HomeMy WebLinkAboutCP-21-CR-1038-2003
COMMONWEALTH : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
: CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
:
vs. : CP-21-CR-1038-2003
:
:
CHRISTOPHER WILLIAM REED :
IN RE: OPINION PURSUANT TO RULE 1925
On January 9, 2004, pursuant to a plea agreement, the defendant pled guilty to murder in
the second degree for the killing of Melissa Conrad. The same day he was sentenced to life
without parole. No direct appeal was filed to the Superior Court. The judgment became final on
or about February 8, 2004.
On April 29, 2004, the defendant filed a PCRA petition. In this petition, he challenged
the effectiveness of trial counsel for failing to proceed with a suppression hearing and failing to
elicit certain information from a psychologist. His petition was denied and he filed an appeal to
the Superior Court. On April 26, 2005, the Superior Court affirmed the lower court ruling. The
defendant did not file a petition for review with the Supreme Court.
According to the defendant, he filed a petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Middle
District of Pennsylvania on November 21, 2005. The petition was denied and a subsequent
appeal to the Third Circuit was also denied on April 17, 2007. The defendant’s second PCRA
petition, the one at issue here, was filed on January 16, 2008. We dismissed the second PCRA
proceeding as untimely. The defendant has appealed.
The law is clear that all PCRA petitions must be filed within one year of the date the
judgment becomes final unless the defendant pleads and proves an applicable exception under 42
Pa.C.S.A. 9545(b)(1). In his Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal, the defendant
CP-21-CR-1038-2003
contends that the pendency of his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Middle District
Court tolled the time limit with regard to the filing of his petition. His argument contradicts the
law in Pennsylvania. The case of Com. v. Whitney, 817 A.2d 473 (Pa. 2003) speaks directly to
this issue. Therein, the court noted the rule that when a post-conviction appeal is pending before
a court, a subsequent post-conviction petition cannot be filed until the resolution of the pending
appeal by the highest state court in which review is sought. The court went on to hold that this
principle is inapplicable when no appeal is pending but there is only a parallel habeas corpus
proceeding in a federal court. As in Whitney, there is no tolling of the time period in this case by
virtue of the pendency of the federal habeas corpus proceeding.
On appeal, the defendant does not raise the issue of an exception to the time limit under
42 Pa.C.S.A. 9545(b)(1)(i-iii). Such an argument would be, in any event, to no avail. The
defendant contended, at the hearing, that he learned of the various matters, which he now raises,
in the course of his PCRA proceeding or while his case was pending in federal court. His Third
Circuit appeal was denied on April 17, 2007. His second PCRA petition was not filed until
January 16, 2008. The law is clear that any petition, invoking an exception to the timeliness rule,
must be “filed within sixty days of the date the claim could have been presented.” 42 Pa.C.S.A.
9545(b)(2). The instant petition was filed well beyond the sixty-day time limit permitted under
the law.
As noted in Com. v. Whitney, supra, the PCRA timeliness requirements are jurisdictional
in nature. In other words, a court is precluded from considering untimely PCRA petitions.
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CP-21-CR-1038-2003
Accordingly, we are satisfied that our refusal to further address the defendant’s post-conviction
petition was proper.
February 18, 2009 _______________________________
Kevin A. Hess, J.
Michelle Sibert, Esquire
Chief Deputy District Attorney
Hubert Gilroy, Esquire
Katie Maxwell, Esquire
For the Defendant
:rlm
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