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HomeMy WebLinkAbout2003-1522 Equity PAULINE E. KECK, Plaintiff IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA v. NO. 03-1522 EQUITY TERM RONALD L. KECK, EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF ARTHUR S. KECK, DECEASED, AND RONALD L. : KECK, INDIVIDUALLY, Defendants CIVIL ACTION IN EQUITY IN RE: PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION Hoffer, P.J. Before the court is the Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration of the court's dismissal of her Complaint. On April 2, 2003, Plaintiff brought an action in equity seeking imposition of a constructive trust against her husband's (Arthur S. Keck, "Decedent") estate and her son, Ronald Keck, the Defendants, individually. Defendants Answered and filed preliminary objections to the Complaint, averring that jurisdiction in this court was not proper, and that Orphans' Court was the proper judicial forum for issues concerning the distribution of property of Arthur Keck's estate. The court agreed with the Defendants, and dismissed the Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on December 18, 2003. It found that Orphans' Court had assumed prior jurisdiction over Arthur Keck's estate by granting letters of administration. On January 5, 2004, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Reconsideration seeking a transfer of the case to Orphans' Court, and both parties filed briefs on the issue. STATEMENT OF FACTS Plaintiff, Pauline E. Keck, and Arthur S. Keck ["Decedent"] were married on October 27, 1933. Although neither filed any divorce action over the course of their marriage, the parties apparently endured a long and rocky marriage. Throughout their marriage, Decedent purposefully excluded Plaintiff from ownership of their marital assets despite the fact that Plaintiff contributed to the household by performing all household duties, raising the parties' children, and working in Decedent's shoe repair shop. On December 20, 2002, Arthur Keck died. His will named one of his sons, Ronald Keck, as his heir and the executor of his estate to which he was appointed to on January 7, 2003. Although the plaintiff did not challenge the validity of the will, she did exercise her right to elect against the will, filing for her spousal share on March 3, 2003. Plaintiff then brought an action in equity against Defendants seeking a constructive trust for her benefit, claiming that the decedent had made financial gifts over the course of his lifetime to his son, and that he would be unjustly enriched if he also received all estate assets. After the court granted the Defendant's Preliminary Objection to jurisdiction and dismissed the case, the Plaintiff filed a Motion for Reconsideration which 2 averred that the court should have transferred the case to the correct division pursuant to Pa.R.Civ.P. 213(f), Pa.Con.Stat. tit. 42, ~ 5103, instead of dismissing it. DISCUSSION The issues in this case are whether the Orphans' Court has proper jurisdiction over the Plaintiff's Complaint, and if so, whether the court must transfer the case to that forum instead of dismissing it. Because the Orphans' Court assumed jurisdiction over all the assets of Arthur Keck's estate, an action for imposition of a constructive trust of estate assets for her benefit belongs in Orphans' Court. In addition, since an action filed in an improper tribunal must be transferred to the appropriate one instead of dismissed when the matter is justiciable, the instant case must be transferred to Orphans' Court. I. Jurisdiction is Proper Because Orphans' Court Assumed Jurisdiction over Matters Concernina the Decedent's Estate. The jurisdiction of Orphans' Court is set out in Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. tit. 20, ~ 711-712 (2004). It has mandatory jurisdiction over adjudication of personal property held in the name of decedent, and concurrent jurisdiction with Common Pleas over the adjudication of title to real estate. .!sL Although constructive trusts are excluded from mandatory jurisdiction, Orphans' Court has concurrent jurisdiction over matters involving the determination of persons to whom title to realty has passed. Moreover, the 3 Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that when Orphans' Court has already assumed jurisdiction prior to the filing of a case in Common Pleas, by granting letters of administration, jurisdiction over continuing matters, even constructive trust claims, is vested there. See Pope v. Dascher, 429 Pa. 576, 577 (1968). The court also noted that "it is well established that orderly judicial procedure dictates that the court which first acquires jurisdiction over a matter be permitted to decide all questions relating thereto." Id. at 583. In Pope, the appellant brought an action in the Court of Common Pleas seeking a constructive trust to own title to shares of stock and real estate that were held in the name of the decedent. 429 Pa. at 579. The appellee raised a preliminary objection stating that jurisdiction was improper in Common Pleas, and was vested in Orphans' Court. .!sL The court sustained the objection, and dismissed the case. On appeal, the court first reasoned that Orphans' Court had exclusive jurisdiction over shares of stock because it was personal property. Second, it reasoned that concurrent jurisdiction for real estate properly belonged in the Orphans' Court because it had already assumed jurisdiction when it granted letters by the register of wills. .!sL at 584. In the case at bar, the court in granting the Defendant's preliminary objections affirmatively answered whether Orphans' Court has proper jurisdiction. It stated, "Since the Orphans' Court has already assumed 4 jurisdiction, the jurisdiction over Arthur S. Keck's estate belongs, not in this court, but in the Orphans' Court." See prior Opinion at 4. Defendants themselves argued in filing preliminary objections that Orphans' Court had exclusive jurisdiction over further challenges to Arthur Keck's wil1.1 Like the Pope case, the Orphans' Court has already granted letters of administration prior to the filing of this case in Common Pleas. Second, although constructive trusts are excluded from mandatory jurisdiction, Orphans' Court has concurrent jurisdiction to determine to whom real estate may be passed. This concurrent jurisdiction is properly vested with Orphans' Court because it has previously assumed jurisdiction, and has a continuing duty to determine to whom real estate is passed. II. Plaintiff's Complaint Was Filed in the Wrona Court and Must be Transferred to Orphans' Court. The purpose of a unified court system with separate divisions is to simplify procedure and remove archaisms from the courts. See Commonwealth v. Wadzinski, 485 Pa. 247, 254 (1978). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated if a matter is justiciable and there is jurisdiction within the divisions of the Court of Common Pleas to hear it, the remedy in this multi-division court is not a dismissal, but a transfer of the matter to the correct division. .!sL This principle is reflected in Pa.Con.Stat. tit. 42, sec. 5103 which states: 1 See Defendants' Preliminary Objections to Plaintiff's Complaint ~~ 14-16. 5 If an appeal or other matter is taken to or brought in a court or magisterial district of this Commonwealth which does not have jurisdiction of the appeal or other matter, the court or district justice shall not quash such appeal or dismiss the matter, but shall transfer the record thereof to the proper tribunal of this Commonwealth... Further, the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure 213(f), states: When an action is commenced in a court which has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action it shall not be dismissed if there is another court of appropriate jurisdiction within the Commonwealth in which the action could have been brought, but the court shall transfer the action at the cost of the plaintiff to the court of appropriate jurisdiction... In addition, in Lucidore v. Novak, 570 A.2d 93, 94 (1990), the civil division of Common Pleas found that it lacked the jurisdiction to hear an equity action that alleged the decedent's will was obtained as a result of undue influence. The civil division refused to transfer the action to Orphans' Court, which had jurisdiction, and dismissed the matter. On appeal, Superior Court held that dismissal was improper merely because it was brought before the incorrect division, and remanded it back to Orphans' Court. Id. at 95. It relied on the mandatory language of Pa.Con.Stat. tit. 6 42, ~ 5103, which states that "a court lacking jurisdiction shall transfer the action..." (Emphasis added) .!sL Similar to the civil division in the Lucidore case, this court lacks proper jurisdiction to hear the Plaintiff's claims. Orphans' Court has proper jurisdiction over the constructive trust claim because it assumed jurisdiction over all matters concerning distribution of Arthur Keck's estate. Similar to the plaintiffs in Lucidore, Plaintiff claims that undue influence upon her permitted Decedent to keep all marital assets in his name, and now brings a claim that concerns how estate assets should be distributed. Therefore, Lucidore and the aforementioned statutes are controlling. Defendant argues that since the plaintiff already elected her spousal intestate share in Orphans' Court that she has exhausted all her remedies, and that Orphans' Court is precluded from granting her any further equitable relief on this matter. Therefore, he argues, there is no other court of appropriate jurisdiction that is able to grant relief, and the matter must be dismissed, not transferred. Generally, "where the legislature provides a statutory remedy which is mandatory and exclusive, equity is without power to act, and a jurisdictional question is presented." DeLuca v. Buckeye Coal Co., 463 Pa. 513, 519 (1975). However, there is no such jurisdictional question present here. Orphans' Court already acquired exclusive jurisdiction over distribution issues of Arthur Keck's estate by 7 granting of the letters. It will decide whether Plaintiff's actions preclude her from recovering on the equitable theory of constructive trust. The court in Pope held that Orphans' Court acquired prior jurisdiction over distribution of realty in decedent's name, and under section 304 of the Orphans' Court Act of 1951 (currently, See 20 Pa.C.S.A. ~701) has "all legal and equitable powers required for or incidental to the exercise of its jurisdiction." 429 Pa. at 584. Furthermore, Orphans' Court has mandatory jurisdiction over distribution of personalty of a decedent's estate. 20 Pa.C.S.A. ~ 711. A question of whether a constructive trust consisting of estate assets may be set up for the benefit of the plaintiff is a matter of distribution of the estate. Therefore, in this case, Orphans' Court has all the equitable powers of Common Pleas Court to fashion appropriate relief concerning distribution of realty(concurrent jurisdiction became mandatory because of prior jurisdiction) and personalty of Decedent's estate even where a plaintiff has already received a legal remedy. This case is transferred to Orphans' Court pursuant to Pennsylvania law. 8 PAULINE E. KECK, Plaintiff IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA v. NO. 03-1522 EQUITY TERM RONALD L. KECK, EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF ARTHUR S. KECK, DECEASED, AND RONALD L. : KECK, INDIVIDUALLY, Defendants CIVIL ACTION IN EQUITY IN RE: PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION ORDER OF COURT Hoffer, P.J.: AND NOW, this 20th day of January, 2005, upon consideration of Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration and Briefs submitted by both parties, it is hereby ordered that Motion is GRANTED. Plaintiff's Complaint is TRANSFERRED to the Orphans' Court Division. By the Court, George E. Hoffer, P.J. Ami J. Thumma, Esq. Ten E. High Street Carlisle, PA 17013 (717)243-3341 Attorney for Plaintiff Marcus A. McKnight III, Esq. 60 W. Pomfret Street Carlisle, PA 17013 (717)249-2353 Attorney for Defendants 9