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Home My WebLink About1998-2127 Civil LAUREEN M. ULRICH, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : V. : : KEITH P. ULRICH, : DEFENDANT/PETITIONER : 98-2127 CIVIL TERM IN RE: PETITION FOR CIVIL CONTEMPT OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT Bayley, J., September 22, 2009:-- Laureen M. Ulrich, now Baltaeff, and Keith P. Ulrich, were divorced on May 11, 2002. They have two children, Chad and Chelsea. They entered into a written Marital Settlement Agreement on April 11, 2002, at a time when both children were in the primary custody of wife. Husband agreed to pay wife $200 per week in child support for the two children to be wage attached through the Domestic Relations Office. The Agreement provided: “Child support shall continue for the Children until the Children reach eighteen (18) years of age, or graduate from High School, which ever occurs first.” The Agreement further provided: “Beginning with the tax year that ends December 31, 2002, the Parties hereby agree that for Income Tax 1 purposes, Husband shall claim Chelsea as a dependent.” In the beginning of September, 2004, by agreement of the parents, Chad began living with his father. Chad has remained in his primary physical custody and Chelsea has always __________ 1 On January 29, 2004, husband and wife entered into a written modification of the Marital Settlement Agreement in which she allowed him, in exchange for some money, to claim Chad as a dependent for the tax year 2003. They did the same thing for tax year 2004. They did the same thing for the 2005 tax year under a verbal modification. 98-2127 CIVIL TERM remained in the primary physical custody of her mother. In 2006, the first year in which the father had primary physical custody of Chad for the entire year, and for each tax year thereafter, he has claimed Chad as a dependent on his income tax returns. Starting in 2006, wife claimed Chelsea as a dependent on her income tax return, and has continued to do that for the tax years 2007 and 2008. Husband testified that he has claimed Chelsea as a dependent in each tax year since the parties entered into their Marital Settlement Agreement. However, for the tax year 2008, he was notified by the IRS that he could not claim Chelsea as a dependent because wife already filed her tax return and claimed her. He then filed this petition to hold wife in contempt, order her either to file an amended tax return and/or reimburse him in the amount of the additional tax he had to pay, $1,525, and pay his counsel fees. Wife maintains that considering their entire Marital Settlement Agreement, the intent of the parties at a time when she had primary physical custody of Chad and Chelsea and was legally entitled to claim both of them as dependents on her income tax return, was to allow husband to claim one of them. The fact that Chelsea was named instead of Chad was incidental. When the primary physical custody of Chad changed and husband became legally entitled to declare him as a dependent on his income tax return, as contrasted to her being legally entitled to declare both children as a dependent on her tax return, that negated allowing him to claim the remaining child in Hart v. Arnold, her primary physical custody as a dependent. In 884 A.2d 316 (Pa. -2- 98-2127 CIVIL TERM Super. 2005), the Superior Court of Pennsylvania stated: The fundamental rule in interpreting the meaning of a contract is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the contracting parties. The intent of the parties to a written agreement is to be regarded as being The whole instrument must be taken embodied in the writing itself. together in arriving at contractual intent. Courts do not assume that a contract’s language was chosen carelessly, nor do they assume that the parties were ignorant of the meaning of the language they employed. When a writing is clear and unequivocal, its meaning must be determined by its contents alone. Murphy v. Duquesne University Of The Holy Ghost, 565 Pa. 571, 591, 777 A.2d 418, 429 (2001) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). “In ascertaining the intent of the parties to a contract, it is their outward and objective manifestations of assent, as opposed to their undisclosed and subjective intentions, that matter.” Espenshade v. Espenshade, 729 A.2d 1239, 1243 (Pa.Super.1999). Further, “specific, express written language is not necessary for a particular contractual intent to exist in an agreement. Rather, it is common for the intent of contracting parties to be inherent in the totality of their contract.”“In Murphy, supra at 596, 777 A.2d at 432. the absence of an express provision, the law will imply an agreement by the parties to a contract to do and perform those things that according to reason and justice they should do in order to carry out the purpose for which the contract was made and to refrain from doing anything that would destroy or injure the other party’s right to receive the fruits of the contract.” Slater v. Pearle Vision Center, Inc., 376 Pa.Super. 580, 546 A.2d 676, 679 (1988) (describing what is known “The meaning of an as “doctrine of necessary implication”). unambiguous written instrument presents a question of law for resolution by the court.” Murphy, supra at 591, 777 A.2d at 430. (Emphasis added.) We agree with the position of wife as to the intent of the parties inherent in the totality of their marital settlement agreement. Her position on this issue is no different than the agreement on child support in which husband agreed to pay support until each child reached eighteen years of age, or graduated from high school, which ever occurs first. The Agreement as a whole shows that the intent of the parties was to require -3- 98-2127 CIVIL TERM husband’s support of two children only if wife had both of them in her primary custody. When the situation changed, notwithstanding how the support provision was written, 2 that negated his having to pay support for both children. For the foregoing reasons, the following order is entered. ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this day of September, 2009, the petition to hold Laureen IS DISMISSED.IS M. Baltaeff in contempt, The request of Keith P. Ulrich for further relief, DENIED. By the Court, Edgar B. Bayley, J. Douglas Miller, Esquire For Plaintiff/Respondent Wendy J.F. Grella, Esquire For Defendant/Petitioner :sal __________ 2 Van Dyke v. Van Dyke, Because the facts were different in 392 Pa. Super. 567 (1990), Van Dyke, husband’s reliance on that case is misplaced. In the parties entered into a Marital Settlement Agreement in which wife was allowed to claim their four children as tax exemptions except for one year in which husband could claim one of them. Husband filed for a reduction in his child support obligation based on the reduction of his net income caused by the loss of the tax exemptions. The Superior Court stated that “the agreement entered into remains unchanged, as does the set of circumstances which it produced." It held that there was no change of circumstances to warrant a reduction in support where husband agreed to a provision governing tax deductions in a settlement contract, and only later realized that its terms were unfavorable, or rendered his financial situation more difficult than originally anticipated. -4- 98-2127 CIVIL TERM -5- 98-2127 CIVIL TERM -6- LAUREEN M. ULRICH, : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA : V. : : KEITH P. ULRICH, : DEFENDANT/PETITIONER : 98-2127 CIVIL TERM IN RE: PETITION FOR CIVIL CONTEMPT ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this day of September, 2009, the petition to hold Laureen IS DISMISSED.IS M. Baltaeff in contempt, The request of Keith P. Ulrich for further relief, DENIED. By the Court, Edgar B. Bayley, J. Douglas Miller, Esquire For Plaintiff/Respondent Wendy J.F. Grella, Esquire For Defendant/Petitioner :sal