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HomeMy WebLinkAbout2008-4299 Civil LYNNEA HALL, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS Plaintiff : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : v. : NO. 08-4299 : DENNIS SEMANCIK, individually : and d.b.a. S&S REAL ESTATE, and : ANDREW SEMANCIK, individually : CIVIL ACTION and d.b.a. S&S REAL ESTATE, et al. : Defendants : JURY TRIAL DEMANDED IN RE: PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS OF DEFENDANTS DENNIS SEMANCIK, ANDREW SEMANCIK, INDIVIDUALLY AND D.B.A. S&S REAL ESTATE BEFORE BAYLEY, J. AND EBERT, J. ORDER OF COURT th AND NOW , this 13 day of May, 2009, upon consideration of the preliminary objections of Defendants Dennis Semancik and Andrew Semancik, individually and d.b.a. S&S Real Estate, to Plaintiff’s complaint, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND DIRECTED that the Defendant’s preliminary objection: OVERRULED. (1)As to Counts 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 of the complaint is (2)Requesting that paragraphs 14, 49, 50 (d), 59, 70, 83 (d), 92, 94, 95, 106, 117, 121, DENIED 128, 133, 139 and 146 be stricken with prejudice from the Plaintiff’s Complaint is . (3)As to Count 1, for violation of §201-1(4)(xxi) of the Unfair Trade Practices and OVERRULED Consumer Protection Law is . (4)As to Count 1, for violations of §201-1(4)(vi), (vii) of the Unfair Trade Practices OVERRULED and Consumer Protection Law is . (5)As to Count 1, for violation of §201-1(4) (xvi) of the Unfair Trade Practices and GRANTED. Consumer Protection Law is OVERRULED (6)As to Count 2, for violation of the Real Estate Disclosure Act is . GRANTED. (7)As to Count 3, for breach of the Implied Warranty of Habitability is (8) As to Counts 5 and 7 for Fraudulent Non-disclosure and Fraudulent OVERRULED Misrepresentation is . (9) As to Counts 4 and 6, for Fraudulent Concealment and Fraudulent Inducement is GRANTED . (10) As to Counts 8 and 9 for negligent non-disclosure and negligent misrepresentation OVERRULED is . OVERRULED. (11) As to Count 10 for negligent infliction of emotional distress is DENIED (12) For a more specific pleading is . By the Court, M. L. Ebert, Jr., J. Laurence C. Kress, Esquire Attorney for Plaintiff Scaringi & Scaringi, P.C. 2000 Linglestown Road, Suite 106 Harrisburg, PA 17110 (717) 657-7770 Douglas K. Marsico, Esquire Attorney for Defendants Caldwell & Kearns 3631 North Front Street Harrisburg, PA 17110 (717) 232-7661 2 LYNNEA HALL, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS Plaintiff : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : v. : NO. 08-4299 : DENNIS SEMANCIK, individually : and d.b.a. S&S REAL ESTATE, and : ANDREW SEMANCIK, individually : CIVIL ACTION and d.b.a. S&S REAL ESTATE, et al. : Defendants : JURY TRIAL DEMANDED IN RE: PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS OF DEFENDANTS DENNIS SEMANCIK, ANDREW SEMANCIK, INDIVIDUALLY AND D.B.A. S&S REAL ESTATE BEFORE BAYLEY, J. AND EBERT J. OPINION and ORDER OF COURT EBERT, J., May 13, 2009 - STATEMENT OF FACTS This action arises out of a transaction for the purchase of the property located at 329 Salt Road, Enola, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania (the “property”). The property was purchased by Plaintiff Lynnea Hall (“Hall”) from Defendants Dennis and Andrew Semancik (the “Semanciks”), individually and doing business as S&S Real Estate, for a purchase price of $177,000. In May 2006, the parties entered into negotiations for the purchase of the property upon completion of renovations of the property by the Semanciks. Hall visited the property three times prior to purchase. During the first visit, Hall did not enter the property, but she observed new siding and new roof shingles. Hall was given a tour of the house during her second visit, and observed the various remodeling projects in progress, including the bathrooms and kitchen cabinets. During her third visit to the property, Hall observed new fixtures, appliances, furnace, and air conditioner. Hall made a final visit to the 3 property on June 20, 2006, and saw the basement for the first time. While in the basement, the parties discussed the presence of a sump pump and Hall noticed that the walls were newly painted. During this June 20, 2006 visit, the parties entered into an Agreement of Sale (the “Agreement”) for the purchase of the property. Hall never received a Sellers Property Disclosure Form. Hall attended closing on July 17, 2006, and proceeded to close on the property. Shortly thereafter, she moved into the property. Hall alleges that she soon began experiencing excessive water in the basement. Because of this, she had a structural inspection of the property completed. The survey revealed the following material defects: (1) the roof supports will not safely support anticipated roof loads; (2) the wood framing system supporting the first floor level is not safe and will not support anticipated residential live loads according to adopted codes; (3) the perimeter basement walls supporting the floor and roof loads are bowed inward and not stable enough to support the loads placed on them by the upper construction; and (4) the flow of outside subsurface water onto and over the basement floor is an unsanitary condition. On July 17, 2008, Hall initiated the instant action against the individuals and business from whom she purchased the property, her mortgage broker, the mortgage broker’s real estate appraiser, and the title insurance company as defendants. Hall stated ten causes of action against the Semanciks: st 1 Cause of Action – Violation of Unfair Practices Act and Consumer Protection Law nd 2 Cause of Action – Violation of the Real Estate Disclosure Act rd 3 Cause of Action – Breach of Implied Warranty of Habitability th 4 Cause of Action – Fraudulent Concealment th 5 Cause of Action – Fraudulent Non-Disclosure th 6 Cause of Action – Fraudulent Inducement 4 th 7 Cause of Action – Fraudulent Misrepresentation th 8 Cause of Action – Negligent Non-Disclosure th 9 Cause of Action – Negligent Misrepresentation th 10 Cause of Action – Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress On September 3, 2008, the Semanciks filed preliminary objections with this Court, which Hall answered on September 23, 2008. The parties filed briefs and argument was heard on February 4, 2009. DISCUSSION A. Standard of Review A demurrer is an assertion that a complaint does not set forth a cause of action or a claim on which relief can be granted. Lerner v. Lerner, 954 A.2d 1229, 1234-35 (Pa.Super. 2008), citing Binswanger v. Levy, 457 A.2d 103, 104 (Pa.Super. 1983). In ruling on a demurrer, the court may consider only matters as arise out of the complaint itself; it cannot supply a fact missing in the complaint. In evaluating a demurrer, all material facts set forth in the complaint and all inferences reasonably deducible therefrom must be admitted as true. Hess v. Fox Rothschild, LLP, 925 A.2d 798, 806 (Pa.Super. 2007). The question presented by a demurrer is whether, based on the facts averred, the law says with certainty that the contested pleading is legally insufficient and no recovery is possible. Schuylkill Navy v. Langbord, 728 A.2d 964, 968 (Pa.Super. 1999), citing Smith v. McDougall, 529 A.2d 20 (Pa.Super. 1987). If there is any doubt as to whether a demurrer should be sustained, the doubt should be resolved in favor of overruling it. Lerner, 954 A.2d at 1234, citing Wawa Inc. v. Alexander J. Litwornia & Assocs., 817 A.2d 543, 544 (Pa.Super. 2003). Therefore, a preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer may be properly granted only where the contested pleading is legally insufficient. Hess, 925 A.2d at 806. 5 B. Parol Evidence Rule The Defendants claim that Plaintiff cannot base her causes of action for fraud and misrepresentation on alleged representations made by the Semanciks prior to the Agreement because (1) the Agreement was a final and complete expression of the agreement between the parties and (2) the Agreement contained language stating that Hall was not relying on any representations the Semanciks made. They argue that the parol evidence rule prohibits Hall from claiming that she justifiably relied on any of the Defendants’ representations. In general, the parol evidence rule states that the written agreement constitutes the parties’ agreement, and terms cannot be added to or subtracted from the agreement through parol evidence. Blumenstock v. Gibson, 811 A.2d 1029, 1036 (Pa.Super. 2002). However, the parol evidence rule has been found to be inapplicable in the context of real estate sales where the prior or contemporaneous representations involve conditions that are not readily apparent from a reasonable inspection of the property. LeDonne v. Kessler, 389 A.2d 1123, 1129 (Pa.Super. 1978). The “real estate inspection cases” that follow LeDonne have applied a balancing test to determine the applicability of the parol evidence rule in cases where buyers allege that they were fraudulently induced to purchase a property through fraud or misrepresentation. To determine whether a party can justifiably rely upon oral representations without insisting upon further contractual protection or the deletion of an overly broad integration clause from an agreement, these courts balance the extent of the party’s knowledge of objectionable conditions derived from a reasonable inspection of the property, against the extent of the agreement’s integration clause. Myers v. McHenry, 850 A.2d 860, 864 (Pa.Super. 1990). Accordingly, it is the function of the trier of fact to determine whether any of the alleged defects were reasonably discoverable through visual inspection by the purchaser. To grant a demurrer at 6 this stage based on a factual determination that the defects were not latent is premature. Ward v. Serfas, 564 A.2d 251, 254 (Pa.Super. 1989). In the instant case, Hall’s Complaint contains factual allegations showing that the defects at issue were not reasonably discoverable through inspection of the property. Plaintiff’s inspection of the roof revealed new looking shingles on the roof; such an observation would not uncover the condition of the framing that supported the roof shingles. While the existence of a sump pump does not necessarily mean that that there are water problems in the basement, Plaintiff has alleged that she saw freshly painted walls during her inspection of the basement, and thus she could not observe any water stains. Therefore, she argues, the flow of outside water into the basement was not reasonably apparent from her inspection. Furthermore, Hall alleges that the basement walls were bowed inward, allowing water to enter the basement every time it rained, and this condition was allegedly obscured by the fresh paint and was therefore not reasonably apparent upon her inspection of the basement. The facts alleged by Hall must be admitted as true for purposes of evaluating the Semanciks’ demurrer. Because Hall has alleged facts that demonstrate that the defects were not reasonably apparent from inspection of the property, the Agreement does not prevent Hall from presenting evidence of the Defendants’ allegedly fraudulent conduct. It would be premature for this Court to grant the Semanciks’ demurrer as to the entire complaint at this stage of the proceedings, when Hall has alleged facts that she relied on the Semanciks’ representations as to various characteristics of the property. Furthermore, the question of justifiable reliance should be decided by a jury on the basis of all facts and permissible inferences from the evidence presented at trial. Myers, 850 A.2d at 865; citing Neuman v. Corn Exchange Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 51 A.2d 759, 764 (Pa. 1947). Therefore, this Court overrules the Semanciks’ demurrer as to Hall’s causes of action that are based on fraud and misrepresentation. 7 C. Violation of Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law Plaintiff Hall has alleged a cause of action against Defendants Semancik for a violation of the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (“UTPCPL”), 73 P.S. §201-1. The general purpose of the UTPCPL is to protect the public from fraud and unfair or deceptive practices, and this statute is the Commonwealth’s principal means of protection from such . practices. Feeney v. Disston Manor Personal Care Home, Inc, 849 A.2d 590, 597 (Pa.Super. 2004). In order to state a claim under the UTPCPL, a plaintiff must allege one of the fraudulent, unfair, or deceptive practices set forth in 73 P.S. § 201-2(4)(i)-(xxi). Id. The Plaintiff alleges that the Semanciks violated the UTPCPL through the actions described in 73 P.S. §201- 2(4)(xxi): “Engaging in any other fraudulent or deceptive conduct which creates a likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding.” In 1996, the UTPCPL was amended to cover deceptive practices, in addition to fraudulent practices. After the 1996 amendments, the Superior Court continued to require that the elements of common law fraud be met in order to establish a violation of the UTPCPL. Id. To prove fraud, a plaintiff must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence: (1) a representation; (2) which is material to the transaction at hand; (3) made falsely, with knowledge of its falsity or recklessness as to whether it is true or false; (4) with the intent of misleading another into relying on it; (5) justifiable reliance on the misrepresentation; and (6) the resulting injury was proximately caused by the reliance. Blumenstock v. Gibson, 811 A.2d 1029, 1034 (Pa.Super. 2002). However, the Eastern District courts have ruled that following the enactment of the amendments, the common law fraud elements need not be met. Jefferies v. Ameriquest , Mortg. Co. 543 F.Supp.2d 368, 389 (E.D.Pa. 2008). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in several cases decided after enactment of the amendments, has required plaintiffs to at least prove 8 the existence of one of the common law fraud elements, justifiable reliance, to establish a UTPCPL violation. Toy v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 928 A.2d 186, 202-03 (Pa. 2007). Hall has averred facts which, if admitted as true, establish the six elements of common law fraud as enumerated in Blumenstock. Plaintiff has alleged that the Semanciks made several misrepresentations about material facts to her about the property: that the roof on the house is new when they allegedly knew that the roof was structurally unsound and only cosmetically covered with new shingles, and that the basement was a dry basement when its walls were bowed so as to permit water to flow inside when it rained. Hall’s complaint has set forth that these conditions were material to the transaction because if she had known of these problems with the property, she would not have purchased it. Her complaint also set forth facts that she asked about conditions on the property, in particular the presence of the sump pump, in order to make a decision about purchasing the property. She has pled that she would not have purchased the property had she known about its structural problems. As stated in the earlier discussion of the parol evidence rule, Hall is permitted to produce evidence regarding these oral representations because these defects were not reasonably apparent from her inspection of the property. Hall has also alleged that she relied upon these representations and that her damages were proximately caused by her reliance. As stated above, it will be a question for the jury to determine whether Hall justifiably relied upon the Semanciks’ representations. Viewing the facts set forth in her complaint as true, Hall has set forth sufficient facts to make out a cause of action against the Semanciks for violation of §201-1(4)(xxi) of the UTPCPL. Therefore, the Semanciks’ demurrer as to the violation of this catch-all subsection is overruled. Hall’s complaint has also set forth facts in support of a cause of action for violations of §§201-1(4)(vi) and (vii) of the UTPCPL. §201-1(4)(vi) states that it is a violation of the 9 UTPCPL to represent that goods are original or new when they are not. §201-1(4)(vii) provides that it is a violation to represent that goods or services are of a particular standard or quality if they are of another. The Defendants maintain that the instant case involves the sale of real estate, and not goods or services and that as a matter of law §(4)(vi) and (vii) pertain only to the sale of goods and services. Neither party has provided any case authority on this point. However, for the purposes of consideration of Defendants demurrer, there is case authority that supports the proposition that all of the provisions of the UTPCPL may be applied to real estate transactions. Zisholtz v. Anthony Charles Home, Inc., 226 B.R. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1998). Accordingly, Semanciks’ demurrer to violation of these two subsections is overruled. Turning to §201-1(4)(xvi) the UTPCPL states: “making repairs, improvements or replacements on tangible, real or personal property, of a nature or quality inferior to or below the standard of that agreed to in writing.” Hall has not attached any writing to the complaint upon which to base a claim under this section. She did attach the Agreement of Sale to her complaint, but this document does not mention any agreements as to “repairs, improvements or replacements.” A plain reading of Hall’s complaint is that the residence she purchased was structurally flawed (roof and basement) and that these flaws were covered up and that misrepresentations were made to her as to the structural integrity of the home. Clearly, there is no writing in this complaint that makes any reference to “repairs, improvements or replacements.” Accordingly, this section is not applicable to the instant case. Additionally, Hall does not discuss this section in her brief in support of her answer to Defendants’ preliminary objections. Under Cumberland County Rule of Procedure 1028 (c)(6) “Issues raised, but not briefed, shall be deemed abandoned.” For these reasons, Defendants’ demurrer as to §201-1 (4)(xvi) is granted. 10 D. Violation of Real Estate Seller Disclosure Act Hall’s complaint alleges facts that are legally sufficient to support a cause of action against the Semanciks for violation of the Real Estate Seller Disclosure Act (“RESDA”), 68 Pa.C.S. §§7301 et.seq. RESDA applies to all residential real estate transfers unless specifically 12 exempted by §7302; the instant property transfer was not exempted under either (1) or (2), so the transfer of this property was subject to RESDA. Hall’s complaint clearly alleges that Paragraph 13 of the Sale Agreement failed to comply with the RESDA. The Semanciks acknowledge that they did not provide a seller’s disclosure statement, which was required under §7303. Failure to comply with the seller’s required duties under RESDA may subject the Defendants to penalties under §7311. However, the Semanciks argue that any potential liability they may encounter under RESDA is limited by §7309. More specifically, they argue that §7309(a)(1) of RESDA requires actual knowledge of an undisclosed material defect, and that Hall cannot state a cause of action for violation of RESDA because of the Inspection/Warranty clause in the Agreement. As set forth above in Section B, Hall may allege misrepresentations through nondisclosure of material defects because they relate to alleged defects that were not reasonably apparent to her during inspection of the property. Also, as stated above, the question of whether or not there were material defects and whether or not the Defendants had knowledge of the undisclosed material defects are an issue to be decided by a jury. Hall has set forth facts demonstrating that the Defendants were aware of the need to replace the roof’s support system and that the northeast basement wall was structurally deficient, but disclosed neither fact to the Plaintiff. Therefore, the Semanciks’ preliminary objection as to violation of RESDA is overruled. 1 Transfers by a fiduciary in the course of the administration of a decedent's estate, guardianship, conservatorship or trust. 68 Pa.C.S. 7302(1). 2 Transfers of new residential construction that has not been previously occupied. 68 Pa.C.S. 7302(2). 11 E. Breach of Implied Warranty of Habitability Hall has alleged a cause of action against the Semanciks for a breach of implied warranty of habitability. In Pennsylvania, the implied warranty of habitability is applicable to residential leases and builder-vendors of new residential real estate. Lindstrom v. Pennswood Village, 612 A.2d 1048, 1051 (Pa.Super. 1992); Elderkin v. Gaster, 288 A.2d 771, 777 (Pa. 1972). Hall’s complaint establishes that the underlying transaction in the instant case was for the purchase of existing real estate; this transaction did not involve either a residential lease or new construction. Hall alleges that the Semanciks have so substantially reconstructed the property so as to make it the functional equivalent of a new home. Even if this were found to be true, this Court cannot extend the doctrine of implied warranty of habitability to include refurbished homes when the doctrine has only applied to completely new residential real estate construction. Because this Court refuses to extend the doctrine of implied warranty of habitability, this Court does not need to discuss the issue of waiver. As a matter of law, Hall cannot prevail under a theory of breach of the implied warranty of habitability; therefore the Defendants’ preliminary objection as to a breach of implied warranty of habitability is granted. F. Fraudulent Concealment, Fraudulent Non-disclosure, Fraudulent Inducement and Fraudulent Misrepresentation. Hall has set forth facts in support of separate causes of action for fraudulent non- disclosure and fraudulent misrepresentation. Under the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, causes of action may be pleaded in the alternative. Pa.R.C.P. 1020(c). Furthermore, under the LeDonnne balancing test, the parol evidence rule does not prohibit the use of representations about conditions of the property that were not reasonably apparent to Plaintiff after inspection. 12 Fraudulent non-disclosure and fraudulent misrepresentation are separate causes of action. Fraudulent non-disclosure differs from fraudulent misrepresentation in that in a non-disclosure, “the party intentionally conceals a material fact rather than making an affirmative representation.” Bortz v. Noon, 729 A.2d 555, 560 (Pa. 1999). The elements necessary for making a fraudulent misrepresentation claim are: (1) a representation; (2) which is material to the transaction at hand; (3) made falsely, with knowledge of its falsity or recklessness as to whether it is true or false; (4) with the intent of misleading another into relying on it; (5) justifiable reliance on the misrepresentation; and (6) resulting injury. Boyd v. Rockwood Area School Dist., 907 A.2d 1157, 1170 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2006), citing Koken v. Steinberg, 825 A.2d 723 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2003), appeal quashed, 834 A.2d 1103 (2003). Hall has set forth facts in her complaint regarding both concealments and affirmative representations by the Semanciks with regard to the sale of the property. Hall avers that the Semanciks did not disclose to her the structural defects in the basement walls and the roof support system, and an improperly constructed flooring system. She alleges that the Defendants knew or should have known of these conditions but did not disclose these defects to her. She also alleges that they concealed the roof structure by covering up the support system with new shingles. As for misrepresentations, Hall alleges the Semanciks misrepresented that the condition of the roof was new, that the basement was dry and without water problems, and that the complete renovation of the property removed any material defects. Because Hall’s complaint has set forth sufficient facts to support separate causes of action for fraudulent non-disclosure and fraudulent misrepresentation, the Semanciks’ preliminary objections to these causes of action are overruled. Plaintiff does concede in her brief that Count 4, Fraudulent Concealment and Count 6, Fraudulent Inducement do fall within the purview of Fraudulent Misrepresentation and 13 Fraudulent Non-Disclosure. Accordingly, as to Counts 4 and 6, Defendants’ preliminary objections are granted. G. Negligent Non-disclosure and Negligent Misrepresentation Hall has set forth facts in support of separate causes of action for negligent non- disclosure and negligent misrepresentation. Under the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, causes of action may be pleaded in the alternative. Pa.R.C.P. 1020(c). Furthermore, under the LeDonnne balancing test, the parol evidence rule does not prohibit the use of representations about conditions of the property that weren’t reasonably apparent through an inspection by Hall. Negligent non-disclosure and negligent misrepresentation are separate causes of action. Negligent non-disclosure differs from negligent misrepresentation in that non-disclosure requires a concealment of a material fact, whereas a misrepresentation requires an affirmative representation. Negligent misrepresentation requires proof of: (1) a misrepresentation of a material fact; (2) made under circumstances in which the misrepresenter ought to have known its falsity; (3) with an intent to induce another to act on it; and; (4) which results in injury to a party acting in justifiable reliance on the misrepresentation. Bortz, 729 A.2d at 561. Hall’s complaint sets forth that the Defendants knew or should have known about but failed to disclose the following: structural defects in the basement walls and roof support system, and improper construction of the flooring system. Her complaint also avers that the Semanciks made misrepresentations about the condition of the roof, the water problems in the basement, and that a complete renovation of the property had removed any material defects. Because Hall’s complaint has set forth sufficient facts to support separate causes of action for negligent non- disclosure and negligent misrepresentation, the Semanciks’ preliminary objections to these causes of action are overruled. 14 H. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress A claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress may be brought in situations where (1) the defendant had a contractual or fiduciary duty toward the plaintiff, (2) the plaintiff was subject to a physical impact, (3) the plaintiff was in the zone of danger and therefore experienced a fear of impending physical injury, or (4) the plaintiff observed a tortuous injury to a close relative. Toney v. Chester County Hospital, 961 A.2d 192, 197-98 (Pa.Super. 2008). Hall alleges that the Semanciks had a contractual duty to her and that the first situation is therefore applicable to this case. She alleges that the Semanciks breached this duty through negligent acts and omissions in remodeling and renovating the property, and that after discovery of these conditions, Hall suffered physical injuries. Plaintiff avers that “it was foreseeable that she would suffer physical emotional injury as a result of purchasing a home that had dangerous material defects which had not been disclosed to her.” Assuming these facts to be true for purposes of evaluating the demurrer, this Court finds that these facts are legally sufficient to support a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. The test for negligence is one of “reasonable foreseeablity.” The requirement of physical injury can be satisfied if physical harm accompanies the emotional distress as measured by the standard set forth in § 436A of the Restatement: § 436A. Negligence Resulting in Emotional Disturbance Alone. If the actor’s conduct is negligent as creating an unreasonable risk of causing either bodily harm or emotional disturbance to another, and it results in such emotional disturbance alone, without bodily harm or other compensable damage, the actor is not liable for such emotional disturbance. Restatement (Second) of Torts, §436A. At this stage of proceeding, before discovery, this issue will turn on whether “anxiety, insomnia and celiac disease” are physical bodily harms which could be linked to “reasonably foreseeable” negligence by the Defendants. Negligence actions may lie where there is a loss 15 that is not solely economic. Pflumm v. Foundation Services Co., 816 A.26 1164 (Pa.Super. 2003). It cannot be stated at this stage, that as a matter of law, Plaintiff’s pleading presents solely only a claim for economic losses. Accordingly, the Semanciks’ preliminary objection to this cause of action is denied. I. Motion for More Specific Pleading. Defendants have requested a Motion for More Specific Pleading for failure of the Plaintiff to specify her damages. At present, her complaint simply states that she has suffered damages in excess of $50,000.00. It would appear that such a statement of damages is satisfactory for this stage of the proceeding under the provisions of Pa.R.C.P. 1021. The Court specifically notes that at any time on its own motion, or the motion of any party through discovery, pre-trial conference, a hearing or otherwise, determines the amount actually in controversy. Thus the Defendants will be given an opportunity to address this question at a later time, after discovery, and take advantage of the county’s compulsory arbitration limits if they are determined to be applicable. At this point, the Defendants’ Motion for More Specific Pleading is denied. ORDER OF COURT th AND NOW , this 13 day of May, 2009, upon consideration of the preliminary objections of Defendants Dennis Semancik and Andrew Semancik, individually and d.b.a. S&S Real Estate, to Plaintiff’s complaint, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND DIRECTED that the Defendant’s preliminary objection: OVERRULED. (1) As to Counts 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 of the complaint is (2) Requesting that paragraphs 14, 49, 50 (d), 59, 70, 83 (d), 92, 94, 95, 106, 117, 121, DENIED 128, 133, 139 and 146 be stricken with prejudice from the Plaintiff’s Complaint is . 16 (3) As to Count 1, for violation of §201-1(4)(xxi) of the Unfair Trade Practices and OVERRULED Consumer Protection Law is . (4) As to Count 1, for violations of §201-1(4)(vi), (vii) of the Unfair Trade Practices OVERRULED and Consumer Protection Law is . (5) As to Count 1, for violation of §201-1(4) (xvi) of the Unfair Trade Practices and GRANTED. Consumer Protection Law is OVERRULED (6) As to Count 2, for violation of the Real Estate Disclosure Act is . GRANTED. (7) As to Count 3, for breach of the Implied Warranty of Habitability is (8) As to Counts 5 and 7 for Fraudulent Non-disclosure and Fraudulent OVERRULED Misrepresentation is . (9) As to Counts 4 and 6, for Fraudulent Concealment and Fraudulent Inducement is GRANTED . (10) As to Counts 8 and 9 for negligent non-disclosure and negligent misrepresentation OVERRULED is . OVERRULED. (11) As to Count 10 for negligent infliction of emotional distress is DENIED (12) For a more specific pleading is . By the Court, M. L. Ebert, Jr., J. Laurence C. Kress, Esquire Attorney for Plaintiff Scaringi & Scaringi, P.C. 2000 Linglestown Road, Suite 106 Harrisburg, PA 17110 (717) 657-7770 17 Douglas K. Marsico, Esquire Attorney for Defendants Caldwell & Kearns 3631 North Front Street Harrisburg, PA 17110 (717) 232-7661 18