HomeMy WebLinkAbout99-6104 civilSTEVE O. FISHER,
PETITIONER
COMMONWEALTH OF
PENNSYLVANIA, DEPARTMENT
OF TRANSPORTATION,
RESPONDENT
IN RE:
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF
CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
99-6104 CIVIL TERM
LICENSE SUSPENSION APPEAL
BEFORE BAYLEY, J.
facts.
On September 5, 1999, Officer Brian Sunday of the Upper Allen Township Police
stopped petitioner for speeding at 76.9 miles per hour in a 55 mile per hour zone.
Officer Sunday told Fisher that he had a video and audio taping system in his patrol car,
and he asked for permission to record their conversation. Fisher consented. Fisher
had a strong odor of alcohol about his person and he failed one-leg stand and walk-
and-turn field sobriety tests. When asked how much he had to drink, Fisher said "not
enough that I couldn't make it home." Fisher was then placed in a patrol car where he
Bayley, J., December 22, 1999:-
The Department of Transportation suspended the driving privilege of Steve O.
Fisher for a period of one year for his refusal, pursuant to the Vehicle Code at 75
Pa.C.S. Section 1547(b)(1), to take a breath test following his arrest for driving under
the influence. A hearing was conducted on December 13, 1999. We find the following
OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT
99-6104 CIVIL TERM
was informed of his rights under the Implied Consent Law and asked by Officer Sunday
to take a breath test. Fisher told the officer that he did not understand the instructions.
The officer then took him to a booking center.
Upon arrival at the center, Officer Sunday turned Fisher over to Agents Peter
Beauduy and Kathleen Cook. Fisher was immediately confrontational, argumentative
and uncooperative. Cook turned on a video and audio taping system without telling
Fisher although there were numerous signs in the booking center advising of the
system? Fisher asked Agent Beauduy if he could call an attorney. Beauduy told him
that he was not entitled to an attorney until after the processing was completed. Fisher
asked Beauduy if the taping system was on and Beauduy told him that it was not.
Beauduy did not know at that point that the taping system had been activated by Agent.
Cook, and although Cook heard Beauduy tell Fisher that the system was not on she did
not correct the error until later during the proceeding. Fisher was then advised of his
Miranda rights? He told Agent Cook that he did not understand those rights. He never
waived his rights. Agent Cook then advised Fisher of the Implied Consent Law. Fisher
repeatedly said that he did not understand what she told him and he refused to take a
test. Agent Cook noted the refusal. She then asked Fisher a series of questions which
she wrote on an intoxication report.
~ Agent Cook testified that when an arrestee is uncooperative she immediately
turns on the tape and audio system.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
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99-6104 CIVIL TERM
DISCUSSION
The Vehicle Code at 75 Pa.C.S. Section 1547(b) provides:
(1) If any person placed under arrest for a violation of section 3731
(relating to driving under the influence of alcohol or controlled substance)
is requested to submit to chemical testing and refuses to do so, the testing
shall not be conducted but upon notice by the police officer, the
department shall suspend the operating privilege of the person for a
period of 12 months.
(2) It shall be the duty of the police officer to inform the person that
the person's operating privilege will be suspended upon refusal to submit
to chemical testing.
At the hearing petitioner testified that he did not understand the relationship of
the Miranda warnings and his taking a chemical test. Before asking Fisher to take a
test, Agent Cook told him:
[y]ou are now under arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol or a
controlled substance pursuant to Section 3731 of the Vehicle Code. I am
requesting that you submit to a chemical test of your breath. It is my duty
to inform you that if you refuse to submit to the chemical test, your
operating privileges will be suspended for a period of one year. The
constitutional rights that you have as a criminal defendant, commonly
known as Miranda Rights, including a right to speak to a lawyer or right to
remain silent, apply only to criminal prosecutions, and do not apply to the
chemical testing procedure under Pennsylvania Implied Consent Law,
which is a civil not a criminal procedure. You have no right to speak to a
lawyer or anyone else before taking the chemical test requested by the
police officer, nor do you have any right to remain silent when asked by
the police officer to submit to the chemical test. Unless you agree to
submit to the test requested by the police officer, your conduct will be
deemed to be a refusal, and your operating privileges will be suspended
for one year. Your refusal to submit to the chemical testing under the
implied consent law may be introduced into evidence in a criminal
prosecution for driving under the influence of alcohol or controlled
substance.
These warnings are known as the O'Connell warnings. Commonwealth v.
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99-6104 CIVIL TERM
O'Connell, 521 Pa. 242 (1989). In Commonwealth, Department of Transportation
v. Scott, 684 A.2d 539 (1996), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania stated:
[o]nce a motorist has been properly advised of his O'Connell warnings, a
refusal to submit to chemical testing under the terms of the Implied
Consent Law will not be excused as unknowing on the basis of the
motorist's subjective beliers regarding the interplay between the Implied
Consent Law and his Miranda rights.
Fisher was properly advised of his O'Connell warnings and he refused to submit to a
chemical test. Therefore, his telling us that he did not understand the relationship
between his Miranda rights and the Implied Consent Law is of no import.
Citing Commonwealth v. Mclvor, 670 A.2d 697 (Pa. Super. 1996), Fisher
maintains, that while he was at the booking center, Agents Beauduy and Cook violated
the Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Control Act, 18 Pa.C.S. Section 5701 et
seq. In DiPaolo v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of
Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 700 A.2d 569 (Pa. Commw. 1997), the
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania stated:
To sustain a license suspension under Section 1547 of the Vehicle
Code, it is DOT's burden to establish the following: (1) the motorist was
arrested for drunken driving by a police officer who had reasonable
grounds to believe that the motorist was operating, or actually controlling
or operating the movement of a motor vehicle, while under the influence of
alcohol or a controlled substance; (2) the motorist was asked to submit to
a chemical test; (3) he or she refused to do so; and (4) the motorist was
warned that refusing the test would result in a license suspension.
Vinansky v. Commonwealth Department of Transportation, 665 A.2d
860 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995). (Footnote omitted).
In DiPaolo, the Court stated that the validity of a motorist's arrest for driving under the
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99-6104 CIVIL TERM
influence does not affect PennDOT's authority to suspend a driver's license for refusing
to submit to chemical testing. Likewise, even if Agents Beauduy and Cook violated the
Wiretapping and Electronics Surveillance Control Act while Fisher was at the booking
center, it would not affect this civil suspension of Fisher's driving privilege for having
refused to take a test pursuant to Section 1547 of the Vehicle Code. Accordingly, we
need not determine if the Wiretapping and Electronics Surveillance Control Act was
violated nor if the statements Fisher made to Agent Cook after he refused the test, but
while he was in custody and having not waived his Miranda rights, are suppressible in
a criminal prosecution for driving under the influence.
For the foregoing reasons, the following order is entered.
AND NOW, this
ORDER OF COURT
')--/L~:_. day of December, 1999, this appeal from a license
suspension for a period of one year, IS DISMISSED.
By the Courtl ..... ~'~,~.
Edgar B. Bay'~ey, J.
John Mancke, Esquire
For Petitioner
Matthew Haeckler, Esquire
For the Respondent
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