HomeMy WebLinkAboutCP-21-CR-0283-2002COMMONWEALTH
V.
RONNIE W. COMERER
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
NO. 2002-0283 CRIMINAL TERM
IN RE: OPINION PURSUANT TO Pa. R.A.P. 1925
Guido, J., August ,2003
After a non-jury trial on December 3, 2002, we found the defendant guilty of
driving under the influence.~ On January 7, 2003, he was sentenced to pay fines and
costs and to undergo imprisonment in the Cumberland County prison for not less than 48
hours nor more than 23 months. He timely filed a post sentence motion for judgment of
acquittal which we denied on March 4, 2003. Because of a breakdown in the system, the
defendant's counsel was never served with a copy of our order denying his motion. On
June 10, 2003, we granted his motion to file this appeal nuncpro tunc. The only issue
raised on appeal is the sufficiency of the evidence.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Shortly after 8:00 p.m. on October 12, 2001, Trooper Gregory Styers of the
Pennsylvania State Police was dispatched to investigate the report of a suspected drunk
driver on Mountain Road in South Middleton Township, Cumberland County,
Pennsylvania.2 After talking with the complaining parties, the trooper parked his vehicle
on Mountain Road, also known as Township Road 474, in order to establish a stationary
patrol3
18 Pa. C.S.A. § 3731 (a)(1). We found him not guilty of related summary offenses.
Trial Transcript, p. 4-5.
Trial Transcript, p. 5.
NO. 2002-0283 CRIMINAL
He saw the defendant operating a four wheel ATV vehicle on a dirt road which is
"Mountain Road extended.''4 There is a stop sign at the juncture of Mountain Road
extended (the dirt portion) and Mountain Road (the paved portion).5 The trooper
observed the defendant run that stop sign and travel onto the paved portion of Mountain
Road.6
During the ensuing traffic stop the trooper noted signs of intoxication. There was
a strong odor of alcohol.7 The defendant's movements lacked coordination, his speech
was slurred, and he was shaky on his feet.8 The trooper opined that the defendant was
under the influence of alcohol to a degree that rendered him incapable of safe driving.9
The defendant was arrested and transported to the booking center to be processed.
He admitted to having consumed ten (10) twelve (12) ounce cans of beer. l0 He was
administered the standard field sobriety tests, which he did not perform satisfactorily. ~
In the opinion of the trained booking center agent, the defendant was under the influence
of alcohol to a degree that rendered him incapable of safe driving. ~2
DISCUSSION
The section of the Vehicle Code under which defendant was charged provides:
A person shall not drive, operate or be in actual physical control of the
movement of a vehicle in any of the following circumstances:
(1) While under the influence of alcohol to a degree which renders
the person incapable of safe driving.
Trial Transcript, pp. 6-8.
Trial Transcript, p. 8.
Trial Transcript, pp. 8-9.
Trial Transcript, p. 10.
Trial Transcript, p. 11.
Trial Transcript, p. 12.
l0 Trial Transcript, p. 22.
~ Trial Transcript, p. 27.
~: Trial Transcript, p. 29?
NO. 2002-0283 CRIMINAL
75 Pa. C.S.A. § 3731 (a)(1). In addition, Section 3101 of the Vehicle Code provides that
Subchapter B of Chapter 37 applies only to highways or trafficways. ~3 Since Section
3731 (a)(1) is within Subchapter B of Chapter 37, operation of the vehicle upon a
highway or trafficway is an essential element of this offense. Based upon the facts as we
found them to be, we were satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the Commonwealth
had proven all the elements of the offense.
Defendant does not dispute that the evidence was sufficient to prove that he had
been operating a vehicle after consuming alcohol. Nor does he question his inability to
drive safely. He does, however, question the sufficiency of the evidence in connection
with his driving upon a highway or trafficway. He argues that since he never left the dirt
portion of Mountain Road, the Commonwealth failed to prove that essential element of
this offense.
The standard of review in assessing a sufficiency of the evidence challenge is well
settled and was recently articulated by the Superior Court as follows:
"The standard (to be applied) in reviewing the sufficiency of evidence
is whether, viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light most
favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence to enable
the fact finder to find every element of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt." Commonwealth v. Heberling, 451 Pa. Super. 119, 678 A.2d
794, 795 (Pa. Super. 1996) (citing Commonwealth v. Williams, 539 Pa.
61,650 A.2d 420 (1994)) .... In addition, we note that the facts and
circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not preclude
every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant's
guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak
and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be
drawn from the combined circumstances. Commonwealth v. Cassidy,
447 Pa. Super. 192, 668 A.2d 1143, 1144 (Pa. Super. 1995) (citations
omitted). The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every
element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly
circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the
entire record must be evaluated and all evidence actually received
13 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 3101(b).
NO. 2002-0283 CRIMINAL
must be considered. Finally, the trier of fact while passing upon the
credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced, is
free to believe all, part or none of the evidence. Commonwealth v.
Falette, 531 Pa. 384, 388, 613 A.2d 548 549 (1992) (citations and
quotation marks omitted).
Commonwealth v. gdarinez, 777 A.2d 1121,1126 Pa. Super. (2001) quoting from
Commonwealth v. Fetrini, 734 A.2d 404, 406-407 Pa. Super. (1999). Applying that
standard to the case at bar, we are at a loss to understand the defendant's challenge.
The trooper specifically testified that the defendant traveled onto the paved
portion of Mountain Road. We believed him. 14 Therefore, we found the defendant guilty
of violating Section 373 l(a)(1) of the Vehicle Code.
DATE
Edward E. Guido, J.
Geoffrey S. Mclnroy, Esquire
For the Commonwealth
Timothy Clawges, Esquire
For the Defendant
:sld
14 Defendant concedes that the paved portion is a highway or trafficway under the Vehicle Code. We also
note that the testimony established that the dirt portion of Mountain Road qualified as a trafficway. It is not
only open to the public, but it serves as an access to two businesses. See Trial Transcript, p. 7.