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HomeMy WebLinkAboutCP-21-CR-2782-2008 COMMONWEALTH : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : V. : : RAYMOND ANTHONY POWELL : CP-21-CR-2782-2008 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- COMMONWEALTH : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : V. : : CLAYTON JEROME SOLOMON : CP-21-CR-2813-2008 IN RE: MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT Bayley, J., May 1, 2009:-- Clayton Jerome Solomon and Raymond Anthony Powell are both charged with unlawful delivery or manufacture and possession with intent to deliver a schedule II 12 controlled substance, unlawful possession of a schedule I controlled substance, and 3 criminal conspiracy to unlawful possession of a schedule I controlled substance. They filed a motion to suppress evidence upon which a hearing was conducted on April 3, 2009. The issues have been briefed. THE PROLOG Saint Vitus' Dance, a symptom of Sydenham chorea, is a disorder which produces movements that are purposeless. In Pennsylvania this disorder has evolved __________ 1 35 P.S. Section 780-113(a)(30) and 18 Pa.C.S. Section 306. 2 35 P.S. Section 780-113(a)(16) and 18 Pa.C.S. Section 306. CP-21-CR-2782-2008 CP-21-CR-2813-2008 4 into the Strickler/Freeman Dance, because, as set forth in Strickler, “the transition between detention and a consensual exchange can be so seamless that the untrained eye may not notice it has occurred.” This Dance is initiated when “certain persons” are stopped for summary violations of the Vehicle Code. They are issued a warning or a summons and then told they are free to leave. The officer starts to walk away, then turns and says something along the lines of – can I talk to you for a minute - we have had a lot of people transporting drugs on this highway, you wouldn’t have any illegal drugs in your car would you?” The person, of course, says “No,” prompting the officer to immediately ask for consent to search the vehicle. Rather than leave, a purposeless legal consent is given because the “certain person,” and this is the fiction, is considered to have reasonably believed that he [rarely a she] was free to leave. Notwithstanding that there is no probable cause to conduct a search, suspicion alone prevails and contraband is found during the consensual search of the vehicle. The consent to search is not a result of the initial detention because the officer has seamlessly turned it into a mere encounter. In the experience of this trial judge who has seen the Dance many times, it is performed by a person who is male, young, and most often a minority. While these variables change slightly from case to case, we have never seen or heard of the Dance performed by either a male or female who is old and 3 18 Pa.C.S. Section 903(a)(1) to Sec. 780-113(a)(16). 4 Commonwealth v. Strickler,Commonwealth v. Freeman, 757 A.2d 884 (Pa. 2000); 757 A.2d 903 (Pa. 2000). -2- CP-21-CR-2782-2008 CP-21-CR-2813-2008 white. In the opinion of this judge, the Dance, unfortunately and certainly not as intended by its creators, is being utilized as a legal and virulent form of profiling in Pennsylvania. THE EVENTS Corporal Gregory Miller of the Pennsylvania State Police does illegal drug interdiction work and supervises such activities. He testified that part of those activities is learning “how to extend a traffic stop.” On the afternoon of October 9, 2008, Miller was in a uniform working on the Pennsylvania Turnpike in Cumberland County. While driving an unmarked police car, he saw a Honda car with a New York license plate traveling westbound with “large objects hanging from the rearview mirror.” Miller 5 stopped the car for a violation of Section 4524(c) of the Vehicle Code. Miller walked 6 up to the Honda at 14:03:36. Clayton Solomon was the driver and Raymond Powell was a passenger in the front seat. While standing at an open window on the passenger side, Miller said why he had stopped the car. There was a “Bob Marley” bandana and a Christmas tree air freshener hanging from the rearview mirror. Marley is a Reggae singer and there were depictions of marijuana leaves on the bandana. __________ 5 The Vehicle Code at 75 Pa.C.S. Section 4524(c) provides: Other obstruction.— No person shall drive any motor vehicle with any object or material hung from the inside rearview mirror or otherwise hung, placed or attached in such a position as to materially obstruct, obscure or impair the driver’s vision through the front windshield or any manner as to constitute a safety hazard. 6 An audio/visual recorder with a time clock was on inside the police car. -3- CP-21-CR-2782-2008 CP-21-CR-2813-2008 Miller said “Take that off – I’m going to give you a warning for it not a ticket.” Solomon took the items off the rearview mirror. Solomon provided Miller with his New York driver’s license and a registration for the Honda. The vehicle was registered to Beverly C. Johnson at P.O. Box 31697, Rochester, New York. Solomon said she was his wife. He said he and Powell were driving from Queens, New York to Pittsburgh. At 14:04:25 Miller left the passenger door, walked to the rear of the car and talked to a uniformed state trooper who had arrived in a marked patrol car. At 14:04:49, Miller walked back to the passenger side of the car and asked Powell for identification. He told Powell that he is required by regulation to “write down everyone who is in the car.” Powell said he did not have a license and he gave him his Jamaican electoral ID card. Miller told the occupants to turn their cell phones off. He said “You can talk to anyone you want once you get your warning and you are out of here.” During the interaction up to this point, 7 Solomon gave short responses and Powell did not make eye contact with Miller. Miller returned to his police car at 14:05:44 and conducted a radio check. At times he saw Solomon looking at him in the rearview mirror. The radio check showed that there were no warrants outstanding for Solomon and Powell. Solomon’s driver’s license and the vehicle registration were in order. At 14:23:10 Miller returned to the Honda after telling his radio contact that he was “going to ask some questions and see 7 Miller testified that he found it unusual for a younger man to be traveling with an older man. Solomon, who is black, is in his forties and Powell, who is black, is in his thirties. -4- CP-21-CR-2782-2008 CP-21-CR-2813-2008 -5- CP-21-CR-2782-2008 CP-21-CR-2813-2008 8 what happens.” He gave Solomon back his license and registration and he gave Powell back his “stuff.” He asked Solomon to get out so he could explain the warning to him. Solomon got out and he and Miller went to the rear of the Honda. Miller said: “I need you to sign here – I’ll give you a copy of that and you’re free to go.” Solomon signed the warning and Miller gave him a copy. At 14:24:14, Miller said: “Here’s your copy – have a safe trip alright.” Miller made about a three-quarter turn toward his patrol car. At 14:24:18 he turned back towards Solomon and said “Sir, is it alright if I talk to you for a minute.” Solomon made no response. Miller asked the same question again. Solomon said “No problem.” Miller asked Solomon where they were coming from and he said “From Queens,” and that they were headed to Pittsburgh. Miller asked Solomon “Who lives out there?” Solomon said “Brittany,” and that Brittany was his girlfriend. Solomon told Miller that while in Pittsburgh he was going to pick up some shoes. Miller asked him where they were staying in Pittsburgh “A hotel or something,” to which Solomon said: “No we’re staying at her house.” Miller asked who Powell is and Solomon said “A friend.” Miller told Solomon “I am going to talk to him [referring to Powell] for one minute. Hang loose here.” At 14:25:30 Miller went to the passenger __________ 8 The audio recording reveals very little conversation between Miller and his radio contact. At one point the contact advises Miller that Rochester is the northwest part of New York State. Miller states that he is “bothered by the Rochester – Queens problem.” There was no testimony at the hearing as to why this radio check took almost 18 minutes. In its brief, the Commonwealth opines that it was “due to the fact that defendant – Powell gave an unusual form of I.D. to which Corporal Miller could not get information regarding. Corporal Miller had to call an information repository that would be able to checks warrants out of Jamaica since defendant – Powell had no -6- CP-21-CR-2782-2008 CP-21-CR-2813-2008 side window of the Honda. He told Powell that he gave Solomon a warning with no fine and no points. He said “Do you mind if I talk to you a couple of minutes.” Powell answered some of the same questions Miller had asked Solomon although he added that Brittany was sick and that they were going to come back from Pittsburgh right away. At 14:26:27, Miller walked back and talked again to Solomon. He asked him if he had any guns, cocaine, marijuana or any large amounts of money he could not 9 account for. Solomon said “no” to each item. By this time a second uniformed state trooper who had arrived in another marked patrol car was present. At 14:26:44, Miller said “Do you have a problem with me searching the car.” Solomon grunted something that cannot be deciphered on the audiotape. He gestured toward the car and Miller immediately asked again: “Is it okay to search it?” At 14:26:47 Solomon made no response and again gestured toward his car. Miller said “Hang loose.” Solomon 10 walked toward the driver’s door and the other trooper said “Come here a minute.” Solomon arrived at the driver’s door and the other trooper walked up to him and other identification.” 9 By this time another trooper in uniform in a second marked patrol car had arrived. 10 On direct examination Miller testified that when he asked Solomon if he had a problem with him searching the car, Solomon said “nah,” and motioned toward his car. On cross-examination he testified that he wrote in his police report that Solomon said “Yeah or something to that effect.” What the recording shows is that Miller asked Solomon a second time: “Okay to search it,” to which no response can be heard. Solomon again made a small gesture with his right hand toward the Honda and walked towards the passenger door. Miller never testified that he asked Solomon a second time for consent to search the car. -7- CP-21-CR-2782-2008 CP-21-CR-2813-2008 directed him away from the door. Miller said: “Come over here a second.” The trooper and Miller walked back to the rear of the car where Miller asked Solomon if he had any weapons and told him he is going to pat him down. The third trooper was at the rear of the Honda. Miller had Powell get out of the car. Miller told both Powell and Solomon that they were not under arrest. They were patted down. A search of the Honda was conducted which resulted in the seizure of contraband. DISCUSSION Defendants seek to suppress all of the evidence seized by the state police on a claim of a violation of rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 11 United States Constitution and Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. The Commonwealth maintains that the stop of the Honda was legal and the contraband was seized pursuant to a lawful consent to search the Honda given by Solomon to Corporal Miller. THE STOP Defendants maintain that the stop of the Honda was pretexual and not supported by reasonable grounds to believe that the vehicle or driver was in violation of the Motor Commonwealth v. Felty Vehicle Code. In support of this position they cite , 662 A.2d Commonwealth v. Benton, 1102 (Pa. Super. 1995), and 655 A.2d 1030 (Pa. Super. __________ 11 Although a passenger in the Honda, Powell has automatic standing to contest the seizure of contraband because the element of its possession at the time of the search Commonwealth v. is an essential element of the prosecution’s case against him. Peterkin , 511 Pa. 299 (1986). -8- CP-21-CR-2782-2008 CP-21-CR-2813-2008 1995). In both of those cases the Superior Court of Pennsylvania concluded that a police officer did not have reasonable and articulable grounds to stop a vehicle for a violation of Section 4524(c) of the Vehicle Code. In the present case, after Solomon and Powell were arrested and the Honda was impounded, Corporal Miller reattached the Christmas tree ornament and bandana on the rearview mirror as he had observed 12 them before making the stop. He then photographed them. He stopped the Honda because of the Section 4524(c) violation which prohibits objects or materials hung from the inside rearview mirror that materially obstruct, obscure or impair the driver’s vision through the front windshield. In order to justify the stop, Miller had to have reasonable and articulable grounds to believe that there was a violation of Section 4524(c) of the Commonwealth v. Smith, Motor Vehicle Code. 75 Pa.C.S. § 6308(b): 917 A.2d 848 (Pa. Super. 2007). The evidence supports a finding that he did. Under these circumstances this was not an unconstitutional pretexual stop. In Whren v. United States , 517 U.S. 806, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996), the United States Supreme Court was asked to adopt a “would have” test, in contrast to a “could have” test, for determining what constitutes an unconstitutional pretextual stop of a motor vehicle. The “would have” test asks whether under the same circumstances a reasonable police officer would have made the stop in the absence of the invalid purpose. The “could have” test asks whether, at the time of the stop, the police officer 12 Commonwealth’s Exhibits 1, 2, 4, 5 and 7. -9- CP-21-CR-2782-2008 CP-21-CR-2813-2008 reasonably believed the driver was committing a traffic offense and whether the law authorized a stop for such an offense. The Supreme Court adopted the “could have” test. In the present case, we have no doubt that Corporal Miller, who was conducting interdiction work when he stopped the Honda, would not otherwise have stopped it to 13 enforce a Section 4524(c) violation. Nevertheless, having reasonable suspicion to believe that he had observed such a violation, he legally stopped the car. THE CONSENT In order for a consent to a search to be valid it must be unequivocal, specific, Commonwealth v. Stapinski, and voluntary. 494 Pa. 283 (1981). Weighing all of the evidence, which most importantly includes the audio/visual recording, we find that despite what Corporal Miller’s perception may have been, Solomon did not give an unequivocal, specific consent to search the Honda. Miller testified that he asked Solomon if he had a problem with his searching the car. On direct examination he testified that Solomon said “nah,” and motioned toward his car. On cross-examination he testified that he wrote in his police report that Solomon said “yeah or something to that effect.” Only by listening to and watching the audio/visual recording did we learn that following Solomon’s response to Miller, whatever it was, Miller asked him a second time: “Is it okay to search it.” No response can be heard on the audio recording. If there was a response Miller did not testify to it. What shows on the video is that __________ 13 It was only one minute and thirteen seconds after Miller first went up to the passenger window of the Honda that he asked the passenger Powell for his identification. It is -10- CP-21-CR-2782-2008 CP-21-CR-2813-2008 Solomon again made a small gesture with his right hand toward the Honda and walked to the driver’s door. Another trooper stopped him when he reached the door. If Solomon said “nah,” in response to Miller asking him if he had a problem with searching his car, that is not an unequivocal, specific consent. If he said “yeah or something to that effect,” we still don’t know exactly what he said. There not being an unequivocal, specific consent it is not surprising that Miller asked a second time: “Is it okay to search it.” No response by Solomon can be heard on the audio recording and Miller did not even testify to having asked him a second time for consent. Additionally, Solomon’s conduct in making another gesture with his right hand toward the Honda and walking to the driver’s door, only to be stopped by another trooper, is inconsistent with his having just unequivocally consented to the search of the vehicle. On this evidence we find that Solomon did not give his unequivocal, specific consent to search the Honda. Therefore, all evidence seized as a result of that search must be suppressed. STRICKLER-FREEMAN Even if we had found that Solomon unequivocally and specifically consented to the search of the Honda, the evidence obtained during that search would still have to Commonwealth v. Strickler, be suppressed. In 757 A.2d 884 (Pa. 2000), the Supreme Court upheld an order of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania which reversed Strickler, an order of a trial court that had granted a motion to suppress evidence. In a uniformed police officer saw a car parked on the side of the road alongside a lawn in obvious that he was not the least bit interested in the Section 4524(c) violation. -11- CP-21-CR-2782-2008 CP-21-CR-2813-2008 front of a farmhouse and barn. The driver and passenger of the vehicle were urinating about fifteen feet from where the vehicle was parked. The officer testified that he stopped in order to ascertain what was happening and whether anything was wrong. As he approached the individuals, he saw a cooler in the vehicle containing unopened beer cans. The officer obtained licenses from the individuals and went to his vehicle to verify their validity and to determine if there were any outstanding warrants. Another police officer arrived. Once the officer determined that the licenses were valid and that there were no outstanding warrants, he informed the individuals that it was inappropriate to stop along the road and urinate. The officer then began walking back to his vehicle. After a few steps, he turned and asked Strickler, the driver and owner of the vehicle, if he had anything illegal in his vehicle. When Strickler stated there was not, the officer asked “if he wouldn’t mind if I took a look through his car.” Strickler hesitated. He stood there and looked at me and looked at [the officer] who assisted me at the scene, and I explained to him, you know, he didn’t have to say yes, you know, and then I asked him again. After saying that, I said, do you mind. Is it okay with you if we just take a quick search of your vehicle[?] At this point, Strickler consented to the search. The Supreme Court stated that: Where the underlying encounter is found to be lawful, voluntariness becomes the exclusive focus. Where, however, a consensual search has been preceded by an unlawful seizure, the exclusionary rule requires suppression of the evidence obtained absent a demonstration by the government both of a sufficient break in the causal chain between the -12- CP-21-CR-2782-2008 CP-21-CR-2813-2008 illegality and the seizure of evidence, thus assuring that the search is not an exploitation of the prior illegality, and of voluntariness. The determination whether a seizure has been affected in the first instance is made upon an examination of the totality of the circumstances to determine whether a reasonable person would feel free to leave. The court concluded: It is significant that the officer’s conduct appears to have been quite restrained throughout the period of the detention; indeed, the level of coercion that was applied was less than that associated with an ordinary traffic stop. . . . Further, although the officer did not expressly advise Strickler and his companion that they were free to leave, his actions at least suggested as much, in that he returned Strickler’s driver’s documentation, thanked him for his cooperation, and turned away prior to reinitiating the interaction and ultimately requesting consent to search. Nevertheless, the absence of an express endpoint to the detention in the form of an admonition by the officer that Strickler was free to leave is an area of concern that carries forward in our assessment of the remaining relevant circumstances. The officer, however, did nothing following the actual endpoint of the lawful detention that would independently suggest that his subsequent requests were to be viewed as directives. . . . We also deem significant the arresting officer’s admonition to Strickler that he was not required to consent to the search. . . . In summary, the . . . officer conducted an investigative detention of a less intrusive nature than is permitted in connection with an ordinary traffic stop. Although the officer did not make the endpoint to the lawful detention an express one, there was an endpoint nonetheless; moreover, the officer confined his subsequent conduct and conformed his requests in a manner consistent with a consensual encounter and expressly advised Strickler of his right to refuse consent. Weighing the above factors . . . we conclude that the request to search did not rise to a second or subsequent seizure under the Fourth Amendment, and, accordingly, proceed to a voluntariness assessment. * * * Thus, the Commonwealth’s unrebutted evidence was sufficient to satisfy its burden of demonstrating both that Strickler was not subject to a -13- CP-21-CR-2782-2008 CP-21-CR-2813-2008 seizure for purposes of the Fourth Amendment at the time his consent was sought and given, and that his consent was voluntary. Commonwealth v. Freeman, In 757 A.2d 903 (Pa. 2000), the Supreme Court reversed the order of the Superior Court which affirmed an order of the trial court that Freeman, had denied a motion to suppress evidence. In a Pennsylvania State trooper saw two cars traveling fairly close together, switching lanes and jockeying for position. The trooper stopped the vehicle being driven by Diana Freeman, while another trooper stopped the other vehicle. The trooper asked Freeman if she was lost or having trouble with the other car. She said that she had entered the wrong lane of traffic and had maneuvered to the left lane to continue west on Interstate 80. She denied traveling with the other car. The trooper obtained her driver’s license and registration and went to his vehicle to verify the documents. He learned from the other trooper that the occupants of the other vehicle contradicted Freeman by stating that the two vehicles were traveling together and further explained that they were following Freeman’s car because it was having some type of engine trouble. The trooper returned to Freeman’s vehicle, issued her a written warning, and returned her license and registration. He told her that she was free to leave. The trooper then went back to his patrol car, and Freeman’s vehicle remained parked. While the trooper who had stopped the occupants of the other car continued to question them, the trooper who had stopped Freeman returned to her vehicle and again asked her whether she was traveling with the second car. Freeman said no. The trooper told her that the occupants of the other -14- CP-21-CR-2782-2008 CP-21-CR-2813-2008 vehicle said otherwise, and he asked her to get out of the vehicle. Freeman walked to the rear of the car, where the trooper asked her for consent to search her vehicle. Freeman consented. The Court stated: [T]he police/citizen encounter involving Freeman opened with a lawful traffic stop. . . . The behavior of the troopers was commensurate with their lawful purpose, as, more generally, was the length and character of the detention. Indeed, the arresting trooper articulated a clear endpoint to the lawful detention by advising Freeman that she was free to depart after returning her driver’s documentation and issuing an appropriate traffic warning. Therefore, the fact of the prior detention does not, in and of itself, convert the subsequent encounter into a seizure. The transition to and character of the subsequent interaction, however, supports the conclusion that Freeman was subject to a second seizure. Since the trooper had accomplished the purpose of the stop, as he expressly indicated, Freeman would have been entirely within her rights to drive away at that point. Nevertheless, the trooper’s subsequent actions were inconsistent with his statement to Freeman that she was free to leave, as he: returned to Freeman’s vehicle; questioned her about the second vehicle; pointed out the inconsistent statements from the vehicle’s occupants when she denied traveling with that vehicle; and, ultimately and most significantly, asked her to step out of the vehicle prior to the request for consent. Such directive constituted a greater show of authority than had previously been made . . . . Moreover, given everything that had come before, although these events occurred after express conferral of advice that Freeman was free to depart, they would have suggested to a reasonable person that such advice was no longer operative. Since we have concluded that Freeman was seized at the time her consent was obtained, we must determine whether such seizure was lawful. To constitute a valid investigative detention, the seizure must be justified by an articulable, reasonable suspicion that Freeman may have been engaged in criminal activity independent of that supporting her initial lawful detention. . . . [T]here are no facts of record indicating that the trooper did possess, or could have possessed, a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity on Freeman’s part. While the trooper undoubtedly suspected that Freeman wished to conceal the fact that she was traveling with the other vehicle, such suspicion had been present when he gave Freeman a warning and told her that she was free to go. Nothing had -15- CP-21-CR-2782-2008 CP-21-CR-2813-2008 happened after the conclusion of the traffic stop to provide any further cause for suspicion; at most, Freeman’s apparent reluctance to drive away may have strengthened the trooper’s initial suspicion that the two vehicles were traveling together. Moreover, even if Freeman’s answer to the trooper’s question, contradicting as it did the information given by the occupants of the other car, could arguably be viewed as evasive behavior, such behavior was unaccompanied by any other indication of criminal activity. . . . Thus, the detention that preceded Freeman’s consent to search was unlawful, and Freeman’s consent, even if voluntarily given, will not justify the otherwise illegal search unless the Commonwealth can demonstrate that Freeman’s consent was an “independent act of free will” and not “the product of an illegal detention.” . . . Here, although we do not view the trooper’s actions as flagrant, the record does not establish the necessary break in the sequence of events that would isolate Freeman’s consent from the prior coercive interaction. To the contrary, the evidence supports the conclusion that the trooper’s initiation of a second seizure and receipt of Freeman’s consent were integrally connected. As Freeman’s consent was invalid, the fruits of its conferral must be suppressed. THE DANCE sub judice In the case , the length and character of detention following the stop when it took almost 23 minutes until Miller asked Solomon for consent to search was not commensurate with the length and character of the lawful detention for the front 14 windshield obstruction. Therefore, despite Miller’s use of words designed as an endpoint to the detention resulting from the lawful traffic stop and a prelude to initiating the Dance, both Solomon and Powell were already unlawfully detained. Being the subject of an unlawful seizure, the request for consent to search the Honda was not made during a mere encounter. There being no reasonable suspicion to support an __________ 14 There was no legal basis to detain Solomon for such an extended period in order to -16- CP-21-CR-2782-2008 CP-21-CR-2813-2008 investigative detention at that point or probable cause to support an arrest, any consent to search preceded by the unlawful detention requires suppression of the evidence discovered absent a demonstration by the Commonwealth both of a sufficient break in the causal chain between the illegality and the seizure of the evidence. make any check on the passenger Powell. -17- CP-21-CR-2782-2008 CP-21-CR-2813-2008 Commonwealth v. By,15 812 A.2d 1250 (Pa. Super. 2002). There was no such sufficient break here. Therefore, all evidence obtained as a result of the search would have to be suppressed. For the foregoing reasons, the following order is entered. ORDER OF COURT IT IS ORDERED: AND NOW, this day of May, 2009, (1) At CP-21-CR-2782-2008, the motion of Raymond Anthony Powell to suppress IS GRANTED. evidence, All evidence gained as a result of a search of a Honda vehicle by IS SUPPRESSED. the Pennsylvania State Police, (2)At CP-21-CR-2813-2008, the motion of Clayton Jerome Solomon to suppress IS GRANTED. evidence, All evidence gained as a result of a search of a Honda vehicle by IS SUPPRESSED. the Pennsylvania State Police, By the Court, Edgar B. Bayley, J. __________ 15 The Commonwealth maintains that Corporal Miller had reasonable and articulable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot sufficient to conduct an investigatory detention after the traffic stop was concluded and defendant was told he was free to leave. At best, Miller had a hunch of criminal activity but not a reasonable suspicion of same. Freeman See at 757 A.2d 903, 908. -18- CP-21-CR-2782-2008 CP-21-CR-2813-2008 Jaime M. Keating, Esquire For the Commonwealth Royce Morris, Esquire For Clayton Jerome Solomon Ellen Barry, Esquire For Raymond Anthony Powell :sal -19- COMMONWEALTH : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : V. : : RAYMOND ANTHONY POWELL : CP-21-CR-2782-2008 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- COMMONWEALTH : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : V. : : CLAYTON JEROME SOLOMON : CP-21-CR-2813-2008 IN RE: MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE ORDER OF COURT IT IS ORDERED: AND NOW, this day of May, 2009, (1) At CP-21-CR-2782-2008, the motion of Raymond Anthony Powell to suppress IS GRANTED. evidence, All evidence gained as a result of a search of a Honda vehicle by IS SUPPRESSED. the Pennsylvania State Police, (2)At CP-21-CR-2813-2008, the motion of Clayton Jerome Solomon to suppress IS GRANTED. evidence, All evidence gained as a result of a search of a Honda vehicle by IS SUPPRESSED. the Pennsylvania State Police, By the Court, Edgar B. Bayley, J. CP-21-CR-2782-2008 CP-21-CR-2813-2008 Jaime M. Keating, Esquire For the Commonwealth Royce Morris, Esquire For Clayton Jerome Solomon Ellen Barry, Esquire For Raymond Anthony Powell :sal -2-