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HomeMy WebLinkAboutCP-21-JV-0167-1998IN THE MATTER OF V.M. DOB: MARCH 5, 1999 IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA JUVENILE NO. 1998-0167 IN RE: OPINION PURSUANT TO Pa. R.A.P. 1925 Guido, J., January ,2004 V.M. has been a dependent child since she was born on March 5, 1999. A dispositional review was held before the dependency Master on August 28, 2003. The child's mother and paternal grandmother were present at the hearing along with their respective attorneys. The child's father and her maternal grandmother participated through their attorneys, though neither was present at the hearing. ~ The child was represented by her Guardian Ad Litem. The foster parents, with whom V.M. had lived for more than 3 lA years, participated, but were not represented by counsel. After a lengthy hearing, the dependency Master concluded that the child remained dependent but that she should be removed from her foster home and placed with her paternal grandmother as her permanent legal custodian.2 By order dated September 4, 2003, we approved the findings and recommendations of the Master. The foster parents contacted counsel to file an objection to the Master's recommendations and to request that we conduct a de novo dispositional hearing. On September 10, 2003, we met with all counsel to discuss the issue of the foster parents' ~ The child's Father was incarcerated on statutory sexual assault charges. The maternal grandmother's absence was unexplained. : See Master's Report approved by Order dated September 4, 2003. (The proceedings before the Master were not recorded). NO. 1998 JUVENILE 0167 standing in this matter.3 At the conclusion of the meeting, we appointed counsel to represent the foster parents and scheduled a de nava dispositional hearing for October 8, 2003.4 We reserved ruling on the issue of standing pending receipt of briefs.5 After review of the briefs, as well as the record in this matter,6 we granted standing to the foster parents by order dated October 2, 2003. The hearing de nava was held as scheduled on October 8, 2003. It was reconvened on October 14, 2003. At the conclusion of the hearing, we modified our prior order approving the Master's findings and recommendations. All parties, except the foster parents, have joined in this timely appeal.? The only issue is our alleged error in granting standing to the foster parents. FACTUAL BACKGROUND V.M. was born on March 5, 1999. At the time of her birth, her mother was only 15 years old and was herselfa dependent child. On March 10, 1999, V.M. was placed, along with her mother, in the care and custody of the child's paternal grandmother, subject to the protective supervision of the agency.8 On July 26, 1999, she and her mother were placed together in foster care.9 Both were placed in the home of the current foster parents in January of 2000. l0 ~ Actually, the foster parents' counsel had contacted our chambers to request that she be court appointed to represent them. The meeting was convened in response to this request. 4 See Transcript of proceedings, September 10, 2003, p. 2. s See Transcript of proceedings, September 10, 2003, p. 2. 6 The record we reviewed consisted of our prior orders as well as the prior reports of the dependency Master. 7 On October 22, 2003, we amended our order of October 2, 2003, to add the following language: This Order involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination (sic) of the matter. 8 See Order dated March 10, 1999. 9 See Order dated July 22, 1999. lo See Master's Report approved by Order dated February 8, 2000 and May 23, 2003. NO. 1998 JUVENILE 0167 The foster parents provided a nurturing and loving home for both V.M. and her mother. V.M. developed a strong bond with the foster parents and considered herself to At the permanency hearing held on May 16, 2003, the Master be a part of their family. noted: V.M., age 4, has been in foster care for over three years, four months with the Miller Foster Home, and has been in placement for three years, 10 months. For almost all of that time, her Mother, Rachel, lived with her in that household. Rachel left for a time, but has now moved back in with the Millers. Rachel lives in the household with the Millers, but she allows the Millers to be the primary caregivers for (V.M.)... Rachel would be in favor of a goal change to permanent legal guardianship with the Millers. ~ ~ By the time of the dispositional review hearing on August 28, 2003, the child's mother had left the foster home because of an argument.~2 As a result, she no longer advocated that the Millers become the child's permanent legal custodians. Rather, she now wanted V.M. removed from the foster home and placed with the paternal grandmother. In his summary, the Master highlighted the testimony of psychologist Dr. Lillenstein who recognized "that this is a very complicated case.''13 Although Dr. Lillenstien had originally recommended that the child stay with her foster parents as permanent legal custodians, the fact that her mother had moved out of the home made the custodial decision a "toss up".TM It was against this factual background that we had to decide whether the foster parents had standing to question the change of custody. ~ See Master's Report approved by Order dated May 23, 2003. Mother continued to live with the foster parents after she graduated from high school and her own dependent status had ended· ~2 Mother's dependency had ended when she graduated high school· However, she had continued to live with the Millers as part of their family· ~3 See Master's Report approved by Order dated September 3, 2003. ~4 See Master's Report approved by Order dated September 3, 2003. NO. 1998 JUVENILE 0167 DISCUSSION The identical issue before us was addressed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in the case of In re: G.C., 558 Pa. 116, 735 A.2d 1226 (1999). As Justice Zappala noted in his Opinion in Support of Affirmance: "The sole issue before us on appeal is whether foster parents have standing to seek or contest awards of custody concerning their foster children." 735 A.2d at 1226. The G.C. trial court had ruled that they did not. Its ruling was affirmed by evenly divided Superior and Supreme Courts.15 Since G.C. was the product of evenly divided courts at both appellate levels, it has no precedential value. See Commonwealth v. Covil, 474 Pa. 375, 378 A.2d 841 (1977) and Estate of Hopkins, 391 Pa. Super. 211,570 A.2d 1058 (1990). We thoroughly reviewed the briefs of the parties as well as all of the opinions of the Superior Court Judges and Supreme Court Justices who addressed this difficult issue. We were persuaded by the analysis of Justices Nigro and Newman in their separate dissenting opinions. Faced with the formidable task of deciding where this young child should reside, we could not help being persuaded by their policy statements in favor of granting standing to the foster parents. As Justice Nigro stated: I believe we must not lose sight of the fact that the aim of the court system is to provide the presiding judge with the relevant information necessary for him to make a fair, just and equitable decision. Granting standing to foster parents furthers this purpose as they have primary physical custody and, more than likely, have insight and information bearing on the best interests of the child which would not otherwise come to the court's attention. ~5 At the Superior Court level, four judges voted to affirm and four judges voted to reverse the trial court's ruling. See In Re: G.C. 449 Pa. Super. 258, 673 A.2d 932 (1996). In the Supreme Court, Chief Justice Flaherty and Justice Cappy joined in the opinion of Justice Zappala affirming the trial court's ruling that foster parents do not have such standing. Justices Nigro, Newman and Castille voted in favor of granting standing. Justice Castille joined in the opinion of Justice Newman. NO. 1998 JUVENILE 0167 735 A.2d at 1232. In her separate Opinion in Support of Reversal, Justice Newman stated: A foster child must rely upon a myriad of legal and social resources to fill the void left when his or her own parents are unable to provide basic nurturing, care and guidance. To resolve what custody arrangement is best for any child that is adjudicated dependent under the Juvenile Act, the court should have the input of all interested parties, not simply an overburdened social service agency. The combined effort of all interested parties, whether they be the agency, the extended family or foster parents, is essential to decide what custody arrangement is best. 735 A.2d at 1237. In addition to the policy reasons set forth above, Justice Newman provided a comprehensive review of the Juvenile Act and existing case law to support the conclusion that foster parents have standing in custody proceedings involving their charges. We found her analysis to be compelling and relied upon it in issuing the order which is the subject of this appeal. DATE Edward E. Guido, J. Lindsay D. Baird, Esquire Lisa Greason, Esquire Robert Lieberman, Esquire Jacqueline M. Verney, Esquire Galen Waltz, Esquire Ruby D. Weeks, Esquire CCC&Y Juvenile Probation CASA