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HomeMy WebLinkAbout02-568, 02-576 CriminalCOMMONWEALTH VS. MICHAEL L. CRAWFORD IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 02-568 CRIMINAL 02-576 CRIMINAL IN RE: POST-CONVICTION RELIEF MEMORANDUM AND ORDER On April 30, 2002, Michael Larue Crawford pled guilty to unauthorized use of an automobile and unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia. He was sentenced to a total term of thirty (30) days to two (2) years in the Cumberland County Prison. On September 3, 2002, Mr. Crawford filed a motion for post-conviction collateral relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. In his motion, he claims that his guilty plea counsel, Jessica Rhoades, was ineffective because the plea agreement was not in Mr. Crawford's best interest. A petitioner is eligible for post-conviction relief if, among other things, he pleads and proves by a preponderance of the evidence that "ineffective assistance of counsel which, in the circumstances of the particular case, so undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place." 42 Pa.C.S.A. 9543(a)(2)(ii). The petitioner must establish, in the case of a guilty plea, that it was "unlawfully induced where the circumstances make it likely that the inducement caused the petitioner to plead guilty and the petitioner is innocent." Id., at (a)(2)(iii). Mr. Crawford's complaint is that his plea counsel agreed with the prosecution that he would be better served with a state sentence because the state parole system would make certain drug programs available to him. He suggests that he was assured, by everyone involved in his pleas of guilty, that a state sentence was being sought because the county system had somehow 02-0568,02-0576 failed him. This argument is, at best, disingenuous. It is clear from the guilty plea colloquy that Assistant District Attorney Jonathan Birbeck had no intention of agreeing to the set sentence unless it was a state sentence. While he stated it more diplomatically, the clear import of Mr. Birbeck's comments were to the effect that the county system had had enough of Mr. Crawford and did not wish to deal with him in the event that he reoffended. (Guilty Plea and Sentencing Proceedings, N.T. 4-5). In the meantime, Ms. Rhoades had explained to the defendant "[n]umerous times" that the matter of Mr. Crawford's parole was ultimately at the discretion of the parole board rather than the undersigned. She made it clear to Mr. Crawford that the Cumberland County Probation Department had exhausted all of their options with regard to the defendant. (P.C.R.A. Proceedings, N.T. 23). After his sentencing, Mr. Crawford did not seek to file a motion to modify nor did he ask Ms. Rhoades to file an appeal. Id. The sentencing guidelines in Mr. Crawford's case suggested a standard range sentence of not less one nor more than nine months. Mr. Crawford received a sentence of the minimum length in the standard range. Given the position of the Cumberland County Probation Department, he would no doubt, in any event, have received a state sentence. In the meantime, he has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his plea of guilty was unlawfully induced where the circumstances made it likely that the inducement caused him to plead guilty when he is, in fact, innocent. To the contrary, during our recent post- conviction relief act hearing, he made it clear that he was, in fact, guilty of the crimes charged. This case is readily distinguishable from the recent Superior Court matter of Com. v. Hickman, 799 A.2d 136 (Pa. Super. 2002). In that case, the defendant, after pleading guilty to possession with intent to deliver and criminal conspiracy to possess with intent to deliver cocaine 2 02-0568,02-0576 and marijuana, petitioned for post-conviction relief based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The Superior Court held that counsel's advice prejudiced appellant Hickman. In that case, counsel had given the defendant reason to believe that he would be eligible for the six- month boot camp program after he had served the first two years of his four-year minimum sentence. Hickman pled guilty and received an agreed upon four- to eight-year sentence. Appellant was statutorily ineligible for release to boot camp and therefore was not able to be paroled until he had served at least four years imprisonment. "Thus based on an ignorance of relevant sentencing law, counsel's advice was legally unsound and devoid of any reasonable basis designed to effectuate Appellant's Interest." Id. at 141. In our case, Ms. Rhoades's advice was not "legally unsound." Ms. Rhoades counseled Mr. Crawford numerous times that it was up to the state as to when he would be paroled. In the meantime, she procured for her client a sentence at the lowest end of the standard range. Her actions were clearly designed to effectuate Mr. Crawford's interest. ORDER day of February, 2003, the petition of the defendant for post- AND NOW, this conviction relief is DENIED. BY THE COURT, Jaime Keating, Esquire Chief Deputy District Attorney Charles Mackin, Esquire Court-appointed for Defendant Kevin A. Hess, J. 3 COMMONWEALTH VS. MICHAEL L. CRAWFORD AND NOW, this conviction relief is DENIED. IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 02-568 CRIMINAL 02-576 CRIMINAL PO ST-CONVICTION RELIEF ORDER day of February, 2003, the petition of the defendant for post- BY THE COURT, Jaime Keating, Esquire Chief Deputy District Attorney Charles Mackin, Esquire Court-appointed for Defendant :rlm Kevin A. Hess, J.