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HomeMy WebLinkAbout03-1129 CriminalCOMMONWEALTH MELVIN MOPPIN IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 03-1129 CRIMINAL TERM IN RE: MOTION TO QUASH INFORMATION BEFORE BAYLEY, J. OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT Bayley, J., August 28, 2003:-- Defendant, Melvin Moppin, is charged with a count of hindering apprehension or prosecution in violation of the Crimes Code at 18 Pa.C.S. Section 5105(a)(1) & (5). The statute provides: (a) Offense defined.--A person commits an offense if, with intent to hinder the apprehension, prosecution, conviction or punishment of another for crime or violation of the terms of probation, parole, intermediate punishment or Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition, he: (1) harbors or conceals the other... (5) provides false information to a law enforcement officer. (Emphasis added.) Defendant filed a motion to quash the information maintaining that there is insufficient evidence that he committed a crime. A motion to quash the information is not the proper pre-trial means to test the sufficiency of the Commonwealth's evidence. Commonwealth v. Marti, 779 A.2d 1177 (Pa. Super. 2001). The proper vehicle is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Id. However, because the Commonwealth did not object to this procedural defect as in Marti, we will treat the motion to quash according 03-1129 CRIMINAL TERM to the standard applicable to a writ of habeas corpus. That standard is a prima facie case. In Marti, the Superior Court stated: "The Commonwealth establishes a prima facie case when it produces evidence that, if accepted as true, would warrant the trial judge to allow the case to go to a jury." Commonwealth v. Martin, 727 A.2d 1136, 1142 (Pa. Super. 1999), appeal denied, 560 Pa. 722, 745 A.2d 1220 (1999) (quoting Commonwealth v. Al/beck, 715 A.2d 1213, 1214 (Pa. Super. 1998)). "[T]he Commonwealth need not prove the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt; rather, the prima facie standard requires evidence of the existence of each and every element of the crime charged." Id. Moreover, the weight and credibility of the evidence are not factors at this stage, and the Commonwealth need only demonstrate sufficient probable cause to believe the person charged has committed the offense. Commonwealth v. Wojdak, 502 Pa. 359, 369, 466 A.2d 991, 1000 (1983); see also Commonwealth v. McBride, supra, fn. 1. "Inferences reasonably drawn from the evidence of record which would support a verdict of guilty are to be given effect, and the evidence must be read in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth's case." Commonwealth v. Owen, 397 Pa. Super. 507, 580 A.2d 412, 414 (1990) (citations omitted). In the case sub judice, a hearing was conducted on August 26, 2003. The Commonwealth produced evidence that Deputy Sheriffs Steven Whistler and Jacob Baker had a bench warrant for the arrest of Michael Irvin. On May 12, 2003, the sheriffs went to a mobile home in Carlisle believing that Irvin might be there. Dawn Mellott, the renter of the home, answered the door. Sheriff Baker had the bench warrant in his hand, and asked Mellott if Michael Irvin was there. She said "no." Baker asked her if they could come in and she said "yes." The Sheriffs walked in and Melvin Moppin walked out of a bedroom. Baker recognized Moppin because he had dealt with him several times in the past when he was a police officer for the Borough of Carlisle. -2- 03-1129 CRIMINAL TERM He asked Moppin if he knew Michael Irvin. Moppin said that Irvin was his brother. Baker asked if he had seen or heard from Irvin. Moppin said Irvin "had stopped by two weeks ago and picked up some clothes en route to Rhode Island with a girl he met." Either before or after Baker asked that question and received that answer, he told Moppin that he had a bench warrant for Irvin. Baker asked Moppin if they could take a quick look around the home. Moppin said "yes." Sheriff Whistler found Irvin behind a door in a bedroom. We conclude that (1) when the two deputy sheriffs arrived at the home, and (2) Baker asked Michael Irvin's brother if he has seen or heard from Michael Irvin, and (3) Michael Irvin was behind a door in the home, and (4) the brother said that he "had stopped by two weeks ago and picked up some clothes en route to Rhode Island with a girl he met," there is a prima facie case that defendant, with intent to hinder the apprehension of Michael Irvin, harbored and concealed him. The sheriffs were not at the home for a social visit. They wanted Michael Irvin. Defendant's statement to Baker raises a reasonable inference that he was trying to convince him that his brother was not in the home thus hindering them from locating him there. Whether Baker told defendant he had a bench warrant for Irvin before or after he asked him if he had seen or heard from his brother is not controlling. ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this day of August, 2003, the motion of defendant, treated as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, IS DISMISSED. -3- 03-1129 CRIMINAL TERM By the Court, Michael Mervine, Esquire For the Commonwealth William Braught, Esquire For Defendant :sal Edgar B. Bayley, J. -4- COMMONWEALTH MELVIN MOPPIN IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA IN RE: 03-1129 CRIMINAL TERM MOTION TO QUASH INFORMATION BEFORE BAYLEY, J. ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this day of August, 2003, the motion of defendant, treated as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, IS DISMISSED. By the Court, Michael Mervine, Esquire For the Commonwealth William Braught, Esquire For Defendant :sal Edgar B. Bayley, J.