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Home My WebLink About96-4053 civil appeal3.A29004/00 STERLING MOLL, Appellant V. MAYNARD TODD AMBROSE, Appellee IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PEN NSYLVANIA No. 245 MDA 2000 Appeal from the Order Entered December 3, 1999 In the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County Civil, No. 96-4053 BEFORE: CAVANAUGH, DEL SOLE and TAMILIA, 33. MEMORANDUM: I= I i. E D SEP 1 2 2000 Sterling Moll appeals pro se from the order of the trial court granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant/appellee Maynard Ambrose. Upon review, we affirm. The facts of this case, as gleaned from the record, are as follows: On .luly 21, 1994, at approximately 3:30 p.m., appellant was involved in a motor vehicle accident with Vicki ]o Erdman at the intersection of Lowther and Third Streets in Lemoyne Borough, Cumberland County. Appellee, Police Officer Ambrose, was dispatched to the scene to investigate. After speaking with the drivers who were involved in the accident and with two unrelated eyewitnesses and after examining the vehicles (which had been moved prior to his arrival), Officer Ambrose prepared an accident report including a diagram based on his investigation. Although appellant and Erdman offered conflicting versions of how the accident happened, Erdman's claim that appellant had attempted to make a J.A29004/00 left turn in front of Erdman, who was travelling straight through the intersection, was supported by eyewitnesses Rausch and Weber and the location of accident-related debris on Erdman's side of the highWay. Based on the evidence collected, Officer Ambrose issued a citation charging appellant with a violation 75 Pa.C.S.A. §3334(a) (turning movements and required signals). On September 7, 1994, after a hearing, a district justice found appellant guilty of the traffic violation and ordered him to pay a fine of $25 and court costs in the amount of $72.50. Appellant sought a de novo trial in the Cumberland County Court of Common Pleas. On December 20, 1994, after a bench trial, the trial court took the matter under advisement and ultimately found appellant not guilty of the traffic violation,z On July 15, 1996, appellant, pro se, filed a civil suit against Officer Ambrose seeking compensatory damages in excess of $20,000 and punitive damages, claiming that appellant had been the victim of a malicious prosecution and that all of the Commonwealth witnesses in this traffic matter had perjured themselves. On December 3, 1999, the trial court granted appellee's motion for summary judgment. Appellant seeks review of this order, raising the following issue for our review: ~ The date on which the trial court rendered its decision is not apparent from the record before this court. -2- J.A29004/O0 WHETHER THE APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO AN ARREST OF JUDGMENT INASMUCH AS THE APPELLEE'S EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT AS A MATTER OF LAW TO SUPPORT A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT?2 Despite appellant's confusing statement of the issue, we will consider this as a challenge to the grant of summary judgment. Our standard of review when considering a challenge to the granting of a summary judgment motion is as follows: In examining this matter, as with all summary judgment cases, we must view the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be resolved against the moving party. In order to withstand a motion for summary judgment, a non-moving party 'must adduce sufficient eviderrce on an issue essential to his case and on which he bears the burden of proof such that a jury could return a verdict in his favor. Failure to adduce this evidence establishes that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.' Finally, we stress that summary judgment will be granted only in those cases which are free and clear from doubt. Our scope of review in this matter is plenary. (citations omitted). V~ashingtor~ v. Baxter, 719 A.2d 733, 737 (Pa. 1998). Appellant filed suit claiming he was the victim of malicious prosecution at the hands of the appellee. 2 Appellant, as the plaintiff in this civil action, bears the burden of proving the absence of probable case, the presence of malice and that the proceedings were terminated in his favor. As such, the issue in this appeal is not the sufficiency of appellee's evidence (he may, but is not required to, present evidence in this matter), but whether at the conclusion of discovery there is sufficient evidence for a jury to find he has proven each required element of his claim. See discussion infra. -3- .1.A29004/00 In order to make out a successful claim of malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must show that 'the defendants instituted proceedings without probable cause, with malice, and that the proceedings were terminated in favor of the plaintiff.' (citations omitted). Cosmas v. Bloomingdales Bros., Inc., 660 A.2d 83, 85 (Pa. Super. 1995). In a malicious prosecution action, the plaintiff has the burden of proving lack of probable cause. Probable cause is defined a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficient to warrant an ordinary prudent man in the same situation in believing that the party is guilty of the offense. (citations and quotations omitted). Cosmas, 660 A.2d at 482. As an initial consideration, appellant here was initially convicted of the underlying offense after a hearing before a district justice. In Cosmas, we noted that: In certain instances, a defendant can introduce conclusive evidence of the existence of probable cause, thereby defeating plaintiff's claim of malicious prosecution. In many states, one such instance of conclusiveness is a plaintiff's conviction in the underlying criminal action. Even if the conviction is later overturned, it is conclusive proof of the existence of probable cause, unless the convicted party can show fraud or other undue influences at work in the conviction proceedings. (citations and footnote omitted). Cosmas, 660 A.2d at 86. In Cosmas, we recognized that although Pennsylvania precedent does not establish an absolute rule that conviction of the underlying offense is conclusive proof of probable cause to defeat a malicious prosecution action, -4- .3.A29004/00 as a general rule, the convicted party must show that fraud or undue influences were at work in the conviction proceedings to rebut the presumption that the defendant had probable cause to initiate the underlying criminal case. Here, appellant alleges all manner of misconduct by the appellee, but fails to present evidence in support of his claims. We also consider the circumstances under which the trial court took the traffic violation matter under advisement and did not render an immediate decision in appellant's favor as it relates to the issue of probable cause. Even if we were to assume arguendo that appellee did not have probable cause to issue the traffic citation, the record rebuts any showing of malice. In the underlying criminal proceeding, the trial court stated "...I have some conclusions about this case, one of which is that no one here has told an intentional falsehood. Of that ! am absolutely positive. It is clear that everyone saw the same thing, but perceived it differently." The court later elaborated: The question is not who acted most prudently in this particular intersection and accident but whether or not the defendant is guilty of a crime and whether that has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. In other words, the question for me is not what probably happened, but what the prosecutor has proved happened to justify the conviction of this man for a criminal offense. So as we take the matter under advisement, ! want everybody to know that that's the issue here. Not who do we believe, because we believe everybody who testified. (emphasis added). -5- .1.A29004/00 The record is clear that the trial court heard the appellee testify and concluded that he testified truthfully. In addition, the court found the eyewitnesses to be credible, which supports the conclusion that the appellee's reliance upon these witnesses in preparing his report and issuing a traffic citation to appellant was reasonable. We conclude that the trial court properly granted the motion for summary judgment because appellant cannot offer evidence that the citation was issued without probable cause or that the officer acted with malice, two of the three necessary elements for which he bears the burden of proof on his claim of malicious prosecution. Motion to quash denied. Order affirmed. -6-