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HomeMy WebLinkAbout93-910 civil (2)3. A45002/99 3EFFREY E. 3OHNSTON, ROBIN L. MCCANNA, .: Appellant : : : : : Appellee , IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PEN NSYLVANIA No. 690 MDA 1999 Appeal from the Order entered March 18, 1999, docketed March 18, 1999, in the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County, Civil, at No. 910 CIVIL 1993. BEFORE: HUDOCK, EAKIN and MONTEMURO,' 33. JUDGMEHT oH CONa~trtOH wflm~om, ~t ~s now here ordered and adjudged by ti~ Court that the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of CU~.RLAN~ County be, and the ,ame is h~r~;y AFFIRMED. BY THE COURT.. ',JAN 2 8 2000 3. A45002/99 JEFFREY E. 3OHNSTON, .: Appellant : V. : ROBIN L. McCANNA, : Appellee IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PEN NSYLVANIA No. 690 MDA 1999 Appeal from the Order entered March 18, 1999, docketed March 18, 1999, in the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County, Civil, at No. 910 CIVIL 1993. BEFORE' HUDOCK, EAKIN and MONTEMURO,* 33. MEMORANDUM' !S I= I L. E O JAN Jeffrey E. JOhnston (Father) appeals from the order that denied his petition to modify his child support obligations for his two children. We affirm. Father and Robin McCanna (Mother) were married on December 27, They have two minor children. Mother and Father separated on 1980. February 23, 1991, and entered into a comprehensive property settlement agreement (the agreement) that included a stipulation regarding Father's payments of child support on April 29, 1994. Mother and Father were subsequently divorced on June 14, 1994, and the agreement was incorporated into, but not merged with, 'the divorce decree. In accord with the agreement, Mother remained in the marital home with the children until her remarriage on August 13, 1997. During the time * Retired Justice assigned to the Superior Court. J. A45002/99 that she remained in the marital home, and continuing to the present time, Mother's income has been $8,100.00 I~er year. Father's gross yearly income is currently $63,453.00. Also according to the agreement, Mother was responsible for all bills associated with the residence, including taxes, insurance, and the mortgage. Mother was able to afford these payments in large part because Father agreed to pay $655.00 biweekly in support, a larger amount than Father would, have been required to pay under the appropriate statutory support guidelines. The agreement provided for the sale of the marital home upon Mother's remarriage, with the proceeds of the sale to be split equally between Mother and Father. Mother and the children moved into a new residence with Mother's new husband, who assumed responsibility for all financial obligations regarding the new family home. The marital home was sold, and the proceeds were evenly divided according to the agreement. Soon afterwards, however, Father attempted to negotiate a reduction in his child support payments. Father maintained that Mother no longer needed the inflated support to pay for a home for the children as Mother's new husband had undertaken that financial obligation. When Mother would not agree to a reduction, Father unilaterally reduced his payments to what he believed was in accordance with the statutory support guidelines. response, Mother filed a petition for contempt, seeking the trial court to order Father to comply with the support terms contained in the agreement. -2- ]. A45002/99 Father then filed a petition requesting modification of his support obligations. After a hearing, the court dismissed-Father's petition to modify and found Father in contempt for-failing to make payments in accord with the agreement. This appeal followed. Father raises the following issues on appeal: A. WHAT STANDARD OF REVIEW MUST BE UTILIZED WHEN AN APPELLATE COURT EXAMINES A TRIAL COURT'S DECISION TO DENY A PETITION TO MODIFY A CHILD SUPPORT ORDER? B. ARE COURTS NOW AUTHORIZED, BY BOTH STATUTE AND CASE LAW, TO MODIFY PRIVATE AGREEMENTS FOR SUPPORT OF CHILDREN REACHED BY THEIR PARENTS? C. IS A SIGNIFICANT INCREASE IN A CUSTODIAL PARENT'S DISPOSABLE INCOME A SUFFICIENT CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES TO .1USTIFY THE MODIFICATION OF A CHILD SUPPORT AGREEMENT? Father's Brief at 3. An order of child support will only be overturned where it is found that the trial court abused its discretion either by a misapplication of the law or an unreasonable exercise in judgment. ~/¢/~/i¢/~ael v. I~¢l~li¢l~ael, 700 A.2d 1337, 1338 (Pa. Super. 1997). · Father questions whether Pennsylvania courts have the authority and/or the obligation to modify a private support agreement that is incorporated but not merged into a divorce decree. This is an issue that has recently been resolved without question, "for all marital agreements w ]. A45002/99 following the enactment of 23 Pa.C.S..§ 3105(b)[~] the trial court has the power to modify the terms of the agreement with regard to child support upward or downward based on 'changed circumstances.'" Patterson v. Robbin$, 703 A.2d 1049, 1051 (Pa. Super. 1997). Accordingly, in this case filed after section 3105(b) was enacted, the trial court had the power to enter a support award which was less than that called for in the agreement if Father established such changed circumstances. See also Nichol$on v. Combs, 550 Pa. 23, 703 A.2d 407 (1997) (acknowledging that marital agreements executed after section 3105(b) was enacted are subject to 3105. Effect of agreement between parties (a) Enforcement.--A party to an agreement regarding matters within the jurisdiction of the court under this part, whether or not the agreement has been merged or incorporated into the decree, may utilize a remedy or sanction set forth in this part to enforce the agreement to the same extent as though the agreement had been an order of the court except as provided to the contrary in the agreement. (b) Certain provisions subject to modification.--A provision of an agreement regarding child support, visitation or custody shall be subject to modification by the court upon a showing of changed circumstances. (c) Certain provisions not subject to modification.--Tn the absence of a specific provision to the contrary appearing in the agreement, a provision regarding the disposition of existing property rights and interests between the parties, alimony, alimony pendente lite, counsel fees or expenses shall not be subject to modification by the court. -4- 3. A45002/99 downward modification by a trial court upon a showing of changed circumstances). Thus, in the present case, our task is to determine whether the trial court properly concluded that Father had not established sufficiently changed circumstances to permit modification of the support agreementi When faced with a petition to modify an existing support order, this Court has stated: A Court may only modify an existing support award when the party requesting the modification shows a material and substantial change in circumstances since the Order was entered. :In order to modify a support order, the moving party has the burden of proving by competent evidence that a material and substantial change of circumstances has occurred since the entry of the original or modified order. The change in circumstances must be permanent, meaning it is irreversible and indefinite in duration. We have refused to disturb a support award unless the trial court in determining the amount of support, has abUsed its discretion in determining the amount of the award and where the moving party's burden of proof has not been met. Crawford v. Crawford, 633 A.2d 155, 164 (Pa. Super. 1993) (citations and quotation marks omitted). Father argues that he. has shown a change in circumstances. Specifically, Father raised' the following four changed circumstances in his petition for modification: (1) Mother has remarried; (2) Mother's income has increased; (3) Mother has moved from what was the marital home; and (4) the purposes underlying the payment of excessive support by Father no longer exist and the payment of additional support is no longer required to maintain the family home as a residence for the children. See Plaintiff's -5- 3. A45002/99 Answer to Petition for Contempt and Plaintiff's Petition for Modification, 2/18/99, at ¶ 13. In essence, Father maintains that because Mother no longer has monetary obligations regarding the former marital home, she now has more discretionary income that can be spent directly on the children and her need for child support is lessened. Father correctly states that each parent has a duty to support his or her minor children. Frankenfield v. Feeser, 672 A.2d 1347, 1349 (Pa. Super. 1996); Opie v. Richart, 598 A.2d 1321, 1322 (Pa. Super. 1991). The trial court, however, showed awareness of this obligation. The court explained its reasons for denying Father's petition to modify thusly: There have been no changed circumstances that warrant modifying the child support order. The mother still has to maintain a home for her children and provide for their needs. That is not her new husband's obligation. The father's income has not decreased and the mother's income has not increased. Both parties have remarried, and their marital status has no bearing on their respective 'duty to support their children. The fact that the mother moved into a home that is about two miles from the former marital residence also has no bearing on the father's obligation to support the children. Trial Court Opinion, 3/18/99, at 5. Moreover, the court noted that the agreement explains why Father's support obligation .was set at a.figure over that which would have been owed under the support guidelines. Contrary to Father's assertion in his petition to modify, the reason for extra support was not that Mother was maintaining the family home as the residence for the children; rather, Mother agreed to accept less property under the agreement -6- ]. A45002/99 than she would have been entitled to had a court equitably divided the marital property in exchange for the inflated monthly support payments. ~'d. (citing the agreement (Settlement Agreement, 4/29/94, at 4)). After review, we find that the trial court did not misapply the law or commit an unreasonable exercise in judgment in finding that Father had not demonstrated a change in circumstances such that modification of the support agreement was appropriate. Simply put, the most important considerations are that the parties' incomes have not changed, nor have their monetary obligations for the minor children's needs changed.2 Father's argument regarding Mother's increased "discretionary" income due to the sale of the marital residence, without more, does not require a change in his obligation. Cf. Beegle v. Beegle, 652 A.2d 376 (Pa. Super. :L994) (stating that modification of a child support order might, under certain circumstances, be warranted by a decrease in the obligor's income); i=arabaugh v. Killen, 648 A.2d 60 (Pa. Super. 1994) (stating that one example of change in circumstances that would support modification of a support order is proof of an increase in expenditures for the litigant's children). Order affirmed. 2 Although not determinative, we note that the agreement provides that Mother could earn up to $15,000.00 per year [more than her current earnings] before her income would be considered as a basis for reducing Father's support obligation. Agreement, supra, at 5. -7-