Loading...
HomeMy WebLinkAboutCP-21-CR-1309-2004COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA ANTHONY DUANE ZEEK IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, :PENNSYLVANIA : CP-21-CR-1309-2004 :CHARGE(S): (1) DRIVING AFTER IMBIBING-GENERAL IMPAIRMENT (2) DRIVING AFTER IMBIBING-HIGH: RATE (3) DRIVING VEHICLE AT UNSAFE SPEED :AFFIANT: OFF. JOHN BECKER : SHIPPENSBURG UNIV. POLICE IN RE: OMNIBUS PRETRIAL MOTION TO SUPPRESS Before HOFFER, P. J. OPINION This matter is before the Court on Defendant Zeek's Pretrial Omnibus Motion to Suppress. In his motion, the Defendant contends that certain evidence should be suppressed because the stop and arrest of the Defendant were made without valid authority or jurisdiction. On August 30, 2004, the Court conducted a hearing and each party submitted a brief. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, Defendant's Motion to Suppress is DENIED. STATEMENT OF FACTS On Saturday, May 8, 2004, Officer John Becket of the Shippensburg University Police Department was parked in a marked vehicle, monitoring campus traffic on North Prince Street. Prince Street is located at the intersection of Shippensburg University and the Township of Shippensburg. At approximately 3:20 a.m., Officer Becker observed the Defendant traveling southbound on Prince Street from Old Main Drive. Officer Becker estimated the Defendant's speed at 30 m.p.h, in a 15 m.p.h, zone. The officer's estimation of the Defendant's speed was based on his training and experience and use of speed tracking devices. Officer Becker observed the Defendant speeding in an area of campus frequented by students and in close proximity to student dormitories. Officer Becker followed the Defendant's vehicle through the Township of Shippensburg and into the Borough of Shippensburg. Officer Becker did not stop the Defendant's vehicle at an earlier juncture because there was another vehicle in front of his patrol car, he was waiting to receive information from dispatch regarding the Defendant's vehicle, and he wanted to stop the Defendant's vehicle at a safe location. After following the Defendant's vehicle for approximately 1 to 1% miles, Officer Becker activated the patrol car's emergency lights and stopped the Defendant's vehicle. Following the stop of the Defendant's vehicle, Officer Becker concluded that the Defendant had been drinking alcohol. The Defendant's blood alcohol level was 0.11%. Officer Becker subsequently arrested the Defendant for violations of Driving Vehicle at Safe Speed, Driving After Imbibing-General Impairment, and Driving After Imbibing-High Rate. 2 DISCUSSION Officer Becker made a lawful stop of the Defendant's vehicle because he had articulable and reasonable grounds to suspect the Defendant was in violation of "Driving Vehicle at Safe Speed," 75 Pa.C.S. § 3361. The Pennsylvania legislature has vested police officers with the authority to stop vehicles whenever they have "articulable and reasonable grounds to suspect a violation" of the Motor Vehicle Code. Commonwealth v. Whitmyer, 542 Pa. 545, 552 (1995), citing 75 Pa.C.S. § 6308(b).~ Thus, an officer must be able to "articulate specific facts possessed by him, at the time of the questioned stop, which would provide probable cause to believe that the vehicle or the driver was in violation of some provision of the Code." Id. at 550. See also Commonwealth v. Faust, 574 Pa. 485, 486 (2003) (Justice Eakin, joined by Justice Castille, filed a Dissenting Statement to the Supreme Court's decision to dismiss an appeal of a Court of Common Pleas Order to clarify that "Whitmyer does not hold an officer needs enough evidence to convict a defendant before effectuating a stop; all that is needed is probable cause.") In the case at bar, Officer Becker stopped the defendant for violating 75 Pa.C.S. § 3361, entitled "Driving Vehicle at Safe Speed." The statute provides: No person shall drive a vehicle at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the conditions and having regard to the actual and ] The statute, entitled "Investigation by Police Officers," provides that "[w]henever a police officer is engaged in a systematic program of checking vehicles or drivers or has a reasonable suspicion that a violation of this title is occurring or has occurred, he may stop a vehicle, upon request or signal, for the purpose of checking the vehicle's registration, proof of financial responsibility, vehicle identification number or engine number or the driver's license, or to secure such other information as the officer may reasonably believe to be necessary to enforce the provisions of this title." 75 Pa.C.S. § 6308(b). potential hazards then existing, nor at a speed greater than will permit the driver to bring his vehicle to a stop within the assured clear distance ahead. Consistent with the foregoing, every person shall drive at a safe and appropriate speed when approaching and crossing an intersection or railroad grade crossing, when approaching and going around a curve, when approaching a hill crest, when traveling upon any narrow or winding roadway and when special hazards exist with respect to pedestrians or other traffic or by reason of weather or highway conditions. 75 Pa.C.S. § 3361. Speeding alone does not constitute a violation of § 3361. Commonwealth v. Heberling, 451 Pa. Super. 119, 123 (1996). Rather, "[t]here must be proof of speed that is unreasonable or imprudent under the circumstances (of which there must also be proof), which are the 'conditions' and 'actual and potential hazards then existing' of the roadway." Id. Furthermore, it is not necessary to allege or prove any specific speed at which a defendant was driving, because whether one is driving too fast for the conditions is a relative matter, dependent not on any specific speed, but on all the existing circumstances. Commonwealth v. Kantner, 242 Pa. Super. 448,450 (1976). In Commonwealth v. Whitmyer, 542 Pa. 545 (1995), the Supreme Court assessed the legality of a police officer's stop of a vehicle pursuant to § 3361. A state trooper observed a vehicle crossing a solid-white line to pass another vehicle before their two lanes merged into one. The trooper followed the vehicle for two-tenths of a mile and utilized his speedometer to estimate the vehicle's speed at seventy miles per hour. Based on these observations, the 4 trooper effectuated a stop of the vehicle and discovered marijuana on the driver. Id. at 546-47. In affirming the lower courts' orders to suppress evidence of the marijuana, the Whitmyer court concluded that the trooper's stop of the vehicle did not fall within the ambit of a § 3361 violation. Whitmyer, 542 Pa. at 552-53. The "erratic lane change" observed by the trooper was not included among the prohibited vehicle operations defined in the statute. Id~ at 553. Furthermore, the vehicle's speeding was of no legal consequence when the "vehicle was not changing lanes, traveling too close to another vehicle, or presenting a potential hazard to any other vehicle or person." Id. The facts of the instant action meet the standard of a § 3361 violation and are distinguishable from Whitmyer. Officer Becker determined that the Defendant was traveling approximately 30 m.p.h, in a 15 m.p.h, zone, a speed twice the posted limit. Officer Becker observed the Defendant speeding on a weekend evening in a residential area of a college campus, near student dormitories and potential pedestrians. Pursuant to Heberling, Officer Becker had "proof of speed" that was "unreasonable or imprudent under the circumstances," which included the "actual and potential hazards then existing" on the roadway. Heberlinq, 451 Pa. Super. at 123. Officer Becker observed the Defendant driving twice the posted limit in circumstances creating actual and potential hazards. II. Officer Becker made a lawful stop and arrest of the Defendant outside Shippensburg University jurisdiction because the circumstances triggered the "hot and fresh" pursuit exception of 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8953(a)(2). Generally, campus police officers have the jurisdiction and authority to perform their duties only on college or university grounds. See 71 P.S. § 646.1. However, an exception exists when the campus police officers are acting pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S., Chapter 89, Subchapter D, pertaining to "Statewide municipal police jurisdiction." See 71 P.S. § 646.1(a)(6). Accordingly, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8953(a)(2) provides that an officer may have power and authority outside his/her primary jurisdiction "[w]here the officer is in hot pursuit of any person for any offense which is committed, or which he has probable cause to believe was committed, within his primary jurisdiction and for which offense the officer continues in fresh pursuit of the person after the commission of the offense." Therefore, a state university campus police officer may make a warrantless arrest outside the boundaries of the campus while in fresh pursuit of a summary offender. Commonwealth v. Holderman, 284 Pa. Super. 161, 164 (1981). A recent Superior Court case illustrates the "hot pursuit" exception. See Commonwealth v. Laird, 797 A.2d 995 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002). In Laird, police observed the defendant driving a vehicle with an inoperative taillight in their jurisdiction. The officers immediately began to follow the defendant, but he was already nearing a bridge that marked the end of the officers' jurisdiction. The officers determined that they could not make a safe stop before the defendant began crossing the bridge. Id~ at 997. The Laird court found that the officers made a valid extraterritorial stop and arrest of the defendant pursuant to the "hot pursuit" exception. The court reasoned that the officers gave chase upon first observing the taillight violation, "but tempered the chase to avoid a potentially hazardous traffic stop just before the bridge." Id. at 999. Thus, the court found no error in the trial court's conclusion "that the officers hotly pursued [the defendant] until they made the reasonable assessment that an extraterritorial stop was unavoidable." Id~ The court stated that "the subjective question of whether an officer's actions constituted hot and fresh pursuit should not stand in the way of an otherwise valid arrest where extraterritorial pursuit is in response to a specific crime" occurring in the officer's primary jurisdiction. Id~ The facts of the case at bar satisfy the "hot and fresh" pursuit exception to extraterritorial jurisdiction. As discussed in the preceding section, Officer Becker possessed "articulable and reasonable" grounds to believe a violation of 75 Pa.C.S. § 3361 had occurred. Officer Becker immediately began to follow the Defendant's vehicle and pursued the Defendant for approximately 1 to 1 ~ miles outside the campus jurisdiction. The officer did not effectuate an earlier stop because he wanted to locate a safe place to stop the Defendant's vehicle and he was waiting to receive more information from police dispatch. Similar to the officer in Laird, Officer Becker's safety considerations justified the "hot and fresh" pursuit exception to extraterritorial jurisdiction. COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, :PENNSYLVANIA : CP-21-CR-1309-2004 ANTHONY DUANE ZEEK :CHARGE(S): (1) DRIVING AFTER IMBIBING-GENERAL IMPAIRMENT (2) DRIVING AFTER IMBIBING-HIGH: RATE (3) DRIVING VEHICLE AT UNSAFE SPEED :AFFIANT: OFF. JOHN BECKER : SHIPPENSBURG UNIV. POLICE IN RE: DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS Before HOFFER, P. J. ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this __ day of November, 2004, upon consideration of Defendant's Omnibus Pre-trial Motion to Suppress and briefs submitted by both parties, it is hereby ORDERED that Defendant's Motion is DENIED. By the Court, H. Anthony Adams, Esquire Assistant Public Defender Michael W. Mervine, Esquire Assistant District Attorney George E. Hoffer, P.J.