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HomeMy WebLinkAbout02-3841 CivilLARRY W. WILKINSON, PLAINTIFF V. THE HOUSING AUTHORITY OF THE COUNTY OF CUMBERLAND; CHRISTOPHER GULLOTA; SUE A. WOLF; CATHERINE MOWERY; AND YVONNE HECKLER, DEFENDANTS 02-3841 CIVIL TERM IN RE: PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS OF DEFENDANTS TO PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED COMPLAINT BEFORE BAYLEY, J. AND HESS, J. OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT Bayley, J., August 6, 2003:-- On March 17, 2003, plaintiff, Larry W. Wilkinson, filed an amended complaint against defendant, the Housing Authority of the County of Cumberland, and its employees, Christopher Gullota, Sue A. Wolf, Catherine Mowery and Yvonne Heckler, on causes of action for: I. Negligent infliction of emotional distress. II. Violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 794) and HUD Regulation 24 CFR B, Ch 1, § 100.204. III. Violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act and HUD Regulation 28 CFR Part 35. IV. Violation of Fair Housing Amendment Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3600-3620 et seq. IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 02-3841 CIVIL TERM V. VI. Violation of Pennsylvania Human Relations Act. Intentional infliction of emotional distress. Defendants filed preliminary objections in the form of a demurrer to all counts in the amended complaint. The objections were briefed and argued on May 21, 2003. A demurrer is to be sustained only where the complaint is insufficient to establish the pleader's right to relief. Allegheny County v. Commonwealth, 507 Pa. 360 (1985). A demurrer admits as true all well-pleaded, material, relevant facts and every inference fairly deducible from those facts. Id. Plaintiff avers the following in his amended complaint. On May 1, 1998, plaintiff leased from defendant, the Housing Authority of the County of Cumberland, Apartment 107 in Two West Penn Apartments in Carlisle. Two West Penn Apartments is a federally subsidized facility for elderly or disabled people. Plaintiff is permanently disabled by Bi-Polar I Disorder. As a result of this mental disability he is susceptible to mundane changes in his environment and he lacks the ability to cope normally with stressors. He has occupied Apartment 107, a ground floor unit, on successive one year leases since May 1, 1998. Apartment 107 is a mobility-impaired unit designed for individuals in wheelchairs. When plaintiff executed his lease, the tenant handbook and house rules of Two West Penn Apartments, which were incorporated into the lease, provided: UNIT TRANSFERS/SPECIALLY EQUIPPED UNITS: Due to operational concerns, management is unable to grant tenants requests for transfer to another apartment or facility under its' [sic] operation. -2- 02-3841 CIVIL TERM However, if the tenant is able to qualify for and obtain a physician's verification of handicap or disability requiring the design features of a unit specially equipped to enhance mobility he/she may transfer to such a unit when on (sic) becomes available (See Manager for appropriate request form). If a tenant is verified as such and would like to transfer to a specially designed unit, the tenant should notify management in writing that he/she would like to be placed on the waiting list for this unit. In keeping with Fair Housing Law and HUD regulations, current tenants requesting a specially equipped unit who possess the appropriate verification, will be given first opportunity at these units ahead of eligible non-resident applicants. If a family or individual without need for a specially equipped unit accepts and moves into one of these units, then they are doing so only on a temporary basis. If no one in the family is eligible for the unit and an eligible tenant or applicant applies for residency, then the existing eligible tenant (or family) will be required to transfer to a conventional (non-equipped) unit as soon as one becomes available, with at least 30 days advance written notice from the manager. The tenant shall be responsible for the moving procedure and any moving costs, if any. The landlord shall be responsible for any electric or telephone utility hook-up fees (except for cable TV) incurred due to the transfer. (Emphasis added.) At the time of the rental, defendant Mowery implied that plaintiff would not be subject to the transfer provision in the tenant handbook, stating "Don't worry about it." In May, 2000, the Housing Authority, through defendant Mowery, told plaintiff that it had received a request from a mobility-impaired disabled person to occupy a specially equipped unit, and because plaintiff was not mobility impaired, he would be required to transfer to another unit. Plaintiff used an in-house grievance procedure to request reconsideration. Through that procedure he met with defendant Heckler, but his request for reconsideration was denied. On May 26, 2000, plaintiff received a notice signed by defendant Wolfe that he would have to transfer from Apartment 107 to a unit -3- 02-3841 CIVIL TERM on the second floor. On June 2, 2000, plaintiff received another written notice signed by defendant Heckler that he must move. The notice stated that any further review of the decision could be made to the Department of Housing of Urban Development (HUD). On June 15, 2000, plaintiff received a notice signed by defendant Gullota that the Authority's decision was final and he would be moved with the assistance of its maintenance staff. On July 14, 2000, through counsel, plaintiff requested an accommodation from the Housing Authority to remain in Apartment 107. On July 18, 2000, the Housing Authority denied plaintiff's request and demanded that he transfer not later than July 31, 2000, or it would evict him. On July 28, 2000, plaintiff filed complaints with HUD and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission alleging discrimination and a failure to make a reasonable accommodation due to his disability. On August 1, 2000, the Housing Authority notified plaintiff that he had ten days to vacate the apartment for failure to transfer to another unit, and that he could appeal the decision to evict him by requesting a hearing with the Housing Authority. An informal hearing was conducted on August 22, 2000, but plaintiff did not receive relief. Following this hearing plaintiff began to suffer severe emotional distress at the prospect of having to vacate his apartment, and, in an effort to alleviate the stress, he began self-medicating through increased alcohol use. The Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission scheduled a fact-finding conference on plaintiff's complaint for November 13, 2000. The conference was cancelled and instead a conciliation conference with HUD was -4- 02-3841 CIVIL TERM scheduled and conducted on November 14, 2000. No resolution was reached at the conciliation so the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission rescheduled a fact- finding conference. On November 30, 2000, the Housing Authority issued a formal decision from the August 22, 2000, grievance hearing. It denied plaintiff relief, concluding that he had violated the provisions of the tenant handbook by not transferring from his apartment, and that "the proposed disposition is for the Authority to proceed with the eviction." On December 19, 2000, a fact-finding conference was conducted before the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission. On February 14, 2001, the Commission issued a finding of no probable cause. Plaintiff was given an opportunity to rebut the Commission's findings and conclusions, which he did. On February 26, 2001, the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission notified plaintiff that his rebuttal was referred to its administrative staff for review. On March 9, 2001, the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission dismissed plaintiff's complaint. After this denial, plaintiff's condition worsened as he believed his eviction was imminent. On March 19, 2001, he requested a formal hearing before the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission to contest the dismissal of his complaint. On August 16, 2001, plaintiff received written notice that the Housing Authority was working with HUD "in an effort to allow [him] to reside in his unit." On March 15, 2002, plaintiff received notice from HUD that the Housing Authority had entered into a settlement which would allow him to remain in Apartment 107. The agreement, to which plaintiff was not a party, sets forth it did "not constitute an admission by the -5- 02-3841 CIVIL TERM [Housing Authority] of any violation of Section 504, ADA, or State and local fair housing laws," with which the Authority agreed to comply. The Housing Authority agreed that plaintiff could continue to reside in Apartment 107, and that it would: [r]evise the language in its transfer policy to insure that it complies with all applicable fair housing laws and does not have a disparate impact on protected classes, including persons with physical and/or mental disabilities. Between May, 2000 and March 15, 2002, the fear of eviction, loss of this subsidy, homelessness, relocation and not being able to finance the protection of his rights, among other fears, were a tremendous psychological burden on plaintiff. On more than on occasion he suffered suicidal thoughts. I. ALLEGED NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS. Defendants maintain that plaintiff has not stated a valid cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress. In Armstrong v. Paoli Memorial Hospital, 633 A.2d 605 (Pa. Super. 1993), the Superior Court of Pennsylvania recognized the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress in the following two instances: First, and most commonly, in cases in which there is liability to a bystander, Sinn v. Burd, [486 Pa. 146 (1979)], and its progeny. Second, Pennsylvania also recognizes recovery in situations in which there is a contractual or fiduciary duty. Crivellaro [v. Pa. Power & Light Company, 341 Pa. Super 173 (1985)]; Hackett [v. United Airlines, 364 Pa. Super 612 (1987)]. Plaintiff argues that the second situation is applicable to this case because the Housing Authority, due to the tenant-landlord relationship and his disability, owed him a fiduciary duty. However, he must do more than merely show that defendants owed him -6- 02-3841 CIVIL TERM such a duty. "In order to recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress a plaintiff must establish, as in any other negligence case, the defendant's breach of a duty and damages proximately caused thereby." Shumosky v. Lutheran Welfare Services, 784 A.2d 196 (Pa. Super 2001). In addition, a plaintiff must also aver physical injury of a serious, continuing nature which accompanies the emotional distress. Armstrong, supra. In Basile v. H & R Block, Inc., 777 A.2d 95 (Pa. Super. 2001), the Superior Court of Pennsylvania stated: The Supreme Court has determined that a confidential relationship and the resulting fiduciary duty may attach "wherever one occupies toward another such a position of advisor or counselor as reasonably to inspire confidence that he will act in good faith for the other's interest." Although the language used to define such advisor/advisee relationships has varied over time and in response to the circumstances established by the record, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has focused, consistently, on the disparity in position between the parties to determine whether their relationship is, in fact, confidential. See Weir by Gaper v. Ciao, 521 Pa. 491,556 A.2d 819, 825 (1989) (stating that a confidential relationship "is created between two persons when it is established that one occupies a superior position over the other; intellectually, physically, governmentally, or morally, with the opportunity to use the superiority to the other's disadvantage"). See also Frowen, 425 A.2d at 418 (Quoting Restatement of Trusts 2d, § 2(b)) ("[a] confidential relation exists between two persons when one has gained the confidence of the other and purports to act or advise with the other's interest in mind"). We conclude that these cases, when considered together and in conjunction with prior authority, compel recognition of confidential relations between parties in a wide array of individual circumstances. The possibility of a confidential relationship cannot be excluded by a concrete -7- 02-3841 CIVIL TERM rule. So long as the requisite disparity is established between the parties' positions in the relationship, and the inferior party places primary trust in the other's counsel, a confidential relationship may be established. A cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress is tightly circumscribed in Pennsylvania. There is no authority that a landlord-tenant relationship gives rise to a fiduciary duty and permits the tenant to recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress. The fact that plaintiff qualified for an apartment with the Housing Authority and defendants knew of this disability when they rented him the apartment did not, as a matter of law, create an advisor or counselor relationship sufficient to make the Housing Authority a fiduciary. In Crivellaro v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 341 Pa. Super. 173 (1985), an employee sued her employer for negligent infliction of emotional distress for threatening to fire her unless she entered an intensive thirty-day drug and alcohol rehabilitation program. The trial court entered a demurrer, but the Superior Court of Pennsylvania reversed. The Superior Court did not state what duty was allegedly breached by the employer, and made no analysis of the claim other than to conclude that the harm suffered by the appellant was severe enough to sustain a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Relying on Crivellaro, the Superior Court in Armstrong stated that the existence of a contractual or fiduciary duty can give rise to a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. In Hunger v. Grand Central Sanitation, 670 A.2d 173 (Pa. Super. 1996), the plaintiff sought to recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress for being fired by arguing that Crivellaro held that employers owe a fiduciary duty to their employees. The Superior -8- 02-3841 CIVIL TERM Court rejected that contention because the plaintiff did not suffer physical injury; however, in a concurring opinion Judge Beck made this analysis: In Armstrong v. Paofi Memorial Hospital, 430 Pa. Super. 36, 633 A.2d 605 (1993) allocatur denied, 538 Pa. 663, 649 A.2d 666 (1994), however, this court clarified that although Crivellaro recognized a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress in cases other than those involving a plaintiff in the zone of danger or who witnesses injury to a close relative, it did not create an entirely new and independent cause of action. Rather, the Armstrong court held that Crivellaro should be read to allow recovery only in a situation where a separate, preexisting duty was owed by defendant to plaintiff and breach of that duty was the cause of the emotional distress alleged. Armstrong, supra at 50-56, 633 A.2d at 612-15. Under this interpretation of Crivellaro, the claim in that case was cognizable only because the actor, an agent of plaintiff's employer, breached a duty of care in the delivery of services to plaintiff. Appellant argues that the mere existence of an employer- employee relationship between himself and appellees is sufficient to bring his claim within the authority of Crivellaro. However, as Armstrong makes clear, the significant factor in making out a cause of action under Crivellaro is not the mere existence of a relationship between plaintiff and defendant, but rather the existence of a duty flowing from that relationship. Only where such a duty exists, is breached, and causes severe emotional distress leading to bodily harm can a cause of action under Crivellaro successfully be asserted. Here, appellant has failed to allege facts showing that the at- will employment relationship between him and appellees imposed upon appellees any duty which was breached when they "expressed resentment and ill feelings directly and indirectly to [appellant]," Complaint, or "harassed [him] concerning [his] actions with regard to his duties as safety director." In the absence of allegations establishing duty and breach, appellant's claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress cannot be permitted to proceed. (Emphasis added.) In the case sub judice, the landlord-tenant relationship does impose certain duties on defendants. See Mclntyre ex rel. Howard v. Philadelphia Housing Authority, 816 A.2d 1204 (Pa. Commw. 2003) (landlord must comply with statutory -9- 02-3841 CIVIL TERM duties and has an implied duty to maintain the premises in a habitable condition). However, it does not impose a fiduciary duty to protect plaintiff from the stress of a dispute over whether he lives in one apartment over another. Defendants did not have a contractual duty to allow plaintiff to remain in Apartment 107 because the tenant handbook, which was incorporated into the lease, expressly reserved the right to transfer a mobile tenant in a specially equipped unit to a non-equipped unit in order to accommodate a person with a physical handicap. The only contractual duty was to transfer plaintiff to another unit with thirty days written notice. Thus, plaintiff's averments that a contractual and fiduciary relationship existed and was breached is not supported by his pleadings. Plaintiff has two remaining arguments in support of his cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress. First, the Housing Authority had a duty to grant him an accommodation because of his mental disability. There is no authority to support this contention. Furthermore, he has been allowed to remain in his accessible apartment despite being mobile. Second, the Housing Authority owed him a duty to preserve and protect his quiet enjoyment of Apartment 107. A covenant of quiet enjoyment is breached "only when the tenant's actual possession is impaired." Rittenhouse v. Barclay White, Inc., 425 Pa. Super 501,625 A.2d 1208 (1993). Plaintiff has pled that he has continued to remain in Apartment 107 since his lease began on May 1, 1998. Thus, there has been no breach of the covenant of his quiet enjoyment. -10- 02-3841 CIVIL TERM For all of the above reasons plaintiff has not stated a valid cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Thus, we need not address whether he has sufficiently pleaded a physical injury of a serious, continuing nature accompanying his emotional distress to sustain a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF SECTION 504 OF THE REHABILITATION ACT OF 1973 AND HUD REGULATION 24 C.F.R. B, CH. 1, .~ 100.204. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, at 29 U.S.C. 794, provides that: "No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States... shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." HUD Regulation 24 C.F.R. B, Ch. 1 § 100.204 provides that it is unlawful to refuse to make reasonable accommodations in rules, practices or services when such accommodations are necessary to afford a handicapped person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling unit, including public and common areas. Plaintiff alleges in his amended complaint that he was entitled to an accommodation to allow him to continue to live in Apartment 107 even though he is not mobility-impaired, that defendants failed to grant him the accommodation, and that the accommodation was reasonable. A cause of action under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 requires that: (1) plaintiff is a handicapped individual within the definition of the Act; (2) plaintiff is otherwise qualified to participate in the activity or program in question; (3) -11- 02-3841 CIVIL TERM plaintiff has been excluded from participation solely because of a handicap; and (4) that the activity or program in question received federal funds. Strathie v. Department of Transportation, 716 F.2d 227 (3rd Cir. 1983). In the case sub judice, plaintiff has acknowledged that he continues to lease Apartment 107 which he started living in on May 1, 1998. The Housing Authority withdrew its efforts to have him move to an accessible unit. Therefore, he has not pled that he has been excluded from participation in any program solely because of his handicap. Accordingly, he has not stated a valid cause of action for a violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and HUD Regulation 24 C.F.R. B, Ch. 1 § 100.204. III. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT AND HUD REGULATION 28 C.F.R. PART 35. Plaintiff alleges in his amended complaint that defendants' interpretation and application of the transfer provision in the tenant handbook had a disparate impact on him by giving a physically handicapped individual preferential treatment. He alleges that the discriminatory conduct forced him to choose between moving or being evicted in order to allow an individual with a physical handicap to move into his apartment, which caused him physical, psychological, emotional and financial harm. To state a claim under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12132, plaintiff must establish that: (1) he is a qualified individual with a disability, (2) he was excluded from participating in or denied benefits of a public entity's services, activities or programs, or was otherwise discriminated against by the entity, and (3) such exclusion, -12- 02-3841 CIVIL TERM denial or discrimination was a result of his disability. Weinreich v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority, 114 F.3d 976 (9th Cir. 1997). While the Housing Authority sought to have plaintiff, who was not mobility impaired, move from his mobility-impaired apartment to a non-mobility impaired apartment, it never commenced an eviction proceeding against him and it ultimately agreed to allow him to stay in Apartment 107. Plaintiff's cause of action under the Americans with Disabilities Act fails because, by his own pleadings, he was never excluded from participating in or denied benefits or was otherwise discriminated against by the Authority. IV. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF FAIR HOUSING AMENDMENT ACT OF 1988, 42 U.S.C..~.~ 3600-3620 ET SEQ. The Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3600-3620 et seq., provides in Section 3604(f)(3)(B) that it is unlawful for a person to refuse to make reasonable accommodations in rules, policies, practices or services when such accommodations are necessary to afford a handicap person equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling unit, including public and common areas. To state a claim under the Act, plaintiff must show that defendants' actions had a discriminatory effect on him. Resident Advisory Board v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126 (3rd Cir. 1977). Plaintiff alleges in his amended complaint that defendants denied him a reasonable accommodation by giving another handicapped individual preferential treatment, and that conduct denied him an equal opportunity to use and enjoy his dwelling. That conclusion, however, is not supported by his pleadings in which he acknowledged that he was not excluded -13- 02-3841 CIVIL TERM from Apartment 107 and the Housing Authority ultimately accommodated his request to remain in that unit. Plaintiff's allegations fall short of establishing that the action of defendants had a discriminatory effect on him. Therefore, he has failed to state a valid cause of action for a violation of the Fair Housing Act of 1988. V. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF PENNSYLVANIA HUMAN RELATIONS ACT. The Pennsylvania Human Relation Act makes it unlawful to deny or withhold housing accommodations because of an individual's handicap. 43 P.S. § 955(h)(1). The Act makes it unlawful to refuse to make a reasonable accommodation in rules, polices, practices or services if accommodations are needed to afford individuals with equal opportunity to use and enjoy housing. 43 P.S. § 955(h)(3.2). Plaintiff alleges in his amended complaint that the transfer provisions relied on by defendant had a disparate impact on him by giving a physically handicapped individual preferential treatment, it forced him to choose between moving or being evicted so that a physically handicapped individual could move into his housing unit; and he was wrongfully denied his request for a reasonable accommodation in the form of an exemption from the transfer provisions. Those conclusions, however, are not supported by his pleadings in which he acknowledges that he was not excluded from Apartment 107 and the Housing Authority ultimately accommodated his request to remain in that unit. Therefore, he has failed to state a valid cause of action for a violation of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act. -14- 02-3841 CIVIL TERM VI. ALLEGED INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS. In Kazatsky v. King David Memorial Park, 515 Pa. 183 (1987), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania stated the following with respect to a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress: The cases thus far decided have found liability only where the defendant's conduct has been extreme and outrageous. It has not been enough that the defendant has acted with an intent which is tortuous or even criminal, or that he has intended to inflict emotional distress, or even that his conduct has been characterized by malice, or a degree of aggravation which would entitle the plaintiff to punitive damages for another tort. Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Generally, the case is one in which the recitation of the facts to the average member of the community would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim, "Outrageous!" Defendants note that HUD regulation 24 C.F.R. 8.27 provides: (a) Owners and managers of multi-family housing projects having accessible units shall adopt suitable means to assure that information regarding the availability of accessible units reaches eligible individuals with handicaps, and shall take reasonable non-discriminatory steps to maximize the utilization of such units by eligible individuals whose disability requires the accessibility features of the particular unit. To this end, when an accessible unit becomes vacant, the owner or manager before offering such units to a non-handicapped applicant shall offer such unit: (1) First, to a current occupant of another unit of the same project, or comparable projects under common control, having handicaps requiring the accessibility features of the vacant unit and occupying a unit not having such features, or, if no such occupant exists, then (2) Second, to an eligible qualified applicant on the waiting list having a handicap requiring the accessibility features of the vacant unit. (b) When offering an accessible unit to an applicant not having handicaps requiring the accessibility features of the unit, the -15- AND NOW, this to the amended complaint of plaintiff, ARE GRANTED. IS DISMISSED. 02-3841 CIVIL TERM owner or manager may require the applicant to agree (and may incorporate this agreement in the lease) to move to a non-accessible unit when available. (Emphasis added.) Thus in May, 2000 the Housing Authority, through its employees as allowed by this specific HUD regulation and the terms of plaintiff's lease, sought to have plaintiff, a mobile tenant, move from an accessible apartment into a non-accessible apartment which was available in the same apartment complex. Plaintiff would not move, and he sought relief on many fronts including an accommodation under another HUD regulation, 24 C.F.R. B, Ch. 1 § 100.204. The Housing Authority ultimately agreed to allow plaintiff to remain in his accessible unit. Plaintiff has not pled a valid cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress because the conduct of the Housing Authority and its employees could not be found to be so outrageous in character, so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. For the foregoing reasons, the following order is entered. ORDER OF COURT day of August, 2003, the demurrers of all defendants Plaintiff's amended complaint, -16- 02-3841 CIVIL TERM By the Court, Edgar B. Bayley, J. John J. Baranski, Jr., Esquire For Plaintiff Christopher Houston, Esquire For The Housing Authority Allen C. Warshaw, Esquire For Christopher Gullota, Sue A. Wolf, Catherine Mowery and Yvonne Heckler :sal -17- LARRY W. WILKINSON, PLAINTIFF IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA THE HOUSING AUTHORITY OF THE COUNTY OF CUMBERLAND; CHRISTOPHER GULLOTA; SUE A. WOLF; CATHERINE MOWERY; AND YVONNE HECKLER, DEFENDANTS 02-3841 CIVIL TERM IN RE: PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS OF DEFENDANTS TO PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED COMPLAINT BEFORE BAYLEY, J. AND HESS, J. ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this day of August, 2003, the demurrers of all defendants to the amended complaint of plaintiff, ARE GRANTED. Plaintiff's amended complaint, IS DISMISSED. By the Court, Edgar B. Bayley, J. John J. Baranski, Jr., Esquire For Plaintiff Christopher Houston, Esquire For The Housing Authority Allen C. Warshaw, Esquire For Christopher Gullota, Sue A. Wolf, Catherine Mowery and Yvonne Heckler