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HomeMy WebLinkAboutCP-21-CR-1465-1999COMMONWEALTH VS. EARL F. PROPST OTN: F311570-0 IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA CP-21-CR-1465-1999 CHARGE: (1) INVOLUNTARY DEVIATE SEXUAL INTERCOURSE (2) INDECENT ASSAULT (3 CTS.) (3) CORRUPTION OF MINORS AFFIANT: DET. LETITIA WOODFORD IN RE: OPINION PURSUANT TO RULE 1925 In this case, the defendant has filed an appeal from our order of October 28, 2003. In that order we dismissed the petition of the defendant's post-conviction collateral relief finding that his petition was without merit and, in any event, was filed more than one year after the judgment in the case became final thus making his petition untimely. Mr. Propst seeks PCRA relief claiming that his trial counsel had not sufficiently investigated the charges before permitting his client to plead guilty. ~ In testimony which we do not find credible, the defendant testified that he agreed to a three- to six-year sentence at the preliminary hearing with the understanding that he was at liberty to change his mind about the guilty plea depending upon the "investigation" which he thought his attorney, William Braught, Esquire, would conduct. Mr. Braught testified, however, that it was Mr. Propst's decision to accept a plea agreement from the time that the agreement was offered. In the meantime, there was nothing about the discovery materials which he had obtained which caused Mr. Braught to have misgivings about the plea agreement. PCRA Hearing, N.T.p. 14. Moreover, Mr. Braught reviewed with Mr. Propst everything that he had available to him and, thus, the defendant was ~ Guilty pleas were entered on July 15, 1999, to three counts of involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, three counts of indecent assault, and one count of corruption of minors in exchange for a total aggregate sentence of three to six years. well aware of the extent of his attorney's investigation into the matter at the time he entered his guilty plea. The transcript of the guilty plea colloquy, itself, belies the defendant's contentions. In a lengthy guilty plea colloquy, we took steps to assure that the plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered. In fact, this court expressed some concern with regard to the rapidity with which the defendant entered his plea. This led to the following exchange: THE COURT: And this has happened rather quickly. ! don't always go into this area of inquiry. But given the speed with which this has all occurred, ! will ask you whether you have had adequate time to discuss this matter with your lawyer? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. THE COURT: And have you asked him to do anything for you that he hasn't done? THE DEFENDANT: No, sir. Guilty Plea Colloquy, N.T. 12, 13. We are also satisfied that Mr. Propst's PCRA petition is untimely. The petition was clearly filed more than one year after the judgment became final. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. 9545(b)(1). On August 14, 1999, thirty days had elapsed from the date of sentence and no notice of appeal had been filed to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania. The PCRA petition was not filed until May of 2003. After one year, a petition is untimely unless the petitioner alleges and proves that (1) the failure to raise the claim was as a result of interference by government officials; (2) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were not known to the petitioner or could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or (3) the right asserted was a constitutional right recognized by the Supreme Court after the one-year time period. 42 Pa.C.S.A. 9545(b)(1)(i)(ii)(iii). There is no governmental interference alleged or proven in this case. There have been no subsequent pronouncements of the Supreme Court that are applicable to this matter. Finally, the extent of counsel's investigation at the time of the guilty plea was made known to the defendant. Thus, to the extent that the failure of counsel to fully investigate the case serves as a basis for post-conviction relief, Mr. Propst was aware of the pertinent circumstances in July of 1999. Because his petition is untimely we lack jurisdiction to grant PCRA relief. Com. v. Gallman, 838 A.2d 768 (Pa. Super. 2003) citing Com. v. Palmer, 814 A.2d 700 (Pa. Super. 2002). For all the foregoing reasons, we are satisfied that the denial of the defendant's petition for post-conviction collateral relief was proper. March 22, 2004 Jaime Keating, Esquire Chief Deputy District Attorney Earl F. Propst, Pro Se FN-6435 FA 37 1600 Walters Mill Road Somerset, PA 15510-0005 :rlm Kevin A. Hess, J.