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HomeMy WebLinkAbout03-538 CriminalCOMMONWEALTH PAULA H. STAHL IN RE: IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 03-0538 CRIMINAL TERM MOTION OF DEFENDANT TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT Bayley, J., June 12, 2003:-- Defendant, Paula H. Stahl, is charged with a count of driving under the influence,~ and driving while her operating privilege was suspended? Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence on which a hearing was conducted on June 10, 2003. We find the following facts. At approximately 10:00 p.m. on January 19, 2003, Officer Jeremy Tappan of the Upper Allen Township Police Department was in his police station. He received a dispatch that a driver, who identified himself, indicated that a van was being driven recklessly on Route 15 south of Slate Hill Road in Upper Allen Township. Officer Tappan got into his police car and left the station to investigate. Another dispatch indicated that the van appeared to be getting onto the Pennsylvania Turnpike. A short time later the dispatcher indicated that the van had not proceeded on the Turnpike but was still southbound on Route 15. A further dispatch indicated that the van had exited ~ 75 Pa.C.S. § 3731(a). 2 75 Pa.C.S. § 1543(a). 03-0538 CRIMINAL TERM Route 15 onto Route 114 and proceeded in an unknown direction. The person providing the information relayed through the dispatcher the make, model, color and the Pennsylvania registration number on the van. As Officer Tappan was proceeding on Gettysburg Pike he saw the van described in the dispatches turn northbound toward him from Route 114. The vehicle came into his lane of travel at an angle and Officer Tappan had to move to the right in order to avoid a collision. The van passed Officer Tappan who turned around in pursuit. When he caught up to the van he turned on his signal lights and saw that the license plate matched the registration number of the van described in the dispatch. The van did not stop. When it reached English Street the driver put on a turn signal but continued straight. The officer turned on his siren. The van still did not stop. The driver signaled and made a left turn onto Greenway Drive, and then signaled and made a right turn onto Mayfield Drive. The driver then signaled and made a right turn into a driveway off of Mayfield Drive. The officer got out of patrol car and approached the van which had been driven by defendant. Further investigation resulted in the within charges. DISCUSSION Defendant maintains that all evidence obtained by the police after the stop must be suppressed because the stop was illegal. She argues (1) that Officer Tappan did not have sufficient information to form a reasonable belief that the vehicle he saw come off Route 114 onto Gettysburg Pike was the vehicle described in the dispatch, (2) the information described in the dispatch was insufficient to justify the stop of the vehicle, -2- 03-0538 CRIMINAL TERM and (3) the information described in the dispatch coupled with what Officer Tappan saw was insufficient to justify the stop. In Commonwealth v. Janiak, 368 Pa. Super. 626 (1987), the facts were: On September 12, 1986 two officers of the Williamsport Bureau of Police were in a police cruiser on duty in Williamsport at approximately 2:59 a.m. when they received a radio communication from County Communication facility that an individual had been reported in an intoxicated condition near gas pumps at a convenience store which was located one long block to the south and a long block to the west of the officers' location. That first dispatch indicated that the individual was about to drive away. The officers immediately turned in a southerly direction and as they approached the intersection with the east-west street they received a second telecommunication that the individual was now driving in an easterly direction on West Third Street. That would mean, according to the report, the vehicle would be proceeding from right to left on the intersecting street. The officers had seen no traffic going in any direction on the street that they had been on originally, no traffic going in either direction on the north-south street that they were presently on, and there was only one vehicle on the east-west intersecting street. That vehicle was somewhat to the east of the convenience market proceeding in an easterly direction toward the officers. The officers waited until the vehicle passed their location and then they made a left turn so as to follow the vehicle. They immediately activated their lights and stopped the vehicle at the next intersection. The only observation that they made with respect to the manner of operation of the vehicle was that it was proceeding at 15 to 20 miles per hour. Both officers stated that the sole reasons for their stop were (a) the report that an intoxicated individual was operating the vehicle, and (b) there belief under all of the circumstances that the vehicle could only be the one in question. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania reversed an order of the trial court suppressing all evidence gained by the police as a result of the stop. The Court stated: We held in Commonwealth v. Benson, 239 Pa. Super. 100, 107, 361 A.2d 695, 698 (1976), aff'd per curiam, 482 Pa. 1,393 A.2d 348 (1978), that the "intermediate response" outlined in [Adams v. Williams 407 U.S. 143, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972], permitted the police -3- 03-0538 CRIMINAL TERM in the early stage of their investigative work to rely on radio information to make a stop of individuals suspected of criminal activity. Likewise, in Commonwealth v. Prengle, 293 Pa. Super. 64, 437 A.2d 992 (1981), we found that information supplied to a police officer over a police radio that a burglary had been committed at a specific location, that the perpetrator would be driving a truck matching a particular description, and that the truck would be filled with certain stolen items allowed the officer to make an investigatory stop of a vehicle matching the description even though the officer had not "personally observed "unusual conduct'" or criminal conduct from the vehicle. Id., 293 Pa. Superior Ct. at 69, 437 A.2d at 994 (emphasis in original). Additionally, the officer in Prengle upon receiving the radio broadcast proceeded to and positioned his vehicle near an exit ramp of an expressway near the reported location of the burglary in an effort to cut-off the reported vehicle. Just some fifteen minutes from receiving the radio broadcast and only five minutes from reaching the exit ramp the officer in Prengle spotted the truck and made the stop. As in Prengle, the officers here were informed by two radio communications that a crime, i.e. driving while under the influence, was being committed and, within minutes of the reports, while acting in response to the reports, the officers saw a vehicle driving on the exact roadway and coming from the exact direction the vehicle was reported to be proceeding from. The trial judge found that based on its findings of fact "the police officer had reasonable grounds to believe that the individual who was the subject of the telephone calls in question was driving the vehicle which they in fact stopped .... "We find no abuse of discretion on the trial court's part in its determination that appellant's vehicle was in fact the vehicle in the police radio broadcast. Consequently, we find the police officers acted with reasonable suspicion and possessed specific and articulable facts which warranted the stop of appellant's automobile. Therefore, we reverse the trial court's suppression Order and find the evidence obtained as a result of the investigatory stop performed by the officers is admissible. (Footnote omitted.) A police officer is authorized to make a traffic stop whenever he has "articulable and reasonable grounds to suspect a violation" of the Vehicle Code. Commonwealth v. Gleason, 567 Pa. 111 (2001) (quoting 75 Pa.C.S. Section 6308(b)). In the case sub -4- 03-0538 CRIMINAL TERM judice, we conclude that Officer Tappan had a reasonable belief that the van he saw come from Route 114 onto Gettysburg Pike was the van identified by the person who told the dispatcher that it was being operated recklessly on Route 15. The description of the van sufficiently fit the report, and the timing of the officer seeing it fit perfectly. Reckless driving is a summary offense,3 however, the person providing the information to the dispatcher did not provide facts which formed a basis for his conclusion that the van was being driven recklessly. See Commonwealth v. Carney, 43 Cumberland L.J. 511 (1994). However, as the van proceeded from Route 114 onto Gettysburg Pike it came into the lane of travel of Officer Tappan at an angle which forced the officer to move to the right in order to avoid a collision. That is more than just erratic driving or a situation where a vehicle momentarily crosses over the middle of a road without immediate danger. See Commonwealth v. Battaglia, 802 A.2d 652 (Pa. Super. 2002). At the very least, Officer Tappan's observation of the way defendant operated her van as she came from Route 114 onto Gettysburg Pike provided reasonable grounds for him to believe that defendant had committed the summary offense of careless driving.4 That standing alone or coupled with the report of reckless driving a short time earlier on Route 15, justified the stop. 3 75 Pa.C.S. § 3736(a) provides that, "Any person who drives any vehicle in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property is guilty of reckless driving." 4 75 Pa.C.S. § 3714 provides that, "Any person who drives a vehicle in careless disregard for the safety of persons or property is guilty of careless driving, a summary offense." -5- 03-0538 CRIMINAL TERM AND NOW, this suppress evidence, IS DENIED. ORDER OF COURT day of June, 2003, the motion of defendant to By the Court, Daniel Sodus, Esquire Assistant District Attorney John B. Mancke, Esquire For Defendant :sal Edgar B. Bayley, J. -6-