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HomeMy WebLinkAboutCP-21-CR-0000792-2009 COMMONWEALTH : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : vs. : CP-21-CR-0792-2009 : : TONY THERONE STONER : IN RE: DEFENDANT’S OMNIBUS PRETRIAL MOTION BEFORE HESS, J. OPINION AND ORDER On December 7, 2008 around 7:00 p.m., Pennsylvania State Police Trooper Steven Nesbit (“Nesbit”) heard a radio report of a red vehicle driving erratically on Gutshall Road. Nesbit indicated that he did not respond to this call. About half an hour later, Nesbit responded to a radio report of an accident at the intersection of Gutshall and Chestnut Grove Roads. Upon arriving at the scene, Nesbit found no vehicle. Residents adjacent to the accident site informed Nesbit that a red Chevrolet Lumina driven by a bearded man struck a utility pole and left the scene. Witnesses also gave Nesbit the license plate number of the vehicle. Nesbit ran the license plate number and learned that it was registered to Lisa Stoner, the wife of Tony Stoner (“Defendant”). Nesbit next proceeded to the address registered to the vehicle, 51 Gutshall Road. By this point, it was around 8:00 p.m., and Nesbit had to use his spotlight to locate the residence. He initially missed Defendant’s driveway and drove past it, but while doing so, Nesbit observed a red Lumina with front end damage sitting in the driveway of Defendant in front of his residence. Nesbit drove his vehicle onto the driveway, which was shared by several other homes. He exited his vehicle and walked toward the red Lumina, where he observed heavy front end damage and a CP-21-CR-0792-2009 protrusion on the windshield, consistent with the driver’s head smashing into it. Nesbit also observed a great deal of blood inside the car, as well as a blood trail outside it. He followed the blood trail to Defendant’s home and knocked on the door but received no response. Nesbit returned to his patrol vehicle and requested that the dispatcher attempt to make telephone contact with Defendant’s residence. He then walked back to the front door of the residence and knocked at the door more aggressively. At least once, Nesbit used his foot on the door. In the course of knocking at the door, it opened, revealing Defendant standing inside, covered in blood. Defendant indicated to Nesbit that he did not wish to receive medical treatment. Nesbit observed the odor of alcohol emanating from Defendant. Nesbit asked Defendant to come outside to discuss the accident, and in the course of doing so, Defendant lost his balance and fell to the ground. Once outside, Nesbit instructed Defendant to lean against his patrol vehicle, and again, Defendant lost his balance and fell to the ground. Defendant indicated to Nesbit that he had been drinking but that his wife had been driving the vehicle that night. Considering Defendant a hazard, Nesbit placed him in handcuffs inside his patrol car. Defendant was arrested and charged with DUI and other offenses related to the accident. Defendant challenges Nesbit’s warrantless entry onto his property as a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects against unreasonable searches and seizures. It reads: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 2 CP-21-CR-0792-2009 U.S. Const. amend. IV. In Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978), the United States Supreme Court synthesized its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence as follows: “[S]earches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” Mincey, 437 U.S. at 390 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)); Commonwealth v. Wright, 560 Pa. 34, 39, 742 A.2d 661, 664 (1999). Exigent circumstances is one of the exceptions alluded to in Mincey and Wright, where both probable cause and exigent circumstances justify warrantless searches and seizures. Commonwealth v. Roland, 535 Pa. 595, 637 A.2d 269 (1994) (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980)). In determining whether exigent circumstances existed, courts apply the Roland factors: (1) the gravity of the offense, (2) whether the suspect is reasonably believed to be armed, (3) whether there is above and beyond a clear showing of probable cause, (4) whether there is strong reason to believe that the suspect is within the premises being entered, (5) whether there is a likelihood that the suspect will escape if not swiftly apprehended, (6) whether the entry was peaceable, and (7) the time of the entry, i.e., whether it was made at night. Roland, 535 Pa. at 599, 637 A.2d at 271. In addition, “Other factors may also be taken into account, such as whether there is hot pursuit of a fleeing felon, a likelihood that evidence will be destroyed if police take the time to obtain a warrant, or a danger to police or other persons inside or outside the dwelling.” Id. The Commonwealth argues that exigent circumstances justified Nesbit’s warrantless entry onto Defendant’s property, pointing to the Superior Court’s ruling in Commonwealth v. Fickes, 2009 PA Super 64. In Fickes, the court upheld a search where a police officer, who was 3 CP-21-CR-0792-2009 investigating a path of damage caused by a vehicle, entered into an open garage without a warrant. At 2:53 a.m., police first responded to a hit and run accident, where a witness saw a silver “rounded sedan” or “coupe” reverse and proceed westbound on Wyndamere Road. Id. at ¶ 2. The investigating officer then proceeded one mile down Wyndamere Road, where a stop sign had been struck and was pushed over. Id. at ¶ 4. The officer continued searching for signs of the vehicle, and around 3:30 a.m., he came upon an apartment complex a short distance from the flattened stop sign. Id. at ¶ 5. Inside the complex, the officer saw a garage with its door open and the lights on, with a silver vehicle inside. Id. From outside, the officer observed wet tire tracks, a ticking sound coming from the vehicle’s engine, and a couch that was pinned against a wall by the vehicle. Id. at ¶ 6. The officer also observed damage to the vehicle. Id. Next, the officer entered the garage and knocked on the door leading to the apartment but received no response. Id. at ¶ 7. He then returned to the vehicle, and because he could not see inside due to tinting, he opened the door, immediately observing a strong odor of alcohol. Id. Inside, the officer found Fickes passed out in the driver’s seat, with an open bottle of vodka on the passenger’s seat. Id. Fickes was arrested and charged with DUI and other offenses related to the hit and run. Id. at ¶ 9. Defendant’s counsel, on the other hand, argues that no exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless entry onto Defendant’s property exist in the case sub judice. Counsel argues that the outcome here is governed by the Superior Court’s ruling in Commonwealth v. Lee, 972 A.2d 1 (Pa.Super. 2009). In Lee, the court agreed with the contention that Lee’s constitutional protections against unreasonable searches and seizures were violated when police followed a trail of antifreeze from the scene of an accident to his home without a search warrant. Police received 4 CP-21-CR-0792-2009 a call from a witness whose mailbox was destroyed and whose pine tree was uprooted. Lee, 972 A.2d at 2. The witness informed police that upon hearing the crash, she observed a pickup truck speeding away. Id. In the course of their investigation of the accident site, police discovered a trail of antifreeze on the roadway leaving the witness’s home. Id. Police followed it to the home of Lee, where they observed the rear end of a pickup truck parked behind the home. Id. They walked back to the vehicle, where they were met by Lee’s wife. Id. After informing the police that Lee had been driving the truck, Lee’s wife reentered the house to summon Lee. Id. Upon making contact with Lee, the police officers observed bloodshot eyes, difficulty standing, and an odor of alcohol. Id. The officers then placed Lee under arrest for DUI and three summary offenses. Id. In addition to discussing the Roland factors, the court also noted that the Commonwealth conceded that Lee’s truck was parked in the curtilage of his home, to which Fourth Amendment protections extend. Lee, 972 A.2d at 3, n.2. In applying the Roland factors, the court noted that when the police went to Lee’s home, they were investigating property damage, as opposed to the much more grave offense of DUI. Lee, 972 A.2d at 4. There was no reason to believe that the occupants of Lee’s home were armed, nor was there any fear of destruction of evidence. Id. As a result, the court determined that, on balance, there was a lack of exigent circumstances justifying warrantless search of Lee’s property, and the results of the police search should have been suppressed. Lee, 972 A.2d at 5. The case sub judice falls somewhere between Fickes and Lee. Applying the Roland factors to the case sub judice, we are satisfied that exigent circumstances justified Nesbit’s warrantless entry onto Defendant’s property. Nesbit arrived at Defendant’s home about ten 5 CP-21-CR-0792-2009 minutes after speaking to eyewitnesses to Defendant striking utility pole and fleeing from the scene. These witnesses provided both a physical description of Defendant, as well as the license plate number from his vehicle. The trooper had a strong reason to believe Defendant was inside his residence when he arrived, having the aid of a trail of blood leading directly from the accident-damaged vehicle to the front door of the residence. Additionally, witnesses to the accident described the vehicle being driven at the time of impact with the pole. When he arrived, Nesbit saw the same vehicle, visibly damaged, parked in front of Defendant’s residence. The circumstances of the accident were consistent with the operator being under the influence of alcohol. Nesbit’s entry onto Defendant’s property was peaceable and at a decent hour. As his testimony indicates, while he did “knock aggressively” and use his foot at least once, the opening of the door was wholly unexpected; it was not his intention to force entry into Defendant’s home. Additionally, this encounter took place shortly after 8:00 p.m., a reasonable hour for warrantless investigation, given the surrounding circumstances. Finally, the vehicle reported to be driving erratically and seen striking the utility pole was parked at Defendant’s residence in plain view from the public roadway, as opposed to behind a home in its constitutionally-protected cartilage, as was the case in Lee. It is well settled that “police cannot reasonably be expected to avert their eyes from evidence of criminal activity that could have been observed by any member of the public.” California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 41 (1988). Similarly, “What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.” Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). 6 CP-21-CR-0792-2009 Here, Nesbit followed a trail of blood, as opposed to a trail of antifreeze as in Lee. Certainly, finding a trail of blood leading from an obviously accident-damaged automobile to a residence implicates safety concerns that a trail of antifreeze does not. The protrusion of the windshield, consistent with the driver’s head striking it, gave Nesbit reason to believe that Defendant’s safety was in danger, separate and apart from his interest in him as a criminal suspect. ORDER th AND NOW, this 7 day of August, 2009, the omnibus pretrial motion in the nature of a motion to suppress evidence is DENIED. BY THE COURT, _______________________________ Kevin A. Hess, J. Derek Clepper, Esquire Assistant District Attorney Linda Hollinger, Esquire Assistant Public Defender :rlm 7 COMMONWEALTH : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : vs. : CP-21-CR-0792-2009 : : TONY THERONE STONER : IN RE: DEFENDANT’S OMNIBUS PRETRIAL MOTION BEFORE HESS, J. ORDER th AND NOW, this 7 day of August, 2009, the omnibus pretrial motion in the nature of a motion to suppress evidence is DENIED. BY THE COURT, _______________________________ Kevin A. Hess, J. Derek Clepper, Esquire Assistant District Attorney Linda Hollinger, Esquire Assistant Public Defender :rlm