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HomeMy WebLinkAbout94-440 Orphans'STUART H. KRANZEL, Petitioner VS. LILLIAN KRANZEL and, JACK E. KRANZEL, Respondents IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA ORPHANS' COURT DIVISION 21-94-440 DECLARATORY JUDGMENT BEFORE HESS. J. OPINION AND ORDER In this case, the plaintiff, Stuart Kranzel, seeks a declaration to the effect that either (1) he may cease paying on a debt or, (2) that any amount remaining due and owing be paid, ultimately, out of a family trust and, to the extent that his share thereof is insufficient, the loan balance be forgiven. For the reasons which follow, we will grant neither declaration. We believe that most of the salient facts have been accurately summarized in the post- trial brief of the respondent, Lillian Kranzel, and adopt many of them as follows. Stuart Kranzel (Stuart), the petitioner herein, is one of three sons of Morris (Metz) and Lillian Kranzel. When Stuart opened his current business, he obtained a line of credit to CCNB for $150,000 based, in part, on a written guarantee of Metz and Lillian. CCNB became PNC Bank. PNC notified Stuart that he was required to begin amortizing the loan and that amounts would now be due on account of principle. Stuart contacted Metz and Lillian for assistance. Metz sought to intervene at PNC, but his efforts failed. Metz and Lillian owned, jointly, an investment account with Smith Barney Shearson (Shearson). Metz and Lillian told Stuart that they would borrow $150,000 from Shearson and that they would lend that amount to him on condition that he pay interest on the $150,000 at the same rate as charged by Shearson to Metz 21-94-440 and Lillian. The agreement was, further, that Stuart would pay $1,000 per month with that sum being applied first to interest and then to principle. In December of 1993, Metz and Lillian concluded the margin loan and borrowed $150,000 from Shearson. This sum they deposited in their joint checking account and, in January of 1994, the $150,000 was delivered to Stuart. Stuart made the regular monthly payments of $1,000 and, in fact, continued to make those payments after his father's death. Payments were made as late as April 2001. Metz died on March 23, 1994. Less than two weeks before his death, on March 11, 1994, Metz had executed a Will which was eventually probated. In the Will there appeared the following provision: SIXTEENTH: Be it known hereby that through my and my wife's good offices, a loan has been made by and through to our son, Stuart H. Kranzel, in the amount of $150,000. He is to pay the interest only on this loan until his new business generates enough income to support payments of the principle. At the current time, these interest payments are being made directly to Shearson. In the event of my death before this loan is repaid in full, any then owing balance of unpaid interest and/or principle shall be considered an advancement against my son's eventual inheritance from my estate. However, in the event my estate is insufficient for any reason to sustain an equal share of distribution to my said son of the amount of any unrepaid principle and/or interest, my said son shall not be required to make any payments back into my estate. The plaintiff interprets the above Will provision as forgiving the loan from his parents. At one time, Lillian Kranzel had an identical provision in her Will. More to the point, however, Lillian Kranzel is alive and it is clear that she has not forgiven the loan. Were she to do so, she, apparently, would suffer financially. 2 21-94-440 It is clear that Lillian has as much say over the loan as did her husband, Metz. The two were joint owners of their investment account at Shearson. The proceeds of the margin loan were paid to Metz and Lillian jointly. Both Metz and Lillian dispersed the $150,000 from the joint checking account to PNC Bank to settle Stuart's loan. Some eighty-six monthly payments were sent by Stuart to the joint Shearson account, both during Metz's lifetime and thereafter, with Lillian as the surviving co-owner. The plaintiff dwells, at length, on his discussions with his father and his reading of Metz's Will. He relies upon them for the proposition that the loan made to him by his parents has somehow been forgiven. He cites no legal authority for this proposition. It seems axiomatic to us that where a loan is jointly made by two persons, it can be forgiven only by both obligees. Unfortunately, as so often happens in the law, "the simpler the proposition, the more difficult it is to find a statement of it." Com. v. Caffrey, 508 A.2d 322, 323 (Pa. Super. 1986). Nor does Metz's Will have any effect on our conclusion. As the defendant observes, Metz had no authority or legal ability to unilaterally forgive a loan. There is no evidence of a contract, on the part of Lillian, to make a Will forgiving the loan. Actually, the language of paragraph 16 of Metz's Will does nothing to further the petitioner's argument. Any unpaid loan balance owed by Stuart was made an advancement against Stuart's eventual inheritance of his father' s estate. Clearly, any inheritance would be received only after the death of Stuart' s mother. This litigation has consumed many hours, not to mention reams of paper. It may seem surprising, therefore, that the court disposes of the petitioner's claim in so few pages. The court, however, has no obligation to follow anyone's lead in making complicated that which is simple. 3 21-94-440 Accordingly, we will say no more on the issue on whether the loan has been forgiven other than - - it has not. We decline to make any declaration concerning any amount that might be due under the loan. The amounts due Lillian Kranzel will best be determined in the context of an action, if any is ever brought, for amounts which are then due and owing. ORDER AND NOW, this declaratory judgment is DENIED. day of August, 2003, the petition of Stuart H. Kranzel for BY THE COURT, Neil Hendershot, Esquire Steven E. Grubb, Esquire David J. Gottfried, Esquire For the Petitioner Keith O. Brenneman, Esquire For Lillian Kranzel David A. Fitzsimons, Esquire For Jack E. Kranzel Charles E. Shields, III, Esquire Robert H. Davis, Esquire For Charles Shields :rlm Kevin A. Hess, J. 4 STUART H. KRANZEL, Petitioner VS. LILLIAN KRANZEL and, JACK E. KRANZEL, Respondems AND NOW, this declaratory judgmem is DENIED. IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA ORPHANS' COURT DIVISION 21-94-440 DECLARATORY JUDGMENT BEFORE HESS. J. ORDER day of August, 2003, the petition of Stuart H. Kranzel for BY THE COURT, Neil Hendershot, Esquire Steven E. Grubb, Esquire David J. Gottfried, Esquire For the Petitioner Keith O. Brenneman, Esquire For Lillian Kranzel David A. Fitzsimons, Esquire For Jack E. Kranzel Charles E. Shields, III, Esquire Robert H. Davis, Esquire For Charles Shields Kevin A. Hess, J. :rlm