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HomeMy WebLinkAboutCP-21-SA-0090 & 0094-2004 COMMONWEAL TH : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS : OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, : PENNSYLVANIA v. : CP-21-SA-94-2004 : CHARGE: APPEAL FROM SUMMARY CRUELTY TO ANIMALS (15 COUNTS) ROBERT LEE ALLEN COMMONWEAL TH : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS : OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, : PENNSYLVANIA v. : CP-21-SA-90-2004 : CHARGE: APPEAL FROM SUMMARY CRUELTY TO ANIMALS (2 COUNTS) DIANNE LYNN ALLEN IN RE: DEFENDANTS' OMNIBUS PRE. TRIAL MOTIONS Before HOFFER. P.J. OPINION HOFFER. P.J.: Before the Court are Defendants' omnibus pre-trial motions to quash their citations. The Defendants, Robert Lee Allen and Dianne Lynn Allen, were originally cited for cruelty to animals on February 2, 2004 by Humane Society Police Officer Pennell Hopkins.1 On April 5, 2004, all charges against the Defendants were dismissed by District Justice Helen Shulenberger at a summary trial. Following dismissal, these same citations were re-filed by 1 These citations were subsequently withdrawn and re-filed several times before a Summary Trial was held on April 5, 2004. Officer Hopkins, and a second summary trial was held before District Justice Harold Bender. The Defendants were found guilty of all charges at the second trial. They appeal these summary convictions to this Court. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, Defendants' motions to quash their citations will be granted. STATEMENT OF FACTS At the first summary trial before District Justice Shulenberger, the Commonwealth, represented by Humane Society Police Officers Keith Mohler and Pennell Hopkins, presented the sworn testimony of seven witnesses to establish the conduct underlying the various citations. (Notes of Testimony, Summary Trial, April 5, 2004, (hereinafter N.T. 6-89.) All seven witnesses were veterinarians who testified against the Defendants concerning the condition of animals in the Defendants' care. (Id.) When the citing officer, Humane Society Police Officer Hopkins, took the stand to testify, District Justice Shulenberger questioned her about her qualifications. (N.T. 90-92.) She testified that she was registered in Cumberland County as a humane society officer. (Id.) On cross-examination, however, she was unable to produce any tangible evidence of her Cumberland County registration when Defense counsel asked to see her registration documentation. (N.T. 92.) In this regard, Officer Hopkins testified that she was registered through her home office in Philadelphia and that the home office had informed her that she was properly registered in Cumberland County. (N.T. 95.) After defense counsel argued that proper registration in 2 Cumberland County was required in order for her to have authority to file these citations, District Justice Shulenberger contacted the Recorder of Deeds at the courthouse to ascertain if she was registered. (N.T. 98.) She was informed by the First Deputy at the Recorder's Office that there was no Officer Hopkins registered as a humane society police officer in Cumberland County. (N.T. 99.) Based on this information, the charges were dismissed. (Id.) Without appealing the dismissal, Officer Hopkins re-filed the same citations on April 8, 2004, after registering as a humane society police officer in Cumberland County. (Non-Traffic Citations, April 8, 2004.) 2 On May 11,2004, the Defendants were adjudged guilty of the same offenses stemming from the same events at a second summary trial before District Justice Harold Bender. (Id.) DISCUSSION The issue in this summary appeal is whether the dismissal of all charges at a summary trial in which sworn testimony was presented barred subsequent prosecutions on the same charges. The principles of double jeopardy are codified in Pennsylvania at 18 Pa.C.S.A. ~ 109 (2004), which states in part: "When a prosecution... is based upon the same law and facts as a former prosecution, it is barred when... the former prosecution is improperly dismissed after the first witness is sworn." Furthermore, when a defendant is placed on 2 Order, Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County, October 31, 2000, recorded in Cumberland County, April 7, 2004. 3 trial for a summary offense, and the charges are dismissed after testimony has been presented, the defendant cannot be subsequently tried for that offense. See In the Interest of RR, 464 A.2d 348,353 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983); Commonwealth v. Lyons, 576 A.2d 1105, 1106 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990). In the instant case, the second summary trial was held in violation of the double jeopardy principles in ~ 109 because the same charges were dismissed in the first summary trial after seven witnesses had testified. In a summary trial, jeopardy attaches after the first witness is sworn because the district justice (now referred to as a magisterial district judge) is vested with the authority to try a defendant on summary charges.3 See Lyons, 576 A.2d at 1106; RR, 464 A.2d at 353. The defendant in Lyons pled not guilty to a summary driving offense, and proceeded to testify at trial before a district justice. 576 A.2d at 1106. The charges were dismissed. .!sL Thereafter, he was re-charged with the same offense. .!sL This time, the district justice returned the case to court for trial, and the defendant was found guilty. .!sL The Superior Court held that the second trial was a violation of double jeopardy because the offense was summary in nature. .!sL It stated that "[h]aving once been placed on trial in a court having jurisdiction to determine his innocence or guilt and the charge having been dismissed, the appellant could not thereafter be placed on trial for the same offense." .!sL Similarly, the Court 3 The title of "District Justice" has been changed to "Magisterial District Judge," but the judicial function remains unchanged. 4 in RR held that a minor defendant's acquittal at a summary trial for violations of the Motor Vehicle Code barred subsequent prosecutions for the same offenses. 464 A.2d at 353. It found that jeopardy attached to the summary trial because the district justice heard sworn testimony regarding the summary offense and had the authority to decide the innocence or guilt of the defendant on the summary charge. .!sL Several courts have held that subsequent summary trials were conducted in violation of double jeopardy as codified in ~ 109 where charges against a defendant had been dismissed in an earlier summary trial after testimony was heard. See ~ Commonwealth v. Milatain, 41 Pa. D. & C.3d 270, 273 (C.P. Chester 1986) (finding that a distinction between a dismissal and acquittal in a summary trial was irrelevant because testimony had been heard, and holding subsequent prosecution of a defendant was barred by a dismissal because jeopardy had attached to the first trial after the defendant testified.); Commonwealth v. Schmehl, 9 D. & CAth 251,257 (C.P. Berks 1991) (holding that subsequent prosecution was barred by double jeopardy because the district justice heard testimony regarding the elements of the same reckless driving summary offense and then dismissed the charges). The Commonwealth argues that the Court should follow the analysis found in Commonwealth v. Labelle, 612 A.2d 418, 420 (Pa. 1992), and permit the prosecution to re-file if it finds that the dismissal was based on a curable defect. However, the Commonwealth's reliance on Labelle is misplaced. The 5 Court in Labelle held that the Commonwealth was barred from re-filing DUI charges against a defendant where the charges had been previously dismissed. .!sL The Court found that appeal was the only route to contest the dismissal because it was based on an incurable defect, the failure of the prosecution to file the complaint within the prescribed time period. .!sL The Commonwealth having failed to appeal, the dismissal was res judicata. .!sL In its reasoning, the Court distinguished incurable defects resulting from a legal determination made by the district justice, which cannot be remedied by re- filing, and curable defects resulting from the prosecution's failure to establish a prima facie case or from a defect in the complaint which compelled dismissal before jeopardy has attached. .!sL However, because jeopardy had attached in the instant case, the nature of the dismissal is not the issue.4 Unlike the fact- 4 Even assuming, arguendo, that a Labelle analysis should be applied, the failure of the Commonwealth to appeal District Justice Shulenberger's dismissal resulting from Officer Hopkins' failure to register in Cumberland County is res judicata. The dismissal was based on a legal determination made after jeopardy had attached that Officer Hopkins had no jurisdiction to exercise the powers of a humane society officer in Cumberland County; therefore, this failure to register was incurable unless the legal ruling underlying the dismissal was made in error. See Hulsizer v. Labor Day Committee, 734 A.2d 848 (Pa. 1999) (holding that humane society officers must record their registration in the county in which they desire to exercise the powers of a police officer in order to have the authority to exercise any police powers.) Registered Humane Society Police Officers have the authority to exercise all the powers of other police officers to enforce animal cruelty law, including the power to arrest a person for violations of the law. 22 Pa.C.S.A. ~ 501 (c) (2004). While the purpose behind animal cruelty laws is to promote humane treatment of animals, the purpose behind requiring the proper registration of humane society officers is to protect the liberty and property interests of citizens by ensuring that officers are properly trained with adequate knowledge of the 6 finder in Labelle, District Justice Shulenberger heard seven witnesses testify for over two hours regarding the Defendant's care of the animals. In contrast, there were no jeopardy issues in Labelle resulting from the dismissal of the DUI charges because the district justice dismissed the DUI charges before hearing any sworn testimony. 612 A.2d at 419. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Labelle never addressed any jeopardy issues.5 In the instant case, jeopardy attached to the first summary trial and, therefore, the dismissal prohibited the Commonwealth from subjecting the Defendants to another trial on the same charges. As was the situation with the minor in RR and the adult defendant in Lyons, Defendants were charged with summary offenses and were placed on trial before a District Justice who had the authority to decide their innocence or guilt. In addition, District Justice Shulenberger, as did the judges in RR and Lyons, dismissed all charges after law before they are given the authority to prosecute a person. This intent is demonstrated by the extensive training requirements and criminal background provisions in the Humane Society Police Officers Enforcement Act, 3 P.S. ~ 456.4 (2004). This Act requires a substantial time investment for animal care and animal law education, as well as a criminal background check for all potential officers. Without these provisions, it would be difficult to ensure that an officer had the requisite knowledge to recognize a violation and to prosecute the offender according to the proper legal procedures that exist to protect citizens' rights. 5 Jeopardy had been an issue for the lower court when it held that the defendant's conviction for reckless driving and unsafe speed may bar subsequent prosecution for the DUI charge if the prosecution attempted to use conduct for which he had already been convicted to establish the elements of the DUI charge, and the case was remanded for that determination. See Commonwealth v. Labelle, 579 A.2d 1315, 1323 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990.) 7 hearing over two hours of sworn testimony from seven witnesses concerning the subject matter of the citations i.e., the Defendants' care of their animals. (N.T. 99.) Despite this outcome, Officer Hopkins, as did the prosecution in Lyons, re-filed the same citations based on the same conduct as the previous prosecution. (Non-Traffic Citations, April 8, 2004.) However, because the Defendants had been previously subjected to trial for those citations in a court having jurisdiction to determine guilt or innocence, jeopardy attached to the first trial after the witnesses testified. Therefore, the dismissal precluded subsequent prosecutions on these citations, and the second trial was held in violation of ~ 109. 8 COMMONWEAL TH : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS : OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, : PENNSYLVANIA VI. : CP-21-SA-94-2004 : CHARGE: APPEAL FROM SUMMARY CRUELTY TO ANIMALS (15 COUNTS) ROBERT LEE ALLEN IN RE: DEFENDANT'S OMNIBUS PRE. TRIAL MOTION Before HOFFER. P.J. AND NOW, this day of , 2005, upon consideration of Defendant's Omnibus Pre-trial Motion to quash his citations and briefs submitted by both parties, it is hereby ORDERED that said Motion is GRANTED. The above citations are QUASHED. By the Court, George E. Hoffer, P.J. Jaime M. Keating Chief Deputy District Attorney District Attorney's Office One Courthouse Square Carlisle, PA 17013 Austin F. Grogan Coyne & Coyne, P.C. 3901 Market Street Camp Hill, PA 17011 (717)737-0464 Attorney for Defendant, Robert Lee Allen 9 COMMONWEAL TH : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS : OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, : PENNSYLVANIA v. : CP-21-SA-90-2004 : CHARGE: APPEAL FROM SUMMARY CRUELTY TO ANIMALS (2 COUNTS) DIANNE LYNN ALLEN IN RE: DEFENDANT'S OMNIBUS PRE. TRIAL MOTION Before HOFFER. P.J. AND NOW, this day of , 2005, upon consideration of Defendant's Omnibus Pre-trial Motion to quash her citations and briefs submitted by both parties, it is hereby ORDERED that said Motion is GRANTED. The above citations are QUASHED. By the Court, George E. Hoffer, P.J. Jaime M. Keating District Attorney's Office One Courthouse Square Carlisle, PA 17013 Chief Deputy District Attorney Karl E. Rominger Rominger, Bayley & Whare 155 S. Hanover Street Carlisle, PA 17013 (717)241-6070 Attorney for Defendant, Diane Lynne Allen 10