Loading...
HomeMy WebLinkAbout99-1478 criminal appealCOMMONWEALTH Vo JESSE R. COBLE IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 99-1478 CRIMINAL TERM IN RE: MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE AND WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS BEFORE BAYLEY, J. OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT Bayley, J., December 8, 1999:-- Defendant, Jesse R. Coble, is charged with three counts of homicide by vehicle, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3732, driving a vehicle at an unsafe speed, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3361, and careless driving, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3714. He filed a motion to suppress statements he made to the state police, and a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. A hearing was conducted on October 20, 1999. The issues were briefed and argued on December 6, 1999. We find the following facts. On May 25, 1999, at approximately 10:50 p.m., several state troopers were dispatched to the scene of an accident on Interstate 81 in North Newton Township, Cumberland County. When the troopers arrived there was a tractor-trailer on fire in the grass median of the four-lane divided highway, and there were other vehicles in the area that had been involved in the accident. Emergency personnel were just arriving at the scene. The troopers fanned out and started an investigation by conducting field interviews with people that were at the scene. 99-1478 CRIMINAL TERM There was a tractor-traiier on the east berm with five people standing nearby. Trooper Dominic Nardone had those people move further onto the berm for safety and he told them that another trooper would be there shortly to talk with them. Trooper Jonathan Mays, one of the officers conducting field interviews, then went to the group of five people one of whom was Jesse R. Coble, defendant herein. Coble told the trooper that he had been the driver of the burning tractor-trailer. Trooper Mays asked Coble questions about how the accident happened and Coble answered them. Trooper Mays then located Trooper Nardone and told him what Coble had said. Trooper Nardone told Trooper Mays that at least two people involved in the accident were dead.' Troopers Mays and Nardone went to Coble and although Coble showed no signs of impairment, Trooper Mays told him that they wanted to rule out the possibility of alcohol or drugs being involved and he asked him if he would consent to be tested. Coble consented and Trooper Christopher Ott was assigned to take him to the Chambersburg Hospital. Coble got into the front seat of the patrol car and left for the hospital. Coble asked Trooper Ott several questions about the accident. The trooper did not know the answers. Coble also told the trooper what he had been doing when the accident occurred. When he arrived at the hospital, Coble consented to breath, blood and urine A third person who was airlifted to a hospital subsequently died. -2- 99-1478 CRIMINAL TERM tests that were conducted? On the way back to the accident scene Trooper Ott asked defendant how he got involved in the accident. Coble then made further statements to Trooper Ott as to how the accident occurred. The trip back and forth to the hospital took approximately forty-five minutes. In the interim Trooper Mays had learned additional information from which he believed that Coble had started a chain reaction accident. The trooper considered Coble to be a suspect in having committed homicide by vehicle and he wanted to further talk to him. At 1:08 a.m. Trooper Mays advised defendant of his Miranda rights and told him that he knew that at least two people had been killed in the accident? Defendant acknowledged that he understood his rights. He waived his rights and agreed to answer Trooper Mays' questions which he did. Later, a representative of the trucking company that defendant had been driving for arrived at the scene and defendant left the area with that representative. A complaint charging defendant with the within offenses was filed by Trooper Nardone before a District Justice the next day, May 26, 1999. As to defendant's motion to suppress evidence, based on these finding of fact we conclude that all of defendant's statements to the police prior to his leaving the scene of the accident were noncustodial and voluntary and thus are admissible into The results obtained later were all negative. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). -3- 99-1478 CRIMINAL TERM evidence. Commonwealth v. Rucci, 543 Pa. 261 (1996). As to defendant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, in Commonwealth v. McBride, 528 Pa. 153 (1991), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania stated that a prima facie case requires the Commonwealth to produce evidence of "sufficient probable cause to believe that the person charged has committed the offense stated." The Crimes Code at 75 Pa.C.S. Section 3732 defines the offense of homicide by vehicle as: Any person who unintentionally causes the death of another person while engaged in the violation of any law of this Commonwealth or municipal ordinance applying to the operation or use of a vehicle or to the regulation of traffic except Section 3731 (relating to driving under the influence of alcohol or controlled substance) is guilty of homicide by vehicle, a misdemeanor of the first degree, when the violation is the cause of death.4 In Commonwealth v. Heck, 517 Pa. 192 (1987), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania concluded that the offense of homicide by vehicle requires that the Commonwealth establish that defendant deviated from the standard established by an underlying traffic regulation which is alleged to have been violated and that defendant's violation of that regulation was the cause of the victim's death. As to culpability, the Court stated: We now hold that ordinary negligence will not sustain a conviction for the offense of homicide by vehicle. The applicable mens rea requirements of culpability are those enumerated in 18 Pa.C.S. § 302(a). Section 302(a) provides, (a) Minimum requirements of culpability.--Except as provided in section 305 of this title (relating to limitations on scope of culpability requirements), a person is not guilty of an offense "The separate offense of homicide by vehicle while driving under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance is governed by Section 3735 of the Vehicle Code. -4- 99-1478 CRIMINAL TERM unless he acted intentionally, knowingly, recklessly or negligently, as the law may require, with respect to e~ci~ material element of the offense. The term 'negligently' is further defined in § 302(b)(4) as follows: A person acts negligently with respect to a material element of an offense when he should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that the actor's failure to perceive it, considering the nature and intent of his conduct and the circumstances known to him, involves a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the actor's situation. (Emphasis added). The Official Comment to § 302 states that "Negligently' as used in Subsection (b)(4) is intended to mean criminal negligence." The Legislature clearly did not intend the phrase 'negligently' to encompass the tort liability concept of negligence. (Footnote omitted). (Emphasis added.) Thus, criminal negligence as defined in Section 302(d)(4) of the Crimes Code is the minimum standard of culpability necessary to convict a defendant of homicide by vehicle. The Commonwealth has produced evidence that defendant, on a clear night, was speeding in a tractor with a flatbed trailer northbound on Interstate 81, a four lane divided highway. He struck the rear of a car in the right hand lane that was moving at approximately 25 miles per hour at the end of a line of slowly moving traffic in a construction zone where the speed limit was reduced to 50 miles per hour. The two northbound lanes were both open where the collision occurred. Two people were killed in the car defendant struck. That car was pushed into another car in which the driver, the sole occupant, was killed. That car was in turn pushed into a truck. After striking the rear of the first car in the right hand lane, defendant's truck crossed the passing -5- 99-1478 CRIMINAL TERM lane and went into the grass median dividing the north and southbound lanes. The sequence of events was that defendant (1) where the speed limit was 65 miles per hour, passed a sign with a flashing yellow light indicating a work area within the next 10.6 miles; (2) later passed two signs across from each other on both shoulders of the northbound lanes indicating a reduced speed ahead of 50 miles per hour; (3) later passed a sign indicating that the left hand lane was closed two miles ahead; (4) later passed two speed limit signs across from each other on both shoulders of the northbound lanes setting a speed of 50 miles per hour in the work zone; (5) told the police that he had been going 65 miles per hour and continued at that speed after he entered the area in the construction zone where the speed was reduced to 50 miles per hour; (6) later passed a sign indicating that fines were doubled in the work area; (7) then crested a hill and passed two signs with flashing yellow lights across from each other on both shoulders of the northbound lanes stating be prepared to stop; (8) struck the last car in line of slowly moving traffic in the right hand lane near the point where there were two other 50 mile per hour signs, one on each side of the northbound lanes; and (9) told the police that he was unwrapping a piece of candy just before the accident. The Vehicle Code at 75 Pa.C.S. § 3361, provides: No person shall drive a vehicle at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the conditions and having regard to the actual and potential hazards then existing, nor at a speed greater than will permit the driver to bring his vehicle to a stop within the assured clear distance ahead. Consistent with the foregoing, every -6- 99-1478 CRIMINAL TERM person shall drive at a safe and appropriate speed when ~pproaching and crossing an intersection or railroad grade crossing, when approaching and going around curve, when approaching a hill crest, when traveling upon any narrow or winding roadway and when special hazards exist with respect to pedestrians or other traffic or by reason of weather or highway conditions. (Emphasis added.) Section 3714 of the Vehicle Code provides: Any person who drives a vehicle in careless disregard for the safety of persons or property is guilty of careless driving... In summary, the Commonwealth has produced evidence that defendant was speeding in a tractor-trailer in a work zone for which he had repeated warning of a potential danger ahead. Notwithstanding, he failed to perceive the substantial and unjustifiable risk that his conduct posed as he continued to drive in excess of the speed limit and was unable to maintain control of his truck which crashed into the rear of a car that had slowed in a line of traffic in the right lane at a point where both northbound lanes of Interstate 81 were still open. The Commonwealth has produced sufficient probable cause that defendant deviated from the standard of care established by the underlying summary traffic regulations, that such conduct was the cause of the death of three people, and that defendant should have been aware of the substantial and unjustifiable risk that his conduct would cause that result, and that the risk was of such a nature and degree that his failure to perceive it, considering the nature and intent of his conduct and the circumstances known to him, was a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in his situation. Accordingly, defendant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus will be dismissed. -7- 99-1478 CRIMINAL TERM ORDER OF COURT AND NOW, this ~ ~'- day of December, 1999: (1) The motion of defendant to suppress evidence, IS DISMISSED. (2) The motion for a writ of habeas corpus, IS DISMISSED. By the Court, · William I. Gabig, Esquire For the Commonwealth Todd B. Narvol, Esquire For Defendant :saa -8-