HomeMy WebLinkAbout2009-773 Civil (2)
STATE FARM MUTUAL : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE : OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY,
COMPANIES : PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
DONALD R. WARD, :
Defendant :
:
v. :
:
DAVE PUNT, : No. 09-773 Civil Term
Additional Defendant :
IN RE: STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANIES AND
DAVE PUNT’S PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS
ORDER OF COURT
th
AND NOW
, this 13 day of May, 2010, upon consideration of the Preliminary
Objections filed by the Plaintiff and Additional Defendant, the Defendant’s responses thereto,
the briefs filed by the Parties, and after argument in the matter, and the Court noting that the
Defendant has filed an amended Answer and New Matter which includes the affirmative defense
of accord and satisfaction;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND DIRECTED
that:
1. Additional Defendant, Dave Punt’s, Preliminary Objection to Defendant’s Joinder
SUSTAINED;
Complaint is
2. Defendant, Donald Ward’s, Joinder Complaint against Additional Defendant Dave
DISMISSED
Punt is ;
3. Plaintiff, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Companies’ Preliminary Objection
SUSTAINED;
against Defendant, Donald Ward’s Counterclaim is
4. Defendant, Donald R. Ward’s, Counterclaim against Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant
DISMISSED
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Companies is .
By the Court
M. L. Ebert, Jr., J.
Karen W. Miller, Esq.
Attorney for Donald R. Ward
Gary A. Drakas, Esq.
Attorney for State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. and for Dave Punt
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STATE FARM MUTUAL : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE : OF CUMBERLAND COUNTY,
COMPANIES : PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
: CIVIL ACTION - LAW
DONALD R. WARD, :
Defendant :
: No. 09-773 Civil Term
v. :
:
DAVE PUNT, :
Additional Defendant :
IN RE: STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANIES AND
DAVE PUNT’S PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS
OPINION AND ORDER OF COURT
Ebert, J., May 13, 2010 –
This opinion addresses Plaintiff State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Companies
and Additional Defendant Dave Punt’s Preliminary Objections. For the reasons set forth in this
opinion, this Court finds these Preliminary Objections are sustained.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This case arises from an automobile accident that occurred on or about July 9, 2007
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between Kurt C. Cranford (hereinafter Cranford) and Defendant. State Farm Automobile
Insurance Company (hereinafter Plaintiff) is a corporation duly licensed to write insurance in the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and having an office at P.O. Box 41, Concordville,
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Pennsylvania 19331. Plaintiff is the insurer of Cranford, whose vehicle was damaged when it
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was struck from behind by a vehicle operated by Defendant. The Defendant is an adult
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Pl.’s Compl., Feb. 12, 2009, ¶ 3, 4.
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Pl.’s Compl., Feb. 12, 2009, ¶ 1.
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Pl.’s Compl., Feb. 12, 2009, ¶ 2, 5.
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individual residing at 12509 Buffalo Terrace, Millerstown, Pennsylvania 17062. Plaintiff was
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required to pay $5,504.96 for the property damage of Cranford’s vehicle.
Dave Punt (hereinafter Additional Defendant) is a duly-licensed and authorized agent of
Plaintiff to write insurance in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and has an office at 4911
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Derry Street, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17111. Dave Pasquali (hereinafter Pasquali) was acting
as agent for Defendant through his insurance company, Progressive Northern Insurance
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Company (hereinafter Progressive). Defendant’s insurance policy through Progressive provided
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for $5,000.00 of property damage coverage.
On or about July 13, 2007, Pasquali met with Cranford and his wife, Allison Cranford, at
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the office of Additional Defendant. Also present for the meeting was an unidentified female
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employee/agent of Additional Defendant. Cranford requested reimbursement for his $250.00
collision deductible, his rental car expenses and for his children’s car seats that were damaged in
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the accident. These amounts totaled $2,612.64.
Pasquali explained to Cranford that only $5,000.00 was available in property damage
coverage; therefore, Plaintiff had to agree to settle the entire claim for the policy limits before the
expenses could be paid directly to Cranford since the vehicle damages alone exceeded the policy
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limits. Allegedly, the Additional Defendant’s unidentified female employee/agent, acting on
behalf of Plaintiff and Additional Defendant, granted the agent for Defendant permission to pay
Cranford directly for the aforementioned expenses, and furthermore, agreed to accept the
4
Pl.’s Compl., Feb. 12, 2009, ¶ 2.
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Pl.’s Compl., Feb. 12, 2009, ¶ 6.
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Def.’s Joinder Compl., July 21, 2009, ¶ 3.
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Def.’s Joinder Compl., July 21, 2009, ¶ 11.
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Def.’s Joinder Compl., July 21, 2009, ¶ 12.
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Def.’s Joinder Compl., July 21, 2009, ¶ 10.
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Def.’s Joinder Compl., July 21, 2009, ¶ 13.
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Def.’s Joinder Compl., July 21, 2009, ¶ 14.
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Def.’s Joinder Compl., July 21, 2009, ¶ 14.
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Def.’s Joinder Compl., July 21, 2009, ¶ 15.
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remainder of the $5,000.00 limit as full and final settlement of the claim, regardless of the fact
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that the total damages caused by Ward exceeded that amount.
As a result of this alleged agreement, Progressive issued a check in the amount of
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$2,612.64 directly to Cranford. Progressive sent a property damage release to Plaintiff for
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$2,387.36, the remainder of the $5,000.00 limits. On October 7, 2007, Progressive received a
telephone call from Plaintiff’s Subrogation Unit, indicating that they would not accept the
remainder of the policy limits, $2,387.36, pursuant to the alleged agreement entered into by
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Additional Defendant’s agent on behalf of Plaintiff.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On February 12, 2009, Plaintiff instituted the above action against Defendant in the Court
of Common Pleas of Cumberland County, Pennsylvania. On July 21, 2009, Defendant filed an
Answer with New Matter and Counterclaim in response to Plaintiff’s Complaint. On July 21,
2009, Defendant also filed a Joinder Complaint against Additional Defendant. On August 18,
2009, Defendant filed a Motion to Compel Plaintiff’s Answers to Production of Documents and
Interrogatories. On August 19, 2009, this Court ordered Plaintiff to file responses to the Request
of Production of Documents and Interrogatories filed by Defendant. On September 14, 2009,
Additional Defendant filed preliminary objections to Defendant’s Joinder Complaint. On
September 14, 2009, Plaintiff, as Counterclaim Defendant, filed Preliminary Objections to
Defendant’s Counterclaim. On September 15, 2009, Plaintiff, as a Counterclaim Defendant, and
Additional Defendant filed a Praecipe to List Case for Argument, for this Court to address the
preliminary objections. On October 1, 2009, Defendant filed an Amended Answer with New
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Def.’s Joinder Compl., July 21, 2009, ¶ 16.
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Def.’s Joinder Compl., July 21, 2009, ¶ 17.
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Def.’s Joinder Compl., July 21, 2009, ¶ 18.
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Def.’s Joinder Compl., July 21, 2009, ¶ 19.
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Matter and Counterclaim. On October 1, 2009, Defendant filed a Response to Additional
Defendant’s Preliminary Objections to Defendant’s Joinder Complaint. On October 2, 2009,
Defendant filed a Response to Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant’s Preliminary Objections to
Defendant’s Counterclaim. The matter is now before this Court.
DISCUSSION
In ruling on preliminary objections, “this Court must accept all material facts set forth in
the complaint as well as all inferences reasonably deducible therefrom as admitted and true and
decide whether, based on the facts averred, recovery is impossible as a matter of law.” Wagner
v. Waitlevertch, 774 A.2d 1247, 1251 (Pa. Super. 2001) (internal citations omitted). However, in
ruling on a demurrer, this Court “need not consider the pleader's conclusions of law, unwarranted
inferences from facts, opinions, or argumentative allegations.” Id.
In this action, Defendant is attempting to restrict the amount that he must pay in damages
to the $5,000.00 limit covered by his insurance policy despite having caused a greater amount of
damage. Taking into account the damage to Cranford’s vehicle amounting to $5,504.96 and the
$2,612.64 amount already paid to Cranford to cover his collision deductible, rental car expenses
and damaged children’s car seats the total amount of the damage resulting from the accident is
$8,117.60.
A. Recovery Against Additional Defendant Punt
As permitted by Pa. R.C.P. 2252(a)(4), Defendant “may join as an additional defendant
any person not a party to the action who may be liable to or with [Defendant] on any cause of
action arising out of the transaction … upon which [Plaintiff’s] underlying cause of action
against [Defendant] is based.” Defendant alleges a breach of contract by Additional Defendant.
Defendant in his counterclaim against Plaintiff also alleges, in essence, a breach of contract, in
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that Plaintiff failed to accept the remainder of the policy limits, ($2,387.36), tendered by
Progressive as full and final settlement.
However, this is not a valid cause of action against Additional Defendant because “[i]t is
a basic tenet of agency law that an individual acting as an agent for a disclosed principal is not
personally liable on a contract between the principal and a third party unless the agent
specifically agrees to assume liability.” Casey v. GAF Corp., 828 A.2d 362 (Pa. Super. 2003).
Plaintiff, State Farm Automobile Insurance Company, was a disclosed principal. Additional
Defendant was acting as an agent on behalf of Plaintiff. An unidentified female employee was
acting as an agent on behalf of Additional Defendant and Plaintiff. The transaction from which
this cause of action arises was an alleged agreement that was made between Defendant and the
unidentified female agent who was acting on behalf of Plaintiff, a disclosed principal.
Thereafter, the principal, State Farm Automobile Insurance Company, refused to honor this
agreement.
Additional Defendant cannot be held personally liable because the alleged agreement was
formed between Defendant and Plaintiff, through one of its agents. A “[p]erson who is
contracting as agent may be found to be personally liable where he or she either executes a
contract in his or her own name or voluntarily incurs personal responsibility.” In re Estate of
Duran, 692 A.2d 176, at 179 (Pa. Super. 1997). The alleged agreement made by Plaintiff’s agent
was made on Plaintiff’s behalf, not in Additional Defendant’s own name and Additional
Defendant incurred no personal responsibility. Accordingly, as a matter of law, Defendant
cannot recover from Additional Defendant Punt.
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B. Counterclaim Against Plaintiff State Farm
Next, this Court will examine the counterclaim of Defendant/Counterclaim Plaintiff
Ward against Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Company in which a breach of contract is alleged. “A breach of contract claim in Pennsylvania
requires three elements: (1) the existence of a contract (2) a breach of a duty imposed by the
contract and (3) resulting damages.” J.F. Walker Co., Inc. v. Excalibur Oil Group, Inc., 792
A.2d 1269, 1272 (Pa. Super. 2002), citing Williams v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 750 A.2d 881,
884 (Pa. Super. 2000). Turning to the contents of the Defendant Ward’s counterclaim, and given
the mandate that this Court must accept as true all material facts set forth in the counterclaim, we
reluctantly accept Ward’s position that he has adequately pled the existence of a contract. It is
often said that an enforceable contract requires the parties to 1) reach a mutual understanding, 2)
exchange consideration, and 3) delineate the terms of their bargain with sufficient clarity. Helpin
v. Trustees of Univ. Of Pa., 969 A.2d 601 at 610 (Pa.Super. 2009). In this case, this Court is
somewhat at a loss to understand what benefit State Farm would have received as a result of this
“contract.” Thus, there could be failure to demonstrate adequate consideration, and the existence
of a contract may well be legally in doubt.
However, for the purposes of simply evaluating these pleadings, the Court will accept
Defendant Ward’s position. Accepting the existence of a contract between Ward and State Farm,
State Farm’s failure to accept the remainder of the policy limits ($2,387.36) could be considered
a breach. However, with regard to the last element, Defendant Ward does not seek any damages
nor could he. In essence, he is asserting that he owes Plaintiff State Farm a lesser amount than
State Farm had to pay for the damages caused by Ward to Kurt Cranford’s automobile.
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Defendant is basically pleading an affirmative defense of accord and satisfaction
concerning the property damage claim. According to Pa. R.C.P. 1030, “all affirmative defenses
including but not limited to the defenses of accord and satisfaction … shall be pleaded in a
responsive pleading under the heading ‘New Matter’.” This affirmative defense is not properly
asserted in the form of a counterclaim and should in fact be raised through new matter.
Defendant Ward has basically admitted as much since he filed an amended Answer with New
Matter which includes the affirmative defense of accordance and satisfaction on October 1, 2009.
Therefore, Plaintiff, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Companies’ Preliminary
Objection against Defendant’s Counterclaim is sustained.
CONCLUSION
Based on the facts averred there does not exist a valid cause of action against Additional
Defendant and so recovery is impossible as a matter of law. Furthermore, Defendant’s
affirmative defense of an accord and satisfaction is not properly asserted in the form of a
counterclaim and should in fact be raised through new matter and so Plaintiff’s Preliminary
Objection against Defendant’s Counterclaim is sustained.
Accordingly the following order is entered:
ORDER OF COURT
th
AND NOW
, this 13 day of May, 2010, upon consideration of the Preliminary
Objections filed by the Plaintiff and Additional Defendant, the Defendants responses thereto, the
briefs filed by the Parties, and after argument in the matter, and the Court noting that the
Defendant has filed an amended Answer and New Matter which includes the affirmative defense
of accord and satisfaction;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND DIRECTED
that:
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1. Additional Defendant, Dave Punt’s, Preliminary Objection to Defendant’s Joinder
SUSTAINED;
Complaint is
2. Defendant, Donald Ward’s, Joinder Complaint against Additional Defendant Dave
DISMISSED
Punt is ;
3. Plaintiff, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Companies’ Preliminary Objection
SUSTAINED;
against Defendant, Donald Ward’s Counterclaim is
4. Defendant, Donald R. Ward’s, Counterclaim against Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant
DISMISSED
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Companies is .
By the Court,
__________________________
M. L. Ebert, Jr., J.
Karen W. Miller, Esq.
Attorney for Donald R. Ward
Gary A. Drakas, Esq.
Attorney for State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. and for Dave Punt
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