HomeMy WebLinkAbout02-2590 CivilCENTRAL PA DATA SERVICES,
INC.,
Plaintiff
VS.
RICHARD DAME d/b/a SHARED
DATA SERVICES,
Defendant
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
02-2590 CIVIL
CIVIL ACTION - EQUITY
OPINION PURSUANT TO RULE 1925
Central PA Data Services, Inc.("Plaintiff") is a Pennsylvania corporation whose
principal place of business is 138 Tory Circle, Enola, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania.
(Plaintiff' s Complaint, para. 1.) The plaintiff is in the business of providing computer
consulting services. (Plaintiff' s Complaint, para. 3.) In 2000, Richard Dame d/b/a Shared Data
("Defendant"), an individual residing in Alabama, contacted the plaintiff about providing
consulting services as a subcontractor. (Plaintiff' s Complaint, para. 4.) The two reached an
agreement, without a written contract, and the plaintiff did consulting work for the defendant' s
clients on site. (Plaintiff' s Complaint, para. 9.) The plaintiff also alleges to have done a
substantial amount of work for the defendant's clients from its Cumberland County office.
(Plaintiff' s Complaint, para. 9.) At the request of the defendant, the plaintiff sent invoices and/or
time sheets to the following address: PNB 204, 60 Chelsea Corners, Alabama. The address is
the location of Post Net, a mail drop and business service operation used by the defendant as his
business address since its inception. (N.T. Richard Dame at p. 14.)
The plaintiff claims that the defendant breached the parties' agreement by failing to pay
$107,047.02 for services rendered to the defendant's clients. (Plaintiff' s Complaint, para. 14.)
The plaintiff initiated the lawsuit by filing a summons on May 28, 2002. The summons was
mailed via certified mail to the defendant at the PNB address. The summons was received and
signed for by Michele Hinton, a person unknown to the defendant. (Defendant's Petition to
Strike and/or Open Judgment by Default, para. 7.) The defendant alleges that he did not receive
the summons until late July 2002. (Defendant's Petition to Strike and/or Open Judgment by
Default, para. 10.) After the defendant received the summons, he drafted two letters to plaintiff' s
counsel. In the correspondence, the defendant set forth his address as being PNB 204, 60
Chelsea Corners, Alabama.
Although the complaint was issued July 24, 2002, the defendant claims he did not receive
it until mid August 2002. (Defendant's Petition to Strike and/or Open Judgment by Default, para
10(B).) Although the Praecipe to Enter Judgment by Default was issued on September 9, 2002,
the defendant claims he did not receive it until approximately September 24, 2002. (Defendant's
Petition to Strike and/or Open Judgment by Default, para. 10((2).) In his deposition the
defendant testified that PNB has signed for mail on his behalf in the past. (N.T. Richard Dame at
p. 89.) The defendant also testified that he picked up his mail at PNB every week. (N.T.
Richard Dame at p. 17.) Further, the defendant testified that he has received every legal
document filed in this matter. (N.T. Richard Dame at p. 17.)
This matter was initiated by the filing of a Praecipe for a Writ of Summons on May 28,
2002. The summons was mailed via certified mail to the out-of-state defendant at the following
address: PNB 204, 60 Chelsea Corners, Chelsea, Alabama. A signed receipt card for the
summons was received June 1, 2002, and was signed for by Michele Hilton.
A complaint was filed on July 24, 2002. A praecipe to enter default judgment was filed
and judgment was entered on September 9, 2002. Notice of the entry of the judgment was
mailed to the defendant on September 9, 2002. On October 22, 2002, defendant filed his petition
to open and/or strike the judgment entered. The plaintiff filed an answer to open/strike on
October 31, 2002. This court heard argument on the defendant's petition on February 10, 2003.
Subsequently, an order was entered, from which the defendant appeals, which order denied his
Petition to Strike and/or Open.
The defendant first asserts that service of process was not proper in this case. We
disagree. The defendant was served by mail at the only address which he used in his dealings
with the plaintiff. He admits that this address was proper and that he had specifically authorized
the "PNB" or Postal Net Box to receive his mail.
42 Pa.C.S.A. 5322(d) permits service of process outside of the Commonwealth.
Pa.R.C.P. 404 provides, specifically, for service by mail in such circumstances. According to
Rule Pa.R.C.P. 403, the process must be mailed to the defendant "by any form of mail requiring
a receipt signed by the defendant or his authorized agent." The creation of an agency requires
no specific formality. It is a question of fact and does not require proof of specific authority.
Rather, agency can be inferred from the facts giving rise to an implied intention to create the
relationship of principal and agent. See B & L Asphalt Industries. Inc. v. Fusco, 753 A.2d 264
(Pa. Super. 2000). In this case, Dame used the same address for all of his mail since the inception
of his business. He knew that the employees of Post Net would sign for his mail. He continued
to use the same address in correspondence to counsel after receiving notice of the initiation of
this action. We are satisfied, in this case, that process was mailed to the defendant and that it
was signed for by the defendant's authorized agent.
The other contention of the defendant is that the this court lacks personal jurisdiction over
the defendant because of a lack of minimal contact with Pennsylvania. In this case, the
defendant had frequent contact with the plaintiff to arrange for and discuss projects. Numerous
phone calls were made by the defendant to the office of the plaintiff in Enola, Cumberland
County. The defendant received a portion of each hour of time billed by the plaintiff. This was
for work done throughout the United States. Any bills sent to the defendant by the plaintiff were
paid by sending checks to the Enola office.
The bases for establishing personal jurisdiction over persons outside of the
Commonwealth are codified at 42 Pa.C.S.A. Section 5322. That statute confers such personal
jurisdiction where there is the transacting of business in this Commonwealth. 42 Pa.C.S.A.
5322(a)(1)(2). We are satisfied that the criteria of this statutory section have been met.
June 20,2003
David Baric, Esquire
For the Plaintiff
Kirk Sohonage, Esquire
For the Defendant
:rlm
Kevin A. Hess, J.