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Home My WebLink About02-1575 CivilMICHAEL P. GROGAN Plaintiff : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : CIVIL ACTION - LAW CARL W. SCHLEICHER/I.C.S.: Defendants : NO. 02-1575 CIVIL TERM IN RE: DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT HOFFER, P.J.: Before HOFFER, P.J. and OLER, J. OPINION Facts On May 6, 2002, plaintiff Michael P. Grogan filed his pro se Complaint naming Carl W. Schleicher, owner of plaintiff's former employer, Investigative Consultant Services, Inc. ("ICS"), as defendants. Plaintiff attached a number of documents to the Complaint to support his cause of action, including his employment agreement. Carl W. Schleicher is not a party to the employment agreement. The agreement is between ICS and Grogan. In his deposition, Grogan admitted that his employment agreement was only with the company, which he understood to be a bona fide corporation, and that Carl Schleicher was not a party to the agreement nor was he the one who issued plaintiff's pay checks. Defendants filed preliminary objections to the Complaint on May 17, 2002. Following oral argument, an order was issued denying the preliminary objections and requesting that a factual record be developed. Defendants then filed an Answer with New Matter to the Complaint, and plaintiff responded on November 15, 2002, with a pleading entitled "Plaintiff's Response".~ Finally, on November 6, 2002, the defendants took the deposition of Grogan. In his Complaint, Grogan alleged that defendant Schleicher had "used and forced his employees to sign employment agreements" that included a requirement to provide a specific type of personal vehicle. (Complaint at 1-1). Additionally, the Complaint stated that Grogan bought several vehicles, including a 1996 Ford Bronco, in accordance with the employment agreement. Apparently due to these allegations, plaintiff sought relief "for the financial obligation brought on by the Employment Agreement for the period of unemployment plus costs totaling $7,297.00." Id. In his deposition, Grogan attempted to further explain his allegations.2 Essentially, his claim is that ICS ~ In "Plaintiff's Response" the plaintiff amended the caption of the case changing the identity of the named defendant to "Investigative Consultant Services, Inc., Carl W. Schleicher, President." This change, made without leave of court, is in violation of Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1033, and thus is without effect. 2 Grogan: When I first went to work for ICS in 1986, we were issued company vehicles. The company policy changed in late 1990 or early 1991 which necessitated the purchase of a personal vehicle for company use. ...The program was put to us that we would be paid mileage and that Mr. Schleicher had reviewed records and represented that sum as $600 a month on the average. Q: But it was based upon the mileage actually incurred? A: Yes, sir. Q: Are you claiming in this lawsuit that you weren't reimbursed the mileage? breached the employment agreement by failing to pay plaintiff certain automobile expenses after plaintiff was terminated from employment. Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on this action, claiming that there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding whether plaintiff is entitled to reimbursement for automobile expenses incurred after his termination from ICS. Defendants rely on the deposition of Grogan, in which plaintiff admitted that "the employment agreement upon which he brings this action entitles him A: No, sir. Q: What are you claiming you weren't paid for...? A: I am claiming that for the period I am being restricted by the employment agreement since I incurred a debt because of the company policy and agreement the company should be liable for that period of- Q: So what you're claiming is after you were terminated, you still had this vehicle? A: Yes, sir. Q: And you were still paying on the vehicle? A: yes, sir. Q: But you weren't receiving travel and mileage expense from ICS since you were no longer employed by them? A: Correct. Q: And so what you're seeking to be paid is what you had to continue to pay on the vehicle after you were terminated? A: Yes, sir .... Q: Just so I understand it, the compensation that you're seeking to be paid for your vehicle is connected with your termination of employment? A: In my mind it's connected to the agreement I signed as part of my employment. Q: But once you were terminated, you're claiming the costs of the vehicle after you were terminated. A: Yes, sir. Q: You're not claiming that you weren't paid while you were an employee? A: No, sir. only to reimbursement for mileage during the period of his employment with [ICS] and...that he has been paid in accordance with the employment agreement." (Defendant's Brief at 2). After reviewing the record in its entirety, the Court is in agreement. Discussion Summary judgment, pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1035(b), should be granted when "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Pa. R.C.P. 1035(b). In this case, the question presented is whether there is any genuine issue as to any material fact regarding whether plaintiff is entitled to any more reimbursement for his automobile under his former employment agreement with ICS. The plain language of the employment agreement and plaintiff's deposition make it clear that there is no question of material fact regarding whether plaintiff is entitled to further reimbursement. Both documents clearly show that he is not entitled to any further reimbursement for his automobile expenses. Although Grogan has admitted that he was paid for all of his auto expenses during his employment (Deposition at 30), he is seeking through this action to be reimbursed for any costs he has continued to pay for his vehicle following his termination from ICS (Complaint at 1-1). His basis for this claim is that he was required to have a vehicle under his Employment Agreement with (Deposition at 29-32). ICS, and after his termination he had to continue making payments. (Deposition at 30). However, this argument is without merit? Plaintiff admitted that he has been paid all amounts to which he is entitled under the Employment Agreement and asserts no legal basis by which he can receive further reimbursement or compensation after his termination from ICS. Because there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding plaintiff's claim of reimbursement, defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 3 Certainly one of plaintiff's options was to get rid of the vehicle. MICHAEL P. GROGAN Plaintiff : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : CIVIL ACTION - LAW CARL W. SCHLEICHER/I.C.S.: Defendants : NO. 02-1575 CIVIL TERM IN RE: DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Before HOFFER, P.J. and OLER, J. ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, June 6, 2003, upon consideration of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, it is hereby ORDERED that said Motion is GRANTED and that Summary Judgment is entered in favor of Defendants, and Plaintiff's Complaint is DISMISSED with prejudice. By the Court: Michael P. Grogan PO Box 1555 Harrisburg, PA 17105-5555 Plaintiff Theodore A. Adler, Esquire Thomas O. Williams, Esquire Reager & Adler, PC 2331 Market Street Camp Hill, PA 17011-4642 Attorneys for Defendant George E. Hoffer, P.J. Michael P. Grogan 548 Walton Avenue Hummelstown, PA 17036