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HomeMy WebLinkAbout02-6005 CivilMARY A. FANNUCl, BRYCE H. BROWN, AUNDRY A. HANNA and CARL A. WINFIELD, Plaintiffs V. WEST SHORE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, Defendant : IN THE COURT OF COMMON : PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND :COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO. 02-6005 CIVIL TERM CIVIL ACTION--LAW IN RE: DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS Before HOFFER, P.J. and OLER, J. Hoffer, P.J. PROCEDURAL HISTORY Plaintiffs Mary A. Fanucci, Bryce H. Brown, Audrey A. Hanna and Carl A. Winfield are all former employees of Defendant West Shore Chamber of Commerce. Defendant hired the Plaintiffs at different times for varying positions: Plaintiff Carl Winfield was hired on January 10, 2000, as a membership recruiter; Plaintiff Mary Fanucci was hired in September 1989 as an administrative services employee; Plaintiff Audrey Hanna was hired in October 1998 as a project coordinator; and Plaintiff Bryce Brown was hired in May 1995 as a membership recruiter. Defendant employed Plaintiffs until May 14, 2001, at which time they were dismissed from employment. Plaintiffs filed a Complaint in this Court on December 18, 2002. Plaintiffs alleged that "Defendant's misconduct in discharging Plaintiffs was an outrageous violation of Pennsylvania's Human Relations Act forbidding age discrimination, the creation of a sexually hostile work environment, and retaliation." Complaint at I] 50. Each Plaintiff brought a separate Count against Defendant for claims of age discrimination, sexually hostile environment and retaliation. Complaint at ¶¶ 52-54; 56-58; 60-62; 64-66. On January 10, 2003, Defendant filed four preliminary objections. Defendant moved to strike Plaintiffs' Complaint for (1) failure to conform, (2) failure to state a claim for sexual discrimination/harassment and retaliation, (3) inclusion of scandalous and impertinent matter and (4) legal insufficiency for a an award of punitive damages. On June 16, 2003, this Court sustained only Defendant's objection to punitive damages. Defendant subsequently filed its Answer and New Matter on June 30, 2003. Plaintiffs filed their Reply to New Matter on July 24, 2003. On October 24, 2003, Defendant filed a Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings. Defendant contends that Plaintiffs have not and cannot state a prima facie case of sexual discrimination/harassment or retaliation. Defendant does not address the Plaintiffs' age discrimination claim. The parties timely filed the appropriate briefs in support of their respective positions. The parties argued the motion before this Court on February 4, 2004. 2 DISCUSSION Defendant filed a Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings pursuant to Rule 1034(a) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure. Judgment on the pleadings "should be granted only where the pleadings demonstrate that no genuine issue of fact exists, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Hammerstein v. Lindsay, 440 Pa. Super. 350, 356 (1994). "Such a motion is in the nature of a demurrer; all of the opposing party's well pleaded allegations are viewed as true but only those facts specifically admitted by him may be considered against him." Gallo v. J.C. Penney Cas. Ins. Co., 328 Pa. Super. 267, 270 (1984). In ruling on such a motion, the court should consider only the pleadings themselves and any documents or exhibits properly attached to pleadings. Hammerstein, 440 Pa. Super. 350, 356. Moreover, "neither party can be deemed to have admitted either conclusions of law or unjustified inferences." Id. I. Doctrine of the Laws In their Brief in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings, Plaintiffs assert that Defendant's Motion is barred by the Doctrine of the Laws of the Case. The Plaintiffs contend that the court has already ruled on the issues raised in Defendant's Motion when it denied Defendant's Preliminary Objections. To illustrate their 3 claim, Plaintiffs cite to a Pennsylvania Supreme Court case addressing the doctrine of the laws, or "coordinate jurisdiction" rule. See Riccio v. American Republic Ins. Co., 550 Pa. 254 (1997). The Riccio Court explained that a "court involved in the later phases of a litigated matter should not reopen questions decided by another judge of the same court or by a higher court in the earlier phases of the matter." Riccio, 550 Pa. at 261 (citing Commonwealth v. Starr, 541 Pa. 564, 574 (1995)). However, the coordinate jurisdiction rule is not dispositive in the case at bar. The Riccio Court added that in "determining whether the coordinate jurisdiction rule applies... [a] Court looks to where the rulings occurred in the context of the procedural posture of the case." Riccio, 550 Pa. at 261. Therefore, "[w]here the motions differ in kind, as preliminary objections differ from motions for judgment on the pleadings, which differ from motions for summary judgment, a judge ruling on a later motion is not precluded from granting relief although another judge has denied an earlier motion." (emphasis added) Id. (citing Goldey v. Trustees of the University of Pennsylvania, 544 Pa. 150, 156-57 (1996)). Furthermore, as the Defendant points out in its Reply Brief, the Plaintiffs filed their Reply to New Matter subsequent to this court's ruling on Defendant's Preliminary Objections. The Reply to New Matter contains additional factual averments that are integral to the evaluation of the Plaintiffs' case for purposes of a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. 4 For these reasons, the Defendant's Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings is not barred by the coordinate jurisdiction rule. II. Plaintiffs Fail to State a Prime Facie Case for Sexually Hostile Environment Claim The Plaintiffs claim that Defendant created a sexually hostile work environment in violation of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act. 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 951 et cet. In support of their claim, Plaintiffs aver the following in their Complaint and Reply to New Matter: Upon the promotion of Karen Christie to Executive Vice President, the "office environment become increasingly less friendly and hostile." (Complaint at ¶ 36); Ms. Christie and Ed Messner "developed an increasingly personal relationship." On a daily basis, they would leave together for long lunches and other long breaks without leaving behind contact information. (Complaint at ¶ 37); "There was occasional drinking during office hours" and occasionally Ms. Christie and Mr. Messner would dismiss the staff early. "Empty bottles of beer, wine, and liquor were in the conference room the next day." (Complaint at ¶ 38); The relationship between Ms. Christie and Mr. Messner was "increasingly personal rather than professional" and they "acted as if they were romantically involved." (Complaint at ¶ 39); Complaints to Mr. Messner about his relationship with Ms. Christie and her failure to adhere to Chamber policies were ignored. (Complaint at ¶¶ 40-41); "The relationship between Messner and Christie resulted in the failure of the office to function properly, and deprived the staff of the ability to perform the jobs as they wished." Complaint at ¶ 42); 5 "The Defendant's misconduct in discharging Plaintiffs was an outrageous violation of Pennsylvania's Human Relations Act forbidding age discrimination, the creation ora sexually hostile work environment, and retaliation." (emphasis added) (Complaint at ¶ 50); "Messner's relationship with Christie generated a sexually hostile work environment adversely affecting all Plaintiffs." (Reply to New Matter at ¶ 6); "The sexually hostile work environment created by Messner's and Christie's relationship constitutes sex discrimination under applicable law ..." (Reply to New Matter at ¶ 11); 10. The personal relationship between Ed Messner and Karen Christie created a sexually hostile work environment, thus "gender was one apparent motivating factor in creating the adverse employment conditions" to which each of the four Plaintiffs was subject. (Reply to New Matter at ¶¶ 12-15); 11. "Mr. Messner favored Karen Christie because of her sex, which led to a sexually hostile environment adversely affecting both male and female employees." (Reply to New Matter at ¶ 16); 12. Messner and Christie's relationship affected the work environment and the ability of Plaintiffs to perform their jobs. (Reply to New Matter at ¶ 18); 13. "Defendant, through its supervisory agents and employees, acted in bad faith toward the Plaintiffs in violation of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act." (Reply to New Matter at ¶ 22). Based upon a review of the pleadings in their entirety, these statements constitute the crux of Plaintiffs' sexually hostile environment claim. A. Legal Standard/Elements A plaintiff's hostile environment claims are "examined solely under 6 Title VII in light of the fact that the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act and Title VII are construed to be consistently interpreted." Kent v. Henderson, 77 F.Supp.2d 628, 631 n.1 (E.D. Pa. 1999). Title VII makes it an unlawful employment practice to discriminate against an individual on the basis of the individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin. Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993). The law is designed to prevent disparate treatment of men and women in the workplace, including "requiring people to work in a discriminatorily hostile or abusive environment." Meritor Savinqs Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986). The Third Circuit has provided a five-factor test for a successful prima facie case of a sexually hostile environment: (1) the employee suffered intentional discrimination because of his/her sex; (2) the discrimination was pervasive and regular; (3) the discrimination detrimentally affected the plaintiff [subjective test]; (4) the discrimination would detrimentally affect a reasonable person of the same sex in that position [objective test]; and (5) the existence of respondeat superior liability. Andrews v. City of Phila., 895 F.2d 1469, 1482 (3rd Cir. 1990). In determining the existence of a hostile environment, courts must look to the totality of the circumstances, including the "frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably 7 interferes with an employee's work performance." Harris, 510 U.S. at 23. When the workplace is permeated with "discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult," then it is "sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment." Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65-67. Courts must ensure the "standards for judging hostility are sufficiently demanding to ensure that Title VII does not become a general civility code." Fara.qher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998). B. The Plaintiffs Cannot Prove They Were Discriminated Against Because Of Their Sex To succeed on a sexually hostile environment claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he/she suffered intentional discrimination because of his/her sex. Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1482. Title VIl's prohibition of discrimination protects both sexes and nothing in Title VII "bars a claim of discrimination because of sex merely because the plaintiff and the defendant.., are of the same sex." Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, 523 U.S. 75, 78-79 (1998). However, the critical issue in a Title VII analysis is "whether members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to which members of the other sex are not exposed." Harris, 510 U.S. at 25 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). A plaintiff asserting a sexually hostile environment claim "must always prove that the conduct at issue was not merely tinged with 8 offensive sexual connotations, but actually constituted discrimination because of sex." Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81. The Third Circuit has instructed lower courts that the "plaintiff has the burden of showing that her sex was a substantial factor in the discrimination and that if she had been a male, she would not have been treated in a similar manner" and vice versa. Kent, 77 F.Supp.2d at 635. Although sexual overtones are not required to show discrimination on the basis of plaintiff's sex, "the offending conduct must nonetheless be motivated by her sex." Id. Furthermore, the Third Circuit has addressed sexually hostile environment claims based on the presence of a consensual sexual relationship between a supervisor and a co-worker. See Drinkwater v. Union Carbide Corporation, 904 F.2d 853 (3rd Cir. 1990). The Drinkwater court noted that in these cases "it is the environment, not the relationship, that is actionable." Id. at 861. Yet, whether gender is a motivating factor remains a key inquiry in these hostile environment claims because "the theoretical basis for the kind of environmental claim alleged here is that the sexual relationship impresses the workplace with such a cast that the plaintiff is made to feel that she is judged only by her sexuality." Id. at 861, n.15. In Drinkwater, the plaintiff complained that a relationship between her co-worker and supervisor made the work environment "oppressive and 9 intolerable." Id. at 861-62. Despite this allegation, plaintiff's claim failed because there was no evidence that the co-worker and supervisor flaunted the romantic nature of the relationship, nor was there evidence that these kinds of romantic relationships were prevalent at the workplace. Id. at 862. The court added that a sexually hostile environment may have existed if "sexual discourse displaced standard procedure" and the plaintiff was prevented "from working in an environment in which she could be evaluated on grounds other than her sexuality." Id. Using these principles, several courts have dismissed claims of sexually hostile environments because the conduct at issue was not motivated by plaintiff's gender. See e.g. Hiester v. Fischer, 113 F.Supp.2d 742 (E.D. Pa. 2000)4 (insults and ill treatment by police cadet academy instructors were experienced equally by female and male cadets and the plaintiff failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact that her sex was a "substantial factor" in her treatment or that "if plaintiff had been a male, she would not have been treated in a similar manner.); Shramban v. Aetna, 262 F.Supp.2d 531 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (although "offensive, disparaging, unprofessional and in poor taste," personal questions about Plaintiff's boyfriend/husband, remarks about Plaintiff's hair and mimicking comments ~ The plaintiff in Hiester brought her action under § 1983. However, the determination of whether a plaintiff faced discrimination because of her sex is identical under either Title VII or § 1983. Hiester, 113 F.Supp.2d at 747, n.4. 10 about Plaintiff's accent were not motivated by Plaintiff's gender); McCauley v. White, 2002 WL 1022037, *3 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (supervisor's "unprofessional and inappropriate" conduct towards plaintiff, including forcing Plaintiff's hand near groin area and making comments about Plaintiff's sexual orientation, did not occur because of plaintiff's gender); Kent v. Henderson, 77 F.Supp.2d 628 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (plaintiff's coworker left clues that he had been present at plaintiff's workplace without plaintiff's knowledge and made an angry face at plaintiff; although the plaintiff could prove harassment by her co-worker, plaintiff could not show that she was harassed because she was a woman). Courts have reached the opposite result in sexually hostile environment cases where the conduct directed at plaintiff was clearly motivated by the plaintiff's gender. See e.g. Flick v. Aurora Equipment Company, Inc., 2004 WL 220859 (E.D. Pa. 2004) (male co-workers addressed plaintiff as a "fucking bitch," plaintiff was told by co-workers she needed to prove herself because she was a woman and when plaintiff complained to her supervisor about poor treatment she was told it "was a man's world."); Endres v. Techneqlas, Inc., 139 F.Supp.2d 624 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (co-worker's disparaging comments about female co-workers and his history of negative conduct towards women constituted a material issue that conduct towards female plaintiff was motivated by gender); Anderson v. Deluxe Homes of Pa, Inc., 131 F.Supp.2d 637 (M.D. Pa. 2001) (a 11 reasonable jury could find that if plaintiff had been male, she would not have been subjected to co-worker's behavior, including co-worker's comments about the size of his genitals compared to plaintiff's boyfriends, and co-workers' placing his hands on plaintiff's breast, waist and leg). A district court in New York recently confronted a case factually similar to the case at bar. See Gale v. Primedia, Inc., 2001 WL 1537692 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). A plaintiff brought a retaliatory discharge claim against her employer for complaints she made about a romantic relationship between her male supervisor and female co-worker. In evaluating whether the plaintiff had a good faith, reasonable belief that the challenged conduct violated the law for purposes of a retaliation claim, the court stated that it was "clear that the plaintiff could not have sustained a hostile work environment claim." Id. at *2. The conduct at issue consisted of instances where the plaintiff witnessed hugging and kissing between the supervisor and co-worker, the supervisor heaped generous praise on the co-worker, the supervisor caressed the co-worker's stomach, and the couple took a separate car after a working lunch with plaintiff so they could be alone. Id. at *3. The court concluded that plaintiff could not sustain a sexually hostile environment claim because the actionable conduct was not made on the basis of gender and the conduct did not rise to the necessary level of pervasiveness or severity. Id. The court reasoned that the plaintiff's exposure to the relationship was not based on her gender because "[a]ll 12 employees...were equally subjected to this personal relationship. Employees exposed to the intimate relationship of a supervisor are not discriminated against because of their gender, but rather are discriminated against because their supervisor prefers his paramour." Id. at *3-4. Similarly, the Plaintiffs in the case at bar have not averred facts to sustain an argument that Defendant's conduct was motivated by the Plaintiffs' genders. Plaintiffs contend that Ms. Christie and Mr. Messner's alleged personal relationship adversely affected all four Plaintiffs and the environment adversely affected "both male and female employees." (Reply at ¶ 16). Plaintiffs pled that Ms. Christie and Mr. Messner developed a personal relationship, took long lunches on a regular basis without leaving a forwarding number, occasionally dismissed the staff early and that there were a few instances of drinking during office hours. None of this behavior was motivated by the gender of either the female or male Plaintiffs. Thus, the two male and two female Plaintiffs were all equally subjected to Ms. Christie and Mr. Messner's alleged relationship. Plaintiffs cannot make the critical argument for sexually hostile environment cases that "members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to which members of the other sex are not exposed." Harris, 510 U.S. at 25. The Plaintiffs simply cannot "prove that the conduct at issue was not merely tinged with offensive sexual connotations, but actually constituted discrimination 13 because of sex." Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81. In light of the principles and case law set forth in the preceding paragraphs, the conduct described by Plaintiffs cannot meet the first element of intentional gender discrimination under a sexually hostile environment claim. C. Plaintiffs Fail to Provide Facts that Support a Finding of a Pervasive and Regular Harassment The second-prong of a sexually hostile environment claim requires a plaintiff to show that the conduct/discrimination at issue was pervasive and regular. Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1482. In addressing hostile environment claims, the U.S. Supreme Court has "made it clear that conduct must be extreme to amount to a change in the terms and conditions of employment." Fara.qher, 524 U.S. at 788. A plaintiff "cannot rely upon casual, isolated or sporadic incidents to support her claim of hostile work environment sexual harassment." LaRose v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 21 F.Supp.2d 492,499 (E.D. Pa. 1998). Thus, Title VIl's purview does not extend to all workplace complaints, "even where the conduct may be crass and unwarranted." Saidu-Kamara v. Parkway Corporation, 155 F.Supp.2d 436 (E.D. Pa. 2001). There are several instances of courts dismissing sexually hostile environment claims for failing to meet the pervasive and regular element. See e.g. Shesko v. City of Coatesville, 292 F.Supp.2d 719 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (conduct not sufficiently pervasive or regular to establish a claim for a 14 sexually hostile environment where co-workers referred to plaintiff as a "bitch" or "cunt" behind her back, plaintiff found pornographic material in the visor of her patrol car, co-workers, supervisors occasionally referred to plaintiff as a "hysterical female" and supervisor described to plaintiff sexually transmitted diseases in plaintiff's age group); Lawler v. Norristown State Hospital, 2003 WL 21904744 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (conduct not pervasive or regular when plaintiff complained of two incidents of supervisor rubbing plaintiff's back and making suggestive comments); Lulis v. Barnhart, 252 F.Supp.2d 172 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (conduct by male plaintiff's female supervisor over a seventeen-month period, including four instances of "brushing" or "touching," three specific instances of "staring" or looking at the Plaintiff in a suggestive manner, four instances of sitting too closely or following Plaintiff, three incidents where Plaintiff felt he was being propositioned in an inappropriate sexual manner by the supervisor, and one incident where the supervisor showed the plaintiff "personal pictures" of herself did not constitute conduct pervasive or severe enough for a sexually hostile environment claim); Saidu-Kamara v. Parkway Corp., 155 F.Supp.2d 436 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (conduct not sufficiently severe when co- worker touched plaintiff's breasts and buttocks, removed a bottle of wine from his pants and propositioned plaintiff to join him at a hotel, commented on her appearance, and made annoying or harassing comments); Gautney v. Ameriqas Propane, Inc., 107 F.Supp.2d 634 (E.D. Pa. 2000) 15 (allegations that plaintiff was subjected to "unprofessional, offensive, and callow" conduct and comments, including discussions concerning the size of a male co-worker's genitals and his "escapades with other women" and comments "that men did not like aggressive women, that [plaintiff] was only using 1/3 of her assets and that she should dress in a skirt and heels," did not amount to severe and pervasive harassment); Bishop v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 66 F.Supp.2d 650 (E.D.Pa. 1999) (dismissing Title VII conduct "consisting merely of staring, leering and 'stud muffin' comments, with no physical touching or threats and no sexual overtones"); Pittman v. Continental Airlines, 35 F.Supp.2d 434 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (alleged conduct not sufficiently severe where plaintiff "occasionally encountered individuals who inquired about her personal life and extended conversations about relationships to a 'graphic' level"); LaRose v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 21 F.Supp.2d 492 (E.D.Pa.1998) (allegations not sufficiently severe where supervisor raised his hand at plaintiff, followed her into an office, denied her overtime and training, and stood too close to her); McGraw v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs. Inc., 1997 WL 799437 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (when her supervisor made several requests for a date with plaintiff, kissed plaintiff without her consent, "forcing his tongue into her mouth" and touched her face, this was not severe enough to create a hostile work environment); Cooper-Nicholas v. City of Chester, 1997 WL 799443 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (work environment not sufficiently hostile where plaintiff's supervisor 16 consistently made vulgar and offensive comments at office gatherings, which included referring to employees as "crotch watchers" and "whoremongers," telling an employee that his secretary was "doing the wild thing" at lunch and telling another employee that "she just had to have my body"); Konstantopoulos v. Westvaco Corp., 112 F.3d 710 (3d Cir. 1997) (finding that a hostile or abusive working environment did not exist where plaintiff was required to work in the proximity of employees who had previously harassed her and was subjected to rude gestures, "squinting stares," and shaking fists). The courts have found that plaintiffs did meet the requisite element of pervasiveness and severity in several recent decisions. In a March 2004 decision, a district court found that the following behaviors were sufficiently pervasive and severe to survive summary judgment: numerous instances of vulgar and lewd language at the job site, specific references to sexual acts including a comment by one co-worker that she "needed to go home to get a prick in me to loosen myself up," questions to the plaintiff about her preferred sexual acts, references to the plaintiff as a lesbian, an invitation to the plaintiff to participate in a sexual act with a manager and his wife and a manager, touching the plaintiff on her buttocks, pushing his body against the plaintiffs and dropping the plaintiff's nametag down her shirt. EEOC v. Rose Casual Dining, 2004 WL 614806, *4 (E.D. Pa. 2004). See also Hawk v. Americold Loqistics, LLC, 2003 WL 929221 (E.D. Pa. 17 2003) (conduct pervasive and severe enough when plaintiff's direct supervisor engaged in a pattern of sexual harassment over an eight-month period. This pattern included unwelcome phone calls to plaintiff's home and pager, statements to plaintiff that he wanted to have sex with her in his chair, grabbing the plaintiff and pulling her to him and shoving her against a wall while indicating his desire to have sex with her). The Plaintiffs in this case cannot sustain the pervasive and regular element of a sexually hostile environment claim. When the workplace is permeated with "discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult," then it is "sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment." Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65-67. An abusive working environment is one "so heavily polluted with discrimination as to destroy completely the emotional and psychological stability of minority group workers." Id. at 66. The U.S. Supreme Court has "made it clear that conduct must be extreme to amount to a change in the terms and conditions of employment." Fara.qher, 524 U.S. at 788. The aforementioned cases demonstrate the high level of pervasiveness and severity required to sustain a claim of a sexually hostile working environment. In the present case, Plaintiffs averred that Ms. Christie and Mr. Messner developed a personal relationship, took long lunches on a regular basis without leaving a forwarding number, occasionally dismissed the 18 staff early and that there were a few instances of drinking during office hours. At worst, this conduct may have been unprofessional, but no reasonable juror could conclude that the conduct was "so severe or pervasive that it alters the conditions of [Plaintiffs'] employment and thus create[d] an abusive environment." Title VII does not protect a plaintiff who experiences conduct that is merely offensive or annoying. Pittman, 35 F.Supp.2d at 442. Therefore, courts must ensure the "standards for judging hostility are sufficiently demanding to ensure that Title VII does not become a general civility code." Fara.qher, 524 U.S. at 788. Accepting all of Plaintiffs' allegations as true for purposes of a motion for partial judgment on the pleadings, the Plaintiffs do not meet this standard as a matter of law. III. Plaintiffs Fail to State A Prima Facie Case of Retaliation To state a prima facie case of retaliation, the plaintiff must show: (1) (s)he was engaged in a protected activity; (2) (s)he was discharged subsequent to or contemporaneously with such activity; and (3) there is a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse action. Quiro.qa v. Hasbro, Inc., 934 F.2d 497, 501 (3rd Cir. 1991). Although in a Title VII retaliation claim a plaintiff need not establish that the opposed conduct was in fact a violation of Title VII, (s)he must show "that (s)he had a reasonable belief that her employer was engaged in an unlawful employment practice." Drinkwater, 904 F.2d at 865. See also Gale, 2001 WL 1537692 at *2 19 ("[P]laintiff must only demonstrate a good faith, reasonable belief that the underlying challenged actions of the employer violated the law.") Accordingly, a retaliation claim can survive independently of a sexual harassment/hostile environment claim. Drinkwater, 904 F.2d at 865. For purposes of establishing a prima facie case of retaliation, merely complaining generally about unfair treatment does not constitute a protected activity. Gautney v. Ameri.qas, 107 F.Supp.2d 634 (E.D. Pa. 2000). The Gautney court found that plaintiff "complained in general terms that she thought she was being treated differently" and her "vague complaints" could not reasonably be construed as complaints of gender or sex discrimination. Gautney, 107 F.Supp.2d at 646. "A mere reference to being treated differently or unfairly followed by the denial of any differential treatment is insufficient to establish that [plaintiff] engaged in a protected activity." Id. In the present case, Plaintiffs contend only that they complained to Mr. Messner about his relationship with Ms. Christie and that Ms. Christie failed to adhere to Chamber policies. (Complaint at ¶¶ 40-41) The Plaintiffs do not contend that they were discriminated against because of their sex, a critical component of a Title VII complaint. Like the plaintiff in Gautney, the Plaintiffs here did not engage in a protected activity under Title VII because they made only general complaints of the work environment, not complaints of gender or sex discrimination. 20 Furthermore, Plaintiffs could not have reasonably believed they were engaged in a protected activity in the case at bar. As referenced earlier in this opinion, the pivotal issue in a sexual discrimination claim under Title VII is that an individual is being treated differently because of his/her gender. The male and female Plaintiffs were equally exposed to the alleged relationship between Mr. Messner and Ms. Christie. "Employees exposed to the intimate relationship of a supervisor are not discriminated against because of their gender, but rather are discriminated against because their supervisor prefers his paramour." Gale, 2001 WL 1537692 at *3-4. See also Kryskie v. Schott Glass Technoloqies, Inc., 426 Pa. Super. 105 (1993) (favoritism for paramour alone does not give rise to a claim of gender discrimination). Plaintiffs cannot make a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII. IV. Conclusion For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings is GRANTED. Plaintiffs' claims for sexually hostile environment and retaliation are DISMISSED. 21 MARY A. FANNUCl, BRYCE H. BROWN, AUNDRY A. HANNA and CARL A. WINFIELD, Plaintiffs V. WEST SHORE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, Defendant · IN THE COURT OF COMMON · PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND · COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA NO. 02-6005 CIVIL TERM CIVIL ACTION--LAW IN RE: DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS Before HOFFER, P.J. and OLER, J. ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this _13th day of_July ,2004, upon consideration of Defendant's and Plaintiffs' Briefs in support and in opposition to the Defendant's Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings, and upon hearing the oral arguments of both parties, it is hereby ORDERED that Defendant's Motion is GRANTED. Plaintiffs' claim for sexual discrimination based on a sexually hostile environment and claim for retaliation are hereby DISMISSED. By the Court, George E. Hoffer, P.J. Joseph M. Melillo, Esquire 4503 North Front Street Harrisburg, PA 17110 For the Plaintiffs Jill M. Lashay, Esquire 240 North 3rd Street, Ste. 600 Harrisburg, PA 17101-1503 For the Defendant 22 23