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HomeMy WebLinkAboutCP-21-CR-0000214-2009 COMMONWEALTH : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, : PENNSYLVANIA : : : CP- 21-CR-0214-2009 : : CHARGES: DUI (2 Counts) : AGGRAVATED ASSAULT (2 Counts) : SIMPLE ASSAULT (2 Counts) v. : RECKLESSLY ENDANGERING : ANOTHER PERSON (2 Counts) : RESISTING ARREST : : JOSHUA M. GRIMES : AFFIANT: SGT. GARY CARTER OTN: K386510-5 : IN RE: DEFENDANT’S OMNIBUS PRE-TRIAL MOTION OPINION EBERT, J., August 3, 2009 – STATEMENT OF FACTS Defendant is Joshua M. Grimes. Troopers Fink and Deal observed Defendant 1 driving in an erratic manner on or about November 26, 2008. Trooper Fink attempted to stop Defendant, but Defendant did not comply when Trooper Fink turned on his lights 2 and siren. Trooper Fink attempted to catch up to Defendant’s car and recorded a speed 3 of 88 miles an hour in a 55 mile and hour zone. Troopers eventually stopped 4 Defendant’s car after approximately an 11-mile pursuit with the use of a P.I.T. 5 maneuver (Pursuit Immobilization Technique). During the chase, Trooper Fink observed the vehicle driving at high rates of speed, driving on the wrong side of the 6 road, driving off the shoulder of the road, and running stop signs. After stopping 1 Preliminary Hearing, Jan. 23, 2009 at 6 (hereinafter Prelim. Hrg. at ___). 2 Prelim. Hrg. at 9. 3 Prelim. Hrg. at 7. 4 Prelim. Hrg. at 10. 5 Prelim. Hrg. at 24. 6 Prelim. Hrg. at 11. Defendant’s vehicle by P.I.T. maneuver, Trooper Fink got out of his vehicle. He was 3 or 7 4 feet behind defendant’s car and yelled for Defendant to put his hands up three times. Defendant did not exit his vehicle, but instead revved his engine and with tires spinning, 8 he rapidly backed up toward Trooper Fink. Trooper Fink fired his gun three times at 9 Defendant. Defendant was shot in the incident, and was taken into custody at the scene. 10 The Defendant was then taken to Hershey Medical Center for treatment. Trooper Gray explained Miranda rights to Defendant, and Defendant acknowledged that 11 he understood these rights. Trooper Gray interviewed Defendant at Hershey Medical Center and said that Defendant appeared wide awake and capable of answering his 12 questions. When asked if Defendant appeared to be still under the influence of alcohol, Trooper Gray said that it appeared that Defendant was not under the influence 13 of anything. The Court finds that Defendant understood the Miranda rights as read to 14 him. He was able to answer questions and explain in his own words what it meant to 15 waive his Miranda rights and speak to the trooper. Trooper Gray testified that during 16 the interview, Defendant appeared alert and provided accurate details of the events of 17 the evening. Trooper Gray testified that during the interview, Defendant Grimes stated that on the evening of November 26, 2008, he knew he was being pursued by a marked 18 police unit which was using its lights and siren, and that he was stopped by the 19 Troopers’ use of a P.I.T. maneuver. Defendant also acknowledged that he was 7 Prelim. Hrg. at 31. 8 Prelim. Hrg. at 27. 9 Prelim. Hrg. at 30. 10 Notes of Transcript, Jun. 2, 2009 at p. 7-8 (hereinafter N.T. at ___). 11 N.T. at 10-11. 12 N.T. at 12. 13 N.T. at 12. 14 N.T. at 10-11. 15 N.T. at 10-11. 16 N.T. at 9. 17 N.T. at 14. 18 Prelim. Hrg. at 47. 19 Prelim. Hrg. at 49. 2 20 wanted for felony warrants. Defendant told Trooper Gray that after he was stopped he 21 did place the vehicle in reverse. Defendant told Trooper Gray that he “saw one trooper 22 in front of him and didn’t see the trooper behind him.” PROCEDURAL HISTORY Defendant was charged with the above-captioned offenses for events alleged to have occurred on November 29, 2008. A Preliminary Hearing was held on January 23, 2009, and the charges were bound over to the Court of Common Pleas. Formal arraignment was held on March 19, 2009 and a Pre-Trial Conference was held on May 7, 2009. Defendant filed an Omnibus Pre-Trial Motion on April 16, 2009 requesting suppression of his statement and dismissal of the charges of aggravated assault and resisting arrest. A hearing on the Omnibus Pre-Trial Motion was held before this Court on June 2, 2009. DISCUSSION I. Standard of Review A. Suppression of Defendant’s Statement Defendant Grimes argues that the statements he made to police while in the hospital should be suppressed because he did not voluntarily waive his Miranda rights before being questioned. Grimes argues that he was under the influence of medication for treatment of a gunshot wound and that he was intimidated by the presence of troopers in the room. Defendant argues that because of these factors, his waiver of Miranda rights was not voluntary, and therefore his statements which followed should be suppressed. The Pennsylvania Superior Court has confirmed that a defendant’s waiver of Miranda rights is not considered involuntary simply because of being in a medicated state while in a hospital. Com. v. Ellis, 700 A.2d 948 (Pa. Super. 1997). In Ellis, the 20 Prelim. Hrg. at 47. 21 Prelim. Hrg. at 50. 22 Prelim Hrg. at 50. 3 Court upheld defendant’s waiver of Miranda rights while defendant was in the hospital being treated for a gunshot wound. The Court ruled that even though the defendant was “medicated and had undergone surgery earlier in the day, there is absolutely no evidence that his cognitive functions were impaired” Id. at 955. The Court reiterated that expert testimony was not necessary to determine the cognitive functions of the defendant, and ruled that the waiver of rights was valid based on the detective’s assessment that the defendant did not appear to be under the influence of any medication. Id. at 955 (citing Commonwealth v. Wanner, 605 A.2d 805 (Pa. Super. 1992). Although the defendant in Ellis was not in custody, the Court found that even if he had been in custody, the detective’s explanation to defendant of his Miranda rights and defendant’s acknowledgement and waiver of those rights as detailed on the form given to him by the detective was sufficient. Id. at 955. Furthermore, there are additional instances in which the Pennsylvania Superior Court has ruled that the mere existence of pain or even intoxication or other medical impairment is not grounds for invalidating defendant’s waiver of Miranda rights. Com. v. Harm, 416 A.2d 533, 534-535 (Pa. Super. 1979). In Com. v. Harm, the Court deferred to the trial court’s ruling that the defendant’s statement should not be suppressed, based on “the testimony of the various officers who testified that appellant, at the time of his statement, was alert, normal, responsive and somewhat cooperative and that he appeared to fully understand his Miranda rights before questioning began.” Id. at 535. Like in the present case, officers testified that Defendant was alert, cooperative, responsive, and appeared to fully understand the explanation of his Miranda rights. In this case, the Defendant was in the hospital for treatment of a gunshot wound. Although he was being treated with some type of medication for his injuries, he was coherent and aware of the statements that he was making to police. While we do not have a doctor’s report on the Defendant’s condition, it seems clear to this Court that the 4 Defendant’s mental capacity was not altered or compromised at the time he made the statements. While the Defendant initially declined to write out the statement himself because “he didn’t feel well enough,” he told the Trooper he would write it out at a later 23 time. The Trooper left the form with the Defendant, but it was never returned. Logic dictates to this Court that the Defendant simply changed his mind after he considered his predicament and the ramifications a handwritten statement could have on his pending case. B. Writ of Habeas Corpus A criminal defendant may file a writ of habeas corpus to challenge the sufficiency of evidence at his preliminary hearing. Com. v. Carmody, 799 A.2d 143, 146 (Pa. Super. 2002) (citing Commonwealth v. McBride, 595 A.2d 589, 590 n. 2 (Pa. 1995)). The trial court’s role in such cases is to determine “whether a prima facie case was presented at the preliminary hearing, that is, whether sufficient evidence exists to require the defendant to be brought to trial.” Id. at 146-147 (Pa. Super. 2002) (citing Commonwealth v. Scott, 578 A.2d 933, 936-37 (Pa. Super. 1990)), appeal denied, 598 A.2d 283 (Pa. 1991). Defendant here seeks a writ of habeas corpus and seeks dismissal of the charges of aggravated assault and resisting arrest. C. Aggravated Assault In Pennsylvania, a person is guilty of aggravated assault if he: (1) attempts to cause serious bodily injury to another, or causes such injury intentionally, knowingly or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life; (2) attempts to cause or intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes serious bodily injury to any of the officers, agents, employees or other persons enumerated in subsection (c) or to an employee of an agency, company or other entity engaged in public transportation, while in the performance of duty; 23 N.T. at 16-17. 5 (3) attempts to cause or intentionally or knowingly causes bodily injury to any of the officers, agents, employees or other persons enumerated in subsection (c), in the performance of duty; (4) attempts to cause or intentionally or knowingly causes bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702. Defendant claims that he was improperly charged with aggravated assault because he did not actually cause bodily injury to the officer and because his actions cannot be considered to have attempted such injury. It is well-established that intent to cause serious bodily injury can be proved by circumstantial evidence. Com v. Lewis, 911 A.2d 558, 564 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citing Commonwealth v. Rightley, 617 A.2d 1289, 1295 (Pa. Super. 1992). In determining requisite intent, the Pennsylvania Superior Court has ruled that the fact-finder may conclude that any natural and probable consequences of defendant’s actions can be considered to be intentional. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Rosado, 684 A.2d 605, 608 (Pa. Super. 1996)). In this case, Defendant was aware that he was being chased by police and that they were attempting to pull him over. He acknowledged that he was stopped by a P.I.T. maneuver, which indicates that he was aware that police had to force him to stop his vehicle. It is clear to this Court that Trooper Fink was behind the Defendant shouting out 24 commands to stop, get out of his car, and to put up his hands. These facts circumstantially establish that the Defendant knew a Trooper was behind him. Defendant’s action of revving his car engine and backing up rapidly toward the police car after he was initially stopped is sufficient circumstantial evidence to show that he intended to take whatever action was necessary to defeat the initial stop and escape, to include causing serious bodily injury to the officer. The fact that Defendant did not actually hit the trooper does not mean that the trooper was not in danger or that serious bodily injury could not have been a natural and probable result of Defendant’s actions. 24 Preliminary Hearing, Jan. 23, 2009 at 30-32 (hereinafter Prelim. Hrg. at ___) 6 We conclude that the evidence at minimum established a prima facie case that the Defendant committed aggravated assault. D. Resisting Arrest In Pennsylvania, “[a] person commits a misdemeanor of the second degree if, with the intent of preventing a public servant from effecting a lawful arrest or discharging any other duty, the person creates a substantial risk of bodily injury to the public servant or anyone else, or employs means justifying or requiring substantial force to overcome the resistance.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5104. The Pennsylvania Superior Court has interpreted this statute to mean that, “as a general rule, it is not criminal merely to ‘flee arrest.’ However, ‘where the circumstances of the flight expose the pursuing officers to substantial danger’ a conviction for resisting arrest is proper. Com. v. Miller, 475 A.2d 145, 146 (Pa. Super. 1984). The Court goes on to say that it is clear that the statute “does not require the aggressive use of force such as a striking or kicking of the officer.” Id. Here, in addition to the danger the officers were exposed to in the 11 mile high speed chase and the P.I.T. stop, the Defendant’s actions of revving his engine and backing up his car toward the trooper created a substantial risk of bodily injury to the trooper. The fact that he never made physical contact with the trooper bears no significance on the existence of substantial risk. This Court does not find credible the Defendant’s claim that he was not aware the trooper was behind him when he revved his engine and reversed his car toward the trooper. Circumstantially, the evidence of the Trooper being only 3 or 4 feet behind the Defendant’s vehicle and yelling loudly several times for him to stop, get out of his car and put his hands up, establishes that Defendant knew the Trooper was behind him. He was aware that he was being chased by police, and was aware that he was initially stopped by a P.I.T. maneuver. He knew that he was wanted for felony warrants and he was trying to escape. In his attempt to escape, he put the troopers in substantial risk of 7 harm by involving them in a high speed chase which required a dangerous P.I.T. maneuver, and then reversing his car rapidly toward the trooper. We therefore find that the evidence supports the charge of resisting arrest even though there was no physical contact with the bodies of the troopers. E. Conclusion It is clear in this case that Defendant was aware of the statements he was making to police while he was in the hospital for treatment of a gunshot wound. Even though he was being treated with medication, he was coherent and alert, was properly provided his Miranda rights by police and validly waived those rights. Therefore, the statements made to police are valid and may properly be admitted as evidence. Defendant’s claim that because he did not physically strike the trooper he is entitled to dismissal of the charges of aggravated assault and resisting arrest is without merit. We find that the charges of aggravated assault and resisting arrest are properly supported by the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing. By the Court, M. L. Ebert, Jr., J. Michelle Sibert, Esquire Chief Deputy District Attorney Tim M. Barrouk, Esquire Attorney for Defendant 8