HomeMy WebLinkAbout2003-843 Civil
INDEPENDENT AUTO
PARTS, INC.,
Plaintiff,
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
v.
CIVIL ACTION-LAW
STAGECOACH
TRANSPORT SERVICES,:
INC., STAGECOACH
SALES AND LEASING
and HARRY P APP AS,
Defendants
NO. 03-843 CIVIL TERM
IN RE: OPINION PURSUANT TO PA. R.A.P. 1925(a)
OLER, 1., June 21, 2005.
In this civil case, Plaintiff Independent Auto Parts, Inc., a corporation
engaged in the selling of auto body parts, sued Defendants Stagecoach Transport
Services, Inc. (a/k/a Stagecoach Sales and Leasing), a corporation engaged in the
selling of motor vehicles, and its owner Harry Pappas for ( a) payments due for
auto parts purchased, (b) breach of contract in connection with the sale of three
wrecked automobiles, and (c) unjust emichment. 1 Following a non jury trial, the
court entered a verdict for Plaintiff on the auto parts claim in the amount of
$3,724.25, plus costs of suit and a collection fee of $931.06? The verdict also
directed that title to the three wrecked vehicles be transferred to Plaintiff. 3
Plaintiff and pro se Defendant Harry Pappas (hereinafter Defendant) filed
post-trial motions.4 With the exception of a substitution of attorney's fees for the
collection fee in the verdict, the post-trial motions of both parties were denied.5
1 P1.'s Comp1., filed Feb. 25, 2003 (hereinafter P1.'s Comp1. ~~.
2 Order of Court, Sept. 23, 2004.
3 Order of Court, Sept. 23, 2004.
4 P1.'s Petition for Post-Trial Relief in Accordance with Pa. RC.P. No. 227.1, filed Oct. 7,2004;
Def.'s Motion for Post-Trial Relief, filed Oct. 4, 2004.
5 Order of Court, Jan. 14,2005. As will be explained hereafter in the text, the parties' agreement
with respect to Plaintiff s sale of auto parts authorized an award to the seller of both a collection
Following this amended verdict, Defendant filed an appeal to the
Pennsylvania Superior Court.6 Defendant has expressed the issues complained of
on appeal as follows:
I. The Court erred in not granting Mr. Pappas his request for
continuance. This request for continuance was made at the
commencement of the trial and was based upon the fact that Mr.
Pappas did not have an attorney to represent him. He requested a
continuance of approximately thirty (30) days in order to obtain
counsel. Mr. Pappas believes, and therefore avers, that the Plaintiff
would not have been prejudiced had the Court granted this brief
continuance. Defendant, Mr. Pappas, was substantially harmed and
prejudiced because he had to proceed to trial without the benefit of
an attorney.
II. The Court erred in including within the verdict an award to
Plaintiff for interest, collection fees and advertising costs. Such an
award is contrary to the evidence introduced at trial, and also,
contrary to the law. Mr. Pappas did nothing to evade service of
process and such costs are not appropriate. Neither did Plaintiff
introduce sufficient evidence, under the law, to entitle Plaintiff to an
award of collection fees, interest and costs.
III. The Court erred in entering judgment against Mr. Harry
Pappas, individually. Such judgment is contrary to the evidence of
record, including the alleged written guarantee.
IV. The Court erred in entering a verdict against Mr. Pappas;
such verdict was against the evidence and the weight of the
evidence, and the law.7
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Prior to trial, Defendant's counsel withdrew from representing Defendant
Harry Pappas, citing Defendant's failure to aid in his defense and other
irreconcilable differences. 8 After more than five months in which the Defendant
fee and attorney's fees. The collection fee under the agreement amounted to $931.06, and
attorney's fees proven by Plaintiff amounted to $3,782.50. Id.
6 Def.'s Notice of Appeal, filed Feb. 16,2005.
7 Def.'s Concise Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal, filed Mar. 4, 2005.
8 See Order of Court Granting Leave for Defendant's Counsel to Withdraw, filed Apr. 1,2004. In
the Motion For Leave of Court To Withdraw As Counsel For Defendants counsel stipulates,
2
had the opportunity to retain new counsel, the Defendant filed a Motion To
Continue Trial to finalize his arrangements to retain new legal counsel,9 which
was denied by the court.10 The Defendant again moved to continue the trial on
September 23, 2004 prior to the beginning of the scheduled trial, stating, "I do
want to get an attorney. I have an attorney, but he wouldn't represent me on the
time that was allotted to prepare for the case."ll The court denied the Defendant's
motion, noting that it would not be possible to reschedule the trial in the near
future,12 and proceeded with the scheduled trial.
The relevant facts, as fairly shown at trial, may be summarized as follows:
Christopher William Farrisi is President of Plaintiff Independent Auto Parts Inc.,13
a Pennsylvania corporation 14 with its principal place of business at 8 Mooredale
Road, Carlisle, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania. IS Defendant is Harry Pappas,
an adult individual who resides in New Port Ritchie, Florida, and who is the
President of Defendant Stagecoach Transport Services, Inc., a Florida corporation,
with its principal place of business located at 1500 York Road, Gettysburg, Adams
County, Pennsylvania.16 Defendant Stagecoach Transport Services, Inc., operates
"[p ]laintiff s counsel has been contacted regarding this matter and does not oppose Defendants'
counsel withdrawing from the case, provided that trial of the case is not delayed."
9 Def.'s Motion To Continue Trial, filed Aug. 24,2004, states "[m]ovant has made arrangements
to retain Jeffrey S. Evans, Esquire to represent him in this matter, however, said arrangement is
pending a continuance in that proposed counsel in unavailable on [August 26, 2004 for the Pre-
Trial Conference and on September 13,2004 for the trial]."
10 See Order of Court Denying Defendant's Motion To Continue Trial, filed Aug. 26, 2004.
11 Notes of Testimony, Trial, Sept. 23,2004, at 4 (hereinafter NT. ~.
12 See NT. 4-7. The court denied Defendant's request for continuance stating, "[0 ]ne thing
you're assuming is that my schedule accommodates a trial within 30 days. It does not. ... We're
scheduling at this point into almost the beginning of next year. So that's a significant delay for
Mr. Irwin." NT. 7.
13 NT. 8.
14 Comp1. ~ 1.
15 Comp1. ~ 1.
16 Comp1. ~ 3.
3
under the name of Stagecoach Sales and Leasing. 17 After meeting Defendant
Pappas (hereinafter Defendant), Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a commercial
credit agreement.18 In order to effectuate the agreement, Mr. Farrisi presented
Defendant a commercial credit application, which Defendant immediately
completed and executed. 19
The commercial credit agreement may be described and summarized, in
relevant part, as follows: On the second page under large, bold, capital letters
reading "terms and conditions" were six numbered paragraphs. The first
paragraph read: "Our terms are WEEKLY/Monday (Providing the account is
current). ,,20 Below that line appeared the following: "Example: All purchases
Monday thru Friday are due the following Monday[.]"21 Additionally, the credit
agreement provided for a 2% per month (24% APR) interest rate on past due
balances.22 Paragraph five of the terms and conditions further provided that
"[ c ]ollection fees of 25% will be applied to the account if the account is sent to a
third party collection [ agency]. ,,23
The final paragraph of the terms and conditions, labeled "Attorneys Fees;
Venue; Choice of Law," read as follows:
Should legal action or a lawsuit be instituted in collection by
Independent Auto Parts, Inc. of Buyer's debt, Buyer hereby agrees to
pay Independent Auto Parts, Inc. costs of legal action or a lawsuit,
including, but not limited to, reasonable attorney's fees or costs
together with costs and disbursements incurred to collect any sums
due including those incurred post judgment, in any bankruptcy
proceeding (including Relief from Stay) and any appeal whether in
State or Federal court. Buyer hereby agrees that venue of any such
17 See NT. 9; see also Comp1. ~ 2. This corporate defendant is not represented.
18 NT. 8; see also P1.'s Ex. 1, Trial, Sept. 23, 2004 (hereinafter P1.'sIDef.'s Ex.~.
19 NT. 8-9; P1.'s Ex. 1.
20 P1.'s Ex. 1.
21 P1.'s Ex. 1.
22 P1.'s Ex. 1.
23 P1.'s Ex. 1.
4
action will be in Cumberland County, Pennsylvania, and choice of
law of Pennsylvania State?4
At the bottom of the page appeared a paragraph that provided, inter alia, that
the agreement "is a binding contract between the parties, fully effective for all
transactions between the parties and hereby [buyer] agrees to pay according to
invoice terms.,,25 On the signature line at the end of the page, Defendant printed
and signed his name; however, he failed to fill in the date and title fields?6
On the final page of the agreement, appearing below the words "individual
unconditional guaranty," which appeared in all capital letters in a large, bold font,
was the following:
The undersigned for and in consideration of the extension of
credit to (herein referred to as "Applicant") by
Independent Auto Parts, Inc., hereby personally guarantees to
Independent Auto Parts, Inc. the full payment of the balance ... of
the above referenced account, together with any and all interest or
late charges, costs of collection, including, but not limited to,
reasonable attorney's fees and any appeal incurred in collection,
including any bankruptcy proceeding (Including Relief from Stay)
together with costs and disbursements and any additional costs,
including enforcement of this guarantee. The venue of any such
action will be in Cumberland County, Pennsylvania, and choice of
law of Pennsylvania State.
It is specifically contemplated that this guarantee shall be a
continuing unconditional guarantee and that the Signator hereto shall
be personally and individually bound for any and all credit extended
to the applicant.
The Signator hereto specifically warrants to Independent Auto
Parts, Inc. that he or she has been individually and personally
benefited by the extension of credit to the applicant by Independent
Auto Parts, Inc and signs this as a guarantor and not a surety?7
24 P1.'s Ex. 1.
25 P1.'s Ex. 1.
26 P1.'s Ex. 1.
27 P1.'s Ex. 1.
5
Defendant printed own his name and executed the guarantee with his own
signature, although he failed to fill in the date field.28
Mr. Farrisi further testified that, but for the executed commercial credit
agreement and individual guarantee, he would not have agreed to extent credit to
Defendant.29 Thereafter, when Defendant required auto parts, a call would be
made to Plaintiff s 800 number and an order placed for the parts required. 30
Plaintiff would then deliver the parts the next day, along with an invoice reflecting
the amount owed.31 In accordance with the commercial sales agreement-which
reflected a weekly term-any auto parts purchased from Plaintiff by Defendant on
or between Monday through Friday would be due the next Monday.32 During the
course of the business dealings between Plaintiff and Defendant, Defendant made
various orders of auto parts; however, Defendant failed to pay for approximately
$3,700.00 worth ofparts.33
In addition to providing Defendant with auto parts, Plaintiff and Defendant
also began a business relationship that revolved around "rebuildables," or vehicles
that have been involved in accidents and are rebuilt and resold.34 Plaintiff, having
decided to explore that area of the automobile industry, purchased three 2001
Dodge Neon automobiles from Defendant for approximately $10,414.00, which
28 P1.'s Ex. 1.
29 NT. 11.
30 NT. 12.
31 NT. 12. Defendant claimed that the agreement between the parties was that Plaintiff would
supply Defendant's parts needs at a 50-60% discount. NT. 21. However, Mr. Farrisi testified
that the agreement was subject to his ability to make the discount available to Defendant and still
secure a profit for himself. NT. 28-29. Mr. Farrisi was the only person authorized to make such
discounts available to Defendant, and, therefore, Mr. Farrisi himself spoke with Defendant or his
agents on the telephone, agreed upon a price, and provided instructions for shipping. NT. 32.
Additionally, Defendant admitted to not reading the invoices presented to him by Plaintiff for
auto parts supplied. NT. 33.
32 NT. 10; see also PI.' sEx. 1.
33 NT. 13.
34 NT. 14. Defendant's main business interest was in rebuildables. NT. 14.
6
Plaintiff had "wired" to Defendant. 35 Defendant, however, failed to transfer the
requisite documentation to allow Plaintiff to assume title to the vehicles.36
Specifically, Defendant failed to have a limited power of attorney notarized, and,
likewise, did not secure his notarized signature on the titles, thereby precluding
Plaintiff from effectuating the title transfer. 37
Despite this, Plaintiff did restore the vehicles for resale at an approximate
cost of $5,300.00?8 Thereafter, Plaintiff found a willing buyer for two of the three
vehicles, which, if Plaintiff had been able to transfer title to the vehicles to the
willing buyer, would have earned Plaintiff $1,200.00 in profit per vehicle.39 Due
to the lengthy delay in providing Plaintiff with the requisite documents to
effectuate a transfer of title to Plaintiff-which had not taken place as of the trial
date-the value of the vehicles depreciated so that at the time of the trial their
value was substantially less than at the time of the potential sales agreement with
the willing buyer. 40 As a result of Defendant's various breaches of contract,
resulting inter alia in accumulated court costs of $1,621.4041 and attorney's fees of
$3782.50,42 Plaintiff requested a total judgment of $28,439.49.43
Defendant based his defense on the various occasions when Plaintiff was not
able to make the 50-60% discount on particular auto parts44 and claimed that the
caveat Plaintiff included with the discounted price offer, i.e., that the 50-60%
discount would depend on Plaintiff s ability to make the discount and still earn a
35 NT. 14; see also P1.'s Ex. 2.
36 NT. 15-16.
37NT. 15-16; see also P1.'s Ex. 3-5.
38 NT. 18.
39 NT. 18.
40 NT. 18-19.
41 NT. 20; see also P1.'s Ex. 5.
42 NT. 20, 145-148; see also P1.'s Ex. 5.
43 NT. 20; P1.'s Ex. 6.
44 See NT. 22-77.
7
profit, was not made until Mr. Farrisi testified to it in court.45 Additionally,
Defendant claimed that various invoices for parts delivered to several repair
facilities not owned by Defendant were not ordered by Defendant nor chargeable
to him.46 However, Mr. Farrisi testified that, as a courtesy to Defendant-who on
several occasions requested that certain auto parts be delivered to area auto
mechanic shops at which vehicles owned by Defendant were undergoing
repairs-Plaintiff would oblige by sending the parts to the requested mechanic
shops while billing the parts to Defendant.47
On September 23, 2004, at the close of the non-jury trial, the court entered a
verdict against Defendant and his co-defendant and in favor of Plaintiff. 48
Thereafter, on October 4, 2004, Defendant filed a motion for post-trial relief.49
The motion contained four paragraphs, which read as follows:
I. The Court erred in not granting Mr. Pappas his request for
continuance. This request for continuance was made at the
commencement of the trial and was based upon the fact that Mr.
Pappas did not have an attorney to represent him. He requested a
continuance of approximately thirty (30) days in order to obtain
counsel. Mr. Pappas believes, and therefore avers, that the Plaintiff
would not have been prejudiced had the Court granted this brief
continuance. Defendant, Mr. Pappas, was subsequently harmed and
prejudiced because he had to proceed to trial without the benefit of an
attorney.
II. The Court erred in including within the verdict an award to
Plaintiff for interest, collection fees and advertising costs. Such an
award is contrary to the evidence introduced at trial, and also, contrary
to the law. Mr. Pappas did nothing to evade service of process and
such costs are not appropriate. Neither did Plaintiff introduce
sufficient evidence, under the law, to entitle Plaintiff to an award of
collection fees, interest and costs.
45 NT. 52; see NT. 21.
46 See NT. 21-55.
47 NT. 22-27, 32,43.
48 NT. 149; Order of Court, Sept. 23, 2004.
49 Def.'s Motion for Post-Trial Relief, filed Oct. 4,2004.
8
III. The Court erred in entering a judgment against Mr. Harry
Pappas, individually. Such judgment is contrary to the evidence of
record, including the alleged written guarantee.
IV. The Court erred in entering a verdict against Mr. Pappas;
such verdict was against the evidence and the weight of the
.d 50
eVI ence.
Plaintiff also filed a motion for post-trial relief, asking the court to amend
its judgment to reflect uncontested attorney's fees incurred by Plaintiff and
provided for in the commercial credit agreement. 51 The court scheduled the matter
for argument court on December 2, 2004, and expressly provided that argument
briefs were due to the court five days prior to the scheduled date. 52 However, due
to a communications breakdown, on December 7, 2004, the court rescheduled the
argument on the post-trial motions for January 13, 2005, and, again, expressly
provided that briefs were due at least five days before the argument. 53
The argument was held on January 13,2005. However, Defendant failed to
file a brief as ordered and failed to appear for the argument. 54 Argument was
heard from Plaintiff on the issue of attorney's fees. The court denied Defendant's
motion for post-trial relief and amended the judgment by deleting the collection
fees awarded Plaintiff and replacing them with the reasonable attorney's fees
50 Def.'s Motion for Post-Trial Relief, filed Oct. 4,2004.
51 P1.'s Petition for Post-Trial Relief in Accordance with Pa.RC.P. No. 227.1, filed Oct. 7,2004.
52 Order of Court, Oct. 6, 2004.
53 Order of Court, Dec. 7,2004. The order also provided that argument court rules would apply.
Id.
54 See Order of Court, Jan. 14,2005. Likewise, Defendant had failed to appear previously as
ordered by the court, namely, for a pretrial conference, as well as failed to file a memorandum
relating thereto. See Order of Court, June 22,2004; see also Pretrial Conference. Defendant's
counsel withdrew from representing Defendant on April 7, 2004, citing Defendant's failure to aid
in his defense and other non-specified irreconcilable differences. See Order of Court Granting
Leave for Defendant's Counsel to Withdraw, filed Apr. 1,2004. Accordingly, Defendant had
more than five months to retain new counsel.
9
incurred, as provided for in the commercial credit agreement. 55 Judgment has
been entered on the verdict56 and Defendant has appealed to the Superior Court. 57
DISCUSSION
Statement of the Law
Boilerplate language in concise statement of matters complained of on
appeal. "The purpose of the [Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure] 1925(b)
statement is to specify the particular issues which appellant intends to present on
appeal in order to permit the trial court an opportunity to provide the appellate
court with a focused and meaningful explanation for any challenged actions in its
[Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure] 1925(a) opinion." Commonwealth v.
Osteen, 381 Pa. Super. 120, 124, 552 A.2d 1124, 1126 (1989) (citing
Commonwealth v. Mueller, 341 Pa. Super. 273, 491 A.2d 258 (1985);
Commonwealth v. Mathis, 317 Pa. Super. 362, 464 A.2d 362 (1983)). Thus, if an
issue raised in a concise statement of matters complained of on appeal is too
vague, it is the functional equivalent of no statement at all, and, therefore, is
deemed waived. See Commonwealth v. Dowling, 2001 PA Super. 166, ,-r,-r 8-9,778
A.2d 683, 687 (2001) (expounding upon Commonwealth v. Lord, 553 Pa. 415, 719
A.2d 306 (1998)).58
Failure to brief issues contained in post-trial motion. The relevant
principle has been aptly expressed as follows: "In order to preserve an issue for
appellate review following a civil verdict, the issue must first be raised in a post-
trial motion." Kraus v. Taylor, 710 A.2d 1142, 1146 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998) (citing
Snyder Bros., Inc. v. Peoples Natural Gas, 450 Pa. Super. 371, 378-80, 676 A.2d
55 See id.
56 See Order of Court, Sept. 23, 2004
57 See Defendant's Notice of Appeal, filed Feb. 16,2005.
58 Additionally, because the rules of appellate procedure apply to both criminal and civil cases
alike, the principles provided in criminal cases apply with equal force to civil cases, and vice
versa. See Kanter v. Epstein, et al., 2004 PA Super. 470, ~13 n.6, 866 A.2d 394,400 n.6 (2004).
10
1226, 1230 (1996)). "Moreover, an issue raised in a post-trial motion is waived
unless it is briefed or argued in post-trial proceedings." Id. (citing Bell v. City of
Philadelphia, 341 Pa. Super. 534, 540-42, 491 A.2d 1386, 1389 (1985)); C.C.RP.
210-7 (issues raised but not briefed deemed abandoned).
Right to counsel. In Pennsylvania, the right to appointment of counsel is
not subject to the mechanical application of a civil versus a criminal distinction.
White v. Gordon, 314 Pa. Super. 185, 189, 460 A.2d 828, 830 (1983). The
determination of whether a party is entitled to counsel in accordance with the Due
Process Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution
must be made after the application of the three factor due process test of Matthews
v. Eldridge. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S. Ct. 893, 903, 47 L.
Ed. 2d 18, 33 (1976).59 Applying these factors, no Pennsylvania court has
required counsel for a party who, if unsuccessful at trial, risks losses of a
pecuniary nature only. 60
Motion for Continuance. Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 216
provides, in relevant part: "The following are grounds for a continuance: ...
Special grounds as may be allowed in the discretion of the court...." Pa. RC.P.
216(A). The rule continues by providing:
59 The three factors include:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the
risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and
the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and
finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal
and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
requirement would entail.
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,335,96 S. Ct.893, 903, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18, 33 (1976).
60 For example, the Superior Court has held that an indigent faced with a civil paternity action in
Pennsylvania is entitled to counsel due to the more than tenuous possibility of loss of liberty for
failure to make required support payments. See Corra v. Coli, 305 Pa. Super. 179, 193-94, 451
A.2d 480,488 (1982). However, the possibility ofloss of liberty which might result from a
party's potential failure to comply with a monetary judgment is, in the court's opinion, too
tenuous to require counsel in a case such as this.
11
No application for a continuance shall be granted if based on a cause
existing and known at the time of publication or prior call of the trial
list unless the same is presented to the court at a time fixed by the
court, which shall be at least one week before the first day of the trial
period.
Pa. RC.P. 216(C).
Thus, because Defendant's reason for a continuance did not fall within one
of the other five potential reasons for the granting of a continuance, it was within
the court's sound discretion to allow or deny the continuance. Id.; see also Swoyer
v. Dept. of Transportation, 142 Pa. Commw. 1, 6, 599 A.2d 710, 712 (1990)
(citing Chester Housing Authority v. Nicholas, 329 Pa. Super. 136, 477 A.2d 1391
(1984)).61
Awarding Cost of Suit and Attorney's Fees. In general the "prevailing
party is entitled to recover costs inherent in a law suit.. 00" Cohen v. Parker, 10
D.&C.3d 107 (Pa.Com.Pl. 1979). Pennsylvania law precludes "recovery for
counsel fees from the adverse party to a cause, in the absence of express statutory
allowance ..., or clear agreement by the parties, Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust
Company v. Philadelphia Transportation Company, 404 Pa. 541, 548, 173 A.2d
109, 113 (1961), or some other established exception.. 00"
Chatham
Communications, Inc. v. General Press Corp., 463 Pa. 292, 300-301, 344 A.2d
837, 842 (1975); see also Deskiewicz v. Zenith Radio Corp., 385 Pa. Super. 374,
376-377, 561 A.2d 33, 35 (1989).
Application of Law to Facts
In the present case, the issues raised on appeal by Defendant are the same
as those contained in his motion for post-trial relief. Several factors militated
against granting that motion.
First, with respect to all of the issues raised in the motion Defendant's failure
to file a brief and appear at argument warranted the denial of the motion. Second,
61 See also supra note 47.
12
the contentions that "[t]he Court erred in entering a judgment against Mr. Harry
Pappas, individually," because it was "contrary to the evidence, including the
alleged written guarantee," and that "[t]he Court erred in entering a verdict against
Mr. Pappas," because "such verdict was against the evidence and the weight of the
evidence," are encompassed by the rule that assignment of error which are merely
general will not be entertained on post-trial motions.
Third, on the merits the issues raised were not compelling. With respect to
the denial of Defendant's request for a continuance immediately prior to trial for
purposes of obtaining an attorney it may be noted that (a) Defendant's lack of
counsel at trial was attributable to his failure to maintain a working relationship
with his prior attorney of record and his failure to take advantage of as-month
period within which to obtain a new attorney, (b) by the time of trial the case had
already been pending more than a year, (c) the court's calendar would not have
accommodated a rescheduled trial in the near future, and (d) the court was under
no obligation to appoint counsel to represent him. Under these circumstances, it is
not believed that the denial of a continuance of trial represented an abuse of
discretion.
With respect to Defendant's position that costs of suit and collection fees
were erroneously awarded, the former are generally awardable to a winning
Plaintiff and both collection fees and attorney's fees were authorized by the
contract document. Although the court could arguably have authorized both
collection fees and attorney's fees, it was of the view that such an award could
have been regarded as duplicative and, ultimately, awarded only the latter, which
were supported by the evidence.
Finally, to the extent that the issue of Defendant's personal liability has not
been waived through the boiler-plate nature of the post-trial motion which he filed,
it is noted that the contractual document which he executed, as well as the other
evidence, supported the verdict against him, in the court's view.
13
For the foregoing reasons, it is believed that Defendant's post-trial motion
was correctly denied and that the judgment in favor of Plaintiff was properly
entered.
BY THE COURT,
1. Wesley Oler, Jr., 1.
Harold S. Irwin, III, Esq.
64 South Pitt Street
Carlisle, P A 17013
Attorney for Plaintiff
Harry Pappas
5798 West Shore Drive
New Port Richey, Fl34652
Defendant, pro se
Stage Coach Transport Services, Inc., a/kla
Stage Coach Sales and Leasing
1500 York Road
Gettysburg, Pa 17325
14