HomeMy WebLinkAbout2004-312 EquityLEE PUBLICATIONS, INC.,
Publisher of THE SENTINEL,
And P.J. BROWNING, Publisher of
THE SENTINEL, and
THE PATRIOT-NEWS and
CATE BARRON,
Plaintiffs
THE DICKINSON SCHOOL OF
LAW OF THE PENNSYLVANIA
STATE UNIVERSITY
ASSOCIATION and THE BOARD
OF GOVERNORS OF THE
DICKINSON SCHOOL OF LAW
OF THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE
UNIVERSITY AS SOCIATION,
Defendants
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
NO. 2004-0312 EQUITY TERM
COMPLAINT IN EQUITY
UNDER THE SUNSHINE ACT
IN RE: OPINION PURSUANT TO Pa. R.A.P. 1925
Guido, J., February ,2004
The reasons for our order of February 2, 2004, are fully set forth in the opinion
which accompanied it.
DATE Edward E. Guido, J.
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PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
BEFORE GUIDO, J.
OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT
Plaintiffs have brought this equity action under the Sunshine Act.~ They have
filed a complaint as well as a motion for preliminary injunction. Currently before us is
their motion for preliminary injunction. Plaintiffs have alleged that the Defendant Board
of Governors of the Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State University
Association (hereinafter "Board of Governors" or "Board") is an agency subject to the
provisions of the Sunshine Act. They have asked that we enjoin the Board from closing
its future meetings to the public in violation of the Act. A hearing on the motion was
held on January 29, 2004.
~ 65 Pa. C.S.A. § 701 et seq.
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The matter is now ready for disposition.
F1ND1NGS OF FACT
The Dickinson School of Law was founded by the Honorable John Reed in
Carlisle, Cumberland County in 1834.2 It is steeped in tradition. It is the oldest law
school in Pennsylvania and the fifth oldest in the nation.3 Prior to its affiliation with the
Pennsylvania State University on July 1, 1997, it was the oldest independent law school
in the United States.4
On July 1, 1997, the Dickinson School of Law became "affiliated" with the
Pennsylvania State University (hereinafter "Penn State") pursuant to the terms of an
"Affiliation Agreement and Agreement and Plan of Merger" (hereinafter "Plan of
Merger" or "Plan").5 The Plan of Merger was approved by both the Board of Trustees of
the Dickinson School of Law and the Board of Trustees of Penn State.6
Pursuant to the Plan of Merger, several relevant occurrences took place. The
Dickinson School of Law became The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania
State University merging "with and into" Penn State and ceasing to exist as a separate
entity.? The Pennsylvania State University and its Board of Trustees continued
unchanged.8 The Plan of Merger also called for the creation of both Defendants in the
instant action. Section 1.02(E) of the Plan provided, in relevant part, as follows:
: See Defendant's Exhibit 4, Bylaws of the Board of Governors of the Dickinson School of Law of the
Pennsylvania State University.
3jfd.
aid.
s Defendant's Exhibit 1, Affiliation Agreement andAgreement and Plan ofg/[erger. The Plan of Merger
called for an affiliation period followed by a merger of the Law School into the University. Since the
merger was accomplished in July 2000, only the terms of the Plan of Merger have relevance to this action.
6 Defendant's Exhibit 1. Paragraph C of the "Recitals" Section, p. 1, and Exhibit C, "Articles of Merger"
attached thereto.
7 Defendant's Exhibit 1. Section 1.02 (A), p. 3.
8Id.
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Effective as of the Merger Date, the Board of Trustees of Dickinson
shall cause to be formed a new non-stock, non-membership
Pennsylvania non-profit corporation to be named "The Dickinson
School of Law of The Pennsylvania State University Association" (the
"Association"). The term of its existence shall be perpetual. In
accordance with Section 4.13 (C), the Association shall be governed
by a self-perpetuating Board of Governors. Such Board of
Governors shall provide counsel and guidance to Penn State with
respect to the academic mission of the law school and have the
responsibilities and duties set forth in Section 4.13 (C) and Section
8.09 of this Plan.9
(Emphasis added).
The make-up of the Board of Governors was dictated by the terms of the Plan.
Section 4.13 (C) provided in relevant part as follows:
Effective as of the Merger Date, Dickinson's Board of Trustees will be
irrevocably appointed as a self-perpetuating Board of Governors of a
newly-created non-stock, non-membership, non profit corporation,
The Dickinson School of Law of The Pennsylvania State University
Association (the "Association").
The Dean shall serve as liaison between Penn State and the
Association. The Dean (or in his absence, the Chairperson of The
Board of Trustees of Penn State, the President of Penn State or any
Executive or Senior Vice President of Penn State) shall attend each
meeting of the Association's Board on an ex officio, nonvoting
basis,l°
(Emphasis added). Many of the Board of Governors' functions, duties, and
responsibilities are also outlined in Section 4.13 (C) of the Plan:
The Board of Governors shall provide counsel and guidance to
Penn State with respect to the operation and academic mission of
The Dickinson School of Law of The Pennsylvania State
University. More specifically, the Board of Governors will have the
following mission, responsibilities and authority:
(1) review and make recommendations on the mission of
Dickinson;
(2) review and make recommendations regarding the strategic
and long term capital plans for Dickinson;
9 Defendant's Exhibit 1, p. 4.
l0 Defendant's Exhibit 1, pp. 30-31.
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(3)
(4)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
provide input and guidance on Dickinson's annual giving
and capital campaign efforts and endowment enhancement;
provide advice, based on their experience in the practice of
the law regarding the nature and scope of the law school
curriculum;
provide input regarding the means by which to maintain
and enhance Dickinson's reputation for academic
excellence including input on class size, tuition and
admissions criteria;
provide input ~nto the selection of a successor Dean;
provide input ~nto operating and capital budgets;
possess authority to confer honorary degrees, in
consultation with Penn State's President;
possess authority to enforce by specific performance in
accordance with Section 8.09 of this Plan, Penn State's
continuing covenants which survive the Merger; and
provide guidance on matters relating to the Loan
Repayment Fund referred to in Section 4.12 (B) of the
Plan. 11
(Emphasis added).
The Merger Plan also required Penn State to abide by certain covenants into
perpetuity, unless a majority of the Board of Governors would agree otherwise. ~2 One
such covenant is contained in Section 4.06 (B) which provides:
The name of the unit of Penn State which offers Penn State's J.D. or
LL.M. programs, joint degree programs with a J.D. or LL.M.
components shall be "The Dickinson School of Law of the
Pennsylvania State University," and its primary location and campus
shall be Carlisle, Pennsylvania. ~3
Consequently, the Law School cannot be moved from Carlisle without a vote of the
majority of the Defendant Board of Governors.
In June and July of 2000, the Plan of Merger was carried out as contemplated.
The Association was created with its registered address being at the law school in
Defendant's Exhibit 1, pp. 30-31.
Defendant's Exhibit 1, Section 4.06, pp. 22-23.
Defendant's Exhibit 1, p. 22.
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Carlisle, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania. Articles of incorporation and articles of
merger were filed and by-laws were adopted, all in substantially the same form as
required by the Plan. 14 Furthermore, the Defendant Board of Governors was created, and
the individual members assumed office, in accordance with the terms of the Plan.
Over the next few years the Defendant Board of Governors performed its
functions and duties with little notice being taken by anyone outside of the Penn State
community. ~5 All of this changed dramatically in the fall of last year.
In anticipation of the Board of Governors meeting to be held at the end of
November 2003, a memo proposing to move the law school's main campus from Carlisle
to State College was sent to all members. The memo was authored by Dean Philip
McConnaughay, Penn State's liaison to and ex officio, albeit non-voting, member of the
Defendant Board of Governors. When the memo became public, interest in the activities
of the Board quickly spread from the Penn State community to the Central Pennsylvania
community at large. The public, including members of the press, have attempted to gain
access to the Board's meetings, which has consistently been denied. ~6
In response to the Dean's memo, the Defendant Board of Governors appointed
several ad hoc committees to study the issue of facilities expansion. Among those
committees is one assigned to explore the possibility of expanding the current site;
another is designated to look at alternate sites in the Carlisle area; and a third is to report
on the desirability of relocating the main campus to State College. The Board is
scheduled to meet on February 7, 2004, in Carlisle, to receive the committees' reports
~4 See Defendant's Exhibit 1, sub exhibits C, D, and E, and Defendant's Exhibits 2, 3, and 4.
~s All living alumni of the former Dickinson School of Law became alumni of the Pennsylvania State
University under the terms of the Plan. They are, therefore, included in the term "Penn State community."
16 The Plaintiffs in this action publish two prominent daily newspapers in Central Pennsylvania.
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and to deliberate on which site will be chosen for the law school's much needed
expansion. In addition, a motion will be made to have the Board vote on whether to
authorize a move of the main campus to State College. ~7
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.) This Court has jurisdiction.
2.) The Board of Trustees of the Pennsylvania State University is an "agency" as
that term is defined in Section 703 of the Sunshine Act.~8
3.) The Defendant Board of Governors is an "agency" as that term is defined in
Section 703 of the Sunshine Act.
4.) The Defendant Board of Governors is subject to the terms of the Sunshine
Act.
5.) The Defendant Board of Governors may be enjoined from holding meetings in
violation of the terms of the Sunshine Act.
6.) The meeting scheduled for February 7, 2004, and all future meetings, should
be enjoined from taking place other than in accordance with the terms of the
Sunshine Act.
DISCUSSION
The case at bar presents several issues, including whether this Court has
jurisdiction; whether the Sunshine Act applies to the Defendant Board of Governors;
whether the Act authorizes an injunction to prevent future meetings from taking place,
~7 See Testimony of G. Thomas Miller, Esquire
~8 65 Pa. C.S.A. § 703.
NO. 2004-0312 EQUITY
and finally; whether such power should be exercised in the instant case. ~9
address each issue seriatim.
We will
Jurisdiction
Defendants contend that this Court does not have jurisdiction. Jurisdiction under
the Sunshine Act is conferred by Section 715 which provides:
The Commonwealth Court shall have original jurisdiction of actions
involving State agencies and the courts of common pleas shall have
original jurisdiction of actions involving other agencies to render
declaratory judgments or to enforce this chapter by injunction or other
remedy deemed appropriate by the court. The action may be brought
by any person where the agency whose act is complained of is located
or where the act complained of occurred.
(65 Pa. C.S.A. § 715). The parties agree that the Sunshine Act can only apply to the
Defendant Board of Governors through its alleged affiliation with the Board of Trustees
of the Pennsylvania State University. The Defendant Board contends that since Penn
State is a state agency, original jurisdiction is vested in the Commonwealth Court.2°
However, for the reasons set forth below, we conclude that Penn State is not a state
agency for purposes of jurisdiction under the Sunshine Act.
Although it did not involve an interpretation of the Sunshine Act, the decision of
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Pennsylvania State University v. Derry Township
19 We are not unaware of a similar action brought by Plaintiffs against the instant Defendants and the
Pennsylvania State University in connection with the November meetings held by the Defendant Board of
Governors. The Plaintiffs also sought a preliminary injunction in that action. The case was filed in
Commonwealth Court pursuant to the original jurisdiction granted that Court under Section 715 of the
Sunshine Act (65 Pa. C.S.A. § 715). The case was tried before the Honorable Renee Cohn sitting as
Chancellor. She denied the request for a preliminary injunction without opinion. However, she
specifically indicated that her decision left unresolved the merits of the issues involving jurisdiction,
applicability of the Sunshine Act, and the Court's power to enjoin future meetings under that Act. The
Plaintiffs have since discontinued that action.
20 We note that the Pennsylvania State University, which was a party to the previous action filed by
Plaintiffs, challenged the jurisdiction of the Commonwealth Court by contending that it was not a state
agency.
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Schoo/District, 557 Pa. 91, 731 A.2d 1272 (1999) is instructive. In that case the court
specifically held that Penn State "is not an agency of the Commonwealth" for purposes of
real estate taxation. 731 A.2d at 1273. The court recognized that the "mere funding of an
institution does not.., make it an agency or instrumentality of the state." 731 A.2d at
1274. It went on to state:
The difficulty in determining the status of PSU arises from the fact that
it is not merely funded by the Commonwealth, but in certain very
limited respects it has governmental characteristics, while in other
regards it is plainly non-governmental. This dichotomy is illustrated
by, for example, the fact that PSU employees are included within the
definition of"state employees" under the State Employees" retirement
Code, 71 Pa. C.S. § 5102, but, for purposes of what is commonly
referred to as the Right to Know Act, 65 P.S. §§ 66.1-66.4, which
provides that public records of state agencies shall be open to
examination by citizens of Pennsylvania, PSU has been held not to
be a state agency. See Roy v. Pennsylvania State University, 130
Pa. Cmwlth. 468, 568 A.2d 751 (1990). The courts below thoroughly
described this as well as other aspects of the divergent manner in
which PSU has, for various purposes, been classified as an agency or
non-agency of the Commonwealth. Other than to illustrate the
dichotomy, however, such an approach is not helpful to the analysis.
This is because an entity's status as an agency or instrumentality
varies, depending on the issue for which the determination is being
made.
Id (emphasis added).
The analysis of the Supreme Court in Derry Township, as well as that of the
Commonwealth Court in Roy, cited therein, lead us to conclude that Penn State is not a
state agency for purposes of the Sunshine Act. The Act applies to "the board of trustees"
of"state aided" or "state related" universities.2~ However, our appellate courts have
specifically held that the "Board of Trustees of PSU is not governmental in nature."
Derry Township, supra, 731 A.2d at 1275. This is because only a minority of the
21 65 Pa. C.S.A. § 703.
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members are public officials. Id See also Roy, supra, 568 A.2d at 753. If the body to
which the provisions of the Sunshine Act are to be applied is "not governmental in
nature", it stands to reason that it cannot be a state agency. Therefore, original
jurisdiction of the alleged violation of the Sunshine Act by the Defendant Board of
Governors is vested in the court of common pleas. Further, since the registered office of
the Defendant Association and the complained of meeting of the Board, is, and will be, in
Cumberland County, the action was properly brought before this Court.
Applicability of the Sunshine Act
The Sunshine Act provides that "official action and deliberations by a quorum of
the members of an agency shall take place at a meeting open to the public" except in
The Act defines the term "agency", in relevant part, as
certain specified circumstances.22
follows:
The body, and all committees thereof authorized by the body to
take official action or render advice on matters of agency business
of all the following:.., the boards of trustees of all State-aided
colleges and universities,.., the boards of trustees of all State-related
universities...23
(Emphasis added). The parties agree that the Sunshine Act applies to the Board of
Trustees of the Pennsylvania State University as "the body" within the above definition
of "agency". They also agree that the Defendant Board of Governors does not fall within
the definition of"the body". Therefore, the Defendant Board can only be an agency as a
"committee" of"the body", i.e. as a committee of the Board of Trustees of the
Pennsylvania State University.
22 65 Pa. C.S.A. § 704.
2~ 65 Pa. C.S.A. § 703.
10
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The Defendant Board of Governors argues that it cannot be a "committee" of the
Penn State Trustees because it is totally independent of, and can at times be adversarial
to, that "body". The Defendant Board places great emphasis on the fact that the Plan
actually gives it the authority to sue the Penn State Trustees, if necessary, to enforce the
covenants that survived the merger.24 The Board contends that the plain meaning of
"committee" does not contemplate such an independent or adversarial role.
Plaintiffs, on the other hand, argue that the function and authority of the
Defendant Board of Governors places it squarely within the plain meaning of the term
"committee". As counsel suggested, "if it walks like a duck and quacks like a duck, it's a
duck." After a thorough review of the facts, the language of the act, and the accepted and
common definitions of the term "committee", we are satisfied that Plaintiffs' position is
the correct one.
Neither party produced, nor could we find, any statutory or case law defining the
term "committee". Black's Law Dictionary defines it as "(a) group of people appointed
or elected to consider, determine, or manage a matter".25 Webster's defines it as "(a)
group of people delegated to perform a particular function or task.''26 Of most
significance is the terminology of the Sunshine Act itself which refers to "committees" as
being "authorized by the body to take official action or render advice" in connection with
the body's business.
The stated functions of the Defendant Board fall within the definitions set forth
above. One of its primary functions is to render advice to the Board of Trustees of the
24 One such covenant would be the promise not to move the law school from Carlisle without the consent of
the Defendant Board of Governors.
:s Black's' Law Dictionary 266, (7th ed. 1999).
:6 Webster's II New College Dictionary (1995).
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Pennsylvania State University with regard to its operation of the law school. Another
main function is to decide whether the law school will remain in its current location or
move elsewhere. These are functions which would have been within the exclusive realm
of the Penn State Board of Trustees had those Trustees not specifically delegated them to
the Board of Governors under the terms of the Merger Plan. As a result of that
delegation, the Board of Governors acts as a "committee" (as used in the Sunshine Act
and within the plain meaning of that word) of the Board of Trustees of the Pennsylvania
State University in the performance of the above functions. Therefore, the Board is an
agency under the terms of, and subject to the provisions of, the Sunshine Act.
Authority to Enjoin a Prospective Violation
Defendants contend that our equity powers in actions brought under the Sunshine
Act are limited to those specifically provided in the Act. We agree. They further argue
that we have no power to enjoin a prospective violation of the Act because the remedies
contained in Section 713 are exclusive.27 We do not agree.
Section 713 provides certain very specific remedies. It provides that a court may
invalidate "any or all official action taken" at a meeting that was held in violation of the
Act. It also grants authority to "enjoin any challenged action until a judicial
determination of the legality of the meeting" is made. Defendants argue that this latter
remedy is the only injunctive power a court may exercise under the Act. However, this is
contrary to both the purpose and express language of the Act as well as existing case law
by which we are bound.
27 65 Pa. C.S.A. § 713.
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The purpose of the Sunshine Act can be gleaned from the legislative findings and
declarations contained therein. Section 702 provides:
(a) Findings.--The General Assembly finds that the right of the public
to be present at all meetings of agencies and to witness the
deliberation, policy formulation and decisionmaking of agencies is
vital to the enhancement and proper functioning of the democratic
process and that secrecy in public affairs undermines the faith of
the public in government and the public's effectiveness in
fulfilling its role in a democratic society.
(b) Declarations.--The General Assembly hereby declares it to be the
public policy of this Commonwealth to insure the right of its
citizens to have notice of and the right to attend all meetings of
agencies at which any agency business is discussed or acted upon
as provided in this chapter.
65 Pa. C.S.A. {} 702 (a), (b). The purpose of the Act is clear, i.e. "to give citizens the
opportunity to observe the decision making process of public agencies." Press
Enterprise v. Benton Schoo/District, 146 Pa. Cmwlth. 203,604 A.2d 1221, 1225 (1992).
In light of the purpose of the Act, it is illogical to conclude that Section 713
provides the exclusive remedies thereunder. One could imagine a meeting in which
"deliberations" took place, yet for whatever reason, no official action occurred. Thus,
there would be a violation, but no remedy. Such a result would be contra to the clear
language of Section 715, quoted above, which provides authority "to enforce this chapter
by injunction or other remedy deemed appropriate by the court.''28
Finally, we note that a court's authority to preliminarily enjoin a prospective
violation of the Sunshine Act was confirmed by the Commonwealth Court in Patriot
News Co. v. Empowerment Team, 763 A.2d 539 (Pa. Cmwlth 2000). In that case the
Commonwealth Court upheld a preliminary injunction issued by the Dauphin County
Court of Common Pleas which required, inter alia, that the Harrisburg School District
28 65 Pa. C.S.A. § 715.
13
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Empowerment Team conduct all of its future meetings in accordance with the provisions
of the Sunshine Act. Therefore, we conclude that the Act provides us with the authority
to enjoin future meetings from being held in violation thereof.
Appropriateness of Preliminary Injunction
Having concluded that we have the authority to issue a preliminary injunction
under the Act, we must now determine whether its issuance is warranted in the case at
bar. Our courts have long recognized that "the grant of a preliminary injunction is a
harsh and extraordinary remedy". Pennsylvania AFL-CIO v. Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, 683 A.2d 691,694 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996)· Therefore, it will be granted only
if certain specific criteria have been met. The Commonwealth Court discussed those
criteria in Patriot-News Co. v. Empowerment Team, supra:
As we explained many years ago in Committee of Seventy v. Albert, 33
Pa. Cmwlth. 44, 381 A.2d 188, 190 (1977) (citations omitted):
Three criteria have been established for the granting of a
preliminary injunction, which, as a harsh and extraordinary remedy,
is to be granted only when and if each criteria has been fully and
completely established .... They are: (1) the preliminary
injunction must be necessary to prevent immediate and irreparable
harm which could not be compensated for by damages; (2) greater
injury would result from the denial of the preliminary injunction
than from the granting of it; and (3) it would operate to restore the
parties to the status quo as it existed prior to the alleged wrongful
conduct. In addition to meeting all three criteria, the court must be
convinced that plaintiffs' right to a preliminary injunction is clear
·.. and general equity jurisdiction must be warranted.
See also T. 144. Phillips. Of course, the movants do not have to prove an
absolute right to relief in order to obtain a preliminary injunction;
instead, if the other elements necessary for a preliminary injunction
exist, and substantial legal questions are raised by the underlying legal
claim, their "right to relief s clear." Id at 780-781.
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Applying the above standards to the case at bar, we are satisfied that a preliminary
injunction should be granted.
The injunction is necessary to prevent immediate and irreparable harm that cannot
be compensated for by damages. We have concluded that the Sunshine Act applies to the
Defendant Board of Governors in its capacity as a de facto committee of the Board of
Trustees of the Pennsylvania State University. Therefore, any meeting at which "official
action" or "deliberations" take place must be open to the public.29 Such a meeting is
planned for February 7, 2004. If that meeting is closed, the public will be harmed by the
denial of its right to witness the deliberations on a matter of importance to a publicly
funded institution and to the local community. The harm would be irreparable in that the
opportunity to witness the deliberations and the dynamics involved in the decision
making process is lost forever once the meeting has been adjourned. There are no
damages available to compensate for such harm, "since there is no price tag that can be
placed on the public's trust.., and on the public's evaluation of the decision making
process." Patriot-News Co. v. Empowerment Team, supra, 763 A.2d at 547.
The second criterion is also present in that greater injury will result in denying the
injunction than in granting it. As noted above, denying the injunction will result in
irreparable harm to the public's right to witness the decision making process of a de facto
committee of a publicly funded institution. Against this must be weighed the inability of
the Board to conduct its deliberations outside the glare of the media's watchful eye. We
29 65 Pa. C.S.A. § 704.
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have no hesitation in finding that the greater harm would be in denying the public its right
30
to witness the process.
As to the third criterion, the alleged wrongful conduct is the Defendant Board of
Governors' refusal to abide by the Sunshine Act, which we have concluded applies to it.
Therefore, there is no status quo to be restored. The identical issue was faced by the
Commonwealth Court in Patriot-News Co. v. Empowerment Team, supra, which
nevertheless held that a preliminary injunction had been properly granted. As that Court
stated:
Moreover, while we agree with Common Pleas that the grant of the
preliminary injunctions did not actually restore the status quo, since
there was no status quo to be restored, it at least gave Appellees, who
represent the public, a clearer view of the decision-making process of
these agencies, which access had been denied before the injunctions
were entered.
763 A.2d at 547. Under the identical circumstances in the instant case, we are satisfied
that a preliminary injunction should issue.31
For the reasons set forth in the above opinion, we will enter the order that
follows.32
~0 In addressing this same issue in the Patriot-News Co. v. Empowerment Team, supra, the Commonwealth
Court stated:
Of course, any minor, alleged "injury" to the improvement plan process arising from the
subjective reactions of some members of the teams to a media presence must necessarily
bow to the greater injury to the public's interest in information that would have accrued
from a denial of the preliminary injunctions.
763 A.2d at 547.
~ Petitioners have also requested that the minutes of all prior meetings be made public. However, since we
perceive no "immediate and irreparable" harm that will result from our refusal to grant the request, it will
not be granted in these preliminary proceedings.
~2 We note that all parties have asked for an award of counsel fees. This case involves complicated issues
of fact and law which have given rise to a legitimate dispute. Each counsel has done a commendable job in
representing the interests of his client. Under these circumstances, we have no hesitation in directing each
party to pay its own, and only its own, counsel fees.
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ORDER OF COURT
AND NOW, this 2ND day of FEBRUARY, 2004, having determined that the
Defendant The Board of Governors of the Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania
State University Association is an "Agency" as that term is defined in the Sunshine Act
(65 Pa. C.S.A. {} 701, et seq) it is hereby ordered and directed as follows:
1.) Defendant The Board of Governors of the Dickinson School of Law of the
Pennsylvania State University Association is directed to comply with the
provision of the aforementioned Sunshine Act; and
2.) Defendant The Board of Governors of the Dickinson School of Law of the
Pennsylvania State University Association is enjoined from conducting any
future meetings except in accordance with the provisions of the Sunshine Act.
The above provisions shall become effective upon Plaintiffs posting bond or cash
in the amount of $1000 in accordance with Pa. R.C.P. 1531 (b) and shall remain in effect
until a full hearing on the merits or further Order of Court.
Each party's request for an award of counsel fees is DENIED.
By the Court,
/s/Edward E. Guido
Edward E. Guido, J.
Niles Benn, Esquire
Craig J. Staudenmaier, Esquire
Jack M. Stover, Esquire
Jayson R. Wolfgang, Esquire
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