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HomeMy WebLinkAbout97-2233 equityPENN REHABILITATION ASSOCIATES, P.C., PLAINTIFF STUART A. HARTMAN, D.O. and CHRISTOPHER S. CANNON, M.D., : DEFENDANTS : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 97-2233 EQUITY IN RE: PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS OF DEFENDANTS TO PLAINTIFF'S PETITION TO HOLD DEFENDANTS IN CONTEMPT OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT BAYLEY, J., May 4, 1999:-- Plaintiff, Penn Rehabilitation Associates, P.C. employed defendants, Stuart A. Hartman, D.O. and Christopher S. Cannon, M.D. pursuant to an employment agreement that contained a restrictive covenant. Hartman and Cannon resigned their employment and opened their own medical practice. Plaintiff filed this action in equity to enforce its rights under the covenant in the employment agreement. The parties entered into a comprehensive settlement that resulted in the entry of an order of adjudication on May 7, 1997. The order contains restrictions on defendants as to where and under what circumstances they could conduct their medical practice. The restrictions were limited for a period of eighteen months from May 7, 1997. The eighteen month period ended on November 7, 1998. On December 9, 1998, plaintiff filed a Petition For Citation For Contempt. The petition avers inter alia: 5. The Defendants have violated the terms and provisions of the Order described above in the following ways: A. Hartman has practiced medicine at the Polyclinic Medical Center in Harrisburg more than one and a half days per week and otherwise in violation of the provisions of Paragraph 2(a) of the said Order. 97-2233 EQUITY B. Hartman has performed tests and consultations on patients at an office in Harrisburg in violation of Paragraph 2(b). C. Hartman and Cannon have both been present and practiced medicine at the same time and on the same days in Harrisburg, in violation of Paragraph 2(c). D. Both Hartman and Cannon have opened, operated, and maintained offices in Harrisburg at the same time, and seen and treated patients and rendered services to patients at the same time, in violation of Paragraph 2(e). All of these acts by the Defendants are violations of this Court's Order of 7 May 1997 and have caused serious, irreparable, and permanent injury to Plaintiff. 6. In addition to the above, Plaintiff believes that Hartman has opened an office located within five miles of the Plaintiff's office in Hershey, which such action violates the provisions of Paragraph 4 of this Court's Order of the said order. Plaintiff seeks an order of "civil contempt" to: [s]et such terms, and impose such sanctions as are necessary to assure Defendants' compliance .with that Order hereafter, which said terms and sanctions should include the extension of the term of this Court's Order of 7 May 1997 for an additional eighteen months, the imposition of a financial sanction upon the Defendants in an amount of $50,000.00 or more, the award of reasonable counsel fees and expenses incurred by the Plaintiff in enforcing this Court's Order, and such other actions as the Court deems appropriate or proper. (Emphasis added.) A rule to show cause was entered and a hearing scheduled. Both defendants then filed preliminary objections to plaintiff's petition. Defendants maintain that the petition must be dismissed because (1) it is in actuality a petition for indirect criminal contempt and not civil contempt, (2) the order on which the alleged contempt is predicated expired prior to the filing of the petition for contempt, and (3) the petition lacks specificity whereby, if the allegations were proven, it would not support a finding of contempt. -2- 97-2233 EQUITY If plaintiff's petition is in actuality a petition for indirect criminal contempt "[t]hose charging such contempt are put to the usual proofs required to convict for any charge, including the right to a trial by jury." Crozer-Chester Medical Center v. Moran, 522 Pa. 124 (1989). As set forth in Crozer-Chester: A finding of criminal contempt is a finding of a specific offense for which a sanction is imposed that does not seek compliance but is a specific punishment for an act done. In criminal contempt one has committed an act that in itself calls for specific sanction and when imposed cannot be obviated because it is a completed offense. Civil contempt is also an available remedy for obstruction in the presence of the court and may be sued to compel obedience by imposing fine or imprisonment conditioned on obedience to the court's order. The difference is best explained in Court house parlance; in civil contempt one has 'the key to the jail house.' That is, he may be released of sanction whenever he signals that he will obey the order. We have said this before: There is nothing inherent in a contemptuous act or refusal to act which classifies that act as 'criminal' or 'civil'. The distinction between civil and criminal contempt is rather a distinction between two permissible judicial responses to contumacious behavior. For example, it is clear that a contemptuous refusal to.testify before a grand jury may be dealt with either a [sic] criminal contempt, civil contempt, or both These judicial responses are classified according to the dominant purpose of the court. If the dominant purpose is to prospectively coerce the contemnor to comply with an order of the court, the adjudication of contempt is civil. If, however, the dominant purpose is to punish the contemnor for disobedience of the court's order or some other contemptuous act, the adjudication of contempt is criminal. Dominant purpose of coercion or punishment is expressed in the sanction imposed. A civil adjudication of contempt coerces with a conditional or indeterminate sentence of which the contemnor may relieve himself by obeying the court's order, while a criminal adjudication of contempt punishes with a certain term of imprisonment or a fine which the contemnor is powerless to escape by compliance. -3- 97-2233 EQUITY The civil-criminal classification of contempt exists solely for determination of a contemnor's procedural rights and a court's sentencing options. Quite simply, a contemnor who will be sentenced to a determinate term of imprisonment or a fixed fine, which he is powerless to escape by purging himself of his contempt, is entitled to essential procedural safeguards that attend criminal proceedings generally. Second, a court is not permitted to impose a coercive sentence conditioned on the contemnor's performance of some act that is incapable of performance. In re Matorano 464 Pa. 66, 77-80, 346 A.2d 22, 27-29 (1975) (emphasis added) (footnotes, citations omitted). (Emphasis added.) Plaintiff has specifically pled that it seeks an order of "civil contempt" against defendants. Notwithstanding the remedies sought in the petition, if the court concludes that defendants are in civil contempt it could only impose remedies to coerce the contemnor to comply with the or(:Jer of May 7, 1997. Schnabel Associates, Inc. v. The Building and Construction Trades Council of Philadelphia and Vicinity, AFL-CIO, 338 Pa. Super. 376 (1985). Fines may be imposed to encourage compliance; however, the order must state the condition which upon fulfillment will result in the remission of a fine. Id. Attorney's fees necessitated by the civil contemnor's noncompliance can also be awarded. Id. Plaintiff filed the within petition on December 9, 1998, seeking civil contempt of the order of May 7, 1997, after that order expired pursuant its terms on November 7, 1998. Plaintiff cites Gregory v. Depte, 896 F.2d 31 (3rd Cir. 1990), for the proposition that an order may now be entered as it requests extending the eighteen month period that the restrictions in the order of May 7, 1997, were to remain in effect. In Gregory, -4- 97-2233 EQUITY the United States District Court found on February 1, 1989, that Gregory was in contempt of an injunction entered by consent on November 29, 1988, "presumably pending a final decision." The court imposed sanctions to compel compliance with that order including additional requirements against Gregory not present in the injunction entered on November 29, 1988. The Court of Appeals concluded that the additional requirements placed on Gregory were appealable because they constituted an independent preliminary injunction and not a modification of the order of November 29, 1988. In Borough of Trappe v. L.ongaker, 59 Commw. Ct. 572 (1981), the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania stated: [a] court of equity that has entered a decree for an injunction may, in exercise of its judicial discretion, open, vacate or modify the same where the situation and circumstances of the parties or the law are shown to have so changed as to make it just and equitable to do so. However, the court further stated: Pursuant to the law of this Commonwealth, an injunctive decree by the court does not give the complaining party a perpetual or vested right either in the remedy, the law governing the order or the effect of it. The appellant's right to injunctive relief rested solely upon the continuance of the law governing the injunctive order. Such relief is not a vested right, and no decree of the court can make it such: it is subject to termination whenever the law changes. In Commonwealth v. Restauri, 664 A.2d 593 (Pa. Super. 1995), the Superior Court of Pennsylvania stated that "Civil contempt proceedings are not intended to provide sanctions in hindsight." In the case sub iudice, the restrictions placed on defendants in the order of May 7, 1997, and the eighteen months term of those -5- 97-2233 EQUITY restrictions, were part of a final adjudication that settled the case. The term of the restrictions is binding on the parties and cannot be extended after the order expired. Thus, we cannot treat the within petition for contempt of the order of May 7, 1997, as a petition for an independent preliminary injunction. Plaintiff cannot now seek enforcement of the expired order of May 7, 1997, because no relief could be entered that could coerce condemnor to comply with that order. cause for civil contempt stated in plaintiff's petition. AND NOW, this DISMISSED. Samuel L. Andes, Esquire For Plaintiff Frank P. Clark, Esquire For Stuart Hartman, D.O. James P. DeAngelo, Esquire For Christopher S. Cannon, M.D. :saa Accordingly, there is no ORDER OF COURT day of May, 1999, the petition for civil contempt, IS Edgar B. Bayley, J.l