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HomeMy WebLinkAboutCP-21-CR-1038-2003 COMMONWEALTH IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA vs. CP-21-CR-l 03 8-2003 CHRISTOPHER REED IN RE: OPINION PURSUANT TO RULE 1925 On January 9,2004, the defendant/PCRA petitioner, Christopher Reed, pled guilty to a count of second degree murder. This plea was entered in full satisfaction of other charges lodged against him as the result of his having stabbed to death the victim in this case, Melissa Ann Conrad, during the early morning hours of April 14, 2003. In his post-conviction relief act petition and at the hearing held thereon, Mr. Reed made three claims with regard to alleged ineffective assistance of counsel. First, he faulted his trial counsel, Taylor Andrews,1 for failing to pursue suppression issues. Second, he complained that his attorney did not obtain a written report from psychologist Dr. Stanley Schneider. Finally, he contended that his case should have been defended on the theory that he was guilty of a lesser degree of homicide or suffered a diminished capacity. Following hearing in August of2004, we denied the defendant's petition for post- conviction relief. An appeal was taken accompanied by a petition on the part of the defendant for leave to proceed pro se. Following hearing on October 5, 2004, the defendant was granted leave to proceed on his appeal pro se and the appearance ofPCRA counsel was withdrawn. This opinion is in support of our earlier order denying post-conviction collateral relief. It is clear that ineffective assistance of counsel claims that arise from the plea-bargaining 1 It should be noted that Mr. Andrews is an experienced and capable trial attorney. He has been Chief Public Defender of Cumberland County since the fall of 1976. He has tried numerous serious cases, including murder cases, to jury. CP-21-CR-l 03 8-2003 process are eligible for review under the post-conviction relief act. Com. ex rei. Dadario v. Goldberg, 773 A.2d 126 (Pa. 2001). In essence, if the ineffective assistance of counsel caused the defendant to enter an involuntary or unknowing plea, then the post-conviction relief act will afford the defendant relief. Com. v. Lynch, 820 A.2d 728 (Pa.Super. 2003). To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, generally, the defendant must demonstrate that: (1) the underlying claim has arguable merit; (2) counsel's performance was not reasonably designed to effectuate the defendant's interests; and (3) that counsel's unreasonable performance prejudiced the defendant. Id With this legal backdrop we review the defendant's issues seriatim. In this case, the Commonwealth had filed a notice of aggravating circumstances indicating that the prosecution would be seeking a conviction of first degree murder and the death penalty. The plea agreement entered into in this case, of course, avoided that result? Part of the understanding with regard to the entry of a plea in this case was that the defendant would withdraw the then-pending suppression motion. The suppression motion had to do with certain statements which were made by the defendant in the state of Arkansas as well as in Pennsylvania. While there were viable suppression issues, Mr. Andrews explained to the defendant that there would not be much benefit to his case even if he won the suppression hearing. This is because the theory of the defense would have required the defendant to testify and his statements would be used in cross-examination in any event. N.T. 12. In short, the benefits of accepting the plea agreement far outweighed any advantages of pursuing the suppression motion. Clearly, counsel's performance was reasonably designed to effectuate his client's interests. 2 The defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment as required by statute. 2 CP-21-CR-l 03 8-2003 The services of Dr. Stanley Schneider, a forensic psychologist, were retained by the defense in this case. It is true that no written report was ever forthcoming from Dr. Schneider. Dr. Schneider was asked to consult with respect to two aspects of the defendant's case. First, he examined the question of whether the defendant could effectively advance an argument that he had acted in the heat of passion warranting a verdict of voluntary manslaughter. Dr. Schneider, in the end, indicated that he was not able to support such a defense. The fact that he did not generate a written report to that effect in no way prejudiced the defendant. The second reason for Dr. Schneider's hiring was to testify with respect to mitigating circumstances which might militate against the death penalty. Once the death penalty was no longer a threat, that part of Dr. Schneider's work became unimportant. Finally, the defendant contends that this matter should have gone to trial and that there should have been an attempt to obtain a guilty verdict on a lesser degree of homicide. First, we note that during the guilty plea colloquy, the elements of the other types of homicide were reviewed with the defendant. He was asked specifically whether he had discussed the various degrees of homicide with his attorneys3 and whether he had the opportunity to "compare what it was you did with these different degrees of homicide." N.T. 12. The defendant indicated that he had. Second, Mr. Andrews's review with the defendant of his various options can best be described as painstaking. He set out, in detailed writings to the defendant, the various pros and cons of the defense case. There was a considerable body of unfavorable evidence which pointed to the fact that the killing had been with premeditation. These included indications of prior 3 Mr. Andrews was assisted by Assistant Public Defender Jessica Rhoades. 3 CP-21-CR-l 03 8-2003 threats and that he lay in wait for the victim with a knife which he did not normally keep on his person. Prior to his guilty plea, the defendant was given the opportunity to obtain a "second opinion." The defendant's family hired Bernard Coates, Esquire, to consult with the defendant. There is no indication that Mr. Coates's advice was any different than that given by Mr. Andrews. In the end, the defendant chose to plead guilty to second degree murder rather than face the possibility of a first-degree murder conviction and the death penalty. In reaching this decision, he had the most capable assistance of counsel. His plea was clearly knowing and voluntary. It is worthy of note that, at the guilty plea, the defendant expressed great remorse for what he had done and indicated that he knew that he would have to live with the consequences for the rest of his life. N.T. 15. He now has apparently changed his mind concerning at least one of the consequences: namely, of having to spend the rest of his life in prison. Such a change of heart does not afford a basis for post-conviction relief. For these reasons, we denied the defendant's petition. November ,2004 Kevin A. Hess, 1. Jaime Keating, Esquire Chief Deputy District Attorney Christopher Reed, FQ-8199 SCI-Rockview, Box A Bellefonte, P A 16823 :rlm 4