HomeMy WebLinkAbout99-3610 civilSUSQUEHANNA VIEW LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP,
PLAINTIFF
V.
JEAN OLAF,
DEFENDANT
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
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IN RE: SUPERSEDEAS UNDER PA.R.C.P.D.J. 1008(B)
BEFORE BAYLEY, J.
OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT
Bayley, J., August 18, 1999:--
Defendant, Jean Olaf, rents an apartment from plaintiff, Susquehanna View
Limited Partnership. Her $190 monthly rent is due the first of each month. On June 7,
1999, plaintiff obtained a judgment from a district justice for possession of defendant's
apartment plus damages and costs of $307.36. The judgment was entered on the
basis that defendant breached her lease by intentionally littering common areas of the
premises and harassing neighboring tenants. Defendant filed a notice of appeal in this
court on June 14, 1999. She deposited with the prothonotary the monetary amount of
the judgment and costs of $307.36. An automatic supersedeas became effective
pursuant to Pa.R.C.P.D.J. No. 1008. The appeal is pending.
On July 2, 1999, defendant paid her monthly $190 rent by check which was
accepted and deposited by plaintiff. On August 3, 1999, plaintiff filed a praecipe with
the prothonotary, stating "please terminate the supersedeas in the above-referenced
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matter by reason of the Defendant's failure to make monthly payments from and after
July 1999." The prothonotary terminated the supersedeas. By check dated August 2,
1999, defendant paid plaintiff her August, 1999 rent. Plaintiff accepted and deposited
the check on August 4, 1999. On August 5, 1999, defendant filed an "Emergency
Petition to Reinstate Supersedeas Pursuant to Pa.R.C.P.D.J. 1008(B)." An order was
entered on August 5, 1999, temporarily reinstating the supersedeas pending a hearing
"[b]ased on the within averment that petitioner has paid the June, July and August rent
payments." A hearing was conducted on August 17, 1999.
Pa.R.C.P.D.J. 1008(B) provides:
When an appeal is from a judgment for the possession of real
property, receipt by the district justice of the copy of the notice of appeal
shall operate as a supersedeas only if the appellant at the time of filing
the appeal, deposits with the prothonotary a sum of money (or a bond,
with surety approved by the prothonotary) equal to the lesser of three (3)
month's rent or the rent actually in arrears on the date of the filing of
appeal, based upon the district justice's order of judgment, and,
thereafter, deposits cash or bond with the prothonotary in a sum
equal to the monthly rent which becomes due during the period of
time the proceedings upon appeal are pending in the court of common
pleas, such additional deposits to be made within thirty (30) days
following the date of the appeal, and each successive thirty (30) day
period thereafter. (Emphasis added.)
The writ of possession was entered in this case for defendant's breach of a non-
rent payment in her lease. When the appeal was filed on June 14, 1999, no back rent
was due. Once the automatic supersedeas was effective on June 14, 1999, which was
the date the appeal was filed, it remains in effect pursuant to Rule 1008(B) as long as
defendant:
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[t]hereafter, deposits cash.., in a sum equal to the monthly rent which
becomes due during the period of time the proceedings upon appeal are
pending in the court of common pleas, such additional deposits to be
made within thirty (30) days following the date of the appeal, and
each successive thirty (30) day period thereafter. (Emphasis added.)
Thus, although July's rent became due to plaintiff on July 1st, the supersedeas
remained in effect as long as the July rent was paid by July 13, 1999, which was thirty
days after the appeal was filed on July 14, 1999. Likewise, although the August rent
became due to plaintiff on August 1st, the supersedeas remained in effect as long as the
August rent was paid by August 12, 1999, which was thirty days following July 13,
1999.
If plaintiff had followed the procedure suggested in the Note to Pa.R.C.P.D.J.
1008(B), it might have recognized that it was not interpreting the Rule correctly when it
filed the praecipe on August 3, 1999, to terminate the supersedeas. The Note states:
The request for termination of the supersedeas, upon the praecipe filed
with the prothonotary, may simply state: 'Please terminate the
supersedeas in the within action for failure of the appellant to pay
monthly rental as required by Pa. R.C.P.D.J. No. 1008 for a period in
excess of thirty (30) days' and will be signed by appellee. The
prothonotary will then note upon the praecipe: 'Upon confirmation of
failure of the appellant to deposit the monthly rent for more than
thirty {30) days, the supersedeas is terminated,' and the prothonotary will
sign and clock the praecipe. (Emphasis added.)
Accordingly, the supersedeas was wrongfully terminated by the prothonotary on August
3, 1999, on the praecipe by plaintiff, because, pursuant to Pa.R.C.P.D.J. 1008(B), it
remained in effect as long as plaintiff paid her rent by August 12, 1999. Although Rule
1008(B) requires that the rent be deposited with the prothonotary, plaintiff accepted and
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deposited both the July and August payments, therefore, the automatic supersedeas
remains in effect. The purpose of the Rule is to ensure that rent is paid during the
pendency of the appeal.
AND NOW, this
ORDER OF COURT
day of August, 1999, the supersedeas terminated by
the prothonotary on August 3, 1999, IS VACATED. The supersedeas, IS
By the Co~'r~,~~J
Edgar B. Bayley, J. ~
REINSTATED.
David J. Lanza, Esquire
For Plaintiff
Michael S. Travis, Esquire
For Defendant
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