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HomeMy WebLinkAboutCP-21-CR-1529-2005 COMMONWEAL TH IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA V. MARCUS A. WILSON CP-21-CR-1529-2005 IN RE: MOTION OF DEFENDANT TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT Bayley, J., November 29,2005:-- Defendant, Marcus A. Wilson, is charged with driving under the influence of alcohol,1 possession of a small amount of marijuana,2 and failing to drive within a single lane of travel.3 Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence upon which a hearing was conducted on November 29, 2005. We find the following facts. On April 5, 2005, at approximately 11 :20 p.m., Officer Danny Fiber, of the North Middleton Township Police Department, was on patrol northbound on Spring Road, Route 34, in North Middleton Township. Spring Road is a two lane road. A vehicle approached the officer in the opposite direction and crossed the centerline approximately two feet into Officer Fiber's lane of travel. Officer Fiber had to drive off the road to avoid a collision. The officer turned around and caught up to the vehicle in North Middleton Township approximately one-half mile from the incident. He had decided to stop the vehicle, but before doing so, as a matter of normal procedure for 175 PaC.S. S 3802(a)(1) and (c). 235 P.S. S 780-113(a)(31). CP-21-CR-1529-2005 his safety, he radioed County Control to run the plate number. About thirty seconds later, the vehicle crossed into the Borough of Carlisle. County Control thereafter advised Officer Fiber that there was an outstanding warrant for the owner of the vehicle from the Borough of Carlisle for an unpaid traffic ticket. Officer Fiber stopped the vehicle in the Borough of Carlisle approximately three and a half miles from where it had crossed the centerline of Route 34 in North Middleton Township. The vehicle was driven by defendant, Marcus Wilson. In his motion to suppress all evidence obtained by the police after the stop, defendant maintains that the stop in the Borough of Carlisle by the North Middleton Township police officer was illegal. The Commonwealth maintains that the stop was legal pursuant to the Judicial Code at 42 PaC.S. Section 8953, that provides: (a) General rule.-Any duly employed municipal police officer who is within this Commonwealth, but beyond the territorial limits of his primary jurisdiction, shall have the power and authority to enforce the laws of this Commonwealth or otherwise perform the functions of that office as if enforcing those laws or performing those functions within the territorial limits of his primary jurisdiction in the following cases. . . (2) Where the officer is in hot pursuit of any person for any offense which was committed, or which he has probable cause to believe was committed, within his primary jurisdiction and for which offense the officer continues in fresh pursuit of the person after the commission of the offense. (Emphasis added.) When defendant, while driving on Spring Road in North Middleton Township, crossed the centerline by approximately two feet forcing Officer Fiber to drive off the road to avoid a collision, the officer had probable cause to believe that he had violated 375 PaC.S. S 3309. -2- CP-21-CR-1529-2005 the Vehicle Code at 75 Pa.C.S. Section 3309, which provides: Whenever any roadway has been divided into two or more clearly marked lanes for traffic the following rules in addition to all others not inconsistent therewith shall apply: (1) Driving within single lane.-A vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane and shall not be moved from the lane until the driver has first ascertained that the movement can be made with safety. (Emphasis added.) In Commonwealth v. Laird, 797 A.2d 995 (Pa. Super. 2002), two Newport Police Officers were patrolling in the Borough of Newport when they saw a vehicle one hundred feet away on Market Street with an inoperative taillight. The officers turned onto Market Street to follow the vehicle which was nearing the Market Street Bridge, the end of their municipal jurisdiction. The officers determined that the final two hundred feet of Market Street leading up to the bridge could not safely accommodate a traffic stop. The car proceeded over the bridge. The officers continued to follow it after they saw it cross a center yellow line, thinking there was a possible DUI. They followed it for the next mile as it drifted across the center yellow line two more times. They then stopped the vehicle. The driver filed a motion to suppress evidence on the basis that the stop was illegal. The motion was denied by the trial court, and affirmed by the Superior Court. The Superior Court stated: One of the principal purposes of the MPJA is to promote public safety while placing a general limitation on extraterritorial police patrols. Commonwealth v. Merchant, 528 Pa. 161, 167, 595 A.2d 1135, 1138 (1991). It is in the interest of promoting public safety, therefore, that the MPJA exceptions contemplate and condone "extra-territorial activity in response to specifically identified criminal behavior that occur[s] within -3- CP-21-CR-1529-2005 the primary jurisdiction of the police." Fetsick, 572 A.2d at 795 (quoting Commonwealth v. Merchant, 385 PaSuper. 264, 560 A.2d 795, 799 (1989)). The Court noted that, "Testimonial evidence supports the court's finding that the officer gave chase upon first seeing Appellant's taillight infraction, but tempered the chase to avoid a potentially hazard traffic stop just before the bridge." The Court concluded: This Court has held that the subjective question of whether an officer's actions constituted hot and fresh pursuit should not stand in the way of an otherwise valid arrest where extraterritorial pursuit is in response to a specific crime that occurred in the primary jurisdiction. [Commonwealth v. McPeak, 708 A.2d 1263, 1267 (Pa Super. 1998)]. There is no dispute that, while still in Newport, the officers obtained probable cause to stop Appellant for driving a vehicle with a broken taillight. See 75 PaC.S.A. S 6308(b); 75 PaC.S.A. 4303(b); Commonwealth v. Sebek, 716 A.2d 1266 (PaSuper. 1998) (holding that police officers have authority to stop a vehicle for failure to have a working taillight). When coupled with the officers' immediate hot pursuit within Newport, the acquisition of such probable cause enabled the officers to execute an extraterritorial stop under the MPJA. Therefore, Appellant would have been properly stopped in the neighboring jurisdiction regardless of whether the officers complied with the MPJA's hot pursuit requirement once they left Newport, and he would have been arrested for appearing drunk and for failing field sobriety tests. Accordingly, we find that suppression of all evidence would have been an inappropriate result in the present case. (Footnote omitted.) In the case sub judice, Officer Fiber had probable cause to believe that defendant violated Section 3309 of the Vehicle Code in his jurisdiction, North Middleton Township. From that point, he was in continuous fresh pursuit of defendant until he stopped him in the Borough of Carlisle for that Section 3309 violation. Although the officer chose for his safety not to stop defendant until he received information from -4- CP-21-CR-1529-2005 County Control on the status of the vehicle owner, that does not make the stop illegal. The stop was based on the Section 3309 violation that defendant committed and the officer observed in North Middleton Township. The facts are not distinguishable from those in Laird. For the foregoing reasons, the following order is entered. ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this _ day of November, 2005, the motion of defendant to suppress evidence, IS DENIED. By the Court, Edgar B. Bayley, J. Matthew Smith, Esquire For the Commonwealth Paul B. Orr, Esquire F or Defendant :sal -5- COMMONWEAL TH IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA V. MARCUS A. WILSON CP-21-CR-1529-2005 IN RE: MOTION OF DEFENDANT TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this _ day of November, 2005, the motion of defendant to suppress evidence, IS DENIED. By the Court, Edgar B. Bayley, J. Matthew Smith, Esquire For the Commonwealth Paul B. Orr, Esquire F or Defendant :sal