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HomeMy WebLinkAbout02-5049 CivilDARYL STRICK, Appellant Vo IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA CIVIL ACTION - LAW COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, BUREAU OF DRIVER LICENSING, Appellee NO. 02-5049 CIVIL TERM IN RE: OPINION PURSUANT TO PA. R.A.P. 1925 OLER, J., February 13, 2003. This license suspension appeal presents the issue of when an appeal must be filed from imposition of an ignition interlock system requirement by the Department of Transportation. Stated more precisely, the question is whether, in a case where the motorist's criminal sentence did not include an ignition interlock system requirement, an appeal must be filed within thirty days of the Department's Official Notice of Suspension providing notice of (a) the motorist's suspension, (b) the ignition interlock system prerequisite to restoration of driving privileges, and (c) the thirty-day appeal period from the Department's action. In this case, where the motorist filed an appeal from the Department's action with respect to the ignition interlock system almost a year after the official notice, the court granted a motion of the Department to quash the appeal as untimely.~ From this quashal order, the motorist has appealed to the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court.2 In his statement of matters complained of on appeal, Appellant expresses the issues on appeal as follows: Order of Court, December 12, 2002. The order was entered on the docket by the prothonotary on December 16, 2002. 1. [Appellant] appeals the quash of his appeal, as the trial court erred when it was found that it was not timely filed. 2. Further, the trial court erred, because at the time [Appellant] filed his request for an appeal, when Commonwealth v. McManus, 2002 Pa. Super. 271 was still good law and said Superior Court case, even if withdrawn, was in full force and effect and mandated that the Court consider the appeal as timely filed. 3. [Appellant] challenges the subject matter jurisdiction of the Department of Transportation over him in the above captioned matter where no Order of Court ever existed mandating the Guardian interlock System apply to [Appellant], and where the Department of Transportation is taking or withholding his driver's license without any Order 3 of Court creating the statutory authority for it to do so. This opinion in support of the order quashing Appellant's license suspension appeal is written pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(a). PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS As the result of an incident on March 4, 2001,4 Appellant Daryl Strick pled guilty on September 4, 2001,5 in the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County, to driving under the influence.6 The sentence for this third offense overall7 did not include a requirement that he install ignition interlock systems on his motor vehicles as a condition of restoration of his operating privileges.8 : Appellant's Notice of Appeal, filed January 15, 2003. 3 Appellant's Concise Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal, filed January 27, 2003. 4 S~'¢ Commonwealth's Ex. 1, Hearing on Motion To Quash, December 11, 2002 (hereinafter Com. Ex. ~ (driving record). 5 See Com. Ex. 1 (notice of suspension). 6 See Appellant's Ex. 1. 7 See Com. Ex. 1 (driving record). 8 Appellant's Ex. 1; see Act of June 22, 2000, P.L. 466, §l(b), 42 Pa. C.S. §7002(b) (2002) (requirement that court order installation of ignition interlock device as condition for restoration of operating privileges by department, in case of second or subsequent DUI conviction). 2 As a result of Appellant's conviction, Appellee Department of Transportation mailed to Appellant an Official Notice of Suspension dated October 30, 2001.9 This notice, which Appellant received shortly after its mailing date,l° provided as follows, inter alia: This is an Official Notice of the Suspension of your Driving Privilege as authorized by Section 1532B of the Pennsylvania Vehicle Code. As a result of your 09/04/2001 conviction of violating Section 3731 of the Vehicle Code DRIVING UNDER INFLUENCE on 03/04/2001: Before PennDOT can restore your driving privilege, you must follow the instructions in this letter for COMPLYING WITH THIS SUSPENSION, PAYING THE RESTORATION FEE and PROVIDING PROOF OF INSURANCE. You should follow ALL instructions very carefully. Even if you have served all the time on the suspension/revocation, we cannot restore your driving privilege until all the requirements are satisfied. IGNITION INTERLOCK Before your driving privilege can be restored you are required by law to have all vehicle(s) owned by you to be equipped with an Ignition Interlock System. This is a result of your conviction for Driving Under the Influence. If you fail to comply with this requirement, your driving privilege will remain suspended for an additional year. You will receive more information regarding this requirement approximately 30 days before your eligibility date. In Commonwealth v. Mockaitis, 54 Pa. D. & C.4th 115 (Cumberland 2001), a challenge to the constitutionality of the statutory ignition interlock system requirement was upheld in an opinion authored by the Honorable Edgar B. Bayley of this court. The absence of a requirement in the sentencing order for installation of such a system is attributable to this holding. 9 Com. Ex. 1 (Official Notice of Suspension). l0 N.T. 6, Hearing, December 11, 2002 (hereinafter N.T. ~. 3 APPEAL You have the right to appeal this action to the Court of Common Pleas (Civil Division) within 30 days of the mail date, OCTOBER 30, 2001, of this letter. If you file an appeal in the County Court, the Court will give you a time-stamped certified copy of the appeal. In order for your appeal to be valid, you must send this time-stamped certified copy of the appeal by certified mail to: Pennsylvania Department of Transportation Office of Chief Counsel Third Floor, Riverfront Office Center Harrisburg, PA 17104-2516~ Appellant did not appeal from the action of the Department represented by this notice within thirty days of the notice.~2 About a year later, on October 17, 2002, Appellant filed an "Appeal from Suspension of Operator's Privilege,''~3 which is the subject of this opinion. This appeal cited Appellant's receipt of a Restoration Requirements Letter dated October 7, 2002, from the Department, noting various prerequisites to restoration of his license, including payment of a restoration fee, proof of insurance, and installation of the ignition interlock system on all of his vehicles. ~4 The appeal challenged in several respects the constitutionality of the statutory ignition interlock system requirement,~5 and pointed out that the statute had been declared unconstitutional by this county's court.~6 The appeal requested an order ~ Com. Ex. 1 (official notice of suspension). ~2 See N.T. 6-7. ~s Appellant's Appeal from Suspension of Operator's Privilege, filed October 17, 2002. ~4 Id. para. 2; Joint Ex. 2. ~5 Appellant's Appeal from Suspension of Operator's Privilege, filed October 17, 2002, paras. 6- 8. 16]d. para. 8; seeMockaitis, 54 Pa. D. & C.4th 115. 4 directing the Department to "issue [Appellant] a license forthwith, without any special requirements.''~7 On October 29, 2002, the court issued a Rule upon the Department to show cause why the relief requested by Appellant should not be granted.~8 In response to the Rule, the Department filed a substantive answer to the appeal and also moved to quash the appeal as untimely.~9 A hearing on the motion to quash was held by the court on December 11, 2002. Following the hearing, at which evidence was received and at which counsel placed their respective arguments with respect to the motion on the record, the court took the matter under advisement.2° On December 12, 2002, the court issued the order from which Appellant has appealed to the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court, granting the Department's motion to quash the appeal as untimely.21 DISCUSSION Rationale for selection of Official Notice of Suspension as a££ea/ event. The Official Notice of Suspension issued by the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation derives from authority provided by the legislature in section 1532(b) of the Vehicle Code. Act of June 17, 1976, P.L. 162, §1, as amended, 75 Pa. C.S. § 1532(b) (2002). This notice is the functional equivalent of an order of a ~v Appellant's Appeal from Suspension of Operator's Privilege, filed October 17, 2002, para. 11. ~8 Order of Court, October 29, 2002. 19 Department of Transportation's Response to Rule To Show Cause, filed November 15, 2002. :0 Order of Court, December 11, 2002. :~ Order of Court, December 12, 2002. Because of the court's quashal on this ground, it was not necessary to consider a second motion to quash, on other jurisdictional grounds, raised with Appellant's consent by the Department at the hearing. See N.T. 7-13. Following the court's quashal, Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration citing a subsequent decision by another judge of this court which reached a result different from that which had been arrived at in this case. See Heber/ig v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation, No. 02-4874 Civil Term (Ct. Com. Pls. Cumberland December 19, 2002) (Bayley, J.). Reconsideration of the order was not granted, however, and Appellant filed a timely appeal from the quashal. 5 government unit and is subject to a statutory right of appeal under the Vehicle Code and under the Judicial Code within thirty days. Act of July 9, 1976, P.L. 586, §2, as amended, 42 Pa. C.S. §§5571-5572; Smith v. Commonrvealth Department of Transportation, 749 A.2d 1065, 1066 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000); see also Act of June 17, 1976, P.L. 162, §1, as amended, 75 Pa. C.S. §1550(a) (2002). The importance to an orderly system of justice of a well-defined period within which appeals must be taken from agency actions is emphasized by (a) the rule that a right to appeal nunc pro tunc will be granted only in "extraordinary circumstances," such as fraud or a breakdown in court operations, Smith, 749 A.2d at 1066,22 and (b) the rule that the thirty-day appeal period is of jurisdictional dimension, Henning v. Commonrvealth Department of Transportation, 687 A.2d 20, 21 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1996); Heberlig v. Commonrvealth Department of Transportation, No. 02-4874 Civil Term (Ct. Com. Pls. Cumberland December 19, 2002) (Bayley, J.); Grissinger v. Commonrvealth Department of Transportation, No. 02-3842 Civil Term (Ct. Com. Pls. Cumberland October 24, 2002) (Bayley, J.). Support for the position that the period for appeal in the present context commences with the Department's Official Notice of Suspension is found in appellate caselaw, established practice, and considerations of practicality. With respect to caselaw, the Commonwealth Court has held that the ignition interlock system requirement is an incident, or continuation, of suspension as opposed to a mere condition of restoration, such as a restoration fee. Frederick v. Commonrvealth Department of Transportation, 802 A.2d 701, 703 n. 1 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002); Schneider v. Commonwealth Department of Transportation, 790 A.2d 363, 366 n.7 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002). The logical consequence of this incidence is that an appeal under section 1550(b) of the Vehicle Code23 (pertaining 22 The present case does not involve an appeal nunc pro tunc. N.T. 7. 23 See Act of June 17, 1976, P.L. 162, §1, as amended, 75 Pa. C.S. §1550(a) (judicial review of Department license suspensions, etc.) 6 to appeals from suspensions, revocations, etc., and subject to a thirty-day timeliness requirement24) lies from the Department's initial notice of suspension on a challenge to the ignition interlock system requirement. See Frederick, 802 A.2d at 702 (referring to such an appeal as "timely" and adjudicating motorist's challenge to imposition of ignition interlock system requirement by Department).25 With respect to established practice, it appears that challenges to the Department's action in connection with the ignition interlock system are almost invariably being filed from the Department's Official Notice of Suspension, notifying the motorist of the ignition interlock system requirement. See, e.g., Turner v. Commonwealth Department of Transportation, 805 A.2d 671 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002); Frederick, 802 A.2d 702-03; Schneider, 790 A.2d at 365; Garretson v. Commonwealth Department of Transportation, No. 02-3832 Civil Term (Ct. Com. Pis. Cumberland December 5, 2002); Myers v. Commonwealth Department of Transportation, No. 02-2018 Civil Term (Ct. Com. Pis. Cumberland July 29, 2002); Stone v. Commonwealth Department of Transportation, No. 02-1888 Civil Term (Ct. Com. Pis. Cumberland July 25, 2002); Adcock v. Commonwealth Department of Transportation, No. 02-1400 Civil Term (Ct. Com. Pis. Cumberland June 20, 2002); Ward v. Commonwealth Department of Transportation, No. 01-3209 Civil Term (Ct. Com. Pis. Cumberland June 12, 2002); Commonwealth Department of Transportation v. Richardson, No. 01-6604 Civil Term (Ct. Com. Pis. Cumberland May 6, 2002) (Hess, J.). :4 "Appeals from Department of Transportation decisions suspending drivers licenses are granted as of right by Section 1550 of the Vehicle Code .... Jurisdiction of such appeals lies in the courts of common pleas as provided by Section 933 of the Judicial Code, . . . and an appeal must be made there within thirty days .... "Henning v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 687 A.2d 20, 21 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1996). :5 Ironically, in Frederick, the Department had contended that the notice of suspension was not the proper time to raise the ignition interlock system requirement issue, because it had not ripened at that stage. Frederick, 802 A.2d at 702. 7 Finally, in view of the need to select one of several possibilities for an appeal period in the present context, the most practical one seemed to the court to be the one traditionally applicable to appeals from actions by the Department--the official notice of suspension, containing notice, in addition to that of the basic suspension, of the continuation of the suspension in the absence of installation of ignition interlock systems in the motorist's vehicles and of the thirty-day appeal period applicable to the Department's action. Other possible events for commencement of the appeal period--such as the restoration letter, the date of rejection by the Department of a request for restoration, and the initial date of the continuation of suspension--did not, in the court's view, offer the advantages inherent in familiar practice. Effect of Commonrvealth v. McManus. upon Commonwealth v. McManus, 2002 With respect to Appellant's reliance PA Super 271 (Pa. Super. Ct.), withdrawn, No. 479 WDA 2001 (Pa. Super. Ct. October 29, 2002) (per curiam), to support the timeliness of his appeal, it is believed that the reliance is misplaced. In McManus, the Superior Court affirmed a judgment of sentence on a direct appeal challenging the constitutionality of the ignition interlock system requirement, basing its decision primarily on the ground that the ignition interlock requirement involved a civil consequence as opposed to an incident of sentence. In dictum, the court opined that in any event an appeal from this aspect of the sentencing order was interlocutory, stating that "[t]he ignition interlock order of [an] offender only becomes ripe for review.., when [an] offender seeks restoration of his operating privileges and it is denied by PennDOT because of his failure to comply with the ignition interlock order... [or] when [an] offender does not apply for an ignition interlock restricted license and his license suspension continues for an additional year." Id. at ¶ 22. The opinion in McManus was with&awn by the Court on October 29, 2002. McManus, No. 479 WDA 2001. McManus is not, in this court's view, availing to Appellant in the present case. First, the opinion has been withdrawn and lacks precedential value. Second, 8 the portion of the opinion supporting Appellant's position was dictum; had the case been decided on the interlocutory issue, the result would have been a quashal rather than an affirmance. Third, the opinion was not filed until about eight months after Appellant's time to appeal from the official notice of suspension had expired. Fourth, Appellant's appeal was not predicated upon either of the events said in McManus to be a proper predicate for appeal--denial by the Department of a request for restoration or continuation of a suspension in the absence of an application for an ignition interlock restricted license--but was instead premised upon receipt of a restoration requirements letter. Subject matter jurisdiction of Department of Transportation. With respect to Appellant's contention that the Department exceeded its authority in imposing an ignition interlock systems requirement under the present circumstances, this fact would not serve to relieve Appellant from the duty to file a timely appeal from the Department's action. Shattuck v. Zoning Hearing Board, 93 Pa. Commw. 209, 217 n. ll, 501 A.2d 319, 323 n. ll (1985) (noting that, even though the "order may have been an ultra vires action by the board, ... the landowner's failure to file a timely appeal has taken that issue beyond this court's grasp"); see Commonwealth Department of Transportation v. Messa, 158 Pa. Commw. 645, 648 n. 1, 632 A.2d 954, 955 n. 1 (1993) (holding that, even though the lower court's "jurisdictional foundation [for the action] was vulnerable," the court lacked the ability to review the action because an appeal was not timely filed); J.B. Steven, Inc. v. Department of Transportation, 156 Pa. Commw. 360, 362-65, 627 A.2d 278, 279-81 (1993) (holding that court lacked jurisdiction to review an action of the Department when no timely appeal from the notice of the action was taken); see also Turner, 805 A.2d at 676 (stating that licensee who filed timely appeal in circumstances in which the Department lacked authority to impose ignition interlock systems requirement would be "relieved" of her existing obligation to comply with the Department's action); cf Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 87 S. Ct. 1824, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1210 (1967) (holding that a party may not defy a preliminary 9 injunction through process other than appeal regardless of apparent invalidity of the injunction). Many challenges to agency actions are premised upon a lack of authority,26 including cases in the present context challenging the Department's imposition of an ignition interlock systems requirement in the absence of a court order. See, e.g., Turner, 805 A.2d 671; Schneider, 790 A.2d 363. To excuse a motorist from the obligation to contest an action of the Department believed to be ultra vires by means of a timely appeal would, in the court's view, invite chaos in the administrative program pertaining to drivers and vehicles in the Commonwealth. See Shattuck, 93 Pa. Commw. at 217 n. ll, 501 A.2d at 323 n. ll; see a/so Wa&er, 388 U.S. 307, 87 S. Ct. 1824, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1210 (stating that "respect for the judicial process" mandates that individuals must pursue appeals from allegedly invalid orders before disobeying those orders and cannot "ignore all the procedures of the law" in disobeying an order before judicial invalidation). For the foregoing reasons, the court entered the order now on appeal quashing Appellant's license suspension appeal. BY THE COURT, J. Wesley Oler, Jr., J. Karl E. Rominger, Esq. 155 South Hanover Street Carlisle, PA 17013 Attorney for Appellant 26 See, e.g., Vernon Township Water Authority v. Vernon Township, 734 A.2d 935 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1999); In re Frederick F., 400 Pa. Super. 542, 583 A.2d 1248 (1990); Shattuck, 93 Pa. Commw. 209, 501 A.2d 319. 10 Harold Cramer, Esq. Elaine Blass, Esq. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Department of Transportation Third Floor, Riverfront Office Center 1101 South Front Street Harrisburg, PA 17104-2516 Attorney for Appellee 11