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HomeMy WebLinkAbout00-1052 SupportSARAH E. HEITZMAN-NOLTE,: Plaintiff IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA Vo CIVIL ACTION - SUPPORT CARL R. NOLTE, Defendant PACSES NO. 978102896 NO. 00-1052 SUPPORT IN RE: PLAINTIFF'S EXCEPTIONS TO MASTER'S REPORT PURSUANT TO RULE 1910.12(f) BEFORE OLER, J. OPINION and ORDER OF COURT OLER, J., April 4, 2003. In this child support case, Plaintiff mother has filed a petition to continue Defendant father's child support obligation beyond the eighteenth birthday of the parties' child, who suffers from congenital blindness, which, Plaintiff mother asserts, prevents the child from supporting himself. Following a hearing before the Cumberland County Support Master, an interim order of court, based on the Support Master's report and recommendation, was entered directing that Defendant father's child support obligation would terminate on the child's eighteenth birthday. For disposition at this time are exceptions to the Support Master's report and recommendation filed by Plaintiff mother. For the reasons stated in this opinion, the exceptions will be dismissed. STATEMENT OF FACTS Plaintiff Sarah E. Heitzman-Nolte and Defendant Carl R. Nolte are married but separated, and both currently reside in Carlisle, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania. The parties are the parents of Andrew J. Nolte, born August 8, 1984.~ On June 24, 2002, following a hearing before the Support Master, an order was entered in which Defendant father was obligated to pay spousal support in the amount of $438.00 per month and child support, for Andrew, in the amount of $778.00 per month.2 ~ N.T. 3, Supp. Master Hr'g, Oct. 15, 2002 (hereinafter N.T. ~; Supp. Master's Report and Recommendations, filed Oct. 22, 2002, paras. 1-4. On August 2, 2002, Plaintiff mother filed a petition to continue Defendant father's child support obligation beyond Andrew's eighteenth birthday, on August 8, 2002.3 At the hearing on the petition, Plaintiff mother presented uncontradicted evidence that Andrew has suffered from congenital blindness since birth.4 Plaintiff mother argued that this condition prevents Andrew, who began attending Messiah College on a full scholarship in September 2002,5 from obtaining employment to support himself and that, therefore, Defendant father's child support obligation should continue. In support of this contention, Plaintiff mother presented the testimony of a counselor with the Pennsylvania Bureau of Blindness and Visual Services, which provided resource and financial assistance to Andrew,6 and of the owner of a business, which provided computer hardware and software to help Andrew complete his educational assignments.7 The witnesses testified that Andrew requires resource assistance to complete most tasks and that he qualified for state support due to his disability; however, neither could testify that Andrew was unable to obtain employment to support himself because of his disability.8 According to the testimony of the counselor with the Bureau of Blindness and Visual Services, which also provides employment 2 The Support Master determined that the net monthly incomes of Plaintiff mother and Defendant father are, respectively, $1,787.49 and $3,992.47. Supp. Master's Report and Recommendations, filed Oct. 22, 2002, para. 7. For purposes of this case, the parties stipulated that their incomes have not changed since that time. N.T. 2. 3N.T. 2-3. 4 N.T. 31-32. 5 N.T. 29, 41-43. As the Support Master noted, "[s]cholarships and grants cover all of Andrew's college expenses." Supp. Master's Report and Recommendations, filed Oct. 22, 2002, para. 10. Andrew, who is a National Merit Scholar, is planning to enter the ministry upon completion of college. N.T. 39-41. 6N.T. 4-6, 10-11, 13-14. 7 N.T. 18-20, 22-23. 8 N.T. 8, 11. 2 placement assistance, Andrew had not sought help in obtaining a part-time or full-time job.9 Plaintiff mother and Andrew testified that Andrew, with the assistance provided by Pennsylvania Bureau of Blindness and Visual Services, has been able to navigate successfully the college grounds and to handle his coursework.~° Andrew lives in a dormitory room while at college, but returns to Plaintiff mother's home during breaks. ~ Andrew's roommate and other classmates assist him in daily activities, but Andrew is generally able to perform daily functions independently.~2 Andrew has never held a job, and does not intend to obtain one during his post-secondary studies.~3 Plaintiff mother generally drives Andrew off-campus when necessary. ~4 On October 22, 2002, the Support Master filed a report recommending that Plaintiff mother's petition to continue child support be denied.~5 The Support Master, after reviewing the testimony of Plaintiff mother's witnesses, stated that, although "Andrew has a physical handicap," he is "extremely intelligent" and "appears to be handling college life as well as any new freshman," and the report distinguished other cases, in which a continuing obligation of support had been imposed, involving children who were mentally disadvantaged.~6 The report noted that Andrew "is doing everything possible to be a regular college student," but that he "is not making an effort to be self- supporting." The Support Master concluded that, "[m]ost importantly, for the purposes of 9 N.T. 10-14. l0 N.T. 32-38, 57-59. ~ N.T. 30-34, 57-58. ~2 N.T. 34-38. ~3 N.T. 48-49, 59. But see N.T. 53-54 (testimony of Andrew) ("I worked under -- well, I worked for a family at my friend's church one summer, but it was about my only work experience."). ~4 N.T. 46, 57. ~5 Supp. Master's Report and Recommendations, filed Oct. 22, 2002. 3 this case, neither he nor the Plaintiff [mother] have met the burden of proof that his physical condition prevents him from being self-supporting.''~7 Accordingly, an interim order of court denying Plaintiff mother's petition was entered.~8 On April 5, 2002, Plaintiff mother filed exceptions to the Support Master's Report and Recommendation in which she made the following contentions: 1. The Support Master's Report and Recommendation... is against the weight of the evidence. 2. The Support Master's Report and Recommendation is contrary to law. 3. The Master erred in determining that Andrew James Nolte, who is blind since birth, did not prove the conditions which make it impossible currently for him to be employed. 4. The Master erred in determining that, because Andrew James Nolte is on the opposite end of the intellectual spectrum from the adult children in [cases in which a continuing obligation of support had been imposed], he is not entitled to support from [Defendant] father .... [5.-6.] The Master erred in determining that, because Andrew James Nolte is extremely bright[,] attends college,... [and] is doing everything possible to be a regular college student despite his blindness, he is not making an effort to be self-supporting. 7. The Master erred in determining that neither Andrew James Nolte nor Plaintiff [mother] met the burden of proving that Andrew James Nolte's blindness prevents him from being currently self-supporting. [8.-9.] The Master erred in determining that Andrew James Nolte resides in a college dormitory [and] ... will return to [Plaintiff mother's] home during breaks from college. 10. The Master erred in recommending that the Court terminate [Defendant father' s] child support obligation. 11. The Master's recommendation to terminate [Defendant father's] child support obligation shifted the full responsibility for Andrew ~7 ld' la Order of Ct., Oct. 22, 2002. In light of the changes in the parties' respective incomes effected by the termination of Defendant father's child support obligation, and in accordance with the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, the order increased Defendant father's spousal support obligation from $438.00 per month to $882.00 per month effective August 8, 2002. Id. Neither party has challenged this aspect of the order. 4 James Nolte's support to Plaintiff [mother], in contravention of well-settled law.19 Briefs were submitted by both parties on the issues presented by the exceptions. DISCUSSION Statement of Law Review of Exceptions to Support Master's Report. In child support cases, the trial court should give a report issued by a support master the "fullest consideration," particularly with respect to the credibility of witnesses, but the court still must conduct its own review of the evidence to determine whether the master's recommendations are proper. Goodman v. Goodman, 375 Pa. Super. 504, 507, 544 A.2d 1033, 1035 (1988); Gomez v. Gomez, 11 Phila. Co. Rptr. 211, 226-27 (1984). With respect to the issues raised by exceptions filed by a party to a master's report, "[i]t is the sole province and the responsibility of the [trial] court to set an award of support, however much it may choose to utilize a master's report." Goodman, 375 Pa. Super. at 507-08, 544 A.2d at 1035; see also Pa. R.C.P. 1910.12(f)-(h) (stating that, if no exceptions are filed to certain issues in master's report and interim order, those issues are not presented for review). Obligation of Support. The obligation of both parents to support their minor children is "nearly absolute"; however, this obligation is generally presumed to be discharged when the child reaches the age of eighteen and has graduated from high school. Hanson v. Hanson, 425 Pa. Super. 508, 512, 625 A.2d 1212, 1214 (1993); see Blue v. Blue, 532 Pa. 521, 529, 616 A.2d 628, 632 (1992);20 see also Act of Oct. 30, 19 PI.'s Exceptions to Master's Report Pursuant to Rule 1910.12(f), filed Nov. 1, 2002. 20 In Blue v. Blue, 532 Pa. 521, 616 A.2d 628 (1992), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court declined to follow Pennsylvania Superior Court precedent by holding that parents are not obliged to support their children's post-secondary education, but that "a parental duty of support is owed until a child reaches 18 or graduates from high school, whichever event occurs later." Id at 529, 616 A.2d at 632. The following year, this holding was superseded by the enactment of Act 62 of 1993, see Act of July 2, 1993, P.L. 431, 23 Pa. C.S. §4327 (1993), which provided that "[t]he responsibility to provide for postsecondary educational expenses is a shared responsibility between both parents" and that "a court may order either or both parents who are separated, divorced, unmarried or otherwise subject to an existing support obligation, to provide equitably for educational 1985, P.L. 264, 23 Pa. C.S. § 4321 (2001) (providing that "[p]arents are liable for the support of their children who are unemancipated and 18 years of age or younger," and that "[p]arents may be liable for the support of their children who are 18 years of age or older") (emphasis added), cited in Hanson, 425 Pa. Super. at 512, 625 A.2d at 1214. The presumption of parental discharge upon the child's majority may be overcome only by evidence that the child "has a physical or mental condition which exists at the time the child reaches majority and prevents the child from being self-supporting or emancipated." Crarvford v. Crarvford, 429 Pa. Super. 540, 551, 633 A.2d 155, 160 (1993) (citing Hanson, 425 Pa. Super. 508, 625 A.2d 1212). Thus, the party seeking to establish a support obligation on behalf of a child who is over the age of eighteen and no longer in high school bears the burden of showing that the child is neither "physically [nor] mentally able to engage in profitable employment" and that "employment is [not] available to [the] child at a supporting wage." Hanson, 425 Pa. Super. at 512, 625 A.2d at 1214. In determining whether this burden has been met, courts should consider, inter alia, the work history, educational level, mental and emotional capacity, and medical needs of the child; however, evidence that a child suffers from a disability is, without more, insufficient to prove entitlement to continuing support. Id at 512-13, 625 A.2d at 1214; Crarvford, 429 Pa. Super. at 552, 633 A.2d at 160; see also Verna v. Verna, 288 Pa. Super. 511, 516, 432 A.2d 630, 632 (1981). The dispositive question in this analysis is whether an individual with the same mental and physical characteristics as the child, but not necessarily similarly situated in terms of societal or familial status, would be able to obtain supporting employment, sufficient to allow the costs of their child whether an application for this support is made before or after the child has reached 18 years of age." Id § 4327(a); see also Hecker v. 0 'Connell, 427 Pa. Super. 608, 611, 629 A.2d 1036, 1037 (1993) (recognizing statute's effect of "nullify[ing] Blue"). However, in Curtis v. Kline, 542 Pa. 249, 666 A.2d 265 (1995), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, while recognizing that the Pennsylvania legislature had intended to displace the Blue decision, held that section 4327(a) violated the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution, see id at 253, 260, 666 A.2d at 267, 270, and, accordingly, Blue remains controlling precedent. 6 individual to meet at least his or her reasonable living expenses.2~ See Blue, 532 Pa. at 529, 616 A.2d at 632 (stating that courts should not consider adult child's desire to attend post-secondary education in determining need for support); DeWalt v. DeWalt, 365 Pa. Super. 280, 286-87, 529 A.2d 508, 511-12 (1987) (stating that court should not consider familial status in determining support obligation with respect to disabled adult child); see also Hanson, 425 Pa. Super. at 512, 625 A.2d at 1214 (finding that adult child was unemancipated although child was holding a full-time job); Verna, 288 Pa. Super. at 516, 432 A.2d at 632 (indicating that courts should not consider receipt of Social Security benefits as evidence of lack of emancipation); York County Prob. Dep 't v. Creech, 12 Pa. D. & C.4th 331, 334 (York 1991) (stating that court should not consider, in emancipation analysis, intentional decision of child not to seek employment); cf Davis v. Davis, No. 2974, 1993 WL 211350, at *5-6 (Ohio Ct. App. June 16, 1993) (unpublished opinion) (stating that, in determining whether disabled adult child is capable of self-support, courts 2~ This conclusion follows from the language used in those opinions articulating the exception for post-minority age child support obligations. In determining whether a child has the ability to be self-supporting, these opinions frame the inquiry only in terms of whether, if necessary, the child could obtain employment that provides sufficient earnings to meet the child's reasonable and essential needs, without consideration of voluntary incurred obligations, financial or otherwise. See Hanson, 425 Pa. Super. at 512, 625 A.2d at 1214 (stating that test is whether child is "physically and mentally able" to obtain employment at a supporting wage); DeWalt v. DeWalt, 365 Pa. Super. 280, 286, 529 A.2d 508, 511 (1987) (stating that courts should consider "reasonable" expenses). Although certain aspects of the child's personal situation, including medical expenses and physical and mental ability, are necessarily considered to determine employment prospects and essential living costs, see, e.g., Hanson, 425 Pa. Super. at 512, 625 A.2d at 1214, the analysis is essentially objective in that courts generally disregard the child's subjective characteristics, such as a desire to pursue post-secondary educational opportunities, see Blue, 532 Pa. at 529, 616 A.2d at 632, in determining if the child lacks the ability to obtain supporting employment. In this way, the standard for determining the emancipation status of an adult child is similar to the "reasonable person" concept of tort law. Cf Kuhns v. Brugger, 390 Pa. 331, 340, 135 A.2d 395, 401 (1957) ("Both an adult and a minor are under an obligation to exercise reasonable care; however, the 'reasonable care' required of a minor is measured by a different yardstick -- it is that measure of care which other minors of like age, experience, capacity and development would ordinarily exercise under similar circumstances."), cited in Stervart v. Motts, 539 Pa. 596, 604-05, 654 A.2d 535, 538-39 (1995). 7 should not consider charitable assistance and other funding specific to the individual's personal situation). Application of Law to Facts In this case, the court is of the opinion that Plaintiff mother has failed to show that Andrew's physical condition renders him unable to obtain self-supporting employment. To prove entitlement to post-minority age child support, the burden is on the party seeking support to establish that the child is neither "physically [nor] mentally able to engage in profitable employment" and that "employment is [not] available to [the] child at a supporting wage." Hanson, 425 Pa. Super. at 512, 625 A.2d at 1214. In the present case, no evidence admitted at the hearing suggested that Andrew had sought employment or that employment at a supporting wage was unavailable to him. Although Andrew's disability may preclude him from obtaining employment that requires visual acuity, the evidence in this case tended to show that Andrew, although legally blind, is able to perform daily functions with a reasonable degree of independence22 and clearly has the mental capability to engage in the occupation of his choice. As several witnesses for Plaintiff mother testified, Andrew, like others in his position, has developed skills, such as utilizing voice-recognition software and memorizing the layout of facilities, that have allowed him to handle his academic requirements and that may be transferred to a professional environment. Thus, Plaintiff mother has not met her burden of showing that Andrew is unable to attain profitable employment, at least sufficient to cover necessary living expenses, particularly in light of Pennsylvania's Human Relations Act, which prohibits discrimination in hiring because of a "disability or the use of a guide or support animal because of the blindness, deafness or physical handicap." Act of Oct. 27, 1955, P.L. 744, as amended, 43 P.S. § 955 (West 2001). 2: Although Plaintiff mother's exceptions suggest that the Support Master erred in finding that Andrew "resides in a college dormitory [and] . . . will return to [Plaintiff mother's] home during breaks from college," see Pl.'s Exceptions to Master's Report Pursuant to Rule 1910.12(0, filed Nov. 1, 2002, paras. 8-9, the court is of the opinion that these findings were clearly supported by the testimony of both Plaintiff mother and Andrew. In her brief, Plaintiff mother argued that the court should consider Andrew's present situation as a college student, both in terms of the expenses and time commitment involved, in determining whether he is able to support himself. However, the determination of whether a child is "physically and mentally [un]able" to be self- supporting is an objective standard, based on whether a child with the same physical and mental characteristics would be able to attain employment sufficient to meet reasonable living and medical expenses, and does not permit consideration of subjective aspects of the child's life, including a desire to pursue post-secondary education)3 See Blue, 532 Pa. at 529, 616 A.2d at 632. Andrew's intent to complete his academic program is commendable; however, as the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has noted, at age eighteen, a child is no longer a minor and is not, under the present state of the law, entitled to support by a parent for a college education. Id. In the absence of a showing that individuals with the same disability and needs as Andrew would be unable to function independently and to obtain employment sufficient to cover necessary living expenses, the court is unable to order post-minority age child support solely on the basis of Andrew's personal, albeit admirable, desire to remain in college)4 Because Plaintiff mother has failed to carry the burden of establishing Andrew's inability to obtain supporting employment, the court is 23 See supra note 21. 24 In her exceptions to the master's report, Plaintiff mother suggests that the Support Master "erred in determining that, because Andrew James Nolte is extremely bright and attends college, he is not making an effort to be self-supporting." Pl.'s Exceptions to Master's Report Pursuant to Rule 1910.12(0, filed Nov. 1, 2002, paras. 5-6. This contention misapprehends the focus of the analysis as being on the subjective motivation of the child. Rather, as stated previously, the dispositive inquiry is whether an individual with the same abilities as the child could obtain supporting employment. See Hanson, 425 Pa. Super. at 512, 625 A.2d at 1214. Clearly, by going to college, Andrew is seeking to improve his prospects for a future career and is "making an effort to be self- supporting" in the future. See N.T. 39 (testimony of Andrew) ("[M]y goal is to become independent, to be able to support myself, to be able to live on my own .... "). However, the Support Master was correct is stating that, at present, Andrew is not making an effort to support himself. Because the child's present ability to obtain employment is the only relevant consideration in such an analysis, the Support Master's finding in this respect was supported by the evidence presented at the hearing. 9 constrained to order that Defendant father's child support obligation shall be terminated effective as of Andrew's eighteenth birthday. Because of the difficulties Andrew faces in performing tasks considered "routine" by others and because of the remarkable manner in which he has dealt with these obstacles, this case presents a sympathetic factual scenario in which an exception to an otherwise firm rule might seem justified. However, as Justice Holmes cogently observed nearly one hundred years ago: "[H]ard cases[] make bad law .... [I]mmediate interests exercise a kind of hydraulic pressure which makes what previously was clear seem doubtful, and before which even well settled principles of law will bend." N. Secs. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400-01, 24 S. Ct. 436, 468, 48 L. Ed. 679, 726 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Although the immediate interests involved in this case present a difficult and unfortunate situation, sympathy alone does not provide a valid basis for the court to deviate from a well-established rule. For the foregoing reasons, the following order will be entered: ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this 4th day of April, 2003, upon consideration of Plaintiff's Exceptions to Master's Report Pursuant to Rule 1910.12(1), and for the reasons stated in the accompanying opinion, the exceptions are dismissed and it is hereby ordered that the interim order of court dated October 22, 2002, shall constitute a final order. BY THE COURT, s/ J. Wesley Oler, Jr. J. Wesley Oler, Jr., J. Michael R. Rundle, Esq. Support Master 10 Theresa Barrett Male, Esq. 513 North Second Street Harrisburg, PA 17101 Attorney for Plaintiff Jacqueline Vemey, Esq. 44 South Hanover Street Carlisle, PA 17013 Attorney for Defendant 11 SARAH E. HEITZMAN-NOLTE,: Plaintiff Vo CARL R. NOLTE, Defendant IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA CIVIL ACTION - SUPPORT PACSES NO. 978102896 NO. 00-1052 SUPPORT IN RE: PLAINTIFF'S EXCEPTIONS TO MASTER'S REPORT PURSUANT TO RULE 1910.12(f) BEFORE OLER, J. ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this 4th day of April, 2003, upon consideration of Plaintiff's Exceptions to Master's Report Pursuant to Rule 1910.12(1), and for the reasons stated in the accompanying opinion, the exceptions are dismissed and it is hereby ordered that the interim order of court dated October 22, 2002, shall constitute a final order. BY THE COURT, J. Wesley Oler, Jr., J. Michael R. Rundle, Esq. Support Master Theresa Barrett Male, Esq. 513 North Second Street Harrisburg, PA 17101 Attorney for Plaintiff Jacqueline Verney, Esq. 44 South Hanover Street Carlisle, PA 17013 Attorney for Defendant