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HomeMy WebLinkAbout2003-0369 CivilTHOMAS A. FULMER and DIANE S. FULMER, Plaintiffs VS. PNC BANK, N.A. and FRANK DESTEFANO, Defendants IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA CIVIL ACTION - LAW 03-0369 CIVIL MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS BEFORE BAYLEY AND HESS. J.J. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER In this case, the plaintiffs entered into loan agreements with the defendant, PNC Bank. In December 2001, the defendant declared the plaintiffs in default of their agreements claiming that they had failed to provide required financial documentation and failed to maintain a ratio of cash flow to debt. The plaintiffs allege that they had provided all of the information which PNC Bank officers had sought and that the bank simply concocted an excuse to terminate their loans. The plaintiffs filed a complaint on or about January 23, 2003, alleging three causes of action against the defendant. Count I alleges that the bank was negligent in handling the plaintiffs' account. Count II alleges the breach of a fiduciary duty on the part of the defendant. Count III alleges breach of contract. Pending before the court is a motion of the defendants for judgment on the pleadings. The parties have agreed that Frank DeStefano, sued in his individual capacity, may be let out of the case. Our order will so reflect. We agree with the defendants that Count II of the plaintiffs' complaint should be dismissed. In Cortez v. Keystone Bank, Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5705, 24 (E.D. Pa. 2000), the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant bank breached a fiduciary duty owed to them beyond 03-0369 CIVIL their lending contract. The court, in holding that the bank had no such duty, stated that "[a] fiduciary duty arises from a special relationship of trust and confidence in which there is confidence reposed by one side and domination and influence exercised by the other." Cortez, at 27. According to the court, "Pennsylvania law follows the 'well recognized principle that a lender is not a fiduciary of the borrower' unless the lender gains 'substantial control' over the borrower's business affairs." Id. The court in Cortez found no evidence that the bank had gained such control over the plaintiff' s affairs and there was no indication that there was any relationship other than the conventional borrower and lender relationship. Id. Likewise, in the present action, there is no allegation that the defendant had substantial control over the plaintiffs' business affairs, nor is there anything to suggest that this was more than a traditional borrower and lender relationship. Consequently, defendant's motion to dismiss Count II should be granted. The defendant contends, also, that Count I, a claim in negligence, should be dismissed. At this stage of the proceedings, we are, however, unable to agree that the "gist of the action" is so clearly one of contract that the tort action cannot proceed. We will leave for another day the question of whether the "gist of the action" doctrine or, if asserted, the economic loss doctrine, precludes recovery in tort. ORDER day of January, 2004, the complaint as to the defendant, Frank AND NOW, this DeStefano, is DISMISSED. The defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings with respect to Count II is GRANTED and the plaintiffs' claim for breach of fiduciary duty is DISMISSED. 2 The balance of the defendams' motion for judgmem on the pleadings is DENIED. BY THE COURT, Kevin A. Hess, J. John Fenstermacher, Esquire For the Plaimiffs Michael J. Donohue, Esquire For the Defendams :rlm THOMAS A. FULMER and DIANE: S. FULMER, Plaintiffs VS. PNC BANK, N.A. and FRANK DESTEFANO, Defendants AND NOW, this DeStefano, is DISMISSED. IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA CIVIL ACTION - LAW 03-0369 CIVIL MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS BEFORE BAYLEY AND HESS. J.J. ORDER day of January, 2004, the complaint as to the defendant, Frank The defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings with respect to Count II is GRANTED and the plaintiffs' claim for breach of fiduciary duty is DISMISSED. The balance of the defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings is DENIED. BY THE COURT, John Fenstermacher, Esquire For the Plaintiffs Michael J. Donohue, Esquire For the Defendants :rlm Kevin A. Hess, J.