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HomeMy WebLinkAbout02-4656 CivilMEGHAN REMSNYDER, A minor, by MAURA JENKINS, HER MOTHER: And natural guardian, Plaintiffs SEARS ROEBUCK & CO., and CONCENTRA MEDICAL CENTER, Defendants IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO. 2002-4656 CIVIL TERM IN RE: DEFENDANT'S PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS TO COUNTS II AND III OF PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT BEFORE HOFFER~ P.J. OLER~ GUIDO~ JJ. OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT Plaintiff has filed a multi-count complaint alleging various causes of action against the defendants. Counts I! and II! allege causes of action for false imprisonment and invasion of privacy, respectively, against defendant Sears Roebuck and Company (hereafter "Sears"). Defendant Sears has filed preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer to each of those counts. The parties have briefed and argued their respective positions. For the reasons hereinafter set forth, the preliminary objections will be granted. Standard of Review The standard to be applied to preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer was succinctly stated by our Supreme Court as follows: NO. 2002-4656 CIVIL TERM A demurrer can only be sustained where the complaint is clearly insufficient to establish the pleader' s right to relief. For the purpose of testing the legal sufficiency of the challenged pleading a preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer admits as true all well-pleaded, material, relevant facts, and every inference fairly deducible from those facts. Since the sustaining of a demurrer results in a denial of the pleader's claim or a dismissal of his suit, a preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer should be sustained only in cases that clearly and without a doubt fail to state a claim for which relief may be granted. County of Allegheny v. Commonwealth, 507 Pa. 360, 372 490 A.2d 402, 408 (1985) (citations omitted). Furthermore, when ruling upon a demurrer, we are limited to a review of the allegations set forth in the complaint. Mellon Bank N.A.v. Fabinyi, 437 Pa. Super. 559, 650 A.2d 895 (1994). Factual Background The allegations contained in the complaint may be summarized as follows. Plaintiff is a sixteen (16) year old unemancipated minor. While she was working as a sales associate for Defendant Sears, her supervisor accused her of drug use. Management demanded that she submit to a drug test. Several Sears' employees transported her to an off site drug testing facility operated by Defendant Concentra. A drug test was done without obtaining the consent of plaintiff' s parent or guardian. Plaintiff sustained emotional injuries, including distress, humiliation, fear, shame and mental suffering. She requests damages for those emotional injuries as well as punitive damages. NO. 2002-4656 CIVIL TERM DISCUSSION Defendant Sears argues that plaintiff' s claims are barred by the exclusivity provisions of the Pennsylvania Worker' s Compensation Act.1 While plaintiff concedes that she was an employee of the Defendant Sears, she contends that her causes of action are not barred by the exclusivity provisions of the Act. After a thorough review of the applicable authority, we are satisfied that the defendant's position is the correct one. The Pennsylvania Worker's Compensation Act provides in relevant part as follows: The liability of an employer under this act shall be exclusive and in place of any and all other liability to such employees, his legal representative, husband or wife, parents, dependents, next of kin or anyone otherwise entitled to damages in any action at law or otherwise on account of any injury or death as defined... 77 P.S. § 451(a). The Act goes onto state that: "The terms 'injury' and 'personal injury,' as used in this act, shall be construed to mean an injury to an employee,.., arising in the course of his employment and related thereto," 77 P.S. §411(1). It is clear that the interaction between the parties as alleged in the complaint was "in the course of (plaintiff' s) employment and related thereto." It is also clear that intentional torts arising out of the employment relationship are subject to the exclusivity provisions of the Act. ?oyser v. Newman, & Co., Inc., 514 Pa. 325, 522 A.2d 548 (1987). While plaintiff does not dispute these issues, she contends that our focus should be on her injuries rather than the conduct of her employer. 1 77 P.S. § 1 et. seq. NO. 2002-4656 CIVIL TERM Plaintiff contends that the injuries she sustained do not fall within the purview of the Act. She relies on Urban v. Dollar Bank 725 A.2d 815 (Pa. Super. 1999) in support of her position. Her reliance is misplaced. The plaintiff in Urban filed a multi-count complaint against her employer for 1) malicious abuse of process, 2) intentional inflection of emotional distress, 3) defamation, 4) conspiracy and 5) negligent infliction of emotional distress. The complaint was based upon allegations that she had been "strapped to a gurney" and transported to a psychiatric interview pursuant to an application for an involuntary commitment filed by her employer under § 302 of the Mental Health Procedures Act of 1976.2 725 A.2d at 817. The employer knew that the facts it alleged in the involuntary commitment application were not true. The trial court granted the employer's motion for summary judgment as to all counts, holding that the claims were barred by the Worker's Compensation Act. The Superior Court reversed only as to the defamation and malicious abuse of process claims. The Urban Court recognized that some injuries do not fall within the purview of the exclusivity provision of the Act. It noted that the "term 'injury' is not specifically defined in the Act." 725 A.2d at 819. Reviewing Pennsylvania case law, it concluded that "injury" as used in the Worker's Compensation Act encompassed "a physical or emotional impairment to one's person". Id. The Urban Court concluded that the injuries sustained in the defamation and abuse of process claims do not fall within the purview of the Act because neither involves an injury to the physical or emotional well being of the claimant. In referring to the defamation claim, the court stated, "(i)n contrast to one' s physical or psychiatric well- being, a defamation action is designed to redress harm to one's reputation." 725 A.2d at : 50 P.S. § 7302. NO. 2002-4656 CIVIL TERM 819. The rationale behind allowing the malicious prosecution claim to proceed was that "the essence of the tort is not physical or mental injury, but interference with the right to be free from unjustifiable litigation." 725 A.2d at 821. In the instant case, plaintiff has claimed that she suffered distress, humiliation, fear, shame, and mental suffering as a result of the defendant's actions. 3 All of those alleged injuries are "psychiatric" or "emotional" in nature. As such, they fall within the purview of the Worker's Compensation Act.4 Therefore, Defendant Sears' preliminary objections must be sustained. ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this day of NOVEMBER, 2003, the Preliminary Objections of Defendant Sears Roebuck and Company in the form of a demurrer to Counts II and III of Plaintiff' s claim are GRANTED and those Counts are DISMISSED. BY THE COURT, Fred H. Hait, Esquire For the Plaintiff Sidney R. Steinberg, Esquire For the Defendant Edward E. Guido, J. 3 The complaint alleges that the accusation was made in front of her peers. However, there is no allegation that the accusation was false. Consequently, no claim for defamation has been made. 4The injuries claimed by plaintiff in this case are not unlike those claimed by the plaintiff in Urban as part of her claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a claim which the court held was barred by the Worker's Compensation Act. MEGHAN REMSNYDER, A minor, by MAURA JENKINS, HER MOTHER: And natural guardian, Plaintiffs VI. SEARS ROEBUCK & CO., and CONCENTRA MEDICAL CENTER, Defendants IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO. 2002-4656 CIVIL TERM IN RE: DEFENDANT'S PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS TO COUNTS II AND III OF PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT BEFORE HOFFER~ P.J. OLER~ GUIDO~ JJ. ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this day of NOVEMBER, 2003, the Preliminary Objections of Defendant Sears Roebuck and Company in the form of a demurrer to Counts II and III of Plaintiff' s claim are GRANTED and those Counts are DISMISSED. BY THE COURT, Fred H. Halt, Esquire For the Plaintiff Sidney R. Steinberg, Esquire For the Defendant Edward E. Guido, J.