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HomeMy WebLinkAbout21-2003-936 / 21-2004-301 Orphans' IN RE: ELEANOR U. COOLIDGE IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA ORPHANS' COURT DIVISION NO. 21-03-936 IN RE: ELEANOR U. COOLIDGE IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA ORPHANS' COURT DIVISION NO. 21-04-301 APPEAL FROM PROBATE BEFORE OLER, J. ADJUDICA TION and DECREE NISI OLER, 1., May 19,2005. In this appeal from probate, one of three children of a testatrix has challenged a Decree of Probate admitting to probate a certain will of the testatrix. The basis of the challenge is undue influence on the part of one of the other children. 1 A hearing was held on the appeal on February 28, 2005, March 3, 2005, and March 4, 2005. For the reasons stated in this adjudication, the appeal will be denied. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. Petitioner/Appellant is Julia Elizabeth Coolidge-Stoltz, M.D., an adult individual residing at 2 Gillis Drive, North Reading, Massachusetts. 2. Respondents are Thomas Edward Coolidge, an adult individual residing at 265 Mooreland Avenue, Carlisle, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania, and Philip Warren Coolidge, Esq., an adult individual having a mailing address of 950 Walnut Bottom Road, P.O. Box 15243, Carlisle, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania. 1 See Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact and Petitioner's Proposed Conclusions of Law, filed May 12, 2005; Petitioner's Post-Trial Brief Re: Undue Influence, submitted April 28, 2005; c.c.R.P. 210-7 (issues not briefed deemed abandoned). 3. Petitioner and Respondents are the only children of Eleanor U. Coolidge, a resident of a facility known as Green Ridge Village, 210 Big Spring Road, Newville, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania. 4. By virtue of an instrument dated December 20, 2002, Respondent Thomas Edward Coolidge received a power of attorney from his mother, Eleanor U. Coolidge. 5. The exercise of this power by Respondent Thomas Edward Coolidge was consistent with the principal's best interests, and his general conduct toward his mother was consistently representative of that of a loving and devoted son. 6. Eleanor U. Coolidge died on March 24, 2004, at the age of 75. 7. The decedent died testate by virtue of a will executed on December 8, 2003, while she was a resident in the assisted living section of Green Ridge Village. 8. Under the will, the decedent devised and bequeathed her estate in a trust to be administered by her sons in two equal shares as follows: a) One (1) share for the benefit of my son, Philip W. Coolidge, the income from which shall be paid to him semi-annually until his oldest child shall attain 18 years of age, at which time the Trust shall be divided into equal shares for each of his then living children and the income from all of such shares shall continue to be paid to him so long as he shall live, except that from the principal of the share of any such child of his the Trustees or surviving Trustee may expend from principal whatever amount or amounts the Trustees or Trustee shall deem reasonable or desirable to be expended for the proper education of such child of Philip W. Coolidge, provided the then living parents of such child shall request and approve such distribution from principal, and upon the death of my son, Philip W. Coolidge, the Trust shall terminate and the amounts then held for the benefit of each of his children shall be paid as follows: The income shall be paid semi -annually to the person entitled to the principal thereof and one-third (1/3) of the principal thereof as then constituted shall be paid to the income beneficiary upon that beneficiary attaining 25 years of age, and upon that beneficiary attaining 30 years of age one-half (1/2) of the corpus of that beneficiary's share as then constituted shall be paid to that beneficiary, and upon the beneficiary attaining 35 years of age the balance of the corpus of that beneficiary's share shall be distributed but in the event any child of Philip W. Coolidge for whom an allocation of principal has been made should become deceased then the share to which such deceased child would have been entitled to receive shall be immediately paid to or for the benefit of the issue of that child, per stirpes, and if there 2 be no such issue then to the representative of the estate of that child for distribution in accordance with that child's will, if any, otherwise to the person or persons entitled to receive the same under the intestate law of the jurisdiction in which that person was domiciled at the time of his or her death. b) One (1) share for the benefit of my son, Thomas E. Coolidge, the income from which shall be paid to him semi-annually until his oldest child shall attain 18 years of age, at which time the Trust shall be divided into equal shares for each of his then living children and the income from all of such shares shall continue to be paid to him so long as he shall live, except that from the principal of the share of any such child of his the Trustees or surviving Trustee may expend from principal whatever amount or amounts the Trustees or Trustee shall deem reasonable or desirable to be expended for the proper education of such child of Thomas E. Coolidge, provided the then living parents of such child shall request and approve such distribution from principal, and upon the death of my son, Thomas E. Coolidge, the Trust shall terminate and the amounts then held for the benefit of each of his children shall be paid as follows: The income shall be paid semi-annually to the person entitled to the principal thereof and one-third (1/3) of the principal thereof as then constituted shall be paid to the income beneficiary upon that beneficiary attaining 25 years of age, and upon that beneficiary attaining 30 years of age one-half (1/2) of the corpus of that beneficiary's share as then constituted shall be paid to that beneficiary, and upon the beneficiary attaining 35 years of age the balance of the corpus of that beneficiary's share shall be distributed but in the event any child of Thomas E. Coolidge for whom an allocation of principal has been made should become deceased then the share to which such deceased child would have been entitled to receive shall be immediately paid to or for the benefit of the issue of that child, per stirpes, and if there be no such issue then to the representative of the estate of that child for distribution in accordance with that child's will, if any, otherwise to the person or persons entitled to receive the same under the intestate law of the jurisdiction in which that person was domiciled at the time of his or her death. c) No provision has been made in this Will for my daughter Julia E. Stolz, not because of any absence of motherly love by me for her, but because I am satisfied that she has adequate resources to maintain a comfortable standard of living by virtue of being a beneficiary of a trust created by her father, and by the income earned by her husband and her. d) No title in the trusts hereby created, or in the income accruing therefrom, or in its accumulation, or in any share or shares thereof into which it may from time to time be divided, shall vest in any beneficiary and no beneficiary shall have the right or power to transfer, sign, anticipate, or encumber his or her interest in said Trust, or the income therefrom, prior to the actual distribution thereof by the Trustees or Trustee to such beneficiary. Further, neither the income nor the principal of said Trust shall be liable in any manner, in the possession of the 3 Trustee, for the debts, contracts, or engagements of any of the beneficiaries. 9. The corpus of the trust will be about $1,240,000.00. 10. Under the will, the trustees were Respondents. 11. Under the will, the powers of the trustees were described as follows: 5. In addition to the powers conferred by law, my Executor or Executors and my Trustees, and their successors, are empowered: a. To invest any part of the trust corpus in such securities, investments, or other property as may be deemed advisable and proper, irrespective of whether the same are authorized for the investment of trust funds under the laws of any governing jurisdiction. b. With respect to any corporation, the stocks, bonds, or other securities of which may be held, to vote in person or by proxy on any shares of stock; to consent to the merger, consolidation or reorganization of such corporations; to consent to the leasing, mortgaging, or sale of the property of any such corporations; to make any surrender, exchange or substitution of such stocks, bonds, or other securities as an incident to the merger, consolidation or reorganization of such corporations; to pay all assessments, subscriptions and other sums of money which may be deemed wise and expedient for the protection and maintenance of the proportionate interest of the investment in such corporations; to exercise any option or privilege which may be conferred upon the holders of such stocks, bonds, or other securities of such corporations either for the conversion of the same into other securities or for the purchase of additional securities, and to make any and all necessary payments which may be required in connection therewith; and generally to have and exercise as to all such stocks, bonds, and other securities, the powers of an individual owner who is not under trust obligation. c. To hold the trust corpus m one or more consolidated funds in which separate shares shall have undivided interests. d. To sell at public or private sale for cash or upon credit, or partly for cash and partly on credit, and upon such terms and conditions as shall be deemed proper, any part or parts of the trust estate, and no purchaser at any such sale shall be bound to inquire into the expediency or propriety of any such sale or to see to the application of the purchase money arising therefrom. 4 e. To keep on hand and uninvested such moneys as may be deemed proper and for such period as may be found expedient. f. To compromise, settle, or arbitrate any claim or demand in favor of or against the trust estate. g. And authorized in the discharge of fiduciary duties, to employ counsel and to determine and to pay such counsel reasonable compensation which shall be charged against the principal or income of the trust fund, and shall further be entitled to charge against the principal or income such other reasonable expenses and charges as may be necessary and proper to incur for the proper discharge of fiduciary duties and for the proper management and administration of the trust estate. h. In making any division of property into shares for the purpose of any distribution thereof directed by the provisions of the trust, to make such division or distribution, either in cash or in kind, or partly in cash and partly in kind, as shall be deemed most expedient, and in making any division or distribution in kind may allot any specific security or property or any undivided interest therein to anyone or more of such shares, and to that end may appraise any or all of the property so to be allotted and the judgment as to the propriety of such allotment and as to the relative value for purposes of distribution of the securities or property so allotted shall be final and conclusive upon all persons interested in the trust or in the division or distribution thereof. i. Authorized to register any shares of stock or other assets of any trust in their own names or in the name of a nommee. j. To retain and invest in shares of stock of my Trustee. k. To retain any investments including mutual funds which I may own at the time of my death and in addition to invest any part of the Trust corpus in such mutual fund or mutual funds as may be deemed advisable or proper, irrespective of whether the same are authorized for the investment of trust funds under the laws of any governing jurisdiction. 1. To determine from time to time whether all or some portion of realized capital gains shall be treated as ordinary income for distribution to a beneficiary or treated as principal to be retained as part of the corpus, and such designation need not be consistent from one year to another. 12. Under the will, the executors were Respondents. 5 13. This will differed from the decedent's immediately prior will, dated October 24, 2002, as modified by a codicil dated December 26, 2002,2 in that (a) it eliminated a bequest of two lamps to Petitioner, (b) it eliminated a gift to Petitioner and her child(ren) of an interest in the residuary trust equivalent to the interests of Respondents and their children, and (c) it eliminated a designation of Petitioner as co-trustee and co-executor. 3 14. The omission of Petitioner as a beneficiary under the will was explicit: No provision has been made in this Will for my daughter Julia E. Stolz, not because of any absence of motherly love by me for her, but because I am satisfied that she has adequate resources to maintain a comfortable standard of living by virtue of being a beneficiary of a trust created by her father, and by the income earned by her husband and her. 15. Although the relationship between the decedent and Petitioner had been less than harmonious for years, the change in testamentary disposition evidenced in the will sub judice was immediately precipitated by the decedent's resentment at Petitioner's unmeritorious attempt to have her declared incompetent in November of 2003.4 16. This decision of the decedent to change her will was the product of her independent will and was not directed, suggested, inspired or influenced in any way by Respondent Thomas Edward Coolidge. 17. At the time of the execution of the will sub judice the decedent, although not in ideal physical or mental health, did not suffer from a weakened intellect of a type that rendered her confused, forgetful, disoriented, or otherwise susceptible to pressure or influence from other persons, including her children, and she was lucid and competent. 2 The codicil eliminated a bequest of a certain wall clock to Petitioner on the basis of ademption. 3 In addition, the new will indicated that certain household items of the testator that were to have been divided equally among the children under the prior will were subject to a prearranged distribution pattern and thus not encompassed by the new will. 4 This court refused to grant that petition, following a hearing at which the decedent, among others, testified. See Order of Court, November 20,2003. 6 18. At the time of the execution of the will a confidential relationship did not exist, nor had it existed, between the decedent and her son, Respondent Thomas Edward Coolidge. 19. As a practical matter, the benefit to Respondent Thomas Edward Coolidge from the revision of the will sub judice will be less than $6,000.00 per year. DISCUSSION "Once a will has been probated, the contestant who claims that the will was procured by undue influence has the burden of proof." In re Estate of Angle, 2001 P A Super. 144, ,-r42, 777 A.2d 114, 123. As expressed in Petitioner's brief in support of her appeal from probate, "a presumption of undue influence arises when the contestant establishes by clear and convincing evidence 'weakened intellect, confidential relationship and substantial benefit to the proponent [of the will].'" Petitioner's Post-Trial Brief Re: Undue Influence, at 1; see In re Estate of Luongo, 2003 P A Super. 171, ,-r51, 823 A.2d 942, 963; In re Estate of Clark, 461 Pa. 52, 60, 334 A.2d 628, 632 (1975). "Once the will contestant fails to prove anyone of the three elements required to establish undue influence, his/her claim must necessarily fail." In re Estate of Glover, 447 Pa. Super. 509, 518 n.4, 669 A.2d 1011, 1016 n.4 (1996). On the other hand, when the presumption has been successfully established by the contestant, "the burden of proof shifts to the [proponent] to disprove undue influence by clear and convincing evidence. . .." Owens v. Mazzei, 2004 P A Super. 106, ,-r11, 847 A.2d 700, 706. In such a case, the proponent must show, by clear and convincing evidence, "that the gifts [to him or her] in the will were free and voluntary, clearly understood and unaffected by undue influence, or imposition, deception or fraud." In re Thomas' Estate, 463 Pa. 284, 290, 344 A.2d 834, 837 (1975). In this context, weakened intellect "is typically accompanied by persistent confusion, forgetfulness and disorientation." Owens, 847 A.2d at 707. Even a 7 condition as senous as Alzheimer's disease does not necessarily render one susceptible to undue influence. In re Estate of Angle, 2001 P A Super. 144, ~45, 777 A.2d 114, 123. A pertinent "inquiry is whether at the time of the execution of the document, the decedent was lucid and competent." Id Being one's child and the recipient of a power of attorney does not, m itself, render the relationship a confidential one. Id at ,-r43, 777 A.2d at 123. The existence of a confidential relationship is dependent upon "circumstances [which] make it certain that the parties did not deal on equal terms but that on one side there was an over-mastering influence. . .." In re Estate of Jakiella, 353 Pa. Super. 581, 586, 510 A.2d 815,817 (1986); see In re Estate of Angle, 2001 PA Super. at ,-r51, 777 A.2d at 125. The question of substantial benefit is, of course, case specific, and in this regard the gift in question must be viewed in the context of the entire estate of which it is a part. See In re Estate ofZiel, 467 Pa. 531, 543, 359 A.2d 728, 734-35 (1976). A five thousand dollar gift in a six thousand dollar estate is obviously of more significance than a five thousand dollar gift in a million dollar estate. Finally, conduct constituting undue influence consists of "'imprisonment of the body or mind . . . fraud, or threats, misrepresentations, or circumvention, or inordinate flattery or physical or moral coercion, [t]o such a degree as to prejudice the mind of the testator, to [d]estroy his free agency and to operate as a present restraint upon him in the making of a will. ", Id at 541, 359 A.2d at 733. As Justice Pomeroy noted, undue influence suggests a "strong and predatory character" who "prey[ s] insidiously [upon the victim] in order to extract testamentary benefactions that would not otherwise be forthcoming." Id at 543, 359 A.2d at 734-35. "Kindly care and solicitous attention do not amount to undue influence. ... Legitimate family and social relations are not prohibited though provisions of a will are thereby influenced and affected; such results are their natural and proper products." In re Brennan's Estate, 312 Pa. 335, 337-38, 168 A. 25, 26 (1933). 8 In the present case, the court has found itself unable to agree with Petitioner that the parties' mother suffered, at the time of the execution of the will sub judice, from a weakened intellect of the type required for undue influence, that a confidential relationship existed, or had previously existed, between the mother and Respondent Thomas Edward Coolidge, or that Respondent Thomas Edward Coolidge received a substantial benefit from the change in the mother's will. In addition, in the court's view, the change complained of in the mother's will was the product of the decedent's understandable resentment at Petitioner's unmeritorious attempt to have her declared incompetent, and not the result of any persuasive effort, expressed or implied, subtle or otherwise, on the part of Respondent Thomas Edward Coolidge. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 1. The court has jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter of this case. 2. The will of Eleanor U. Coolidge dated December 8, 2003, and admitted to probate by decree dated March 29, 2004, was not the product of undue influence on the part of Respondent Thomas E. Coolidge and was properly admitted to probate by the Cumberland County Register of Wills. 3. The appeal from probate filed by Julia Elizabeth Coolidge-Stoltz must accordingly be dismissed. DECREE NISI AND NOW, this 19th day of May, 2005, upon consideration of the Appeal from Probate filed on behalf of Julia Elizabeth Coolidge-Stoltz, following a hearing held on February 28, 2005, March 3, 2005, and March 4, 2005, and for the reasons stated in the accompanying Adjudication, it is ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the appeal is dismissed. BY THE COURT, s/ 1. Wesley Oler, Jr. 1. Wesley Oler, Jr., 1. 9 R. Mark Thomas, Esq. 101 S. Market Street Mechanicsburg, P A 17055 Attorney for Petitioner Julia Elizabeth Coolidge-Stolz James D. Flower, Jr., Esq. 26 West High Street Carlisle, P A 17013 Attorney for Respondents Thomas Edward Coolidge and Philip Warren Coolidge Robert M. Frey, Esq. 5 South Hanover Street Carlisle, P A 17013 Attorney for the Estate of Eleanor U. Coolidge 10 11 IN RE: ELEANOR U. COOLIDGE IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA ORPHANS' COURT DIVISION NO. 21-03-936 IN RE: ELEANOR U. COOLIDGE IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA ORPHANS' COURT DIVISION NO. 21-04-301 APPEAL FROM PROBATE BEFORE OLER, J. DECREE NISI AND NOW, this 19th day of May, 2005, upon consideration of the Appeal from Probate filed on behalf of Julia Elizabeth Coolidge-Stoltz, following a hearing held on February 28, 2005, March 3, 2005, and March 4, 2005, and for the reasons stated in the accompanying Adjudication, it is ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the appeal is dismissed. BY THE COURT, 1. Wesley Oler, Jr., 1. R. Mark Thomas, Esq. 101 S. Market Street Mechanicsburg, P A 17055 Attorney for Petitioner Julia Elizabeth Coolidge-Stolz James D. Flower, Jr., Esq. 26 West High Street Carlisle, P A 17013 Attorney for Respondents Thomas Edward Coolidge and Philip Warren Coolidge Robert M. Frey, Esq. 5 South Hanover Street Carlisle, P A 17013 Attorney for the Estate of Eleanor U. Coolidge