Loading...
HomeMy WebLinkAboutCP-21-CR-0210-2003COMMONWEALTH VS. SUSAN L. MEASE IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 03-0210 CRIMINAL CHARGE: DRIVING UNDER SUSPENSION IN RE: OPINION PURSUANT TO RULE 1925 On June 17, 2003, the court conducted a hearing on both the defendant's motion for suppression of evidence and the question of the defendant's guilt on a charge of driving under suspension, DUI related. Following the hearing, the defendant's suppression motion was denied and she was found guilty as charged. Following several continuances, the defendant was eventually sentenced to pay the mandatory fine and to undergo ninety days imprisonment. At the time of sentence, the defendant was continued on bail pending her perfection of an appeal to the Superior Court. A timely appeal has been filed. In a statement of matters complained of on appeal the defendant raises four issues: 1. The evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to support the defendant' s conviction. 2. The court's verdict convicting the defendant of the charged offense was against the great weight of the evidence. The court erred in denying the defendant's pretrial Motion to Suppress Physical Evidence. 4. The imposition of a mandatory sentence of imprisonment without the possibility of house arrest being imposed or even considered by the sentencing court violated the defendant appellant's constitutional right to equal protection of the laws as other defendants sentenced for other similar crimes are entitled to have the sentencing court impose house arrest as part or all of a defendant's sentence. 03-0210 CRIMINAL Taken in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the facts are as follows. On April 19, 2002, Patrolman Troy L. McNair of the Lower Allen Township Police was on duty in an unmarked patrol car. He pulled into the parking lot of Moe's Bar and Grill and began to observe two people seated in a white van in the parking lot. He observed a female exit the van and enter the bar. Moments later she exited the bar and got back into the vehicle. The officer then observed the van, being driven by the female, exit the parking lot and enter onto Gettysburg Road. The van proceeded in front of Moe's Bar and Grill, entered a second entrance into the parking lot and returned to the area where it had been first observed. Officer McNair requested a check of the vehicle registration which revealed that the van was owned by the defendant, Susan Mease. The officer then realized that the woman he had seen was, indeed, Susan Mease, a person with whom he had had past contact. The officer then verified that her driver's license was under suspension and he learned that the suspension was DUI related. Officer McNair then approached the van. At that point, the defendant was sitting on the passenger side of the vehicle. The officer indicated to her that he had seen her drive on Gettysburg Road. According to Officer McNair: A. She at that time denied that she was driving. ! once again told her, ! said, don't lie to me, ! saw you with my own eyes driving. At that time she did admit that she was driving. Her exact words were, Yes, ! was driving, but he is going to now. ! assume she was referring to her male passenger that was in the vehicle. She went on to explain that her driver's license was suspended because of a DUI arrest in New Jersey, however, there was some litigation going on with that and she didn't feel that her license was justly suspended. 2 03-0210 CRIMINAL In fact, the defendant had won an appeal of her driver's license suspension in Cumberland County Court. At the time of the incident in question, however, the Commonwealth Court had reversed that Common Pleas decision and the defendant had, again, been notified that her license was suspended. She had filed a petition for allowance of appeal to the Supreme Court but the Supreme Court had not yet acted in the matter.~ The defendant testified that she knew that her license was under suspension in April of 2002, but she denied that she was driving. We resolved issues of credibility, on the matter of her driving, in favor of the Commonwealth. The defendant first contends that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to support the defendant's conviction for driving under suspension or, in the alternative, the conviction of the defendant for the charged offense was against the weight of the evidence. When presented with a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, the testimony and all reasonable inferences therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner to determine whether all the elements of the crime have been established beyond a reasonable doubt. Com. v. Devine_, 750 A.2d 899 (Pa. Super. 2000). A motion for new trial on the grounds that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence concedes that there is sufficient evidence, but nevertheless contends that the trial judge should find the verdict so shocking to one's sense of justice and contrary to the evidence as to make the award of a new trial imperative. Com. v. Davis, 799 A.2d 860 (Pa. Super. 2002). In this case, the Commonwealth had the burden of proving that the defendant drove a motor vehicle on a highway of the Commonwealth. In addition, it was required to show that the ~ Allocatur was denied on August 1, 2002. 3 03-0210 CRIMINAL defendant had notice that her license was suspended. Com. v. Brewington, 779 A.2d 525 (Pa. Super. 2001). Here, the defendant was observed driving, albeit for a relatively short distance. There is no question in this case that she knew her license was under suspension. The evidence is clearly sufficient to sustain the verdict. While some could argue that the penalty mandated by the legislature is disproportionate to the conduct of the defendant in this particular case, this issue does not go to the weight of the evidence with respect to the conviction. The defendant also contends that we erred in failing to suppress the evidence of statements which she made to the police officer when she was confronted in the parking lot. Presumably, this contention is based on the fact that the officer did not administer Miranda warnings prior to questioning the defendant. At the time of her conversation with Officer McNair, the defendant was not under arrest or in custody of any kind. In fact, she was never arrested in connection with this case but, instead, was sent a summons. Miranda warnings are required only when a person is subject to interrogation after having been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of her freedom of action in any significant way. See Com. v. Mannion, 725 A.2d 196 (Pa. Super. 1999). Here, the defendant was not subject to custodial interrogation. Finally, the defendant argues that she is entitled to a sentence of house arrest. We denied the request for house arrest based on prior pronouncements of the Supreme Court to the effect that such sentences were not lawful. We have since become aware of the provisions of 42 Pa.C.S.A. 9804 which makes sentences of intermediate punishment possible in DUI-related driving under suspension cases. House arrest, however, is allowed only when combined with drug and alcohol treatment and no treatment program was advanced in this case. Moreover, while certain offenders may be eligible for house arrest and electronic surveillance, there is certainly no entitlement to this sentence. The defendant was not treated differently than other 4 03-0210 CRIMINAL people who are sentenced in Cumberland County. To the contrary, she was sentenced to the mandatory term of imprisonment but will, as are virtually all defendants in such cases, be made eligible for work release. January 8, 2004 Jaime Keating, Esquire Chief Deputy District Attorney J. Michael Farrell, Esquire For the defendant :rim Kevin A. Hess, J.