Loading...
HomeMy WebLinkAboutCP-21-CR-1439-2005 COMMONWEAL TH IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA V. CHRISTOPHER J. KOBERLEIN CP-21-CR-1439-2005 IN RE: MOTION OF DEFENDANT TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT Bayley, J., November 30,2005:-- Defendant, Christopher J. Koberlein is charged with unlawful possession of a small amount of marijuana,1 and unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia2 He filed a motion to suppress evidence upon which a hearing was conducted on October 28, 2005. The evidence was as follows. On March 17, 2005, at approximately 3:30 am., Officer James Miller of the Upper Allen Township Police Department stopped a car with a faulty brake light driven by Christopher Koberlein. The officer told defendant the reason for the stop. He obtained defendant's license, registration and insurance cards. While defendant was getting those documents, the officer saw a clear empty plastic baggie, a soda can, and a Styrofoam cup on the front floor of the car. Defendant asked to see the brake light, and the officer told him to wait. The officer went back to his patrol car and wrote a warning for the equipment violation. He returned to defendant's car and noticed that the plastic baggie was no longer on the floor, or in sight. He handed defendant a 1 35 P.S. S 780-113(a)(31). CP-21-CR-1439-2005 warning, which defendant signed. The officer gave defendant his copy of the warning and all of his cards. He then asked defendant if he wanted to see the brake light. Defendant got out of the car and looked at the light. Officer Miller told defendant that he had seen a baggie on the floor of the car and it was no longer there. Defendant said he had put it under the seat. The officer asked, "Why, unless it had marijuana in it?" Defendant said, "Not anymore." The officer asked if there was anything illegal in the car. Defendant answered, "A pipe." He said that a friend of his smoked marijuana that had been in the baggie. The officer prepared a consent form to search the car. He told defendant that he did not have to consent, however, because defendant had said that there was an illegal pipe in the car, without his consent he would impound the car and seek a search warrant. Defendant did not consent to a search of his car. Officer Miller allowed him to get some of his things out of the car, and to walk to his nearby home.3 He then had the car towed. A search warrant was obtained, which resulted in a search of the car and the seizure of the items that defendant seeks to suppress from admission into evidence at trial. Defendant maintains that when Officer Miller issued him a written warning, returned all his cards, and showed him the faulty brake light, the purpose of the traffic stop ended. The officer's continued questioning constituted an impermissible investigative detention under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 235 P.S. S 780-113(a)(32). 3 Before defendant left, the officer patted him down and searched into his pockets. -2- CP-21-CR-1439-2005 Nothing was found. -3- CP-21-CR-1439-2005 States Constitution, and Article I, S 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, requiring suppression of all evidence obtained by the police from that point on. In Commonwealth v. Strickler, 757 A.2d 884 (Pa. 2000), the Supreme Court upheld an order of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania which reversed an order of a trial court that had granted a motion to suppress evidence. In Strickler, a uniformed police officer saw a car parked on the side of the road, alongside a lawn in front of a farmhouse and barn. The driver and passenger of the vehicle were urinating about fifteen feet from where the vehicle was parked. The officer testified that he stopped in order to ascertain what was happening, and whether anything was wrong. As he approached the individuals, he saw a cooler in the vehicle containing unopened beer cans. The officer obtained licenses from the individuals and went to his vehicle to verify their validity, and to determine if there were any outstanding warrants. Another police officer arrived. Once the officer determined that the licenses were valid and that there were no outstanding warrants, he informed the individuals that it was inappropriate to stop along the road and urinate. The officer then began walking back to his vehicle. After a few steps, he turned and asked Strickler, the driver and owner of the vehicle, if he had anything illegal in his vehicle. When Strickler stated there was not, the officer asked "if he wouldn't mind if I took a look through his car." Strickler hesitated. He stood there looked at me and looked at [the officer] who assisted me at the scene, and I explained to him, you know, he didn't have to say yes, you know, and then I asked him again. After saying that, I said do you -4- CP-21-CR-1439-2005 mind. Is it okay with you if we just take a quick search of the vehicle? At this point, Strickler consented to the search. The Supreme Court stated that: Where the underlying encounter is found to be lawful, voluntariness becomes the exclusive focus. Where, however, a consensual search has been preceded by an unlawful seizure, the exclusionary rule requires suppression of the evidence obtained absent a demonstration by the government both of a sufficient break in the causal chain between the illegality and the seizure of evidence, thus assuring that the search is not an exploitation of the prior illegality, and of voluntariness. The determination whether a seizure has been affected in the first instance is made upon an examination of the totality of the circumstances to determine whether a reasonable person would be free to leave. The court concluded: Further, although the officer did not expressly advise Strickler and his companion that they were free to leave, his actions suggested as much in that he returned Strickler's driver's documentation, thanked him for his cooperation, and turned away prior to reinitiating the interaction and ultimately requesting consent to search. . .. Nevertheless, the absence of an express endpoint to the detention in the form of an admonition by the officer that Strickler was free to leave is an area of concern that carries forward in our assessment of the remaining relevant circumstances. The officer, however, did nothing following the actual endpoint of the lawful detention that would independently suggest that his subsequent requests were to be viewed as directives. . . we also deem significant the arresting officer's admonition to Strickler that he was not required to consent to the search. . . . It is significant that the officer's conduct appears to have been quite restrained throughout the period of the detention; indeed, the level of coercion that was applied was less than that associated with an ordinary traffic stop. . . . In summary, the. . . officer conducted an investigative detention of a less intrusive nature than is permitted in connection with an ordinary traffic stop. Although the officer did not make the endpoint to the lawful -5- CP-21-CR-1439-2005 detention an express one, there was an endpoint nonetheless; moreover, the officer confined his subsequent conduct and conformed his request in a manner consistent with the consensual encounter and expressly advised Strickler of his right to refuse consent. Weighing the above factors. . ., we conclude that the request to search did not rise to a second or subsequent seizure under the Fourth Amendment, and, accordingly proceed to a voluntariness assessment. . . . Thus, the Commonwealth's unrebutted evidence was sufficient to satisfy its burden of demonstrating both that Strickler was not subject to a seizure for purposes of the Fourth Amendment at the time his consent was sought and given, and that his consent was voluntary. In Commonwealth v. Freeman, 757 A.2d 903 (Pa. 2000), the Supreme Court reversed the order of the Superior Court which affirmed an order of the trial court that had denied a motion to suppress evidence. In Freeman, a Pennsylvania State trooper saw two cars traveling fairly close together, switching lanes and jockeying for position. The trooper stopped the vehicle being driven by Diana Freeman, while another trooper stopped the other vehicle. The trooper asked Freeman if she was lost or having trouble with the other car. She said that she had entered the wrong lane of traffic, and had maneuvered to the left lane to continue west on Interstate 80. She denied traveling with the other car. The trooper obtained her driver's license and registration and went to his vehicle to verify the documents. He learned from the other trooper that the occupants of the other vehicle contradicted Freeman by stating that the two vehicles were traveling together and further explained that they were following Freeman's car because it was having some type of engine trouble. The trooper returned to Freeman's vehicle, issued her a written warning, and returned her license and registration. He told her that she was free to leave. The trooper then went back to his patrol car, and -6- CP-21-CR-1439-2005 Freeman's vehicle remained parked. While the trooper who had stopped the occupants of the other car continued to question them, the trooper who had stopped Freeman returned to her vehicle and again asked her whether she was traveling with the second car. Freeman said no. The trooper told her that the occupants of the other vehicle said otherwise, and he asked her to get out of the vehicle. Freeman walked to the rear of the car, where the trooper asked her for consent to search her vehicle. Freeman consented. . . . The policelcitizen encounter involving Freeman opened with a lawful traffic stop. . . . The behavior of the troopers was commensurate with their lawful purpose, as, more generally, was the length and character of the detention. Indeed, the arresting trooper articulated a clear endpoint to the lawful detention by advising Freeman that she was free to depart after returning her driver's documentation and issuing an appropriate traffic warning. Therefore, the fact of the prior detention does not, in and of itself, convert the subsequent encounter into a seizure. The transition to and character of the subsequent interaction, however, supports the conclusion that Freeman was subject to a second seizure. Since the trooper had accomplished the purpose of the stop, as he expressly indicated, Freeman would have been entirely within her rights to drive away at that point. Nevertheless, the trooper's subsequent actions were inconsistent with his statement to Freeman that she was free to leave, as he: returned to Freeman's vehicle; questioned her about the second vehicle; pointed out the inconsistent statements from the vehicle's occupants when she denied traveling with the vehicle; and, ultimately and most significantly, asked her to step out of the vehicle prior to the request for consent. Such directive constituted a greater show of authority than had previously been made. . .. Moreover, given everything that had come before, although these events occurred after express conferral of advice that Freeman was free to depart, they would have suggested to a reasonable person that such advice was no longer operative. Since we have concluded that Freeman was seized at the time her consent was obtained, we must determine whether such seizure was lawful. To constitute a valid investigative detention, the seizure must be justified by an articulable, reasonable suspicion that Freeman may have -7- CP-21-CR-1439-2005 been engaged in criminal activity independent of that supporting her initial detention. . . . There are no facts of record indicating that the trooper did possess, or could have possessed, a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity on Freeman's part. While the trooper undoubtedly suspected that Freeman wished to conceal the fact that she was traveling with the other vehicle, such suspicion had been present when he gave Freeman a warning and told her that she was free to go. Nothing had happened after the conclusion of the traffic stop to provide any further cause for suspicion; at most, Freeman's apparent reluctance to drive away may have strengthened the trooper's initial suspicion that the two vehicles were traveling together. Moreover, even if Freeman's answer to the trooper's question, contradicting as it did the information given by the occupants of the other car, could arguably be viewed as evasive behavior. . . such behavior was unaccompanied by any other indication of criminal activity. . . . Thus, the detention that preceded Freeman's consent to search was unlawful, and Freeman's consent, even if voluntarily given, will not justify the otherwise illegal search unless the Commonwealth can demonstrate that Freeman's consent was an "independent act of free will" and not "the product of an illegal detention. . .." Here, although we do not view the trooper's actions as flagrant, the record does not establish the necessary break in the sequence of events that would isolate Freeman's consent from the prior coercive interaction. To the contrary, the evidence supports the conclusion that the trooper's initiation of a second seizure and receipt of Freeman's consent were integrally connected. As Freeman's consent was invalid, the fruits of its conferral must be suppressed. In the case sub judice, there was no endpoint in the lawful detention of defendant by Officer Miller. The officer gave defendant a warning and his cards, and asked him if he wanted to see the faulty brake light. Immediately upon defendant looking at the light, Officer Miller told him that he had seen a baggie on the floor of the car that was no longer there. He then questioned him about the baggie. At that point, as in Freeman, and unlike Strickler, defendant was seized because no reasonable person in that situation would have felt free to get in his car and drive away. The -8- CP-21-CR-1439-2005 information that Officer Miller obtained from defendant was then used to support an affidavit of probable cause for the search warrant resulting in the seizure of the evidence that defendant seeks to suppress. If Officer Miller had reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot when defendant was seized, the limited detention for investigation would be justified. The officer saw on the front floor of defendant's car a soda can, a Styrofoam cup, and an empty plastic baggie. When he issued the warning for the equipment violation, the plastic baggie was no longer in sight. Even though Officer Miller knows that a plastic baggie is a common method to transport controlled substances, seeing an empty plastic baggie on the floor of a car next to a can of soda and a Styrofoam cup, and then not seeing it there when he returned to the car to issue a warning, did not give him reasonable and articulable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot sufficient to make a legal investigatory detention of defendant. He had only a hunch. See Commonwealth v. Zhahir, 751 A.2d 1153 (Pa. 2000). Plastic baggies can be used to transport food and other things as well as illegal drugs. They are like air fresheners that can be used to mask all sorts of smells as well as those from illegal drugs. See Commonwealth v. Dales, 820 A.2d 807 (Pa. Super. 2003). Because the evidence that Officer Miller obtained by defendant during the period of his illegal detention produced the probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant which was obtained after defendant would not consent to the search of his vehicle, the evidence seized as a result of the execution of the warrant must be -9- CP-21-CR-1439-2005 excluded as fruit of the unlawful detention. There was not a sufficient break in the causal chain between that detention and the seizure assuring that the search was not an exploitation of the prior illegality. See Commonwealth v. Strickler, supra. Therefore, the following order is entered. ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this _ day of November, 2005, IT IS ORDERED that all evidence seized by the police from defendant's vehicle, IS SUPPRESSED. By the Court, Edgar B. Bayley, J. Daniel Sodus, Esquire For the Commonwealth Andrew W. Norfleet, Esquire F or Defendant :sal -10- COMMONWEAL TH IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA V. CHRISTOPHER J. KOBERLEIN CP-21-CR-1439-2005 IN RE: MOTION OF DEFENDANT TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this _ day of November, 2005, IT IS ORDERED that all evidence seized by the police from defendant's vehicle, IS SUPPRESSED. By the Court, Edgar B. Bayley, J. Daniel Sodus, Esquire For the Commonwealth Andrew W. Norfleet, Esquire F or Defendant :sal