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HomeMy WebLinkAbout2006-7263 Civil PATRICIA A. WHITE and : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF EUGENE D. WHITE, her : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA husband, : Plaintiffs : : vs. : CIVIL ACTION – LAW : NO. 06-7263 CIVIL DONNA L. HEILMAN, : Defendant : IN RE: PLAINTIFFS’ POST-TRIAL MOTIONS BEFORE HESS, J. OPINION AND ORDER This case is before the Court on Plaintiffs’ motion for post-trial relief seeking a new trial. At trial, a jury refused to award compensation for pain and suffering to Plaintiff, Patricia A. White, for injuries allegedly sustained as a result of a motor vehicle accident. The jury also awarded “zero damages” to the husband-Plaintiff, Eugene D. White, on his claim for loss of consortium. On December 30, 2004, the Plaintiff, Patricia A. White, was a passenger in a motor vehicle operated by her husband, Eugene D. White. (N.T. 11). Plaintiff’s car was rear-ended by a vehicle driven by Defendant, Donna L. Heilman, while stopped at a red light. (N.T. 64). Defendant has admitted that the subject accident was caused by her negligence. (Def.’s Answer and New Matter ¶ 5). At trial, Plaintiff testified that the impact was relatively mild and caused her body to move forward then backward. (N.T. 12). Plaintiff testified that she began experiencing pains in her neck and left shoulder blade as well as headaches, which prompted her to seek the services of her chiropractor. (N.T. 14-16). However, Plaintiff had been regularly treated by her chiropractor prior to the accident for pain in her lower back and neck. (N.T. 23). NO. 06-7263 CIVIL At trial, the defense presented Plaintiff’s medical records which indicate that she suffered from severe neck pain and headaches prior to the accident. (N.T. 40). Later, Plaintiff sought the services of Dr. Suddaby for chronic neck, upper back, and shoulder pain. He ordered her to undergo MRI testing. (N.T. 15-16). Dr. Suddaby believed that Plaintiff sustained soft tissue damage in her neck and a herniated disk as a consequence of the motor vehicle accident. (Deposition of Loubert S. Suddaby, M.D., April 17, 2010, at 25). Dr. Suddaby also noted that Plaintiff suffered from pre-existing degenerative changes in her neck. (Deposition of Loubert S. Suddaby, M.D., April 17, 2010, at 28). At trial, the defense presented testimony from Dr. Walter Peppelman, an orthopedic surgeon who specializes in the field of spine surgery. (Deposition of Walter Peppelman, D.O., April 19, 2010, at 3; hereinafter “Peppelman Dep. at _). Dr. Peppelman testified that the MRI depicted degenerative changes which were common in any aging patient. (Peppelman Dep. at 15-16). Peppelman further testified that Plaintiff’s injuries were insignificant and cannot be attributed to trauma because there were no MRIs taken before the injury and she had a prior history of neck injuries. (Peppelman Dep. at 41). Dr Peppelman testified that Plaintiff’s injuries, if any, were limited to minor whiplash or strain/sprain injuries, but were not of the type that would be expected to result in chronic pain. (Peppelman Dep. at 24). Peppelman’s diagnosis was that Plaintiff’s degenerative changes were aggravated by the accident, but that she quickly recovered. (Peppelman Dep. at 23). He noted, also, that the medical professional(s) who treated Plaintiff after the motor vehicle accident did not place any physical limitations or restrictions upon her. (N.T. 43). 2 NO. 06-7263 CIVIL During her testimony, Plaintiff claimed that neck pain associated with the motor vehicle accident has prevented her from golfing. (N.T. 30). However, she later admitted that she had trouble golfing prior to the accident. (N.T. 44). Additionally, the defense presented medical records that demonstrate that Plaintiff experienced constant and severe neck pain well before the accident. (N.T. 41). Plaintiff also claimed that the accident has negatively impacted her daily life as she is no longer able to read for extended periods due to headaches. (N.T. 21-22). However, Plaintiff’s medical records demonstrate that she suffered from headaches prior to the accident. (N.T. 43). Plaintiff claims that the accident has prevented her from participating in some recreational activities, however, Plaintiff’s pre-existing degenerative injuries forced her to retire from a career as a dispatcher before the accident. DISCUSSION A new trial must be granted where a verdict is “so contrary to the evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice.” Henery v. Shadle, 661 A.2d 439, 441 (Pa. Super. 1995). A new trial must not be granted simply because “the trial judge would have reached a different conclusion on the same set of facts.” Id. Only where “the injustice of a verdict stands forth like a beacon” is a reversal based upon the inadequacy of a verdict appropriate. Hawley v. Donahoo, 611 A.2d 311, 312 (Pa. Super. 1992). Although an injury may result in pain, not every injury necessitates compensation. Van Kirk v. O’Toole, 857 A.2d 183, 186 (Pa. Super. 2004). “The determination of whether the pain is severe enough to be compensable is to be left to the jury.” Id. Where a jury believes a plaintiff’s injury to be insignificant, they are not required to provide compensation. Majczyk v. Oesch, 789 3 NO. 06-7263 CIVIL A.2d 717, 724 (Pa. Super. 2001). “Even though every muscle strain causes pain, it does not follow that all muscle pain is compensable.” Van Kirk, 857 A.2d at 185. A jury must consider as uncontroverted evidence, any diagnosis made by the defense doctor that is not based on the Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. Id. However, a jury may reject uncontroverted evidence of injury that it does not find credible. Majczyk, 789 A.2d at 724. “The test of whether a zero verdict can be upheld then becomes whether the uncontroverted injuries are such that a conclusion that they are so minor that no compensation is warranted defies common sense and logic.” Van Kirk, 857 A.2d at 185. While a jury may not disregard an obvious injury, they are free to disbelieve all that their common experience does not accept. Boggavarapu v. Ponist¸ 542 A.2d 516, 518 (Pa. 1988). A jury’s verdict must not be overturned where the jury possessed a reasonable basis to believe that a plaintiff’s alleged pain and suffering can be attributed solely to a preexisting condition, and/or the jury did not believe that the plaintiff suffered any pain and suffering. Davis v. Mullen, 773 A.2d 764, 770 (Pa. 2001). Pennsylvania courts have been selective in overturning a jury’s decision not to award compensation for pain and suffering. For example, in Van Kirk the court held that it was not unreasonable for the jury to find that a passenger’s injuries were not severe enough to warrant compensation for damages, despite the fact that the passenger experienced some pain. Van Kirk, 857 A.2d at 187. In Van Kirk, the plaintiff brought suit for injuries suffered as a result of a rear- end motor vehicle accident. At trial, the defendant admitted responsibility for the accident, but presented a medical expert who testified that plaintiff sustained a soft-tissue neck injury due to the accident. In this case, the court reasoned that the jury was justified in concluding that the 4 NO. 06-7263 CIVIL plaintiff’s injury was “no more than a transient rub of life for which no compensation for pain and suffering is due.” Id. at 187. Pennsylvania courts’ reluctance to overturn a jury’s refusal to award compensation for pain and suffering is further evidenced in Majczyk. In Majczyk, the court affirmed the trial court’s denial of a new trial. Majczyk, 789 A.2d at 724. In that case, the plaintiff’s vehicle was struck from behind while stopped at a traffic light by a vehicle that was traveling approximately five miles per hour. Id. at 721. At trial, the plaintiff’s counsel presented disputed testimony that plaintiff suffered a herniated disk as a result of the accident. Id. However, the defense’s doctor conceded that he believed the plaintiff was suffering from a cervical strain. Id. In making its decision, the court reasoned that “the jury was not required to award plaintiff any amount as it obviously believed that any injury plaintiff suffered in the accident was insignificant.” Id. at 724. Not surprisingly, in circumstances where a plaintiff has suffered significant injuries, Pennsylvania courts have granted a new trial due to a jury’s failure to award compensation for pain and suffering. For example, in Todd v. Bercini, 92 A.2d 538 (Pa. 1952); and Yacobonis v. Gilvickas, 101 A.2d 690 (Pa. 1954), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted the plaintiffs a new trial because the jury’s award was “totally inadequate.” Yacobonis at 692. In each case, the plaintiff suffered incapacitating injuries that were directly attributable to their accident and either prevented them from returning to work, resulted in extended hospitalization, or left them permanently disfigured. Like Van Kirk this case involves a plaintiff who sued to recover for injuries stemming from a mild car accident. As in Van Kirk, Plaintiff seeks a new trial because a jury refused to 5 NO. 06-7263 CIVIL award compensation for pain and suffering despite the defendant’s admission of negligence. Similar to Van Kirk, Plaintiff sought the services of a chiropractor following the motor vehicle accident but had prior injuries to her back and neck. The case at bar is also similar to Majczyk another case where the alleged injuries were sustained during a rear-end motor vehicle accident. The plaintiff’s doctor presented testimony that plaintiff suffered a herniated disk as a result of a motor vehicle accident. The defense doctor noted that Plaintiff suffered from degenerative changes in the neck, though he conceded that the Plaintiff likely suffered from a cervical strain following the accident. As previously noted, the question at this juncture is not whether the trial judge would have made an award of damages based on the same facts. Rather, the question is whether the jury’s verdict so defies common sense and logic that it represents a manifest injustice. We are unable to conclude that the jury’s verdict, in this case, represented such a deviation from common sense as to require the award of a new trial. ORDER nd AND NOW, this 22 day of July, 2010, the motion of the Plaintiffs for post-trial relief in the form of a new trial is DENIED. BY THE COURT, _______________________________ Kevin A. Hess, P. J. Harry M Paras, Esquire For the Plaintiffs John A. Lucy, Esquire For the Defendant 6 PATRICIA A. WHITE and : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF EUGENE D. WHITE, her : CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA husband, : Plaintiffs : : vs. : CIVIL ACTION – LAW : NO. 06-7263 CIVIL DONNA L. HEILMAN, : Defendant : IN RE: PLAINTIFFS’ POST-TRIAL MOTIONS BEFORE HESS, J. ORDER nd AND NOW, this 22 day of July, 2010, the motion of the Plaintiffs for post-trial relief in the form of a new trial is DENIED. BY THE COURT, _______________________________ Kevin A. Hess, P. J. Harry M Paras, Esquire For the Plaintiffs John A. Lucy, Esquire For the Defendant :rlm