The URL can be used to link to this page

Home My WebLink About2002-1882 Civil RICKY JOHNSTON, PLAINTIFF IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA V. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE: INSURANCE COMPANIES, DEFENDANT 02-1882 CIVIL TERM IN RE: MOTION OF DEFENDANT FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BEFORE BAYLEY. J. OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT Bayley, J., January 12, 2005:-- Plaintiff, Ricky Johnston, filed a complaint pursuant to the Declaratory Judgments Act, 42 Pa.C.S. Section 7531, et seq. He seeks a declaration of rights and obligations under an automobile insurance policy issued by defendant, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Companies, pursuant to the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (MVFRL), 75 Pa.C.S. Section 1701, et seq. A motion for summary judgment by State Farm is ready for decision. From 1997 through August 24, 2001, plaintiff drove a commercial truck between 800 and 1,000 miles a week for the Keebler Company. On each workday he unloaded from inside the truck between 600 and 1,000 cases of Keebler products. Plaintiff began experiencing discomfort in his right hand in July, 2000. He had developed bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome by August 29, 2001, when a physician restricted him from driving a truck. Plaintiff then performed some warehouse work until February, 2002, when he was taken off work 02-1882 CIVIL TERM completely on the recommendation of his physician.1 In his complaint, plaintiff seeks a declaration: "That [his] bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome [is] 'injury' or 'bodily injury' arising out of the maintenance and use of a motor vehicle for purposes of Section 1712 of the MVFRL and/or the Policy." Both parties agree that for plaintiff's condition to be compensable for first party benefits for lost income, he must prove: (1) that his bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome is an injury resulting from accidentally sustained bodily harm, and (2) that his condition arose out of the maintenance and use of a motor vehicle. Although there are unresolved issues of fact as to causation, for the purposes of this motion defendant maintains that even if plaintiff can prove causation, i.e., that his bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome was caused by his maintenance and use of a motor vehicle, summary judgment must still be granted because that condition is not an injury resulting from accidentally sustained bodily harm.2 Whether a claim is within the scope of coverage of an insurance policy or barred by an exclusion is a question of law to be decided in a motion for summary judgment. Butterfield v. Giuntoli, 670 A.2d 646 (Pa. Super. 1995). Section 1712 of the MVFRL provides: An insurer issuing or delivering liability insurance policies covering any motor vehicle of the type required to be registered under this title... shall make available for purchase first party benefits with respect to injury arising out of the 1 Beginning on August 29, 2001, plaintiff received partial workmen's compensation for the difference in pay while on modified duty. Since February 25,2002, he has received full benefits. 2 We initially denied defendant's motion for summary judgment because of the issue of causation. On the parties' agreement, the motion has been resubmitted with an assumption that plaintiff can prove causation. -2- 02-1882 CIVIL TERM maintenance or use of a motor vehicle as follows: . . . (2) Income loss benefit.-Includes the following: (I) Eighty percent of actual loss of gross income.... The State Farm Policy contains similar language: [State Farm] will pay income loss benefits with respect to bodily injury to an insured arising out of the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle. Income loss benefits are: 1. 80% of the insured's actual loss of gross income from work the insured would have performed except for the bodily injury. Section 1702 of the MVFRL defines "injury" as "accidentally sustained bodily harm to an individual and that individual's illness, disease, or death resulting therefrom." (Emphasis added). The State Farm Policy provides: "we will pay income loss benefits with respect to bodily injury to an insured arising out of the maintenance and use of a motor vehicle." The policy defines "bodily injury" as "accidental bodily harm to a person and that person's resulting illness, disease or death." (Emphasis added.) "Accidentally" is not defined in the MVFRL or in the State Farm insurance policy. When a term is not defined words and phases shall be construed according to rules of grammar and according to their common and approved usage. 1 Pa. C. S. Section 1903( a). We may consider the dictionary definition of terms left undefined. P.R. v. Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare, 759 A.2d 434 (Pa. Commw. 2000). Neither party nor the court has found a reported decision in the Commonwealth analyzing the availability of first party benefits in the context of a non-traumatic, repetitive-type -3- 02-1882 CIVIL TERM injury that developed progressively and continuously over an extended period of time.3 State Farm maintains that the plain and ordinary meaning of "accidental bodily harm" is a relatively sudden, unexpected discrete event. It cites Black's Law Dictionary (6th Ed), which defines "accident" to include: a happening, an incident or occurrence, or event; an unusual or unexpected result attending the operation or performance of an unusual or necessary act or event; mishap; some sudden and unexpected event taking place without expectation, upon the instant, rather than something which continues, progresses, or develops. An accident has been described by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Brenneman v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 411 Pa. 409 (1963): An accident simply stated, is merely an unanticipated event; it is something which occurs not as a result of natural routine but as the cumulation of forces working without design, coordination or plan. (Emphasis added.) Plaintiff notes that neither the MVFRL nor the insurance policy provides that coverage requires that an injury arise from an accident. The law and the policy defines covered "bodily injury" as "accidentally sustained bodily harm" and "accidental bodily harm" resulting in illness, disease or death. We conclude that for an injury to be accidentally sustained there must have been an accident. This is an automobile insurance policy not a disability policy. Black's Law Dictionary, (th Ed 1999) defines "accidental injury" as: An injury resulting from external, violent, and unanticipated causes; esp., a bodily injury caused by some external force or agency operating contrary to a 3 Merriam Webster's Medical Desk Dictionary, 1993, defines carpal tunnel syndrome as: a condition caused by compression of the median nerve in the carpal tunnel and characterized expo by discomfort and disturbances of sensation in the hand. -4- 02-1882 CIVIL TERM person's intentions, unexpectedly, and not according to the usual order of events. adj. 1. Occurring unexpectedly and unintentionally; by chance. 2. Not part of the real or essential nature of a thing.. . (Emphasis added.) In P.R. v. Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare, supra, the Commonwealth Court cited Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1986), defining "accidental" as: 2: occurring sometimes with unfortunate results by chance alone; a: UNPREDICTABLE: proceeding from an unrecognized principle, from an uncommon operation of a known principle, or from a deviation from normal; b: happening or ensuring without design, [or] intent .... (Emphasis added.) Black's Law Dictionary (th Ed 1999), defines "accident" as: 1. an unintended and unforeseen injurious occurrence; something that does not occur in the usual course of events or that could not be reasonably anticipated. (Emphasis added.) Plaintiff cites Spisak v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, 329 Pa. Super. 483 (1984), and Cummings v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 408 Pa. Super. 381 (1991), as supportive of his position. In Spisak, decedent and his companion were engaged in love-making in the backseat of his vehicle when they were overcome by carbon monoxide poisoning. Under the prior No-fault law, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania concluded that insurance coverage applied because the automobile was the instrumentality that caused the harm. Thus the deaths were a result of an accident arising out of the maintenance and use of an automobile. In Cummings, the Superior Court concluded that injuries sustained by an insured as a result of a physical altercation with another driver after an accident did not arise out of the maintenance and use of an automobile and was not -5- 02-1882 CIVIL TERM covered by a policy issued pursuant to the MVFRL. Citing Day v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Co., 261 Pa. Super. 216 (1978), the Court stated: The real issue. . . involved the instrumentality used that caused the injury, not whether it was intentional or accidentally inflicted. Automobile insurance, including uninsured motorist provisions, are designed to compensate victims for vehicle-caused injuries. There must be some connection between the harm done and the insured vehicle. These cases do not support plaintiff's position because the issue in defendant's motion for summary judgment is not whether the trucks that plaintiff drove and unloaded were the instrumentalities that caused his carpal tunnel syndrome. That is assumed. The issue is whether the carpal tunnel syndrome resulted from accidentally sustained bodily harm. It is not dispositive, as defendant claims, that the carpal tunnel syndrome developed over a period of time. A person can be in a vehicle accident and incur injuries caused by that accident which develop and get worse over time, and which are compensable. In plaintiff's case, however, his bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome developed and became worse as a result of his normal operation and use of trucks over an extended period of time. It has occurred as a result of his natural routine arising out of the real and essential nature of his job of operating and unloading trucks. That is not accidental sustained bodily harm that triggers first party benefits under the State Farm insurance policy and the MVFRL.4 Accordingly the following order is entered. 4 A similar situation, undoubtedly more common than carpal tunnel syndrome, is the onset of back problems associated with the operation and use of a truck over a long period of time. That too would be a workmen's compensation issue and not an issue under a vehicle policy that limits compensation for injuries resulting from accidentally -6- 02-1882 CIVIL TERM ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this day of January, 2005, IT IS ORDERED: (1) The motion for summary judgment by defendant, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Companies, IS GRANTED. (2) A policy issued by defendant pursuant to the MVFRL does not provide coverage for plaintiff's bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome condition. By the Court, Edgar B. Bayley, J. Michael A. Koranda, Esquire 219 State Street Harrisburg, PA 17101 For Plaintiff Lee E. Ullman, Esquire 540 Court Street P.O. Box 542 Reading, PA 19603 F or Defendant :sal sustained bodily harm. -7- RICKY JOHNSTON, PLAINTIFF IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA V. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE: INSURANCE COMPANIES, DEFENDANT 02-1882 CIVIL TERM IN RE: MOTION OF DEFENDANT FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BEFORE BAYLEY. J. ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this day of January, 2005, IT IS ORDERED: (1) The motion for summary judgment by defendant, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Companies, IS GRANTED. (2) A policy issued by defendant pursuant to the MVFRL does not provide coverage for plaintiff's bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome condition. By the Court, Edgar B. Bayley, J. Michael A. Koranda, Esquire 219 State Street Harrisburg, PA 17101 For Plaintiff Lee E. Ullman, Esquire 540 Court Street P.O. Box 542 Reading, PA 19603 F or Defendant :sal