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HomeMy WebLinkAbout02-4958 CivilMICHAEL P. GROGAN Plaintiff : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : CIVIL ACTION - LAW CARL W. SCHLEICHER/I.C.S.: Defendants : NO. 02-4958 CIVIL TERM IN RE: DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT HOFFER, P.J. Before HOFFER, P.J. and OLER, J. OPINION Facts On October 11,2002, plaintiff Michael P. Grogan filed a pro se Complaint naming Carl W. Schleicher, owner of plaintiff's former employer, Investigative Consultant Services, Inc. ("ICS"), and ICS as defendants. Although inartfully drawn, the complaint sounds in "wrongful discharge from employment." Plaintiff attached a number of documents to the Complaint to support his cause of action, including his Employment Agreement. Carl W. Schleicher is not a party to the Employment Agreement. The agreement is between ICS and plaintiff. In his deposition, plaintiff admitted that his employment agreement was only with the company, which he understood to be a bona fide corporation, and that Carl Schleicher was not a party to the agreement nor was he the one who issued plaintiff's pay checks. Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on this action, claiming that there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding whether plaintiff was wrongfully terminated from ICS. Defendants rely on the deposition of plaintiff, in which plaintiff admitted that his employment was "at-will" (Deposition at 20), and the Employment Agreement, which states, "1 understand that my employment is 'at-will' and may be terminated by ICS or me at anytime" (Employment Agreement at ¶4). After reviewing the record in its entirety, the Court is in agreement with the defendant. The Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure establish the standard of review for a motion for summary judgment: After the relevant pleadings are closed, but within such time as not to unreasonably delay trial, any party may move for summary judgment in whole or in part as a matter of law (1) whenever there is no genuine issue of any material fact as to a necessary element of the cause of action or defense which could be established by additional discovery or expert report, or (2) if, after the completion of discovery relevant to the motion, including the production of expert reports, an adverse party who will bear the burden of proof at trial has failed to produce evidence of facts essential to the cause of action or defense which in a jury trial would require the issues to be submitted to a jury. Pa. R.C.P. 1035.2. Under subparagraph (1) of Rule 1035.2, summary judgment may be granted if the material facts are not in dispute and "the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Dean v. Commonwealth, 561 Pa. 503, 507, 751 A.2d 1130, 1132 (2000). In this context, "the record must be viewed in the light most favorable to the [non-moving] party, and all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be resolved against the moving party." Id. at 507, 751 A.2d at 1132. Under subparagraph (2), summary judgment also may be granted if the non-moving party has not offered evidence sufficient to support its burden of proof on a key element of the claim or defense. Young v. Commonwealth Dept. of Transp., 560 Pa. 373, 375-76, 744 A.2d 1276, 1277 (2000). Viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the evidence in the present case may be summarized hereinafter. In his Complaint, plaintiff seeks compensation of $46,793.08 and punitive damages through a cause of action arising from the written Employment Agreement between plaintiff and ICS. The Complaint alleges that plaintiff was "capriciously terminated" for requesting, scheduling, and taking a vacation in accordance with company policy. (Compl. at ¶12). It also asserts that defendants expanded the meaning of the employment agreement through threats of termination. (Compl. at ¶¶7, 9-10). As evidenced by the Complaint and plaintiff's deposition,1 it seems that plaintiff has set forth an action for wrongful discharge. ~ In his deposition, plaintiff expanded on how Schleicher threatened him with termination. "There were a couple of occasions where he told me that I would have to conform with his new ideas of the company, that... I would have to regain his trust or prove myself to him generally speaking. He also threatened to fire me several times saying if I didn't do certain things or if I didn't follow certain guidelines or if I didn't Plaintiff was an at-will employee for ICS. His Employment Agreement stated that "1 understand that my employment is 'at-will' and may be terminated by ICS or me at anytime." (Employment Agreement at ¶4). Additionally, plaintiff stated in his testimony that he believed "the agreement speaks to at-will employment only." (Deposition at 20).2 The Complaint does not allege that defendants have violated any statutes or regulations. It only asserts that defendants "capriciously terminated" plaintiff, and that defendants "benefited from their capricious behavior and their bad faith Terms of Employment Agreements without ever having [sic] paid any consideration and doing substantial damage to the plaintiff both personally and professionally." (Compl. at ¶17). change certain attitudes, he was going to terminate me for those things." (Deposition at 35-36). 2 Plaintiff also stated that he did not have a clear understanding of what "at-will" meant, and that, in fact, he thought he could only be fired for cause. He alleged that Tom Maitland, the person who interviewed and hired him, told plaintiff he could only be fired for cause. (Id. at 19). However, when asked if there was something in the employment agreement that said he could only be fired for cause, plaintiff responded that he believed the contract only spoke to at-will employment. (Compl. at ¶20). Additionally, because plaintiff knew this was what the employment contract said, signed the contract saying he understood his employment to be at-will, and failed to question the meaning of at-will at the time he signed the contract, he must abide by the clear language of the contract. Discussion The question presented is whether there is any genuine issue of material fact regarding whether plaintiff was wrongfully discharged. It was the general rule in Pennsylvania for over a century that an employer may terminate an employee at any time unless restrained by contract. McGlaughlin v. Gastrointestinal Specialists,/nc., 561 Pa. 307, 314, 750 A.2d 283, 286 (2000) (citing Henry v. Pittsburg & Lake Erie Railroad Co., 139 Pa. 289, 21 A.157 (1891)). This rule remained intact until Geary v. United States Steel Corporation, 456 Pa. 171,319 A.2d 174 (1974), where the Pennsylvania Supreme Court opened the possibility for a wrongful discharge claim in situations where termination would violate a "clear mandate of public policy." Id. at 185, 319 A.2d at 180. The Supreme Court reaffirmed this position in Paul v. Lankenau Hospital, 524 Pa. 90, 569 A.2d 346 (1990), when it stated: [there is] no common law cause of action against an employer for termination of an at-will employment relationship. Exceptions to this rule have been recognized in only the most limited of circumstances, where discharges of at-will employees would threaten clear mandates of public policy. Id. at 94, 569 A.2d at 348, (citing Clay v. Advanced Computer Applications, /nc., 522 Pa. 86, 559 A.2d 917 (1989)). To assert a public policy exception to the at-will-employment doctrine in Pennsylvania, the employee must point to a clear public policy articulated in the constitution, in legislation, an administrative regulation, or a judicial decision. Hunger v. Grand Central Sanitation, 477 Pa. Super. 575, 580, 670 A.2d 173, 175 (1996) (citing Jacques v. Akzo Intemational Salt, Inc., 422 Pa. Super. 419, 619 A.2d 748 (1993)). The public policy must also be applicable directly to the employee and the employee's actions. Id. A few, narrow public policy exceptions to the at-will employment doctrine have been determined through case law regarding wrongful discharge. In Hennessy v. Santiago, 708 A.2d 1269 (Pa. Super. 1998), the court stated that these exceptions fall into three categories: [A]n employer (1) cannot require an employee to commit a crime, (2) cannot prevent an employee from complying with a statutorily imposed duty, and (3) cannot discharge an employee when specifically prohibited from doing so by statute. Id. at 1273. However, simple unfairness is not against public policy. Reese v. Tom Hesser Chevrolet-BMW, 413 Pa. Super. 168,604 A.2d 1072 (1992) (explaining there is no public policy exception to the doctrine of at-will employment even though employer required employee, as condition of continued employment, to reimburse it for losses attributable to action of employee); Darlington v. General Electric, 350 Pa. Super. 183, 504 A.2d 306 (1986) (finding there is no public policy exception to at-will employment doctrine even though employee was discharged unfairly in that he was not afforded the opportunity to defend himself against allegations of accounting irregularities). In the instant case, the plaintiff alleges that defendants expanded the Terms of Agreement through threats of termination and then "capriciously terminated" him for requesting, scheduling, and taking a vacation in accordance with company policy. (Compl. at ¶12). In his deposition, plaintiff further elaborated on his theory as to why he was terminated. Q Why do you believe you were terminated? A I was told by Mr. Schleicher the day he terminated me that I had publicly embarrassed him with his employees... Q Did Mr. Schleicher give you any details as to how you had embarrassed him in front of other employees? A He referenced the fact that I had scheduled and taken a vacation...It didn't make a lot of sense to me at the time. He just - the day I was terminated he called me into his office, said he was very disappointed with me, told me I had embarrassed him in front of the other employees and that he was terminating my employment. Q In the materials that you have attached to your complaint, you have like a journal? A Yes, sir. Q And in the journal there is reference to Mr. Schleicher telling you that you were going to be suspended and asking you to change your attitude and you indicated that you weren't going to change your attitude and that if he was going to fire you, he should just go ahead and fire you. Do you recall making that entry in the log? A Yes, sir. Q Is that the way things happened? A Not verbatim, but it's close. (Deposition at 18-19). The exchange referenced in the journal entry occurred on February 7, 2001. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 4). Plaintiff does not point to any clear public policy articulated in the constitution, in legislation, an administrative regulation, or a judicial decision of Pennsylvania to which defendants' behavior in terminating plaintiff has offended. Assuming that plaintiff's version of events is true, as we must for purposes of summary judgment, the fact that defendants fired plaintiff because he embarrassed defendant, albeit possibly unfair, is not against any articulated public policy. And even assuming plaintiff was fired for taking vacation time, this does not fit the narrow exceptions, for it did not force the plaintiff to commit a wrongful act, it did not prevent him from complying with a statutorily imposed duty, nor did defendants discharge him when specifically prohibited from doing so by statute. Because there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding plaintiff's claim of wrongful discharge, defendant Carl W. Schleicher and defendant ICS are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. MICHAEL P. GROGAN Plaintiff : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : CIVIL ACTION - LAW CARL W. SCHLEICHER/I.C.S.: Defendants : NO. 02-4958 CIVIL TERM IN RE: DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Before HOFFER, P.J. and OLER, J. ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, , 2003, following consideration of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and argument thereon, the Motion is granted and it is hereby Ordered and Decreed that summary judgment be entered in favor of Defendants, Carl W. Schleicher and Investigative Consultant Services, Inc. By the Court, George E. Hoffer, P.J. Michael P. Grogan PO Box 1555 Harrisburg, PA 17105-5555 Plaintiff Michael P. Grogan 548 Walton Avenue Hummelstown, PA 17036 Theodore A. Adler, Esquire Thomas O. Williams, Esquire Reager & Adler, PC 2331 Market Street Camp Hill, PA 17011-4642