search is a determination of when there is a sufficiently high probability that criminal conduct is occurring to make the intrusion on the individual's privacy interest reasonable. Id. A statutory framework for probation and parole searches is set out at 61 P.S. Section 331.27a and 331.27b. The first of these two sections deals with state parole agents. The second deals with county probation and parole officers. Both sections provide that a property search may be conducted by an agent if there is reasonable suspicion to believe that an offender is possessing contraband or otherwise violating a condition of supervision. In this case, Agent Bennett heard a young female voice in the apartment. He, clearly, had a suspicion that the defendant was violating a probation condition. In addition, the defendant would not open the door when asked to do so. Given the possible imminent danger to a young person inside, the immediate warrantless entry was appropriate. March 10, 2003 Kevin A. Hess, J. 4 02-003 CRIMINAL Jaime Keating, Esquire Sr. Assistant District Attorney H. Anthony Adams, Esquire Assistant Public Defender :rlm COMMONWEALTH VS. IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 02-003 CRIMINAL JOHN MEARS AND NOW, this IN RE: OMNIBUS PRETRIAL MOTION ORDER day of April, 2002, the defendant's omnibus pretrial motion in the nature of a motion to suppress evidence is DENIED. BY THE COURT, Edmund Zigmund, Esquire Assistant District Attorney H. Anthony Adams, Esquire Assistant Public Defender :rlm Kevin A. Hess, J.