HomeMy WebLinkAboutCP-21-CR-0001195-2009
COMMONWEALTH : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
: CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
:
vs. : CP-21-CR-1195-2009
:
:
ALAHAD AMIR ARMIYA :
IN RE: OPINION PURSUANT TO RULE 1925
On December 29, 2009, the defendant was sentenced on counts of Terroristic Threats,
Simple Assault, Recklessly Endangering Another Person and Criminal Mischief to concurrent
terms of eight to eighteen months. On a count of Disorderly Conduct he was sentenced to a ten-
month concurrent probationary term. Since he was deserving of credit for time served from
April 23, 2009, he was paroled to a Dauphin County detainer. The defendant did not file post-
sentence motions but instead filed an appeal to the Superior Court. In his Statement of Matters
Complained of on Appeal, the defendant contends:
1. The evidence presented at trial was not sufficient to prove Terroristic Threats beyond
a reasonable doubt. The evidence presented established that Mr. Armiya made statements in the
heat of an oral argument and not with the intent to terrorize another.
2. The evidence presented at trial was not sufficient to prove Criminal Mischief beyond a
reasonable doubt. The evidence presented established that Mr. Armiya did damage to property
that was owned by him.
3. The evidence presented at trial was not sufficient to prove Simple Assault beyond a
reasonable doubt. The actions of Mr. Armiya were not an attempt by physical menace to put
anyone in fear of imminent serious bodily injury. The evidence established that his actions were
reckless at most.
CP-21-CR-1195-2009
The testimony at the jury trial in November of 2009 was very brief. In fact, there does
not appear to be much dispute about what happened in the case. On April 22, 2009, the evening
in question, the defendant and his wife, Janice, had an argument because the defendant had quit
his job. She asked him to leave their home. The defendant began packing his things to leave.
Mrs. Armiya’s sister arrived to pick up the defendant. The defendant and his wife then began to
struggle with a television which the defendant was attempting to remove from the residence.
The quarrel over the television boiled down to a question of who had paid for it. The defendant
got the upper hand in the struggle and, according to his wife, threw the television in the direction
of Mrs. Armiya’s niece who had arrived with her sister.
After the television was thrown, the defendant went into the kitchen and began to open
drawers where Mrs. Armiya kept her “biggest knives.” Mrs. Armiya had her cell phone and dialed
911. She then observed her husband standing in the hallway of the home with a hammer in his
hand. Mrs. Armiya then ran outside the apartment to call 911. She then testified:
A I ran back to the apartment, and I could still
hear a lot of crashing inside and windows breaking
and mirrors. And I walked in, and there he was
again, he had the hammer, and he was just tearing
up everything.
Q What did you see him do with the hammer?
You said he was tearing up everything. What did
you see?
A I saw him breaking glass. I had a table that was
close to the kitchen. He was crashing it with the
hammer. And he was just beating up everything,
and I ran again. I think I went in the house, the
apartment, like about two or three times. And each
time I went in, I had to run back out.
Q Why did you go back in?
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A I was asking him to please stop tearing up my
stuff.
N.T. 16. Mrs. Armiya described her husband’s demeanor as “crazy.” N.T. 27. She also testified
that, as the defendant was destroying property, she heard him say “I probably can’t beat all of you
up, but I am going to kill me somebody up in here tonight.” At hearing those words, Mrs. Armiya
felt threatened and “scared” and felt that she “was going to die that night.” N.T. 19. Before the
police arrived, Mr. Armiya continued his rampage. At one point he threw a stereo from the patio
of the apartment onto Mrs. Armiya’s car. He threw it with such force that “it stuck in the
windshield.” N.T. 19. In addition to other items in the home, the defendant destroyed the toilet
tank. Water apparently leaked from the toilet and destroyed property in the apartment below. Of
the many other items damaged in the home were the microwave, the headboard in the bedroom, a
dresser mirror and a medicine cabinet.
Chisa Galloway also testified. She verified Mrs. Armiya’s account of the defendant’s
rampage. She testified, also, that at the point where the defendant had a hammer in his hand he
approached Mrs. Armiya’s grandson, Dwayne, and said that he, the defendant, was going to kill
him, Dwayne.
The final witness for the Commonwealth was Patrolman Joseph Capers of the West
Shore Regional Police Department. He responded to the scene which had initially been
described as a “domestic involving a knife.” He, also, observed the defendant with a hammer in
his hand. The officer noted:
He was approximately ten to twelve feet away
from me at the time. I pulled out my firearm,
pointed it at him and ordered him to drop the
hammer. He hesitated, and then looked at me, and
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CP-21-CR-1195-2009
he said what are you going to do, shoot me. And
that is when he hung up the cell phone and an
assisting officer came up next to me and pointed
his Tazer at him and then he complied with my
request and laid down on the floor. And then he
was taken into custody.
N.T. 69. The police officer described the defendant as “very agitated” and said that he “seemed to
almost have like a thousand yard stare, like he wasn’t in the moment.” N.T. 70.
The defendant did not testify in the case. In our charge, we were very careful to explain
to the jury that the terroristic threat statute did not contemplate idle threats said in a moment of
anger. We described those kinds of threats as being made where there is no particular intent or
where the comment resulted from “spur of the moment anger.” We went on to tell the jury:
On the other hand, the mere fact that a defendant is
angry does not mean that the defendant cannot
make a terroristic threat. So it is for you to
determine whether it was his intent to terrorize one
or more of these people by making the comment
that he did, that it was not on the spur of the
moment anger, a comment made out of anger.
At the defendant’s sentencing, we continued to allow for the possibility that the threats he had
made were idle threats. The defendant, however, filed no post-sentence motions and we have not
been invited to revisit this issue. Regardless of how we would have ruled, we are satisfied that
our charge to the jury was correct to the effect that simply being angry does not render a person
incapable of forming the intent to terrorize. See Com. v. Walker, 836 A.2d 999 (Pa.Super. 2003).
The defendant’s contention that the only property that was damaged was property that was
owned by him is simply untenable. Mrs. Armiya testified as to numerous items of property
which belonged to her which were damaged by the defendant.
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CP-21-CR-1195-2009
Finally, the defendant contends that there was insufficient evidence at the trial to
establish his guilt on a count of Simple Assault. Specifically, he claims there was no attempt by
physical menace to put another in fear of imminent serious bodily injury. Again, we were not
asked in any post-trial motion to review the validity of this conviction. Nor did the defendant
seek dismissal of the charge at trial. In other words, prior to the appeal of this case, we have not
been asked to pass on the question of whether simply holding a hammer in one’s hand while
making threatening comments constitutes a simple assault. Since there was no demurrer in this
case and no post-sentence motions were filed, we do not understand how our opinion on the
matter would have any relevance at this juncture. In fact, this entire appeal poses the interesting
issue of whether any of the questions raised by the defendant have been preserved for appellate
1
review.
February 5, 2010 _______________________________
Kevin A. Hess, P.J.
Matthew Smith, Esquire
Sr. Assistant District Attorney
Arla Waller, Esquire
Assistant Public Defender
:rlm
1
We understand that there is no longer a requirement in criminal cases that post-trial motions be filed. Instead, an
appeal may be taken, without filing post-trial motions, at the option of the defendant. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 720. A
reading of the comment to Rule 720 suggests, however, that the practice of preserving issues for appeal has not been
raised before or
altered. The text of the Rule, itself, also states that issues deemed preserved for appeal are those
during trial.
Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(B)(1)(c). The issues, sub judice, raising the legal sufficiency of the evidence have
been asserted for the first time in this appeal.
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