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HomeMy WebLinkAbout2001-3339 Civil KALAWATIE SINGH, As Administratrix IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF of the Estate of Jaideo H. Singh, CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA PLAINTIFF V. CLARION, INC., A/K/A CLARION SUITES, A/K/A CLARION PROPERTIES, A/K/A CLARION HOTEL: AND CONVENTION CENTER, A/K/A THE CLARION HOTEL COMPANY, FORMERLY KNOWN AS THE EMBERS INN AND CONVENTION CENTER; EMBERS INN, INC., A/K/A THE EMBERS INN AND CONVENTION CENTER; SCHAAD DETECTIVE AGENCY, INC.; SONY RIDGE SECURITY; LODGING IN CARLISLE; GRACE BIBLE FELLOWSHIP CHURCH; LIBERTY BIBLE FELLOWSHIP CHURCH; BRIDGEMOHAN M. SINGH, A/K/A RONALD SINGH; MAHASE SINGH; SHEM LUTCHMAN; REBECCA LUTCHMAN, A/K/A REBECCA PERSAUD; STEPHEN CHESTER; JENNIFER CHESTER; MICHAEL PERSAUD; JOSEPH PERSAUD AND RACHEL PERSAUD, DEFENDANTS V. KALAWATIE SINGH, ADDITIONAL DEFENDANT 01-3339 CIVIL TERM IN RE: MOTIONS OF DEFENDANTS EMBERS INN. INC. A1K/A THE EMBERS INN AND CONVENTION CENTER. SCHAAD DETECTIVE AGENCY. INC.. MAHASE SINGH. SHEM LUTCHMAN AND REBECCA LUTCHMAN A1K/A REBECCA PERSAUD. MICHAEL PERSAUD. AND ADDITIONAL DEFENDANT. 01-3339 CIVIL TERM KALAWATIE SINGH. FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BEFORE BAYLEY. J. AND HESS. J. OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT Bayley, J., January 13, 2005:-- Plaintiff, Kalawatie Singh, Administratrix of the estate of Jaideo H. Singh, instituted a wrongful death and survival action in negligence against numerous defendants as a result of the tragic death of her son, Jaideo H. Singh.1 Jaideo's death occurred on July 17, 1998, in an indoor swimming pool at the Embers Inn in Middlesex Township, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania. Defendants, Embers Inn, Inc., Schaad Detective Agency, Inc., four individuals, Mahase Singh, Shem Lutchman, Rebecca Lutchman a/k/a Rebecca Persaud and Michael Persaud, who plaintiff alleges were chaperons for decedent, and decedent's mother, Kalawatie Singh, as an additional defendant, filed motions for summary judgment. The motions were briefed and argued on November 10, 2004. In Washington v. Baxter, 719 A.2d 733 (Pa. 1998), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania set forth the standard for examining a motion for summary judgment. A court: [m]ust view the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be resolved against the moving party, Pennsylvania State University v. County of Centre, 532 Pa. 142, 143-145, 615 A.2d 303, 304 (1992). In order to withstand a motion for summary judgment, a non-moving party "must adduce sufficient evidence on an issue essential to his case and on which he bears the burden of proof such that a jury could return a verdict in his favor. Failure to adduce this evidence 1 Some defendants have been dismissed. The caption lists the remaining defendants. -2- 01-3339 CIVIL TERM establishes that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Ertrel v. Patriot-News Co., 544 Pa. 93,101-102,674 A.2d 1038,1042 (1996). (Emphasis added. ) Bridgemohan (Ochie) Singh, Pastor of the Grace Bible Fellowship Church in Brooklyn, New York, organized a trip to a religious retreat to Indiana in July, 1998. Jaideo H. Singh, age 14, went on the retreat after Ochie contacted his mother, Kalawatie Singh, and told her that the church would help defer his expenses and that he would take responsibility for her son's care. Many adults and children attended the retreat including some from the Liberty Bible Fellowship Church in Brooklyn. On the return trip on July 17, 1998, Jaideo rode in a van driven by Ochie. The groups from both churches stopped at the Embers Inn. Jaideo stayed in a room with Ochie and three younger children. There was an indoor swimming pool at the Inn that had just closed at 10:00 p.m. when the groups arrived. The Inn agreed to open the pool for a half an hour so that people from the church groups could swim. Several adults and children, Jaideo among them, used the pool. Not long after 10:30 p.m. the pool was closed by the Embers' staff. No one remained in the pool or the pool enclosure. A security guard for the Schaad Detective Agency patrolled the Inn. One of the duties of the guard was to check doors in the facility that were supposed to be locked. At approximately 2:30 a.m., on July 18th, the security guard was contacted by management to check the pool. The guard obtained a key from the front desk, entered the pool enclosure, and saw Jaideo at the bottom of the pool. His body was recovered. The cause of death was drowning. -3- 01-3339 CIVIL TERM Jaideo was 14 years old. He had just completed ninth grade. He was, according to his mother, a "pretty good" student. He worked as a busboy at a catering business. He was the best swimmer of his mother's three children, and she considered him to be a "good swimmer." Her husband was a good swimmer and he taught their children how to swim in pools and in the ocean in the New York area. His mother testified:2 Q. Do you know if Jack knew back in July 1998 that he should not swim by himself? A. Yes. Q. How do you know that? A. Because I had a pool and I told him not to go in there. Q. By himself? A. Yes. Q. Why? A. Because no one is there. Ochie Singh testified: Q. Do you remember seeing him [Jaideo] swim? A. Yes, because he was teaching Joseph's [Persaud] son to swim. He was like four years old, three years old. Rebecca Lutchman, a member of Liberty Bible Fellowship Church, testified: Q. Did you ever see Jack swim out in Indiana? A. Yes. Q. For approximately how long did you have an opportunity to see Jack swim when he was out in Indiana? A. Quite a few minutes. Q. Could you describe his swimming ability? A. He can swim. Q. Okay, when you say he can swim, what sort of things did you observe him doing in the water out in Indiana? A. He was swimming back and forth. 2 Jaideo is referred to as Jack. -4- 01-3339 CIVIL TERM Q. He was swimming laps? A. Yes. Shem Lutchman, a member of Liberty Bible Fellowship Church, testified: Q. Did you ever observe Jack go swimming before the Indiana trip? A. No, I observed him swimming on the Indiana trip. Q. What did you observe about his ability to swim in Indiana? A. He was a good swimmer. Q. What did you observe that made you conclude that he was a good swimmer? A. He made a good challenge in a race swimming with me. Q. Did he beat you? A. No, he didn't beat me. Q. Did you consider yourself a good swimmer? A. Average. Q. Average? When you raced him was it in a pool? A. Yes. Q. Was it one lap, two laps, three laps? A. It was going that way and coming back, two laps. Elizabeth Singh, the daughter of Ochie Singh, testified: Q. Did you ever see him swim before the trip to Indiana? A. Yes. We, usually on church trips, we used to take trips to the beach, um, I don't remember the beach's name, and to pool areas and he used to try and teach us how to swim. Q. Did you ever see Jack race anyone swimming? A. No. Not that I can remember. Q. How would you characterize Jack's swimming abilities? A. They were good. You know, he didn't - if you left him in the water he wouldn't drown. The following testimony of Ochie Singh is in dispute to the extent that his daughter, Elizabeth Singh, who was age fifteen at the time of the accident, testified that other adults were aware that Ochie Singh was in his room sleeping from the time they arrived at the Embers Inn until it was discovered that Jaideo had drowned. Ochie testified that he and Jaideo were swimming in the pool. Ochie left and went to his room -5- 01-3339 CIVIL TERM at approximately 10:40 p.m. Three younger children who were staying in his room were asleep. Jaideo was in the bathroom changing from his swimming trunks. Ochie fell asleep while Jaideo was there. He woke up later in the evening and Jaideo was not there. There is no evidence from any individual other than Ochie that Jaideo was seen after he left the swimming pool and it was closed. DISCUSSION All moving defendants for summary judgment maintain that they owed no duty to Jaideo, therefore, they cannot be found liable for his death. The elements of an action for negligence are: 1) a duty or obligation recognized by law requiring the defendant to conform to certain standard of conduct; 2) the failure of defendant to conform to the standard required, a breach; 3) a causal connection between the defendant's conduct and the resulting injury; and 4) actual damages. Leone v. Commonwealth, Department of Transportation, 780 A.2d 754 (Pa Commw. 2001). For negligent conduct to be the legal cause of an injury, it must be a substantial factual cause of the injury for which damages are sought. Zieber v. Bogert, 747 A.2d 905 (Pa. Super. 2000). DEFENDANTS. MAHASE SINGH. SHEM LUTCHMAN. REBECCA LUTCHMAN A1K/A REBECCA PERSAUD. AND MICHAEL PERSAUD Plaintiff seeks liability against Michael Persaud, Mahase Singh, Shem Lutchman and Rebecca Lutchman, a/k/a Rebecca Persaud, on claims that they breached a duty as -6- 01-3339 CIVIL TERM chaperons to care for Jaideo. Plaintiff relies on The Restatement of Torts (Second), section 324 A, which provides: One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of a third person or his things is subject to liability to the third person for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to protect his undertaking, if (a) his failure to exercise reasonable care increase the risk of such harm, or (b) he has undertaken to perform a duty owed by the other to the third person, or (c) the harm is suffered because of reliance of the other or the third person upon the undertaking. (Emphasis added.) Michael Persaud is the senior pastor of Liberty Bible Fellowship Church. He did not stop at the Embers Inn on July 17, 1998. In her brief, plaintiff agrees that there is no basis for liability against him. Mahase Singh, Shem Lutchman and Rebecca Lutchman, a/k/a Rebecca Persaud are members of the Liberty Bible Fellowship Church. They all deny that they accepted, assumed or undertook responsibility for Jaideo at the Embers Inn on July 17, 1998. Plaintiff argues in her brief: [t]hat the deposition testimony of other parties and witnesses is not consistent with these denials. For that reason this issues must be submitted to the trier of fact. To cite specific examples: Elizabeth Singh [the daughter of Ochie], referring to the adults on the trip, among whom she identified moving defendants, testified that "we're always under their watch. They're always looking after us." She stated that some of the adults stayed in the vans to supervise the youths, while others went inside the Embers Inn to check in. She identified Steven and Jennifer Chester as having volunteered to supervise the minors while in their rooms and Shem Lutchman as supervising them while at the pool. Finally, she said that all of the other adults were aware that Bridgemohan Singh was in his room sleeping from the time they arrived at the hotel until they discovered that Jack had -7- 01-3339 CIVIL TERM drowned. The plaintiff Kalawatie Singh, Jack's mother, testified that after Jack's drowning, Shem Lutchman told her that he, along with Steven Chester and Mahase Singh, were watching the youths at the pool. Bridgemohan Singh identified himself, as well as Shem Lutchman, Grace Bible's youth pastor, and Shem's wife Rebecca as having responsibility for supervising Jack. He further identified Joseph Persaud and Mahase Singh as pastors and stated that "you know, young kids, we all look after them." It is undisputed that Ochie Singh told Jaideo's mother, plaintiff Kalawatie Singh, that he would be responsible for him on the trip. While other adults from both churches may have looked out for all of the children, including Jaideo, at various times when they were with them, Jaideo was staying in Ochie's room at the Embers Inn. There is no evidence that anyone in either of the church groups other than Ochie saw Jaideo after he left the pool. Clearly, he was under the supervision of Ochie at the time of his death. Even if others, including these four individual defendants, either looked out for him when he swam in the pool before it was closed or at other times during the trip, there is no evidence that they undertook a responsibility for him at all times during the trip, and specifically after the pool was closed. The testimony cited by plaintiff is insufficient to show that any of the four individual defendants breached a duty of care owed to Jaideo at the time of his death. ADDITIONAL DEFENDANT. KALAWATIE SINGH Jaideo's mother, Kalawatie Singh, is joined as an additional defendant by Joseph Persaud and Rachel Persaud. They allege that she breached a duty by entrusting Jaideo to the care of Ochie Singh, by failing to insure that Ochie was -8- 01-3339 CIVIL TERM capable and competent to chaperone him during the trip, by entrusting Jaideo to his supervision knowing that he "required further supervision of his conduct for protection of himself," and in failing to ascertain who all the adults on the trip were that she assumed at times would look after Jaideo. There is no evidence produced by a non- moving party to support any of these allegations of a breach of duty owed by Kalawatie Singh to her son. EMBERS INN. INC. In Palange v. City of Philadelphia, Law Department, 433 Pa. Super. 373 (1994), the Superior Court of Pennsylvania stated that "the duty of a possessor of land toward a third person entering the land has been measured by the status of the entrant at the time of the accident." A trespasser is "a person who enters or remains upon land in the possession of another without a privilege to do so created by the possessor's consent or otherwise." Id. A licensee is a "person who is privileged to enter or remain on land only by virtue of the possessor's consent." Id. An invitee is either a public invitee or a business visitor. Id. A public invitee is "a person who is invited to enter or remain on land as a member of the public for a purpose for which the land is held open to the public." Id. A business visitor is "a person who is invited to enter or remain on land for a purpose directly or indirectly connected with business dealings with the possessor of the land." In Jefferson v. Young Men's Christian Association, 354 Pa. 563 (1946), plaintiff, a thirty-four-year old man, rented a space at a YMCA. He was intoxicated and went to a swimming pool in the building that was not -9- 01-3339 CIVIL TERM open to the guests. He drowned in the pool. The Court stated: Proprietors of lodging houses and hotels are not expected to anticipate that guests will go to parts of the premises where they are not privileged to go and where there is no need of their going. Restatement of Torts, Vol. II, Sec. 343, lays down this ruling: "A possessor of land is subject to liability for bodily harm caused to business visitors by a natural or artificial condition thereon if, but only if, he knows, or by the exercise of reasonable care could discover, the condition which, if known to him, he should realize as involving an unreasonable risk to them, and has no reason to believe that they will not discover the condition or realize the risk involved therein." Comment "b", reads as follows: "Under the rule stated in this Section, a possessor of land is subject to liability to another as a business visitor only for such bodily harm as he sustains while upon a part of the land upon which the possessor gives the other reason to believe that his presence is permitted or desired because of its connection with the business or affairs of the possessor and which as such is held open to the other as a business visitor." (Emphasis added.) In upholding a nonsuit entered by the trial court, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania concluded: That an unguarded swimming pool anywhere presents possibilities of danger is evident. If such a pool were situated where infants and young children might fall into it, its creation and existence in that place and in an unguarded condition might well be adjudged negligence, (See Altenbach et ux. v. Lehigh Valley R.R. Co., 349 Pa. 272, 37 A. 429), but the creation and maintenance of a swimming pool in a place and time where only adults have access to it cannot be adjudged negligence. Persons beyond the stage of infancy or early youth are reasonably expected to be self-protecting. (Emphasis added.) In Long v. Manzo, 682 A.2d 370 (Pa. Super. 1996), Cynthia Long, age 13, had been in a pool at the home of defendant before July 24, 1986, and knew the water level was only to her waist. She went to the pool on July 24, 1986, misjudged the depth of a dive, and hit her head on the bottom sustaining serious injuries. The trial court, categorizing plaintiff as a trespasser, entered a nonsuit. The Superior Court stated that -10- 01-3339 CIVIL TERM the trial court should have allowed the jury to adjudicate plaintiff's status as either a trespasser or a licensee. Notwithstanding, the Court concluded that plaintiff has: [flailed to present sufficient evidence to raise a jury question as to appellee's liability to her regardless of her status as trespasser or licensee. Absent that evidence, [plaintiff] could not establish the elements of a negligence cause of action. The Court stated that even if plaintiff had been a licensee, one of the elements of a cause of action for physical harm against a possessor of land is that: The possessor knows or has reason to know of the condition and should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such licensees, and should expect that they will not discover or realize the danger... (Emphasis added.) Restatement (Second) of Torts, S 342. The Court noted that while satisfaction of these elements is normally a question for the jury, they may be decided by the court if reasonable minds could not differ. The record showed that plaintiff was aware of the risks associated with diving head-first into a shallow pool. The Court stated that "a landowner's duty 'does not extend to those conditions the existence of which is obvious even to children and the risk of which is fully recognized by them.'" The Court concluded that the record showed that plaintiff appreciated the risks associated with diving into a shallow pool. As a result, [plaintiff] failed to present sufficient evidence to raise a question for the jury as to whether, because of her youth, she did not realize the risk involved in diving in the shallow pool. In the case sub judice, there is no dispute that the Embers Inn closed the pool after all of the people in the church groups left, including Jaideo. Even though Jaideo -11- 01-3339 CIVIL TERM was a business invitee at the Inn, he had to have later gained entrance into the pool when it was closed. Whether a door was unlocked, or he got inside another way, is in dispute. On this record it would appear that he was a trespasser in the swimming pool when he drowned. In Oswald v. Hausman, 378 Pa. Super. 245 (1988), the Superior Court of Pennsylvania stated that, "A trespasser is one who enters the land of another without any right to do so or who goes beyond the rights and privileges which he or she has been granted by license or invitation." The Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 332(3) Comment I, states: The possessor of land is subject to liability to another as an invitee only for harm sustained which he is on the land within the scope of his invitation. Thus an invitee ceases to be an invitee after the expiration of a reasonable time within which to accomplish the purpose for which he is invited to enter, or to remain. . .. Likewise the visitor has the status of an invitee only while he is on the part of the land to which his invitation extends - or in other words, the part of the land upon which the possessor gives him reason to believe that his presence is desired for the purpose for which he has come. (Emphasis added.) Even if Jaideo was a business invitee and not a trespasser, and thus was owed the highest duty of care by a possessor of land, the Embers Inn cannot be found liable to him for drowning in its pool unless it had reason to believe that he would not discover or realize the danger or fail to protect himself against it. In Summers v. Giant Food Stores, Inc., 743 A.2d 498 (Pa. Super. 1999), the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, citing Section 343 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, set forth the duty of a possessor of land to a business invitee: A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused to his invitees by a condition on the land if but only if, he (a) knows or by the exercise of reasonable care would discover the condition, and should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm -12- 01-3339 CIVIL TERM to such invitees, and (b) should expect that they will not discover or realize the danger, or will fail to protect themselves against it, and (c) fails to exercise reasonable care to protect them against the danger. (Emphasis added.) As in Long v. Manzo, supra, and Jefferson v. Young Men's Christian Association, supra, the only evidence is that Jaideo, a fourteen-year-old, knew how to swim and was aware of the risks of getting into a swimming pool alone. Thus, the Embers Inn could expect that he would discover and realize the danger of his conduct. This case is no different than if Jaideo had climbed over a fence to get into an outdoor swimming pool at a time when it was closed to quests. Notwithstanding, plaintiff cites Feld v. Merrian, 506 Pa. 383 (1984), in support of her position that the Embers Inn, having undertaken to provide security checks in its facility, owed a duty of care to Jaideo to prevent him from entering the pool when it was closed, and that there is evidence, although in dispute, that this duty was breached because a door leading to the pool was not locked thus allowing Jaideo to enter. The issue in Feld was whether a landlord has any duty to protect tenants for the foreseeable criminal acts of third persons, and if so, under what circumstances. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania concluded that there was no general duty of a landlord to protect tenants against criminal intrusion, but pursuant to Section 323 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, a landlord may incur a duty voluntarily or by specific agreement if it provides a program of security for its tenants. The Court noted that innkeepers who hold their property open to the public may be subject to liability for the -13- 01-3339 CIVIL TERM harmful acts of third persons for a negligent breach of a duty of protection. The facts in the case sub judice, however, are that Jaideo got into the indoor pool at the Embers Inn when it was closed, and drowned. There is no evidence that his death was caused by a third person. The duties set forth in Feld to do apply here. SCHAAD DETECTIVE AGENCY. INC. Citing Feld v. Merrian, supra, plaintiff alleges that the Schaad Detective Agency "had a duty to properly monitor and secure the pool area so as to preclude occurrence of individuals drowning in the pool." In her brief, plaintiff argues that there is sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that the security guard negligently failed to notice an unlocked door of the closed pool through which Jaideo entered and then drowned in the pool. Plaintiff concludes that, "[i]f the jury were to find that Jaideo entered through that door, then the jury could further find that Schaad's negligence was a substantial factor in Jaideo drowning." Feld does not apply because there is no evidence that Jaideo's death was caused by a third person. Therefore it is necessary to determine if the security agency breached a duty owed to Jaideo before we can consider if there is evidence that a breach was a factual cause of his death. On the facts of this case, any duty owed to Jaideo by the Schaad Detective Agency would be no greater than the duty owed him by the Embers Inn that employed Schaad to provide security. The duty of the Embers Inn, and by extension the security agency it employed, does not extend for the failure to protect Jaideo from his own conduct unless there was reason to believe that he would not discover or realize the danger of entering the pool or fail to -14- 01-3339 CIVIL TERM protect himself. As there is no breach of a duty owed by the Embers Inn to Jaideo, there is no breach of a duty owed to him by the Schaad Detective Agency. CONCLUSION Plaintiff as failed to adduce sufficient evidence of a breach of a duty for which she bears the burden of proof such that a jury could return a verdict in her favor against the moving defendants. There is no evidence of a breach of a duty whereby a jury could return a verdict against additional defendant, Kalawatie Singh. Therefore, the following order is entered. ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this day of January, 2005, IT IS ORDERED that the motions of defendants Embers Inn, Inc. a/k/a The Embers Inn and Convention Center, Schaad Detective Agency, Inc., Mahase Singh, Shem Lutchman and Rebecca Lutchman a/k/a Rebecca Persaud, Michael Persaud, and additional defendant, Kalawatie Singh, for summary judgment, ARE GRANTED. By the Court, Edgar B. Bayley, J. Joseph T. Piscitello, Esquire The Mellon Bank Center 1735 Market Street, Suite 3913 Philadelphia, PA 19103 Anne Dixon, Esquire -15- 01-3339 CIVIL TERM 1515 Locust Street, Suite 900 Philadelphia, PA 19102 For Plaintiff Philip A. Ryan, Esquire The Bellevue, Suite 500 200 S. Broad Street Philadelphia, PA 19102 For Michael Persaud Richard Wix, Esquire 4705 Duke Street Harrisburg, PA 17109 For Shem Lutchman and Rebecca Lutchman a/k/a Rebecca Persaud -16- 01-3339 CIVIL TERM James K. Thomas, II, Esquire Hugh O'Neill, Esquire 305 N. Front Street Harrisburg, PA 17101 For Embers Inn, Inc. a/k/a The Embers Inn and Convention Center Timothy McMahon, Esquire Marshall, Dennehy, Warner, Colman & Goggin 4200 Crums Mill Road, Suite B Harrisburg, PA 17110 For Mahase Singh David C. Ray, Esquire 140 East State Street Doylestown, PA 18901 For Schaad Detective Agency, Inc. Andrew Lehman, Esquire Nealon & Grover 2411 N. Front Street Harrisburg, PA 17110 For Kalawatie Singh Fred B. Buck, Esquire The Widener Building One South Penn Square Philadelphia, PA 19107 For Clarion, Inc., a/k/a Clarion Suites, a/k/a Clarion Properties, a/k/a Clarion Hotel and Convention Center, a/k/a The Clarion Hotel Company, formerly known as the Embers Inn and Convention Center Marc L. Bogutz, Esquire John C. McNamara, Esquire 1880 JFK Blvd. 10th Floor Philadelphia, PA 19103 For Joseph Persaud and Rachel Persaud Hubert X. Gilroy, Esquire Broujos & Gilroy, P.C. 4 North Hanover Street Carlisle, PA 17013 For Sony Ridge Security -17 - 01-3339 CIVIL TERM William A. Duncan, Esquire Duncan & Hartman, P.C. One Irvine Row Carlisle, PA 17013 For Lodging in Carlisle Bridgemohan M. Singh, Pro se Grace Bible Fellowship Church 1514 N. Gardiner Drive Bay Shore, NY 11706 Grace Bible Fellowship Church, Pro se 3234 Fulton Street Brooklyn, NY 11208 Stephen & Jennifer Chester, Pro se 133-31 126th Street South Ozone Park, NY 11420 Liberty Bible Fellowship Church, Pro se 14604 Liberty Avenue Jamica Queen, NY 11435 :sal -18-